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This dissertation is a multidisciplinary study on video game gameplay as an autono-
mous form of vernacular experience. Plays and games are traditional research subjects 
in folkloristics, but commercial video games have not been studied yet. For this rea-
son, methods and concepts of the folkloristic research tradition have remained un-
known in contemporary games studies. This thesis combines folkloristics, game stud-
ies and phenomenological enactive cognitive science in its investigations into player–
game interaction and the video game gameplay experience at large. 
In this dissertation, three representative survey samples (N=2,594, N=845, 
N=1,053) on “Rewarding gameplay experience” are analyzed using statistical analysis 
methods. The samples were collected in 2014–2017 from Finnish and Danish adult 
populations. This dissertation also analyzes data from 32 interviews, through which 
the survey respondents’ gameplay preferences, gaming memories, and motivations to 
play were further investigated. By combining statistical and qualitative data analyses, 
this work puts forward a mixed-methods research strategy and discusses how the find-
ings relate to prior game research from several disciplines and schools of thought.  
Based on theoretical discussions, this dissertation argues that the video game 
gameplay experience as a cultural phenomenon consists of eight invariants in relation 
to which each individual gameplay experience can be interpreted: The player must 
demonstrate a lusory attitude (i), and a motivation to play (ii). The gameplay experi-
ence consists of explorative and coordinative practices (iii), which engender a change 
in the player’s self-experience (iv). This change renders the gameplay experience in-
herently emotional (v) and performative (vi) in relation to the gameworld (vii). The 
gameplay experience has the dramatic structure of a prototypical narrative (viii) alt-
hough a game as an object cannot be regarded a narrative in itself.  
As a key result of factor analytical studies and qualitative interview analyses, 
a novel approach to understanding player–game interaction is put forward. An original 
gameplay preference research tool and a player typology are introduced. This work 
argues, that, although video games as commercial products would not be intuitive 
research subjects for folkloristics, video game gameplay, player–game interaction, 
and the traditions in experiencing and narrating gameplay do not differ drastically 
from those of traditional social games. In contrast to this, all forms of gameplay are 
argued to be manifestations of the same vernacular phenomenon. Indeed, folkloristic 
research could pay more attention to how culture is experienced, modified, varied and 
expressed, regardless of whether the research subject is a commercial product or not. 
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Käsillä oleva väitöskirja on monitieteellinen tutkimus videopelien pelaamisesta itse-
näisenä kansanomaisen kokemuksen muotona. Pelien ja leikkien tutkimus on perin-
teikäs tutkimusaihe folkloristiikassa, mutta kaupallisten videopelien tutkimusta ei ole 
juuri tehty. Tästä syystä folkloristiikan tutkimusmenetelmät ja -käsitteet ovat jääneet 
tuntemattomaksi nykyaikaisessa pelitutkimuksessa. Tutkimus yhdistää folkloristiikan 
ja pelitutkimuksen näkökulmien lisäksi enaktiivisen kognition fenomenologista teo-
riaa pelaaja–peli-vuorovaikutuksen tutkimukseen sekä pelikokemuksen analyysiin.  
Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan tilastotieteellisin menetelmin kolmea aikuisvä-
estöä edustavaa ”Palkitseva pelikokemus” -kyselytutkimusaineistoa (N=2,594, 
N=845, N=1,053), jotka kerättiin Suomesta ja Tanskasta vuosina 2014–2017. Kyse-
lytutkimusaineiston rinnalla analysoidaan 32 teemahaastattelun aineistoa. Haastatte-
luilla tuotettiin syvempää ymmärrystä kyselyyn vastanneiden henkilöiden pelimielty-
myksistä, pelimuistoista ja pelimotivaatioista. Tilastoaineiston ja haastatteluaineiston 
analyysi tuodaan yhteen monimenetelmällisellä ja dialogisella tutkimusotteella, joka 
yhdistää havainnot usealla eri tutkimusalalla tehtyyn pelitutkimukseen.  
Teoreettisen analyysin tuloksena argumentoidaan, että videopelien pelikoke-
musta ilmiönä määrittää kahdeksan muuttumatonta ominaisuutta, joiden suhteen kun-
kin yksittäisen pelikokemuksen ainutlaatuisuutta voidaan tarkastella: Pelaajalla tulee 
olla leikkisä asenne (i) ja motivaatio pelaamiseen (ii). Pelaamisen kokemus rakentuu 
tutkivista ja suorittavista käyntänteistä (iii), jotka tuovat väliaikaisen muutoksen pe-
laavan henkilön minäkokemukseen (iv). Tämän muutoksen myötä pelaajuudesta muo-
dostuu emotionaalinen (v) ja performatiivinen (vi) positio suhteessa pelimaailmaan 
(vii). Näin syntyvän omakohtaisen pelikokemuksen rakenne vastaa kertomuksen dra-
maattista perusrakennetta (viii), vaikka peliä itsessään ei voida pitää kertomuksena.  
Tutkimuksen empiirisenä tuloksena esitellään faktorianalyyttisiin tapaustut-
kimuksiin ja laadullisten aineistojen analyysiin perustuva uudenlainen näkökulma ja 
menetelmä pelaaja–peli-vuorovaikutuksen ja pelimieltymyksen tutkimukseen, sekä 
edelliseen perustuva pelaajatyyppiluokittelu. Samalla väitetään, että vaikka videopelit 
kaupallisina esineinä eivät olisi folkloristiikan tutkimuskohteita, videopelien pelaami-
nen, pelaaja–peli-vuorovaikutus ja pelien kokemisen tavat eivät eroa ratkaisevasti pi-
haleikeistä vaan ovat saman kansanomaisen ilmiön esiintymiä. Folkloristisen tutki-
muksen soisikin kiinnittävän nykyistä painokkaampaa huomiota kulttuurin kokemi-
sen, muokkaamisen ja ilmaisun tapoihin riippumatta siitä, onko tarkastelun kohteena 
kaupallinen tuote vai ei. 
 
Asiasanat: videopelit, faktorianalyysi, kokemuskerronta, kertomusperinne, kognitio, 








   
 
 
So, there you are, glued to the PC or console or what you have. 
And you are hungry as hell, but you just have to go there and 
find the item and then you, of course, want to take it back to the 
village and solve the mystery in a dungeon not so far away. And 
your stomach starts to hurt because of the excitement, and your 
shoulders are in pain. 
 
And when the situation is resolved, you can finally breathe and 
go to the bathroom and watch whether someone tried to phone 
you three hours ago. This is why I play. Did I describe fun? 
Well, I do not know, but this is the best kind of gaming for me.  
 
— Interview participant P2 
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[T]he path is our footsteps, laid down in walking 
(Evan Thompson, 2007, p. 166)  
 
 
The Phenomenon of Interest 
  
This thesis is an investigation into the video game gameplay experience, and into what 
in this phenomenon varies and what does not vary between encounters with games. It 
is a fundamentally folkloristic question to ask how a cultural expression alters and 
stays fixed when enacted; to examine what in an expression remains the same and 
what changes is to consider the interplay between tradition and variation in culture. 
Playing video games has become a widespread pastime activity during the 
past four decades. For instance, 87 percent of Finnish people and 73 percent of Danish 
people aged 18–70 play digital games at least for a little while weekly, and 66 percent 
of Finnish people and 55 percent of Danish people play digital games at least one hour 
every week. On average, a Finnish person plays digital games for almost 8 hours 
weekly in a total of 15 play sessions, while the mean weekly play time for a Danish 
person is 6.5 hours in 14 play sessions. Today, playing video games is equally com-
mon for both men and women; of those who play at least one hour weekly, 48 percent 
are women in both Finland and Denmark, with a mean age of 42 years in Finland and 
43 years in Denmark. Considering the entire data set (N=2000 of which 50.9 percent 
were men), since the mean age for adults is 42.7 years, it can be concluded that playing 
digital games is a common and pervasive activity for most of us. Indeed, we encounter 
games everywhere and all the time.1 
From a folkloristics perspective, video games are fascinating as technology-
bound cultural products and participatory practices. Yet, until recently, video games 
have largely escaped the attention of folklorists. With the exception of Sharon R. 
Sherman (1997), Kiri Miller (2008; 2012), Kimberly Lau (2010), Robert Guyker 
(2016), Jeffrey A. Tolbert (2016) and Anthony Bak Buccitelli (2017), there are hardly 
any full-blown folkloristic studies on video games or the activity of playing them. This 
is rather surprising because games, and especially traditional children’s games, have 
been collected and categorized in folkloristics since the early 19th century.2  
                                                 
1  These results are from two surveys with nationally representative samples (Finland, N=1000; 
Denmark, N=1000). These surveys were conducted in the research project, Play for Reward, 
financed by Tekes (Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation) in 2014–2016. I report more de-
tails about the survey process and sampling in empirical Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
2 See, for instance, The Sports and Pastimes of the People in England by Joseph Strutt (1801), 
Games and Songs of American Children by William W. Newell (1884), The Traditional 
Games of England, Scotland and Ireland by Alice Bertha Gomme (1894; 1898, two volumes) 
and The Game of Rich and Poor (1932, FF Communication 100) by Elsa Enäjärvi-Haavio, 
which included both game classifications and a historic-geographic analysis of a singing game 
(see Georges, 1972, pp. 174–176). 
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Although Newell (1884) established games as a fundamental part of folklore, folklor-
ists only started to pay more attention to studying games as a specific subject area 
after 1950s. Folklorists of that time were especially influenced by the works of Johann 
Huizinga, Roger Caillois and Brian Sutton-Smith, who studied games and play in re-
lation to culture, and by the social-psychological investigations of Jean Piaget and 
Erik H. Erikson. Scholars of folklore, such as Alan Dundes, Robert A. Georges, Roger 
Abrahams, Jay Mechling, and Kenneth S. Goldstein, began to find the concept of a 
‘game’ to be an intriguing research subject for folkloristics—a discipline that had 
started to emphasize more and more the performative contexts of folklore. According 
to Simon J. Bronner (2007), Dundes (2007 [1964]) was among the first folklorists to 
argue that folklore was to be understood as a type of knowledge in social lives, and as 
the varied cultural expressions through which this knowledge is transmitted, rather 
than as specific texts and textual forms. Because games, ceremonies, rituals, dances 
and festivities are also “types of knowledge, characterized by particular kinds of cul-
tural expression,” they began to be regarded as folklore (Bronner, 2007, p. 154).  
Whereas Dundes (2007 [1964]) studied games with structural, morphological 
and psychoanalytic analyses, American folklorist Georges (1972) examined the sub-
ject by applying behavioral models. Abrahams, furthermore, appropriated a rhetorical 
approach to the performances of play and games, and Goldstein analyzed games from 
the framework of the ethnography of speaking. As Goldstein (1999 [1967], p. 235) 
notes, games are a significant research subject for folklorists since in games the par-
ticipants are exceptionally aware of the rules of the performance. Because folklorists 
have conducted few studies on video games, the methodological tools of folkloristics 
have remained foreign in game studies of today. The opportunity thus presents itself 
for a folklorist to investigate the meaning of video game gameplay in today’s culture. 
I have always been interested in games, whether those games were collectible 
card games like Magic: The Gathering (1993, Wizards of the Coast), board games or 
video games. I remember from my childhood when playing, e.g., cards with my fam-
ily, I never wanted to quit, but would have liked to play yet another game. As a teen-
ager, I grew attached to my in-game avatars in the tabletop role-playing game, Rune-
Quest (1984, Avalon Hill), which I played mostly with my big brother and his friends. 
I remember writing my own fantasy short stories, drawing characters and designing 
world maps based on my RuneQuest experiences.  
I have never played any games as much as tens of hours weekly, but I have 
always been interested in game cultures and game aesthetics, and especially in the 
gameplay experience. In the case of video games, I have preferred role-playing games 
over other types of games since the 1990s, and I have been especially fascinated in 
Japanese role-playing game aesthetics. I have played many action-adventure games, 
platformer games, graphic adventures, puzzles, and racing games, mainly with gam-
ing consoles (MSX, Atari ST, Playstation, Playstation 2, Playstation 3, Playstation 4, 
XBox One, Super Nintendo, Nintendo Wii, Nintendo WiiU) and handheld consoles 
(GBA, DS, 3DS, PSP, PSVita). I have much less player experience with first-person 
shooter games, strategy games, and sports games. Also, I have played only a few mo-
bile games, and I have no real experience with multi-player online games or compet-
itive esports.  
While my interest in video games surely has had an impact on the thesis at 
hand, I believe that this impact has been positive. In game studies, the idea is held 
that, in order to study games, much of the researcher’s knowledge of this phenomenon 
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should come from his or her first-hand experiences. I also believe that my own 
background as a game hobbyist made it much easier for me to conduct in-depth inter-
views with players and design quantitative surveys for investigating gameplay expe-
riences and game preferences. 
 
 
Context of the Study 
 
In The Ambiguity of Play (2001 [1997]), folkloristically inclined psychologist, Brian 
Sutton-Smith, famously presents seven rhetorics of studying play. By rhetorics, Sut-
ton-Smith refers to the persuasive discourses utilized by researchers who argue for the 
worthwhileness of their particular research strategy. I find it fitting to begin this thesis 
by positioning it within the seven rhetorics proposed by Sutton-Smith.  
The first rhetoric Sutton-Smith presents is the rhetoric of play as progress, 
which argues that play is adaptation through which children and animals develop. The 
rhetoric of play as fate is to be contrasted with the first one, since this second rhetoric 
deals with games of chance and gambling, and the chaos and the luck that resides in 
the element of uncertainty associated with all games. The third rhetoric is that of play 
as power, and it is the rhetoric of conflict and competition. This latter rhetoric is about 
status, control, and heroes that emerge from play.  
The rhetoric of play as identity is how play traditions build, maintain, and 
transform the identities of individuals and communities, and the rhetoric of imaginary 
is the sustaining positive modern attitude towards creativity and innovation, with play 
as the core driver of them both. The rhetoric of the self deals with the first-person 
experience of playing games, what motivates people to play, and what kind of mean-
ings people attach to gameplay experiences. And the rhetoric of play as frivolous is 
the trickery, foolishness and carnivalesque of play.  
The thesis at hand is to be situated firmly as a representative of the rhetoric 
of the self, the first-personal character of gameplay. This emphasis on the lifeworld 
of an individual is also central for the rhetoric of progress, and indeed the current work 
is influenced by the latter rhetoric. However, it is not my intention to focus only how 
gameplay experiences come forth for the individual, but rather approach gaming as a 
form of cultural and social participation from a phenomenological vantage point of 
the first-person. Here, my work will be connected to the rhetoric of identity.  
Sutton-Smith (2001 [1997], pp. 219–220) lists key researchers and concepts 
for every type of rhetoric. In relation to prior research on the rhetorics of the self, this 
thesis draws from authors such as Richard Bauman (performance), Eugen Fink (ec-
static actions), and Mihály Csíkszentmihályi (flow experience); some key authors 
from rhetorics of identity in this context are George Herbert Mead (‘self,’ social and 
symbolic interactionism), Erving Goffman (dramaturgical approach), and Roger 
14 
 
Abrahams (stylization and enactment); and from the rhetorics of progress Jean Piaget 
(assimilative and accommodative conducts) and Brian Sutton-Smith himself.3  
Importantly, Sutton-Smith (2001 [1997], pp. 192–200) situates “play as ec-
static performance” and “play’s stylized excitement” within the rhetorics of self 
alongside the phenomenological research attitude. This is a noteworthy observation 
since it is indeed the purpose of the current thesis to bring phenomenology and folk-
loristics together. Similar to Sutton-Smith, I conceive ‘performance’ as a key concept 
for understanding the gameplay experience. Examining player performance and per-
formativity in the process of gameplay emerges as a focal point of this thesis.  
This thesis is also closely related to game ontology. As described by Espen 
Aarseth (2014b, p. 484), game ontology can refer to the formal and functional char-
acteristics of game objects or to existential ontologies, which ask what kinds of exist-
ence a game has and what games are as processes. In game studies, the object per-
spective can refer either to games as artwork or as formal systems, and both the object-
centered and process-centered investigation can be conducted as normative or descrip-
tive (Aarseth, 2014b, p. 483; see also Stenros, 2015, pp. 128–129). 
The current work is as an exercise of process-centered descriptive and exis-
tential game ontology (see Aarseth, 2014b, p. 492), which challenges the notions of 
real and fiction by investigating gameplay experience, i.e., game as experienced in 
the ongoing interplay between a player and a game system. Although the profound 
questions of game ontology have visibility in this thesis, it is not my primary objective 
to focus only on what games are. Rather, I delineate this thesis as an exploration on 
how games emerge as played. In this demarcation, the gameplay experience arises a 
phenomenon that can be perceived meaningful and memorable by players represent-
ing different cultural backgrounds and motivations to play.  
Thinking of discourses on contemporary game studies from the past twenty 
years, the debate between narratological and ludological4 approaches on games are of 
special interest for a folklorist. However, this intriguing phase in the development of 
interdisciplinary game studies has been discussed at length by many authors, and it is 
not the objective of the current work to reiterate their arguments. In my view, Gonzalo 
Frasca (2004, p. 86; see Aarseth, 1997), described the then peaked debate clearly by 
stating that since video games require active participation from the player, they rely 
on simulation rather than on semiotic representation, the latter of which is essential 
for narrative interpretation. Through participation, players have a different kind of ac-
cess to the content of the game than they have to the narrative content. 
                                                 
3 This thesis is, of course, also influenced by many other authors from enactive cognitive the-
ory, phenomenology, folkloristics, and game studies. Yet, this short list may suffice here since 
the purpose of presenting some central researchers is merely to relate the current work to the 
rhetorics of self, progress, and identity as proposed by Sutton-Smith (2001 [1997]). As a gen-
eral guideline, I would situate the phenomenological theorists mostly into the rhetoric of the 
self, the enactive theorist into the rhetoric of the progress and the folkloristics and game studies 
primarily into the rhetoric of the identity. 
4 The term ‘ludology’ was introduced to video game studies in 1999 by Gonzalo Frasca, but 
its identity has remained rather ambiguous. Depending on the context of usage, ‘ludology’ can 
refer to the general study of games and thereby also to studies on e.g. social play and children’s 
games; to a specific approach to study especially video games, their structure and functionality; 




The subject areas of the “debate” between ludologists and narratologists are still rele-
vant in game studies; first, there remains the question of whether games as a medium 
can tell stories, i.e., if and how games are capable of full-blown storytelling. This is 
the vantage point of critical ludology. Second, there is an ongoing critical discussion 
on whether narratological concepts and methods are applicable to games, or should 
there instead be a particular methodology developed for studying game phenomena. 
As noted by Dominic Arsenault (2014, p. 476), in a narratological view by Janet Mur-
ray (1997), computer and computer games indicate new forms of narration, whereas 
Aarseth (1997) emphasizes that studying games requires developing novel analytical 
tools since they function differently than narratives. The third theme deals with the 
link between ludology and hermeneutics. This theme asks how the relationship be-
tween a player and a game is defined simultaneously by the interactivity of gameplay 
and its mechanics and by the semiotic representational aspects of the game (Aarseth, 
2014a, pp. 186–188). 
From the three themes in the ludology/narratology discourse, this thesis deals 
mostly with the third one. Although I will also discuss in the course of the current 
study how games relate to storytelling and experiencing stories (Chapter 8), the ques-
tion of how interactivity in playing games constitutes a gameplay experience is abso-
lutely crucial for this dissertation. Just as Aarseth (2014a, p. 188) writes, an applica-
tion of the third theme should put “emphasis on the player as a part of the game sys-
tem, an agent partly definable by the role the game affords, and as a condition framed 
by the game’s affordances5 and therefore as an integrated part of the game.” However, 
the theoretical framework of this thesis is not ludo-hermeneutic, but instead enactive 
and phenomenological, which, when brought together with a research interest and the 
methodological tools of folkloristics, constitutes an approach I call first-person folk-
loristics. 
A central argument of this thesis is that there is an element of folklore to all 
games, whether the game under analysis is a children’s schoolyard game or a recent 
commercial video game. However, it must immediately be clarified that folklore in 
games is not necessarily found from the game objects that are transmitted through 
institutional channels such as retail stores and online marketplaces. Instead, folklore 
in games resides at the other end of the ontology of games, in games as processes. 
This is to contend that the gameplay element in games has an inherent vernacular 
quality. I will return to this argument many times during this thesis. Here it suffices 
to offer that folklorists should not decline from investigating commercial products 
solely based on an argument that the type of object is not folkloric. Folklorists could 
instead embrace the different traditions by which objects are experienced, modified, 
altered, interpreted and communicated to others. Games represent a prime example of 




                                                 
5 Affordances can be shortly defined as environmental possibilities for action (Chemero, 
2009). I discuss the concept of affordance further in Chapter 7. 
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Research Gap and the Purpose of the Study 
 
The thesis at hand is about the organization of the experience of video game gameplay, 
the focus being on the phenomenology of the first-person experience. Second, this 
thesis is about the cultural narratives and meanings that emerge from the organizations 
of the gameplay experience. The title of this thesis, In Gameplay, thus refers to my 
objectives of 1) investigating the ongoing interaction6 between a video game and a 
player, and 2) how players remember and interpret their first-hand experiences of 
gameplay.  
This work has substantive, methodological and theoretical objectives. On a 
substantive level, the task of this thesis is to provide an extensive and rigorous empir-
ical portrait of the video game gameplay experience by combining qualitative and 
quantitative data. As Laura Ermi and Frans Mäyrä (2007) note, studies on the game-
play experience have remained scarce partly due to the “disciplinary tilt” in game 
studies. Most game scholars have a background in academic disciplines that study the 
ontology of games as objects rather than as processes. Although interaction analyses 
in the lineage of, e.g., Erving Goffman (see Deterding, 2013) are today more common 
than ten years ago, there is an evident need for empirical investigations into what 
makes a gameplay experience memorable and worth sharing with others. 
On a methodological level, this work aims to combine the theoretical tradi-
tions of folkloristics, phenomenology and enactive approach to cognition, and pro-
poses this combination as a significant addition to the discourses on game studies. 
This work has another methodological goal, and it is directed to the academic disci-
pline of folkloristics: I aim to demonstrate many potential areas of investigation in 
video game cultures that folklorists could study in future research. In the empirical 
sections of this thesis, I present a developed mixed-methods approach to quantitative 
and qualitative data that could be a promising research strategy for both game scholars 
and folklorists. 
On a theoretical level, I aim to unveil the invariant structures of the video 
game gameplay experience. Since prior research on video games has largely focused 
on game objects, the crucial question of what constitutes a gameplay experience has 
not been studied rigorously. From the framework of phenomenological enactivism 
and folkloristics, I aim to open new horizons on the invariants of games as a processes, 
as seen from the first-person vantage point of the player herself. Another theoretical 
goal of this thesis is to present first-person folkloristics, that is, phenomenologically 
inclined folkloristics that focuses on the life-world of the individual and how folklore 
is expressed and experienced by the embodied subject. The essential research ques-
tions of this thesis can be summarized as: 
 
RQ1: How do we experience video game gameplay and what are the 
constitutive principles, i.e., invariants, of this cultural phenom-
enon (theoretical level)? 
                                                 
6 I will return to the concept of interaction in Chapter 2. 
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RQ2: How do players value, remember, and narrate their past expe-
riences of video game gameplay (substantive level)? 
RQ3:  How can the academic traditions of folkloristics, phenomenol-
ogy and enactivism be brought together, and how can this com-
bination open new horizons for interdisciplinary game studies 
(theoretical and methodological levels)?  
 
 
Plan of the Thesis 
 
The thesis unfolds as follows. In Chapter 1, I develop theoretical grounds for the dis-
sertation by bringing together folkloristics, enactivism and phenomenology (RQ3). In 
Chapter 2, I situate the thesis in game studies by defining the key concepts and by 
identifying discourses on academic game studies relevant to the dissertation (RQ3). 
In this latter chapter, I consider the concepts of ’game,’ ’play,’ ‘the magic circle,’ and 
‘the self of the player’ from the viewpoint of first-person scholarship. 
In Chapter 3, I introduce the most important concept of the thesis: gameplay. 
I begin the chapter by presenting how the concept has been defined in earlier literature 
and move then to conduct a series of statistical analyses with two large datasets 
(N=2,594, N=845) collected in 2014 and 2015. I study RQ2 by analyzing how we can 
identify the recurrent modes of player–game interaction that contemporary video 
games offer for the players and players’ preferences of engaging with these modes in 
gameplay. As a result of the statistical analyses, I introduce five factors in gameplay 
preferences and seven player types. Several of the main findings I report in Chapter 3 
are previously published in an article, “Digital Game Dynamics Preferences and 
Player Types” (Vahlo et al., 2017). In Chapter 4, I describe how I designed and con-
ducted a series of 32 interviews and a call for meaningful gameplay experience writ-
ings (N=10) with players representing the revealed seven player types.  
In Chapters 5–9, I first investigate the invariant structures of the gameplay 
experience (RQ1), and then analyze how players attach meanings to each of the pro-
posed invariants (RQ2). The theoretical considerations combine aspects of phenome-
nology, enactivism, folkloristics and game studies (RQ3). In corresponding empirical 
analyses, I continue to explore both the statistical (N=2,594, N=845, N=879) and the 
qualitative data by asking how players come to appreciate some gameplay experiences 
more than others. During these five chapters, I develop a theoretical framework for 
studying the video game gameplay experience. The framework is exploratory, and I 
construct it from the perspective of a meaningful gameplay experience. Because of 
this demarcation, the framework is probably more suitable for investigating memora-
ble and emotionally engaging gameplay experiences than for studying casual gaming, 
such as short-term mobile gameplay.  
Chapter 5 is an investigation into how gameplay as the temporary phenome-
non between a player and a game should be conceived and how both enactivism and 
folkloristics can deepen our current understanding of this phenomenon. The main the-
oretical arguments of this chapter are published earlier in the journal, Game Studies 
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(Vahlo, 2017). In the context of this thesis, however, I broaden the theoretical analysis 
by examining how the respondents of a survey (N=1,718) and my interviewees 
(N=32) reflected on their experiences of different forms of player-–game interaction.  
In Chapter 6, I change my focus from gameplay to that of the player position. 
By utilizing the concept of ‘presence,’ I analyze how a gameplay experience can mat-
ter to the participatory player. The chapter will revolve around the concept of player 
persona and the idea that we do not play games only as persons but precisely as 
players. Building on writings by Erving Goffman (1959), I argue that the position of 
the player is performative, and that gameplay is a performance of the self. I conclude 
the chapter with empirical analyses on performative player experience and emotions 
in gameplay.   
After investigating the player–game interaction of gameplay and the player’s 
position within it, I continue in Chapter 7 to analyze the cultural event of playing video 
games. I ask whether an occurrence of gameplay can be regarded as a performance, 
given that the participatory position of the player is indeed performative. For this pur-
pose, I introduce the concept of ‘enactment’ as it is conceptualized in folkloristics. I 
then continue to describe the relationship between a player and a game by studying 
how ‘game’ arises as an alternative environment of significant interaction, the game-
world. I conclude the chapter by analyzing how players representing different player 
types come to appreciate different qualities in the gameworlds of contemporary video 
games. I move then to examine the elapsed experience of video game gameplay. In 
Chapter 8, I discuss the possibility of new stories emerging from the gameplay expe-
rience. I argue that, although gameplay could not be conceived a narrative in itself, 
gameplay nevertheless has, as a form of experience, a structure not unlike prototypical 
narratives. I proceed then to investigate how gameplay experiences can be argued to 
be folkloric. Chapter 8 concludes with an analysis of how my player-interviewees 
narrated their most memorable gameplay experiences.  
In the final chapter of this thesis, I study emotional gameplay experience and 
the profound question of why we play video games with a mixed-methods approach 
combining the statistical data and the qualitative data analyses. As a conclusion for 
this study, I argue for a total of eight invariants that are present in every instance of 
the phenomenon of video game gameplay. Taken together, Chapters 5–9 constitute a 
chronological analysis on what is going on in gameplay (Chapter 5), how the identity 
of player emerges in it (Chapter 6), how this identity relates to the world-like qualities 
of games (Chapter 7), what kind of structure of experience is produced by gameplay 
and how players reflect on these experiences (Chapter 8), and what motivates us to 
engage with gameplay repeatedly (Chapter 9). 
A few remarks must be made considering the ethical aspects of this thesis. 
Since I consider myself a gamer, I have a sympathetic relationship with games and 
gaming cultures. This surely affected the interviews I had with the 32 participants, at 
least those interviews in which the interviewee and I shared similar preferences in 
games. In several interviews, I empathized with how the interviewee described his or 
her gameplay experiences. Surely my enthusiasm had an impact on the flow of the 
interviews, but because my objective was to have informal discussions rather than ask 





Because a central objective of this thesis is to provide an extensive portrayal of the 
first-person gameplay experience, it is not my purpose to give any kind of normative 
statements about whether playing games can be a good or a bad thing for an individ-
ual, a family, specific social groups, or a culture at large. Instead, I focus in this work 
on taking the experiencer’s vantage point to gameplay, and finding patterns in how 
experiencers describe games, gameplay preferences, and meaningful play. For in-
stance, I do not give much consideration to the theme of ‘addiction’ since this subject 
had only minor visibility in the statistical and qualitative data—and when it did, the 
interviewees talked mostly about ‘good addiction,’ which they typically associated 
with games they liked the most.  
The participants included in the statistical analyses of this study (N=2,595, 
N=845, N=879) were all recruited via a market research company that holds large 
online panels in several countries. The company maintains certifications for highest 
quality data collection and project management. Individual survey respondents are 
kept anonymous, and therefore the statistical data used in this dissertation was already 
anonymized. When analyzing both the statistical and the qualitative data, I tried to 
carefully describe the respondents’ views as they were originally described in the data. 
This means that I did not detach the quotations from the context of a broader discourse, 
and thus I sincerely believe that the interviewees would recognize themselves from 
the interview passages.  
 
 
A Word for the Reader 
 
Since this thesis is an interdisciplinary endeavor and it has goals at the substantive, 
methodological, and theoretical levels, I appropriate a dialogical research attitude. I 
aim to develop my arguments by relating them to prior literature from different fields 
of academic research. The dialogical attitude also encompasses my analyses of game-
play experience. 
The dialogical and interdisciplinary attitude means that this dissertation may 
contain sections that only some readers will find relevant for their purposes. There-
fore, I propose that the reader interested in folkloristics will perhaps find Chapter 1, 
Chapter 3, Chapter 7, and Chapter 8 the most valuable. For a researcher interested in 
the theoretical contribution of this work, Chapter 1 and the first halves of Chapters  
3–9 will offer more insight than the latter empirical halves of these chapters, which, 
correspondingly may be interesting for the ethnographically inclined.  
A game scholar may wish to concentrate on the proposed combination for 
folkloristics, enactivism, and game studies. For this purpose, I recommend that the 
reader could focus first on Chapter 1, Chapter 2, the discussion sections of each Chap-
ter, and the Conclusions. For a representative of the game industry or game design 
research, I believe that Chapter 3, Chapter 9, and the empirical parts of Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7 are worthwhile. Finally, I hope that researchers of enactive cognition and 
phenomenology will find Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 intriguing.  
However, it is my sincere belief that the work as a whole is relevant for both 
game studies and folkloristics, and that the central arguments of this study are best 
conceived by reading the whole thesis. Let me begin, then. 
20 
 
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
FIRST-PERSON FOLKLORISTICS  
 
[F]olklore must be enacted, as it exists nowhere outside of a perfor-
mance (Roger Abrahams, 2005, p. 59). 
 
 
Situating the Study within Folkloristics 
 
I begin this chapter by situating the current work in relation to contemporary folklor-
istics and its theoretical currents. Then I proceed to present enactivism and its phe-
nomenological foundations as a theoretical framework for studying first-person expe-
rience. I conclude this chapter by arguing that folkloristics and phenomenological en-
activism together constitute a promising theoretical stance for studying both the in-
variant structures and varied experiences of video game gameplay.  
Folklore, in the early nineteenth century, when the scientific study of folklor-
istics began, meant the traditional items of knowledge that described people, their 
surroundings and their practices. It was what was remembered from the past, and the 
task of a folklorist was to collect and study these objects of culture (Abrahams 2005, 
pp. 58–61). The ‘folk’ in the folkloristics of today, however, refers much more broadly 
to the informal and unofficial level of expressive culture. It is on this level that cultural 
meanings, values and understandings are communicated to others, as well as enacted 
and transmitted between everyday people.  
Folk groups, which are an essential unit of examination for folklorists, are in 
contemporary research considered to be any groups of people who engage with cul-
tural meaning-making that entails an element of vernacularity, or unofficial self-ex-
pression. Such groups share at least one common factor (Dundes, 1965, p. 2), and may 
come in different sizes. According to Elliott Oring (1984, p. 19; see Oring, 1986), two 
persons who engage in enduring informal interactions—such as friends—are enough 
to constitute a folk group, i.e., a folk dyad, and to sustain dyadic traditions.  
Although all groups have institutionality, by studying folk groups, folklorists 
focus their attention specifically on the non-official culture, or at least on the dialogi-
cal relationships between the vernacular and the institutional in the arrangement of 
the folk group. The ‘lore’ encompasses expressive forms of communication within a 
folk group. These expressions include, e.g., the narratives, customs, performances, 
beliefs, and expressions of humor. According to Lynne S. McNeill (2013a, p. 6), what 
distinguishes folklore from institutional forms of culture is the way in which folklore 
is transmitted, used and shared. The content does not, by itself, make something, e.g., 
a story, folklore.  
Similar to anthropology, media studies and literary studies, folkloristics is an 
analytical field of academic research. Folkloristics focuses not only on the items of 
folklore, but it also observes the processes and patterns of contextual conduct through 
which folklore emerges, varies and evolves. This it shares with anthropology. With 
literary studies, folkloristics shares the interest to study the items of folklore, e.g. the 
texts, the narratives, the rituals, and the customs, and the meanings we attach to them 
(McNeill, 2013a, p. 23). 
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Roger Abrahams (2005, pp. 22–23) suggests that there are four ways to approach a 
work of folklore in folkloristics. The first emphasizes the artistry of the “author” of 
folklore and studies the audiences and the work of folklore as byproducts of the artistic 
performance. The second view focuses on the internal characteristics of an object that 
is the work of folklore, which it sees as a self-sufficient entity without taking the per-
former and the audience into account. The third approach investigates how the perfor-
mance affects its audience, and the fourth is concerned with how the audience affects 
the performance and thus highlights the interactional elements of folklore. Whereas 
the interests of literary folklorists still lie in studying folklore as texts and discovering 
how these texts are varied, anthropologically inclined folklorists are most interested 
in studying the interactional qualities and audience values. Also, structuralist analysts 
take the audience’s point-of-view as a vantage point by studying formalized enact-
ments such as rituals and festivities.  
As a folklorist, I lean towards both anthropological and structural schools of 
thought. I am more interested in studying how items of folklore are experienced in 
performances (anthropological emphasis) and how these experiences are constituted 
and organized (structuralist emphasis) than in studying the textual qualities of folk-
lore. However, “[t]he full analysis of a tradition or genre calls for study of the organ-
izational elements of both items and performances” (Abrahams 2005, p. 25).  
Similar to Dundes (2007 [1964]), I propose that the organization of a perfor-
mance type, or “the structure of context,” can be analyzed. An investigation into how 
a performance is organized focuses on the relations between participants, e.g., a per-
former and her audience, as affected by the spatiotemporal, traditional and situational 
factors. Here the attention of the structural analyst is not only morphological in the 
sense that it would emphasize the holistic and organic organizational structure of folk-
lore (Bronner, 2007, p. 154)—i.e., how an expression of culture is brought forth in 
specific relations of its essential parts—but especially in its dramatic and dynamic 
aspects.  
According to Abrahams (2005, p. 26), items of expressive culture are best 
understood as “a strategy for achieving speech rights and a device for putting forth an 
argument.” This understanding can be achieved by bringing together rhetorical intent 
and contextual structure of the dynamical qualities of folklore in a performance. Folk-
lore thus presents itself as movement, that is, how an item of folklore when performed 
manages to invoke sympathetic and empathic reactions in its dramatic organization. 
Abrahams’ (2005, p. 3) analysis is that of expressive interaction, and this description 
fits with the approach I develop in this thesis. Following Abrahams (2005, p. 27), we 
must then be able to approach folklore from a theoretical stance that is capable to 
consider both the organization of a performance and the item that has an existence of 
its own beyond the ongoing performative event.  
Elliott Oring (2013, pp. 39–41) offers a highly informative account of tradi-
tion as product and process. He argues that the study of folklore has always focused 
on certain traditions and products whereas the process of tradition has received only 
marginal research attention. Oring suggests that the process of tradition is cultural 
reproduction in which culture is reenacted and thus reproduced in transmission and 
repetition. He argues that more attention should be paid to the conditions and circum-
stances in which tradition is invoked as well as to how and why tradition is enacted. 
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This would involve investigations that take into account psychological elements such 
as memory, intentions and affections. To put it differently, the focus turns to the ex-
perience of folklore, and how folkloristics takes the first-person view of the subject 
into its careful consideration.  
The questions of how ‘game’ can be approached both as an item of folklore 
and as a performative process of expressive culture is related to an ongoing discussion 
on how folklore should be defined and conceptualized in the digital age of today. 
Although I agree with Anthony Bak Buccitelli (2012), who argues that digital envi-
ronments should be understood as arenas of performance rather than media that trans-
mit texts, I acknowledge that appropriating ‘performance’ as the definitional concept 
of folkloristics is not without challenges.  
‘Performance’ was introduced to folkloristics in the 1960s and 1970s to em-
phasize the agency of the tradition-bearer over that of ‘tradition’ as a social structure. 
According to Richard Bauman (1992; 2012), this made it possible for folklorists to 
study the aesthetic aspects of tradition, as these aspects were expressed in ongoing 
situations. As emphasized by Dan Ben-Amos (1971; 1976; 1997), who was another 
central character of the performative school in folkloristics, “the application of the 
concept of performance to folklore, hence, has transformed its subject from being a 
cultural metanarrative to becoming acts of narrating, singing, and speaking” (Ben-
Amos 1997, p. 630). Bronner (2012, p. 30) observes that most American folklorists 
who approach their research subject from the conceptual framework of performance 
argue that folklore is aesthetically marked (framed, staged) and observable small-
group events rather than textual items. During these situated events, performers take 
the responsibility of the expression they present for their audience (reflexive practice) 
and shape their conduct in response to the reactions of that audience (Bauman, 1975; 
Bauman, 1992). 
Bronner (2016, pp. 13–15) notes that folkloristics, and especially the per-
formative school of thought within the discipline, today faces at least five profound 
challenges that may force another paradigm shift or necessitate the re-evaluation of 
the definition of both ‘folk’ and ‘lore.’ First, vernacularity in digital cultures is char-
acterized more by “variation in repetition” (e.g., memes) than by being social in the 
sense of face-to-face interaction. Second, the role of tradition in folkloric expressions 
should be re-evaluated. Performance-oriented approaches have had challenges in in-
corporating tradition in their analyses because these studies tend to emphasize con-
textual meaning-making and aesthetic expression. Third, there is a growing need in 
folkloristics to relate the discipline to the theories of mind, and thus to cognitive de-
scriptions of actions and activities that generate folklore. Fourth, digital environments 
and mediated communication give rise to the question of letting go of the requirement 
of ‘group’ in folklore. We should ask whether intersubjective presence is indeed 
needed to sustain, transform, manipulate and generate folklore (see e.g., Mechling, 
2006). And fifth, the “practice turn” in philosophy indicates that folklorists, too, 
should pay more attention to the skills, habits, know-how and silent expectations that 
underlie both everyday activities and stylized cultural events.  
Indeed, Bronner (2016) suggests that practice theory could be a solution to 
alter the focal point of a folklorist from “artistic communication in small groups” 
(Ben-Amos, 1971) towards “traditional knowledge put into, and drawing from, prac-
tice” (Bronner, 2016, p. 15). The latter view proposed by Bronner studies activities or 
practices as knowledge and knowledge-generating processes that often manifest in 
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stylized and expressive forms. In these practices, the aesthetic element is not separable 
from the routines or from the technologies that make the particular activities possible, 
repeatable, and comparable.  
In my reading of Bronner (2016), ‘practice’ as a concept comes close to ver-
nacular traditions of sense-making. It is through practices that both everyday life and 
stylized forms of cultural expression come to make sense to us. I concur with Bronner 
(2012; 2016) that performance-centered understanding of folklore faces challenges 
when we are examining digital culture and human–technology relations. I also concur 
that utilizing the concept of ‘practice’ may indeed provide a possible solution for 
many of these problems. However, I do not position this dissertation as a representa-
tive of ‘practice-centered’ folkloristics. Instead, I advocate for a closely related con-
cept of ‘enactment’ as an additional way to understand folklore both as an object and 
as a process. I maintain that folkloristics would benefit from theoretical work that 
enables us to grasp the lifeworld of the experiencer of folklore, and that ‘enactment’ 
is more promising in this regard than ‘practice.’ 
I am not the first to note the potentiality of ‘enactment’ in folkloristics. Maria 
Schwertl (2016) writes that enactment is to be situated between performance and prac-
tice because enactment is a lens with which to look at both embodied subjective 
agency and the objects of culture, including mediating technologies such as human–
technology interfaces. What ‘enactment’ enables, I propose, is that by appropriating 
this concept we are able to analyze the physical aspects, situated restrictions and social 
expectations in relation to ongoing activity, conducted by a conscious and affective 
subject.  
The fundamental difference between ‘enactment’ and ‘performance,’ then, is 
that an enactment-centered study investigates how a subject brings forth her perspec-
tive to that which is established and expected without restricting its attention only to 
the aesthetic qualities or the face-to-face dimensions of this participation. ‘Enactment’ 
differs from ‘practice’ by keeping the first-personal agency of the participating subject 
as its paramount focal point. I suggest that in contrast to ‘practice,’ ‘enactment’ is 
better able to consider the subject as an embodied person with hopes, desires and pur-
poseful goals.  
As Schwertl (2016, p. 173) contends, ‘enactment’ is sensitive both to the rou-
tines of everyday activities and to the transformations that may occur in the interrela-
tions of subjective agency and the traditional. In this sense, it can be situated precisely 
in between ‘performance,’ which emphasizes the unique qualities of a social situation, 
and ‘practice,’ which designates the holistic structural aspects of culture. However, I 
acknowledge that the important question of relating an enactment-centered approach 
to the practice theory is largely beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
 
Enactive Approach to Embodied Cognition 
 
In this thesis, enactivism is suggested as a theoretical stance for studying gameplay 
and meaningful gameplay experience. Enactivism was initially coined by Francisco 
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Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in The Embodied Mind (1991) as a pro-
gram to understand embodied cognition. It has recently gained a fair amount of atten-
tion, primarily in cognitive science, philosophy, phenomenology, and psychology.  
Whereas in representationalism, computationalism, and connectionism the 
mind is generally conceived in the framework of data processing between sensory 
input and motor output, in enactivism a living organism is argued to actively enact7 a 
meaningful perspective to the world (Thompson, 2007, pp. 4–10, 59). All forms of 
enactivism understand humans as profoundly social and material beings, as the focus 
of cognitive action is understood to be on the interface where an agent and the world 
meet. In enactivism, cognition is best conceptualized as a contextual practice, i.e., 
relation, instead of capacity of being a database of information; the purpose of cogni-
tion is in guidance of actions and not in formation of mental representations (Engel 
2010, pp. 219, 221; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009, p. 26; Di Paolo & De Jaegher, 
2012, p. 2).  
Enactivism has been described as noncartesian, nonreductive and nonfunc-
tionalist naturalism, focused on researching the dynamics of coupling8—the mutual, 
situational influence between an agent and its environment. It further argues that 
meanings emerge from these dynamical processes of being-in-the-world. (Di Paolo et 
al., 2010, p. 36; McGann et al., 2013, p. 204)9 In enactivism, ‘objective’ is understood 
as a “body of regulated knowledge from individual accounts of experience” (Varela 
& Shear, 1999) rather than as something that can be analyzed without taking the ob-
server’s vantage point into careful consideration. This positions enactivism firmly a 
theoretical tradition that builds from first-person view to cognition. First-person meth-
odologies emphasize the lived experience, that is, ‘qualia’ or ‘phenomenal conscious-
ness.’ The focus of a first-person view is thus on the processes that have a relevant 
subjective and experimental side. However, “[d]ealing with subjective phenomena is 
not the same as dealing with purely private experiences… The subjective is intrinsi-
cally open to intersubjective validation” (Varela & Shear, 1999, pp. 1–2).10  
By emphasizing a brain–body–environment perspective and being-in-the-
world position, enactivism strongly draws from theoretical biology, neuroscience, and 
phenomenology—especially from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty (Thompson, 2007, p. 
14). Although there is hardly a unified understanding of an enactive approach to 
embodied cognition (Gallagher & Bower, 2014, p. 233; see Kyselo, 2014), it is pos-
sible to argue that the concepts of autonomy, embodiment, emergence, experience, 
                                                 
7 ‘Enaction’ connotes the performance or carrying out of an action (Thompson 2007, p. 13). 
8 Coupling means linking or bonding between oneself and the other, based on the similar qual-
ities between the two constituents of interaction (Thompson, 2007, p. 393).  
9 Enactivism has also been defined to be ontologically nonobjectivist and radically biocon-
structivist in the views in which ‘the world’ is understood as a relational domain brought forth 
or enacted by the cognitive system itself. In these accounts, reality has been argued to manifest 
as a multiverse (see Maturana & Varela, 1987; cf. Brier, 2008, pp. 179–185).  
10 Although enactivism builds from first-person methodologies which emphasize the life-
worlds of embodied subjects, it takes second-person approach to intersubjectivity and to the 
theory of mind debate (Kyselo, 2014). Schilbach et al. (2013, pp. 407–410) note that the pri-
macy of second-person engagements demands that emotion is to be taken as central to an 
awareness of minds. This is why second-person view on cognition focuses on emotionally 
engaged, interactive perspective and emotional responses rather than mental reflections, i.e., 
simulation (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010) or mentalizing (cf. Frith & Frith, 2010). 
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and sense-making comprise the core elements of the approach (Di Paolo et al. 2010, 
pp. 36–45). 
The central concept of autonomy in enactivism originates from Chilean biol-
ogists Humberto Maturana’s and Francisco Varela’s (1980) theory of autopoiesis as 
an organizational principle for all living systems.11 According to the theory, living 
systems constitute themselves as unities by establishing a boundary between them-
selves and the environment in actions that regenerate the conditions of their own sur-
vival (Weber & Varela, 2002, p. 117).12 As far as the system sustains, defines and 
regenerates its constitution in its own dynamics, it has autonomy. In enactivism, an 
autonomous system, extended from the theory of autopoiesis, is considered operation-
ally closed (Di Paolo & Thompson, 2014; Thompson, 2007, pp. 44–46, 92, 98–107).  
Operational closure means that every constituent process in the system is 
conditioned by another process or other processes within the same system. This self-
organized network of processes brings about and maintains the identity of an individ-
ual. An autonomous system is also precarious since a given process of the system will 
stop or run down if the recursive networked relations that enable the process are ab-
sent. To maintain its autonomy, an autonomous system is required to interact with the 
world, and so these interactions have intrinsic value for its self-individuation (Cuffari 
et al., 2015; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009; Di Paolo & Thompson, 2014; Kyselo, 
2015).13  
The environment in which an individual interacts is not external to the pro-
cesses that constitute it as a unity: the environment is an active ingredient of the net-
worked self. Individuals are identified in relation to their environment instead of being 
ontologically distinct from it (Kyselo, 2015; see Thompson, 2007, p. 26). The config-
uration of the relations that define the system as a singular entity equals to its organ-
ization, which is realized in its structure. If the organization of the system changes, its 
identity is destroyed (Maturana, 2002, p. 16). Thus, we encounter situations not con-
sisting of mere objects but rather as promises of meanings; we are structurally cou-
pled14 to our environment (Thompson, 2007, p. 45).  
Operational closure of an autonomous system is non-trivial and requires au-
tonomous adaptive agency in which the system actively regulates the conditions of its 
couplings with the environment and self-generates its individuation and identity (Di 
Paolo & Thompson, 2014). These relational and interactional activities are called 
                                                 
11 Tom Froese and Ezequiel Di Paolo (2009) suggest that the development of enactive frame-
work begun in the early 1970s when Maturana and Varela started to work on their theory of 
autopoiesis.  
12 This view was originally suggested by Aristotle: A living thing is designed to maintain and 
reproduce itself. It is its own end (Korsgaard, 2011, p. 35). 
13 Varela (1979) hinted that this type of organizational logic could be seen in other domains 
such as communication networks and conversations. This line of thought was further devel-
oped, especially by Niklas Luhmann, who applied the principle of autopoiesis in his theory of 
operationally-closed social systems (1995).  
14 Structural coupling refers to the history of interactions that leads to the structural congruence 
between systems. These couplings manifest in mutual communicative connections between 
living systems and their environment (Maturana & Varela, 1987, p. 75; Brier, 2008, p. 25). 
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sense-making. It is through sense-making that an agent actively monitors and regula-
tes its interactions with the world, and both sustains itself and establishes, i.e., enacts, 
a meaningful perspective to the world (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 488; Di Paolo 
et al., 2010, pp. 36–40). In enactivism, emotions and cognition are not held as separate 
systems but are thoroughly integrated; cognition is always affective since the indivi-
dual makes sense of its activities according to a fundamental norm—its own con-
tinuity (Thompson, 2007, p. 126; Colombetti, 2014). With these arguments, enacti-
vism offers a naturalistic science of meaning (McGann et al., 2013, p. 207). 
Emergence is a novel process that arises in the interactional dynamics be-
tween existing processes or events (Thompson, 2007, pp. 60–65). An emergent pro-
cess has its own autonomous identity and mutual constraints with the processes that 
enables the emergence to happen. A situation in which an embodied agent15 interacts 
with its environment in the processes of sense-making and emergence belongs to the 
domain of experience (Di Paolo et al., 2010, p. 36–45). 
According to Froese and Stewart (2012), enactivism differs from other 
branches of embodied cognitive science by emphasizing a first-person stance and bi-
ological autonomy. In addition to its very close relations to phenomenology and em-
bodied cognitive neurosciences, enactivism is connected to post-gibsonian ecological 
psychology, dynamical systems research, and the writings of pragmatists such as 
James, Dewey, Mead, and Peirce. It has further affinities with, e.g., Piaget’s theory of 
cognitive development, Vygotsky’s take on “region of proximal development,” and 
Jerome Bruner’s theory about narrative construction of reality (Di Paolo & De 
Jaegher, 2012, p. 2; Gallagher & Bower, 2014, p. 232; Chemero, 2009, pp. 29–30, 
152–154; Hutto & Myin, 2013, pp. 1–2; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009). 
I have already delineated in the title of this thesis that a central purpose of this 
study is to investigate the invariants of the gameplay experience. To study invariants 
of an experience is to examine its structure through patterns of time. This is also 
known as phenomenological reduction in the Husserlian approach with which enac-
tivism is congenial. Phenomenological reduction means to focus on analyzing the 
ways by which things appear to us, as correlates to our first-person experience. The 
analysis, i.e., phenomenological reduction, pivots around examining “the correlation 
structure of our subjectivity and the appearance or disclosure of the world” (Thomp-
son, 2007, pp. 17–19). As Thompson (ibid.) emphasizes, reduction here does not stand 
for eliminating one theory in favor of another but redirecting thought to the unre-
flected characteristics of our involvement with the world (Latin re-ducere, ‘lead 
back’). In phenomenological reduction, the attention is on how the imagined appears 
as imagined, the remembered as remembered and the perceived as perceived. The core 
research question of phenomenological reduction, and also this thesis, is not what 
things are but how they are experienced.  
 
                                                 
15 An agent is here defined as an autonomous adaptive system that has an ability of sense-
making in its interactive domain. This definition differs profoundly from the way in which the 
concept of ‘agent’ has been used in, e.g., robotics and human-computer interaction research. 
An agent here has constitutive autonomy— it is capable of organizing and creating itself. It 
thus has intrinsic teleology, which is not yet found among non-living things (De Jaegher & 
Froese, 2009, p. 447).  
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A methodological principle in Husserlian phenomenological reduction is called the 
epoché, which in this context means suspending or refraining from judgment about 
the “objective reality” and focusing on analytic investigation of experience instead. 
The “‘epoché’ can be described as the flexible and trainable mental skill of being able 
both to suspend one’s inattentive immersion in experience and to turn one’s attention 
to the manner in which something appears or is given to experience” (Thompson, 
2007, p. 19). Through the strategy of the epoché, one becomes able to focus on the 
modes of experiencing the phenomena and how the world appears to us (Gallagher & 
Zahavi, 2008, p. 27). The epoché is thus reflective awareness of awareness, and it 
entails a change in our attitude towards reality.  
The epoché requires adopting a phenomenological attitude instead of a natural 
attitude. In a phenomenological attitude, the realistic position of a natural attitude is 
replaced with attention on 1) the appearances, that is, phenomena, of reality to the 
subject; 2) how these appearances come to have meanings; and 3) how meaningful 
phenomena are constituted. Together, these three aspects of phenomenological reduc-
tion aim to track down the invariant structure of meaningful experience that encom-
passes the intentional acts of a living bodily subject and the intentional object of that 
experience (Thompson, 2007, pp. 21–24; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, pp. 23–29).16 
This, indeed, precisely describes the theoretical objective of the current thesis. 
The theoretical stance adopted in this thesis is rooted both in enactive second-
person account to cognition and in phenomenological first-person approach to mean-
ingful, embodied experience. A rich theory of cognition that starts from ongoing dy-
namic interaction between an embodied agent in its environment and locates meaning-
making to these very processes suggests great potential for studying gameplay expe-
rience, the phenomenon of gameplay, and the ontology of games as process. 
By appropriating a theoretical framework of phenomenological enactivism on 
gameplay, the focus of this study is on the embodied dynamical interplay between a 
player and a game during ongoing gameplay. The strength of an enactivistic approach 
to social cognition lies in its capability to establish a solid biological foundation for 
its argumentation. It has significant similarities to how Jan H. G. Klabbers (2009) has 
studied games. Both enactivism and Klabbers’ theory adopt emergence, autopoietic 
organization, and interactional dynamics as their key concepts. Although also the 
other central research concepts of enactivism—such as autonomy, embodiment, 
meaning, and agency—are all used commonly in different branches of game studies, 
these concepts are only rarely utilized rigorously in the framework that is rooted in 
theoretical biology, first-person phenomenology, and cognitive neuroscience.  
Why is phenomenological enactivism relevant for a folklorist exploring ga-
mes and gameplay experience? First, enactivism is a solid approach to the human 
cognition, as it is also capable of studying action-orientedness and dynamic contextual 
experiences including intentionality and emotions. Thus, it offers a promising stance 
                                                 
16 Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (2008) conclude that in contrast to representationalism, 
which can be argued to neglect the subjective qualities of experience, phenomenological anal-
ysis pays attention specifically to the qualitative and subjective characteristics of an experience 
(ibid., p. 28).  
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for investigating the understudied ontology of games as processes. Second, by re-
fusing to narrow its approach to analyzing the cognitive agent detached from its situ-
atedness, enactivism is a valid option for studying an autonomous system such as a 
human agent, the context in which the agent acts, and the ways in which mutual in-
fluence happens between the agent and the environment. Recall the four ways to ap-
proach a work of folklore, as proposed by Abrahams (2005): 1) the artistic expression 
by a performer; 2) the internal characteristics of an object of folklore; 3) experiencing 
folklore as an audience; and 4) the ongoing interaction between a performer and her 
audience. Enactivism is a potential theoretical framework, especially for studying the 
fourth, but also the first and the third dimensions of approaching folklore—since these 
three views emphasize the relational qualities of folklore, whether this relation is bet-
ween a performer and a product of folklore (1), between a product of folklore and the 
audience (3), or between the performer and her audience (4).  
Phenomenological analysis focuses on identifying the invariants of a phenom-
enon, but it is not interested in idiosyncratic descriptions of experiences. In this sense, 
phenomenology is not closely related to folkloristics, which aims to carefully describe 
the lifeworld of a vernacular. However, I suggest that phenomenology and folkloris-
tics can be brought together if these two research traditions are considered as distinc-
tive phases of research. This is indeed what I aim to do in this thesis. During the first 
halves of Chapters 5–9, I investigate the invariants of the phenomenon of gameplay. 
Then, based on the findings from enactive phenomenological analysis, I move to ex-
amine the idiosyncratic perspectives and personal narratives of the gameplay experi-
ence through each of the argued invariants. The two parts of this dissertation focus on 
the invariants and the variable qualities of video game experiences, respectively. 
With the enactivistic stance that I apply, folklore is approached as embodied 
activity of participatory sense-making. In this frame of thought, “identity is a perfor-
mance,” as Dorothy Noyes puts it (2003, pp. 27–29). I propose that the central con-
cepts of autonomy, embodiment, emergence, experience, and sense-making are also 
crucial for folklorists, and that the shared focus on investigating dynamic first-person 
experiences is what makes enactivism deeply congenial with folkloristics; “Autono-
mous adaptive systems enact a world of meaning and value through their movement 
in it,” De Jaegher and Froese write (2009, p. 447). It is the notion of movement that 
leads us back to consider enactive accounts together with folkloristics as a framework 
within which to study the gameplay experience, because “Movement is, in fact, the 
most important characteristic of any item of folklore” (Abrahams, 2005, p. 27).  
 
 
Play Genres and the Theoretical Stance 
 
Simon Bronner, who has collected and edited a selection of Alan Dundes’ analytical 
essays in The Meaning of Folklore (2007), notes that for Dundes, folkloristics is a 
discipline valuable for understanding the human experience since it provides a view 
from within rather than from outside; folklore expresses how people think and inter-
pret their own experiences individually and collectively. For Dundes, this “position 
within” also meant the possibility to examine the unconscious aspects of cultural men-
talities. As an interdisciplinary folklorist, Dundes drew from anthropology, psychol-
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ogy, structuralism and philosophy to study, e.g., how folklore “uses symbols in elab-
orated narratives and in rituals to encapsulate (or intensify) experience and provide a 
release from reality” (Bronner, 2007, p. 3). Furthermore, folklorist Robert A. Georges 
emphasized already in 1969 that folklorists interested in the phenomenon of play 
should study it from the participants’ point-of-view. 
Bringing together an enactive account to cognition and folkloristic meaning-
making means that the statement of folklore as “fast vanishing” turns into an obser-
vation of folklore as “constantly emerging” in the dynamics of enactment and social 
interaction. In this framework, the attention of a folklorist focuses on how vernacular 
meanings are ‘brought forth’ in processes of motivated participation and experience. 
This is indeed what both Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1996, p. 249) and Dundes 
affirmed by noting that folkloristics does not study only what is at the brink of van-
ishing, but just as much what keeps emerging (see Bronner, 2007, p. 4). Folkloristics 
is an academic research tradition focused on the constantly manifesting cultural expe-
riences, and enactivism is a theoretical stance devised precisely on investigating the 
emergence of an experience.  
Indeed, Abrahams (2005) analyzes ‘experience’ as key concept of ethno-
graphic and anthropological folkloristics. Experience is rendered both an idiosyncratic 
and social construct. It is always personal and yet can also be regarded as typical. 
Because experiences can be typical, an experience is to be positioned at the nexus of 
the individual and socially shared, and so are also, thus, our sentiments arising from 
the experience. Here we may meet the experience of experience, the reflection of a 
relevant event that takes place in one’s life. Common everyday experiencing becomes 
an experience special enough for remembering and communicating to others (Abra-
hams, 2005, p. 117). Abrahams notes that experience is a way to understand both the 
everyday ongoingness of life and instances of special meaning and significance. An-
thropology and folkloristics of experience starts from recognizing stylistic expressions 
and “the range of expressive means, affects, techniques and sentiments” (ibid., p. 124). 
In the case of the current thesis, the interest is in studying these means, effects and 
techniques as they manifest in the genre of ‘game.’  
‘Genre’17 is a fundamental concept in folkloristics, as it is in the vocabulary 
of many related disciplines. Folklorists Frog, Kaarina Koski and Ulla Savolainen 
(2016) track the roots of the term in late eighteenth-century English, and to its French 
meaning as “kind, sort, style”. Corresponding to its Latin ancestor genus, ‘genre’ came 
to describe assemblages of texts and other objects that share resemblance to their qual-
ities. Since genres focus on the qualities common for multiple items, they communi-
cate not of any single object but of a class, or a category, of objects. As Abrahams 
(2005, p. 53) states: “Genre suggests that the experience of literature and other artistic 
media arises from the set of associations which can be drawn upon both by writers, as 
they compose, and by readers, as they read in an anticipatory fashion… Genre, then, 
                                                 
17 The folkloristic understanding of ‘genre’ has profound similarities with how Goffman (1986 
[1974], p. 24) came to describe the analytical concept of ‘frame.’ Similar to ‘genre,’ ‘frame’ 
describes patterns of sociocultural experience, and how differently organized experiences set 
normative expectations for communicating and encountering particular types of situations. 
Like ‘genre,’ ‘frame’ in Goffman’s writings facilitates expectations for activities and commu-
nication and therefore also contextual meanings and emotional relevancy. 
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suggests patterns of expectation which both artist and audience carry into the social 





Figure 1. Range of levels of interaction between performer and audience in different 
genres of folklore, as printed in Abrahams (2005, p. 45). 
 
Abrahams (2005, pp. 44–69) divides the genres of folklore into four categories based 
on two criteria: the type of involvement a product of a specific genre necessitates from 
the participants, and whether a genre emphasizes conflict o r its resolution. He then 
introduces i) conversational genres, ii) play genres, iii) fictive genres, and iv) static 
genres of folklore (Figure 1). The ‘borders’ between the four categories are not dis-
crete: rather the model describes the genres of folklore as a continuum in the terms of 
range of performer–audience relationships and changes in dramatic focus. I find Abra-
hams’ model valuable for positioning game studies within the folkloristic research 
tradition, and I therefore present this model in more detail. In Abrahams’ view, all of 
these genres bring forth conflict by confronting social and personal problems and by 
attempting to adjust social positioning. Their rhetoric thus revolves around the themes 
of power and domination (Abrahams 2005, pp. 44–51).  
Abrahams (2005, pp. 63–65) divides play genres into three groups. In Play I, 
the play happens quite spontaneously and frequently, and the participating people re-
main closely involved with each other. This group includes riddles, jokes and verbal 
contests as well as many games. Just as conversational genres, the members of Play I 
genres operate according to the principle of back-and-forth movement of interpersonal 
communication. However, riddles and games, for example, oftentimes take place in 
riddling sessions and gaming sessions, and thus they are somewhat removed from 
casual conversation. Furthermore, riddles, games, jokes etc. imply roles of the riddler 
and riddlee, the players, and the joker and the joke-listener.  
In Play II and Play III, we move from free-form back-and-forth interaction 
towards more formalized and less spontaneous expressive culture. In Play II and Play 
III, we have distinctive roles for the players and for the audience. Play II includes 
  
31 
sports, traditional contests and debates, and Play III consists of rituals, role-playing 
games and folk plays. The sense of spontaneity diminishes when we move from Play 
I towards Play III and the fictive genres. As the formality of the genres increase, the 
progression of movement pointing to predetermined resolution becomes more appa-
rent. In Play II, referees, judges and timekeepers appear, enforcing the rules of inter-
action.  
Finally, in Play III, the identification with the conflict occurs vicariously, not 
through the active participation of the players; “When narrative movement is introdu-
ced, the outcome of the story becomes as important as the original conflict situation 
in the strategy of the piece” (ibid., p. 67). The genres of Play III thus emphasize reso-
lution rather than conflict, latter of which is a central element of the conversational 
genres and Plays I and II. In Play III, movements are described more fictively than in 
Plays I and II. Thus, Play III begins to converge into the myths, legends, fairy tales 
and fables of fictive genres.  
By following Diane E. Goldstein (1993), McNeill (2013b) argues that folk-
loristics can be distinguished from its perhaps closest academic discipline of anthro-
pology by the concepts of genre, transmission and tradition. These three methodolog-
ical “tools of a folklorists” are all relevant for folkloristic studies, and can be argued 
to be essential for the skills and training of a researcher of the discipline. As we have 
seen above, ‘genre’ refers to the established practices of both interpreting and enacting 
cultural communication. ‘Genre’ illuminates the distinctive interest of a folklorist to 
understand expressive culture, “the stuff of folklore,” and a performer’s identity and 
motivation to communicate in a particular way.  
Transmission is how expressions of culture move through space and time, 
from a person to another through mostly informal channels. By studying transmission, 
a folklorist investigates performances, contexts of performances and folklore as expe-
rience. Tradition is the social, cultural, material and historical continuity of expressive 
culture and informal transmission processes as understood together. The continuity of 
tradition is built on a dialogical relationship between varied and unvaried, or dynamic 
and stable, which introduces tradition as malleable construct that has intrinsic value 
in the society in which it emerges. As Sandra K. Dolby Stahl (1977, p. 15) writes, 
“‘tradition’ has two interrelated aspects; the first is continuity as opposed to change, 
and the second is collectivity as opposed to individuality.” 
Recall that Espen Aarseth (2014b) argues that game ontology has two dimen-
sions that are inseparable from the essential quality of any game: games are both ob-
jects (cultural artifacts and systems) and processes in which something arises as a 
game through play. We have now seen that the academic discipline of folkloristics 
can be distinguished from its close cousins of anthropology and literary studies by the 
three conceptual tools of a folklorist: genre, transmission, and tradition (Goldstein, 
1993; McNeill, 2013b). The three tools reveal a deep yet largely unexplored synergy 
between folkloristics and game studies. For if the three tools of ‘genre,’ ‘transmis-
sion,’ and ‘tradition’ are what make folkloristics an independent academic discipline, 
then folkloristics may be an exceptionally fit stance for investigating game ontology.  
In the research practices of studying ‘genre,’ a folklorist has the understanding of ex-
amining an object, an artifact, or a system of expressive culture; and in the research 
practices of ‘transmission,’ a folklorist is both methodologically and theoretically 
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equipped to analyze processes of expressing, performing, and experiencing culture. 
Importantly, these two aspects of folkloristic research (‘genre’/‘transmission’) do not 
only correspond to the two ontologies of game (‘object’/‘process’) but are in folklor-
istics studied in a particular fashion—in relation to each other. This is ‘tradition,’ the 
third tool of a folklorist, argued by some to be the most foundational for the discipline 
of folkloristics. 
In this thesis, I aim to demonstrate that the “three tools of folklore” are all 
valuable in game studies. Although games have been studied widely as artistic com-
munication, as implied in the folkloristic understanding of ‘genre,’ the aspects of pro-
cessual transmission in game cultures are much less studied. Furthermore, the per-
spectives of games as artistic communication (‘genre’) and as processes (‘transmis-
sion’) are scarcely, if ever, brought together (‘tradition’) within a single research 
framework. This is, in my view, the most important contribution of folkloristics to 
game studies: its unique capability to focus both on games as aesthetically significant 
objects and as contextual processes of cultural experience. This is to argue that the 
folkloristic toolkit of “genre + transmission = tradition,” as put by McNeill (2013b, p. 
183), makes it possible to examine the two ontologies of games as objects and as 
processes (Aarseth 2014b) as a whole under the even broader concept of games as 
traditions.  
However, folkloristics, just as any one discipline, has limited a capability of 
study games and gameplay. As noted by Sutton-Smith (2001 [1997, pp. 6–7]) studying 
play and games requires interdisciplinary attitude, and anchoring a study on folklor-
istics does not change this requirement. Since folkloristics is able to examine both of 
the game ontologies within the frames of variation, continuity, vernacular, and tradi-
tion, though, I propose that folkloristics is an exceptionally well-suited platform for 
conducting interdisciplinary game studies.  
An important contribution of folkloristics for game studies is that folkloristics 
does not study only one genre of expressive culture but all of them. It is the mission 
of folkloristics not to describe a genre, e.g., ‘game,’ in isolation from the other genres 
but precisely in relation to the other forms of vernacularity; “[O]ne should be able not 
only to point to a class of expressions like proverbs and riddles but also to demonstrate 
how they differ from each other: for example how games differ from rituals and myths 
from Märchen (fairy tales)” (Abrahams, 2005, p. 54). There is scant discussion in 
contemporary game studies on how games relate to other forms of folklore, although 
some studies have highlighted, for example, the similarities between games and rituals 
(e.g., Harviainen, 2012). Folkloristics, instead, has decades of experience of describ-
ing genres in relation to each other, and I argue that a similar research attitude would 
be very valuable for contemporary video game studies as well.   
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2. A VISIT TO GAME STUDIES: 
DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS  
 
Video games come into being when the machine is powered up and 
the software is executed; they exist as enacted (Alexander Galloway, 
2006, p. 2).  
 
 
In this chapter, I relate the thesis to key concepts of game studies literature, including 
the concepts of ‘game’ and ‘play’ (RQ3). Before I can proceed to theoreticize and 
analyze the dynamics of the gameplay experience in Chapter 3, I describe the position 
of the player and how a person may acquire this position. For this latter purpose, I rely 
on the theory of social self by George Herbert Mead (2015 [1934]) and on phenome-
nological and enactive literature.  
My point of departure for situating the current work in relation to prior defi-
nitions of ‘game’ is the reference manual book The Study of Games (1971), edited by 
Elliott M. Avedon and Brian Sutton-Smith. Especially important for the current thesis 
is a section written by Avedon, called The Structural Elements of Games (ibid., pp. 
419–428). Albeit written nearly 50 years ago, I find the argumentation by Avedon still 
relevant for studying both vernacular social games and commercial video games. Alt-
hough this thesis is about video game gameplay experience, video games are games, 
regardless of the fact that they are also software systems and are thus “algorithmic 
cultural objects” as described by Alexander Galloway (2006, p. 6). Where I interpret 
that video games and other games should be described as differentiated phenomena, I 
will explicitly express this need. Otherwise, video games will be considered through-
out this thesis as a special type of games but games nonetheless. 
Avedon (1971) examines the structural elements in games by building on 
writings by G. H. Mead (2015 [1934, pp. 158–159]), who identified five necessary 
characteristics in game structure: a game has a “definitive end to be obtained,” which 
Avedon labels purpose; it consists of action procedures that are both related to each 
other and directed towards the definitive end; these action procedures manifest as in-
teraction patterns, which regulate the interplay between players and the game accord-
ing to predefined rules; and finally, in order to play, a player must take the role of the 
player (Avedon, 1971, pp. 420–421). Avedon adds another five elements to Mead’s 
description of a game’s necessary structure: the number of required players; result or 
pay-off; skills and abilities required for participation; physical setting and; equipment 
needed for playing.  
Avedon and Sutton-Smith (1971) provide another take on the definitional 
characteristics of play and game: play is an “exercise of voluntary control systems” 
(ibid., p. 6), and a game is “an exercise of voluntary control systems in which there is 
an opposition between forces, confined by a procedure and rules in order to produce 
a disequilibrial outcome” (ibid, p. 7). By voluntary control systems, Avedon and Sut-
ton-Smith (1971) refer to an individual’s pursuit of mastery through the, e.g., skillful 




Game scholar Jesper Juul (2001) criticizes the definitions provided both by Avedon 
(1971) and Avedon and Sutton-Smith (1971) by describing the definitions as too 
vague. Juul does not find Avedon’s (1971) list of structural elements of games con-
vincing either. He asks: “Can we tell the interaction patterns from the role of the par-
ticipants,” “Is equipment a bit imprecise since many games (such as Checkers or Man-
cala) can be played with whatever objects are at hand,” and, “Couldn't it be argued 
that the pay-off (such as money) is rather something you can apply to every game—
is chess the same game whether it is played for money or not?” A few years later, in 
his book Half-Real (2005, pp. 6–7), Juul gave his own definition of game, which he 
calls the “classic game model”: 
 
[A] game is 1) a rule-based formal system; 2) with variable and quan-
tifiable outcomes; 3) where different outcomes are assigned different 
values; 4) where the player exerts effort in order to influence the out-
come; 5) the player feels emotionally attached to the outcome; 6) and 
the consequences of the activity are optional and negotiable.  
 
While Juul (2001) is correct in his critique of Avedon’s (1971) definition when he 
notes that Avedon does not specify how the ten elements relate to each other, the 
questions posed by Juul (2001) have, in my reading, an unfortunate tendency towards 
the straw man fallacy. First, Avadon does not imply whether or not the interaction 
patterns could be derived from the roles players take in a game situation. This question 
remains open for investigation. Second, Avadon does not define the qualities that 
make a piece a game piece. He does not claim that one must use “official” pieces but 
only that the function of a set of equipment must be met. Third, surely one can add a 
‘pay-off’ to any game but, again, Avedon (1971) refers to the observation that for 
something to be a game, it must have an outcome. So, chess remains chess also when 
it is played for money, but—according to Avedon (1971)—it is not chess (or even a 
game) without the outcome that is marked by checkmate.  
In my view the “classic game model” by Juul (2005) has more profound prob-
lems to be dealt with than the definition by Avedon. Juul’s (2005, pp. 6–7) model 
begins as a definition of a formal game system and explores what Aarseth (2014b) 
calls the ontology of “games as objects.” When Juul introduces the player, however, 
“where the player exerts effort in order to influence the outcome,” the definition 
crosses ontological boundaries and suddenly discusses “games as processes.” Alt-
hough both “games as objects” and “games as processes” can be observed from a 
third-person stance, which approaches its research subject from an objectivist view-
point—that is, from a perspective that does not take into account the subjective expe-
riences of an experiencer—Juul crosses this border by stating that players are neces-
sarily emotionally attached to the outcome of the game. This latter turn still belongs 
to the ontological context of “games as processes” but investigates it now from a first-
personal phenomenological stance. Just as Aarseth (2014b, p. 484; see also Deterding, 
2013, p. 166) stresses: “Games are both object and process… but the phrase ‘a game’ 
will refer to either one or the other, not both.” In Juul’s definition (2005), ‘game’ not 
only refers to games as objects and processes but also from both third-person and first-
person perspectives, which is another ambiguous quality of the “classic game model.” 
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Rules, Interaction, and Game Mechanics 
 
Of the ten elements of game as proposed by Avedon (1971), only four are considered 
at length in this thesis, namely the position of the player, interaction patterns, action 
procedures and their relation to game mechanics.18 However, I find it imperative to 
shortly discuss game rules, since all of the other themes are related to this overarching 
principle of games. After all, almost every definition of game includes the element of 
rules (see Georges, 1972; Parlett, 1999, p. 3; Salen & Zimmerman, 2004, p. 79; Juul, 
2005, pp. 29–33; Deterding, 2013, p. 156). As Celia Pearce (2009, p. 26) notes, many 
game scholars agree that “a game is a formal system for structured play constrained 
by a set of rules that prescribe the means of achieving a specific goal,” and the dispute 
on the more fine-grained definition is placed on this general foundation.  
In their game design-oriented book, Rules of Play (2004), Katie Salen and 
Eric Zimmerman introduce a distinction between constituative rules and operational 
rules (pp. 130–132). Constituative rules or “foundational rules” are the logical, math-
ematical and abstract formal structure of a game artifact. In video games, foundational 
rules are defined in the code of the game. Operational rules are the guidelines that 
describe how a game is to be played. In contrast to foundational rules, operational 
rules are directed at the players, and these rules can be written in a game instruction 
manual and transmitted orally or through demonstration. Salen and Zimmerman (ibid., 
p. 130) also write about implicit rules, by which they refer to the conventions and 
norms that underlie game conduct, including, e.g., good sportsmanship.  
Linda A. Hughes (1999) has made yet another important distinction that fur-
ther clarifies the implicit rules of a game. In her studies on children’s informal games, 
Hughes writes about basic rules, real rules and social rules. Basic rules are what Salen 
and Zimmerman call operational rules. Real rules, however, are how games are being 
played, and how players appropriate the basic rules of a game in play. Hughes, who 
studied children’s gaming, that is, the processes of how children modulate existing 
games into actual play, added that social rules are present in all acts of gaming (see 
Georges, 1972, p. 174). 
There is no actual video game gameplay without all the four aspects of rules; 
a video game has foundational rules, which are perceivable by the player through 
operationalization, whether this operationalization happens by describing the rules in 
a manual or by showing the player the basic rules during the actual flow of the game-
play. However, whether the player accepts the operative rules of a game, or transforms 
them to better fit her preferences, every instance of gameplay necessarily includes an 
aspect of real rules—a player-centric perception of how the game is played. The 
player brings along the implicit social rules as expectations of how the game should 
be played. As psychologist Jordan B. Peterson (2002, p. 192) notes: “The game itself, 
at its first stages, is played at the procedural level; the rules remain implicit. Once a 
representation of the game has been established, then the game can be shared; later, 
the rules themselves can be altered.”  
 
                                                 
18 I will return to the definition of game mechanics shortly. 
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Deterding (2013, pp. 157–158) has provided an insightful critique on Salen’s and 
Zimmerman’s (2004) understanding of rules from a frame analytic19 stance. He con-
tends that Salen and Zimmerman repeat what he calls “structuralist and cognitivist 
notions of rule-following.” With this, Deterding means that foundational rules are, for 
Salen and Zimmerman, the true formal identity of a game, conceivable by the player 
only through the operational rules, which are introduced as representational expres-
sions of this formal identity. The operational rules, furthermore, are taken as some-
thing that guide the player’s conduct in relation to the game. For Deterding, this ap-
proach is misleading because it implies a hierarchical top-down model from a de-
signed formal game system to the social and cultural experience of the player. Deterd-
ing argues that the operational rules of a game do not “guide” players, but that the 
meaning of these rules should instead be understood from the perspective of how 
players interpret, appropriate and use these rules.  
For Deterding (2013, pp. 157–158), rules are social resources and reference 
points, not algorithms to be executed. The fact that every video game has a formal 
code does not, indeed cannot, be considered separable from always situational and 
indexical human understanding and sense-making. Deterding’s frame analytic stance 
of “games as processes” aims to bring together the first-personal character of experi-
encing games and third-personal perspective of analyzing the situational interaction 
system, whereas Salen’s and Zimmerman’s system analytical and formalist frame-
work studies “games as objects” from a third-personal perspective—which makes 
their objective to investigate “meaningful game experience” rather puzzling.20 This is 
because, and I agree here with Deterding (2013, p. 164): “‘Games,’ like any other 
social entity, are human–environment relations... formalised rules… mean nothing 
without humans.”  
In video games, the game system has rules, but these rules are not necessarily 
presented to the player. Instead, the rules implemented in the code of a video game 
become observable by the player as rule-following outputs, which at least partly de-
pend on rule-following inputs made by the player. In video games, rules are “material 
arrangements that do something” (Deterding, 2013, p. 169) rather than static repre-
sentations that stand for something else within the game system. This description in-
troduces video game rules as how player actions (input) and game effects (output) 
relate to each other. Here, we encounter the concepts of ‘interaction’ and ‘game me-
chanics,’ both of which are important for the current thesis.  
When we move from describing formal characteristics of game artifact (ob-
ject) to discussing game-as-played (process), we necessarily come across the concept 
of ‘interaction,’ or at least related concepts such as ‘interplay’ or ‘coupling.’ Interac-
tion is a contested concept that remains central to video game studies. This is so, re-
gardless of the difficulties of providing a satisfactory definition for this phenomenon 
that can be regarded as a property of a user, a medium and an allopoietic system. Lori 
Landay (2014, p. 173) has provided a definition for interaction that I find useful for 
the current study: “Interaction is an action that occurs as two or more participants 
exchange information (people, artifacts, materials, or machines) that has a reciprocal 
effect on each other.”  
                                                 
19 I will relate this thesis to the frame analytic approach in Chapter 6. 
20 I will return to the subject of ‘meaningful game experience’ many times during this thesis, 
especially in Chapter 6 and Chapter 9. 
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I interpret Landay’s definition as an extended version of Chris Crawford’s (2002, p. 
5) influential characterization according to which interaction is “a cyclic process in 
which two actors alternately listen, think, and speak.” Importantly, Landay adds the 
aspect of reciprocal effect to this definition and thus emphasizes the dynamic nature 
of interaction. In his reading of Janet Murray’s Hamlet on the Holodeck (1997, pp. 6–
10, 74; 2004, p. 2), Ian Bogost (2010, p. 3) reiterates that environments that are inter-
active are participatory and procedural. They are participatory since these environ-
ments remain responsive to (player) inputs. Their core representational mode is pro-
cedural since their organization produces varied behaviors and multiple outcomes 
when set in motion. 
Game mechanics are the rule-defined and designed methods by which players 
interact with games in any given state of gameplay.21 In this description, a ‘method’ 
is understood according to object-oriented programming terminology as “the behav-
iors available to a class,” as specified by game scholar Miguel Sicart (2009). To put it 
differently, a game mechanic is how a player, by taking rule-afforded actions with 
input devices such as a game controller, invokes in-game behaviors that have an effect 
on the state of the game (see Juul, 2005, pp. 59–64). Following Aki Järvinen (2008), 
Miguel Sicart (2009) and Chris Crawford (2013), I concur that game mechanics are 
best expressed by verbs that facilitate a player’s agency during gameplay: “rules are 
normative, while mechanics are performative” (Sicart, 2009; see Järvinen, 2008, p. 
74). Through gameplay, engaging with game mechanics generates patterns of the 
player–game interaction (Salen & Zimmerman, 2004, pp. 316–317). Game mechanics 
are thus the modes of interaction that a game provides for the performative player. 
 
 
Play, and the notion of ‘The Magic Circle’ 
 
The question of whether a game should be understood first and foremost as an object 
that can be played in varied situations or as a process that may or may not include an 
independent game artifact, is related to another influential question: is play a form of 
specific activity or rather a particular type of experiencing the world?  
Thomas Malaby (2007) argues that ‘play’ sustains usefulness as a concept 
that points towards a mode of human experience. For Malaby, similar to Bateson 
(2000 [1955]), play is a stance to be set apart from the immediate environment. This 
introduces play as ‘playfulness,’ i.e., something that the individual brings along with 
her into every situation and not as something internal to any particular situation. In 
contrast to Malaby (2007), Jaakko Stenros (2015) sees play primarily as a type of 
activity. Not unlike Sicart (2014, pp, 1–34), Stenros separates ‘play’ as a type of ac-
tivity from the attitude or mindset of ‘playfulness.’  
Deterding (2013, p. 139), however, contends that one does not have to sepa-
rate play as a type of activity and play as a mode of experience if the phenomenon is 
                                                 
21 Although not all game mechanics in video games are triggered by players but can also be 
invoked by artificial agents within the code (Sicart, 2009), I discuss game mechanics in this 
thesis only in relation to the modes of interaction that take place between a player and a formal 
game system.  
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approached from a frame analytic research perspective. He notes that social interac-
tion structures do not set apart the inner experience from external or environmental 
situations. This means that play as a type of activity entails a particular motivational 
relevance, ethos, and attentive involvement; and playfulness is not only an inner state 
but also a stance that is readily observable in a social situation. Deterding (ibid., p. 
140) concludes that playfulness includes a subjective attitude and an observable “type 
of transformation of activity.” In his view, then, play is not a specific kind of activity 
but a “form of transformation of a source activity,” according to a set of “transforma-
tion rules.” I will return to this description shortly.  
I am not willing to separate playfulness from play activity, but, similar to De-
tarding (2013), I offer that whereas the former term highlights the first-personal per-
spective and the attitude towards the unfolding events, the latter introduces the situa-
tion from a third-person view as something in which playfulness is expected to man-
ifest. The subjective experience of playfulness may be encouraged by the designed 
environmental cues, which is the case with games, but it nevertheless also includes a 
specific attitude towards that which takes place. A distinction between play activity 
and playful attitude is therefore needed, but it depends on the vantage point of the 
researcher whether or not the ‘activity’ and ‘attitude’ of play can be analyzed together.  
I propose that if one engages with a game system with work-like attitude, the 
activity that then takes place is not to be regarded as play. I follow here philosopher 
Bernard Suits (2005 [1978]), and describe this first invariant quality of gameplay ex-
perience as ‘lusory attitude.’ A type of activity such as engaging with a video game is 
not a sufficient quality for gameplay. For a phenomenon to be regarded gameplay, it 
must also include an experiencer who adopts a lusory attitude and continues to em-
brace it during gameplay—“A definite milieu demands a definite attitude”, as Carl 
Gustav Jung wrote (1946, p. 589). This is also to state that taking a lusory attitude 
towards a situation does not yet constitute it as a game-play event. For gameplay to 
emerge, the situation must also include qualities that make distinctive game-play ac-
tivity possible, because “games are a way to organize play” (Abrahams, 2005, p. 98).  
Thus, a border emerges between game as object and game as played, that is, 
game as a process, and this border is impassable for the formal game system but not 
for the player. Although a formal system of a game cannot, by itself, include, e.g., 
purpose, player actions, or a lusory attitude, a player can indeed appropriate the non-
game system she faces as a system of rules, an outcome, game mechanics, physical 
setting, equipment and interface. This is what is meant by saying that, in principle, 
any system can be made into a game, or be gamified. It also means that no artifact in 
itself can be regarded as a complete game without also postulating a subject who en-
gages with this system by adopting a lusory attitude.  
 Let me give an example. A system may fulfill many of Avedon’s (1971) cri-
teria of a formal game but lack, e.g., a clear outcome. For example, the “video games” 
The Sims (Electronic Arts, 2000) and SimCity (Electronic Arts, 1989) lack clear out-
come. This observation highlights that the system in question, i.e., The Sims, is not a 
complete game by itself. But if the player who then engages with the system brings 
along not only a lusory attitude but also her own goals, the system as a whole, that is, 
the game as played, acquires an outcome and can be regarded as a full-blown game. 
Still, although a video game would have a clear end state, for this end state to be 
perceived as a meaningful outcome, we must presuppose an intentional player. I there-
fore suggest the following further categorization of Avedon’s (1971) ten elements, 
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where ‘game as object’ only includes a formal game system, but ‘game as process’ 





Necessary qualities of a ‘game’ 
Ten elements of a game 
(Avedon, 1971) 






Action procedures Game mechanics Player actions 
Outcome Altering game state Outcome 





Number of Players  A Player 
Purpose  Purpose 
Skills and abilities  Skills and Abilities 
Interaction Patterns  Interaction Patterns 
Role of the Player A player position Lusory attitude 
 
Table 1. The ten elements of a game by Avedon (1971), approached from a third-
person viewpoint of formal game system (game as object) and gameplay activity 
(game as process). 
 
In the current study, the formal system of game is understood as a game artifact af-
fording gameplay and providing an “optimised material anchor” (Deterding 2013, p. 
163) for stabilizing the constitution of games. However, a fully developed formal 
game is not a complete game without being played. As Malaby (2007) argues “the 
essential point, then, is that games are grounded in and constituted by human practice 
and are therefore always in the process of becoming” (2007, p. 103). The situated 
activity in which play in general and gameplay in particular manifest through human 
practice is often called ‘the magic circle’ in game studies literature. 
Discussion on the magic circle has its origins in Johann Huizinga’s ground-
breaking work, Homo Ludens (2014 [1950]). In this book, Huizinga (ibid., p. 8) argues 
that “play is not ‘ordinary’ or ‘real,’” but, “a stepping out of ‘real’ life into a temporary 
sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own.” Huizinga described this “tempo-
rary sphere of activity” as distinctive in locality, duration and meaning (ibid., p. 9). 
Huizinga’s description of the magic circle entails two important elements: the element 
of being separated from ordinary life in both spatial and temporal fashion, and that of 
endogenous meaning. Both of these two elements have engendered wide discussions 
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in game studies. Whereas the notion of inherent meaning is generally agreed-upon, 
the portrayal of play as separated from the ordinary is highly debated.  
The critical discussion on the magic circle revolves around how the border 
between play and non-play should be understood—or whether such a border can be 
argued to exist at all. Is the border between play and non-play spatial, temporal, psy-
chological or social, or maybe a combination of these? Stenros (2012; 2015, pp.  
132–137) notes that the border has been interpreted as psychological, which entails 
how play signifies the absence of real danger and a feeling of being detached from 
what takes place in play. Another way to interpret the magic circle is to emphasize 
play as a social contract. Play is open for negotiation and it is sustained by interper-
sonal trust. According to Stenros (ibid.), the magic circle has also been discussed in 
the literature as an arena: a spatial, temporal, conceptual and cultural site for play.  
The basic criticism addressing the concept of ‘the magic circle’ states that the 
“boundary” is to be understood as social and negotiable rather than as spatial and fixed 
(Juul, 2008). However, this argument is not exactly in contrast to Huizinga, who 
wrote: “All play moves and has its being within a playground marked off beforehand 
either materially or ideally, deliberately or as a matter of course” (Huizinga, 2014 
[1950], p. 10). The underlying other criticism furthermore argues that there is no bor-
der at all between play and non-play, and thus the concept of “the magic circle” should 
be discarded altogether (see Salen & Zimmerman, 2004; Taylor, 2006, pp. 151–155; 
Calleja, 2007; Calleja, 2012; Malaby, 2007; Juul, 2008; Liebe, 2008; Consalvo, 2009; 
Nardi, 2010, p. 108; Stenros, 2012; Zimmerman, 2012; Stenros, 2015). 
Regardless of the active academic debate on the subject, the discussion lacks 
versatility. As Deterding (2013) observes, the usages of ‘the magic circle’ are often 
restricted to conceptual analyses without trying to better understand the phenomenon 
to which the metaphorical expression of ‘the magic circle’ refers. This is indeed “the 
basic fallacy of ‘the magic circle’: it abstracts and reifies a game/non-game ‘bound-
ary’ from the process of situated action as some entity existing next to or as an ana-
lytically separable part of this process” (ibid., p. 207).  
As mentioned earlier, the notion of endogenous meaning is generally accepted 
as a recurrent or even a definitional characteristic of play and games. For instance, 
Salen and Zimmerman (2004, p. 332) write that “every game implicitly asserts the 
premise that the value of the game is intrinsic.” To say that a game has endogenous 
meaning is expressed also by stating that games are autotelic. The concept of “au-
totelic” originates from Greek, where ‘auto’ denotes ‘self’ and ‘telos’ refers to ‘goal.’ 
Autotelic activity is thus self-contained in the sense that it is conducted not because 
of some instrumental or external value but “because the doing itself is the reward” 
(Csíkszentmihályi 1990, p. 67). Since the meaning of gameplay is largely intrinsic to 
the activity itself, participating becomes the main driver of engaging with games; 
games are largely means to their own end. Importantly, Klabbers (2009, p. 52) states 
that in order to retain its autotelic character, a game must provide the player with both 
the freedom to act according to her own goals and motivations and the means to do 
so. Thus, a game can be regarded as autotelic only inasmuch as the player retains her 
autonomy as being the player. I return to the concept of autonomy in Chapter 5 and 
later in Chapter 9.  
In a sense, the current thesis is very much about ‘the magic circle’ since the 
main purpose of this study is to better understand how gameplay experiences are con-
stituted. However, my research is related to ‘the magic circle’ in the fashion urged by 
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Deterding (2013). In a study that aims to analyze the couplings between a player and 
a game, postulating a general metaphor to describe these couplings as a whole is not 
necessary or beneficial.  
With the aspects of ‘game’ in Table 1, I explored the original list of ten nec-
essary elements of game by Avedon (1971) through the lens of the two ontologies of 
games as objects and games as processes. The elements listed in Table 1 are therefore 
fundamental components in identifying an object or an activity as game. These com-
ponents, however, do not take into account the first-personal vantage point of the 
player. Instead, they discuss a game object or a game process as readily observable 
from a third-person viewpoint, that is, “outside” the actual experience of playing the 
game. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate aspects of first-person video game 
gameplay experience which renders the list proposed by Avedon (1971) or any other 
third-personal definition of game only orthogonal to the current work. 
 
 
The Self of the Player 
 
For understanding the phenomenon of gameplay, we must not only focus on games 
but equally importantly on the person who takes on the position of the player. Let me 
next specify how I conceptualize the self of the player in this thesis, based on phe-
nomenological enactive literature and writings by George Herbert Mead.  
In Mind, Self & Society (2015 [1934]), Mead discusses the origins of the self. 
According to Mead, “the self” arises from social interaction as an object to itself, 
which entails a reflective position of self-consciousness. Mead argues that one be-
comes an object to herself by assuming the attitudes of other individuals—the gener-
alized other (Ibid., pp. 154–156)—toward herself. The process of becoming an object 
to oneself is made possible through language and signification. We become selves, 
not by individual right, but in the virtue of our relation to others. 
The activity of reflecting upon oneself is simultaneously an experience of 
subjectivity and of communality, which Mead coins consequently as “I” and “me” 
perspectives of self-consciousness. Internalization of the generalized other is how so-
cial meaning-making and cultural signification comes forth. This is the “me” aspect 
of the self, and it encompasses how social processes influence the subject’s behavior 
through institutions, practices and control. “I”, in contrast, is the constantly present 
initiative aspect of the self; it is the freedom, self-expressivity and immediate agency 
of an individual. In the self-referential processes of oneself—such as in reflective and 
reflexive thinking or in imaging—“I” can modify the social process itself but this 
change is conceivable only in relation to the “me” as a perspective of the generalized 
other and as a conventional, habitual individual. There is thus a constant self-reflective 
inner dialogue between the enacting and novel “I” and the structure and form that is 
“me” (Mead, 2015 [1934], pp. 173–186). 
Philosopher Dan Zahavi (2014, pp. 10, 36, 95) goes against social construc-
tivism, which argues that the self is entirely negotiated and constructed in social in-
teractions. Instead, he argues for experiential self, which is defined as the very sub-
jectivity of experience. Zahavi’s notion of experiential self is strongly rooted in Hus-
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serl’s phenomenology, and that of Sartre’s. He contends that the self is first and fore-
most experience-based, and that this minimal experiential self is a necessary precon-
dition for the socially constructed self. Experiential self is pre-reflective self-con-
sciousness, which renders the reflection possible, as Sartre argued (Sartre, 2003 
[1957], p. 9).  
Pre-reflective self-consciousness prevails independently from the reflective 
self-consciousness and has therefore priority over the latter. “Prereflective experience 
is logically prior to reflection, for reflection presupposes something to reflect upon; 
and it is temporally prior to reflection, for what one reflects upon is a hitherto unre-
flected experience” (Thompson, 2007, p. 250). Pre-reflective bodily consciousness of 
selfhood, or ipseity (Sartre, 2003 [1957], p. 126; Zahavi, 2005, p. 115) is the phenom-
enal presence of self-consciousness in experiential life. Experiential self-conscious-
ness is not something unique to humans but instead given to all phenomenally con-
scious creatures. “Although I live through various different experiences, there is con-
sequently something that remains the same, namely, their first-personal character. All 
the different experiences are characterized by a dimension of mineness, or for-me-
ness, and we should distinguish the plurality of changing experiences from their per-
sisting dative of manifestation” (Zahavi, 2014, pp. 18–19). 
The mineness of experience does not refer to specific content in question but 
to the first-personal presence of experientiality. It is a constitutive, subjective aspect 
of every experience. In phenomenology, constitution is the process by which objects 
appear as they are and come to have meanings. For an object to appear, we have to 
also postulate a consciousness for whom the objects present themselves: “without 
consciousness, no appearance” (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 26). The fact that expe-
riences are given to me first-personally makes these experiences mine: my experien-
tial life is distinguishable from the experiential life of others most fundamentally be-
cause of the for-me-ness instead of their specific content (see Zahavi, 2014).  
It is of paramount importance to clarify that in existence is not only reflective 
self-consciousness that renders possible to understand oneself as an object and thus 
engage with me–I dialogue. Just as profoundly, the experiential pre-reflective self, the 
lived-through-experience, exists and precedes reflection. We are pre-reflectively self-
aware of our experience, but we do not tend to attend to it. When we do, we do it 
through reflection (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008).  
In the current thesis, ‘the self’ is conceptualized consisting of the minimal 
experiential self and the narrative extended self. Self-experience in the minimal expe-
riential sense equals to being pre-reflectively aware of our own consciousness when 
we are engaged with the world and its temporality. Self-experience in the narrative or 
extended sense is being self-reflectively aware of oneself (Zahavi, 2005, p. 129). We 
manifest our consciousness to ourselves in narrative practices, we make sense of our 
experiences through self-narration as Shaun Gallagher and Yanna B. Popova have 
argued (Gallagher, 2014; Popova, 2014).  
Why is this significant for studying gameplay experience? I propose that for 
understanding the position of the player, her identity as the player, as well as how 
emotions emerge to herself during video game gameplay,22 we must understand that 
                                                 
22 This is a widely studied subject in contemporary game studies. For instance, Jonathan Frome 
(2007) notes that the majority of video game scholars are interested in understanding the ways 
by which video games are able to induce emotions. 
  
43 
the conscious self is both non-reflective (minimal) and reflective (narrative). I contend 
that video game gameplay necessitates both self-reflective practice of the narrative 
self, and the pre-reflective experience of the experiential self. Without pre-reflective 
experiences, we could not distinguish the subjectivity of our gameplay experiences. 
Without self-reflective practice, we could not consciously play a game—“We cannot 
play if we are not conscious of playing” (Arsenault & Perron, 2009, p. 111). 
Mead (2015 [1934], pp. 144–164) tracked down the differences between 
‘play’ and ‘game’ by investigating the origins of the social self. In play, a person plays 
at something, such as playing at being a doctor or being a mother, in other words, by 
taking on a social role of the other. In a game, however, it is not enough to take on the 
role of the other. Instead, one has to take on the role of everyone else, i.e., play as 
being something. For Mead, play and game represent a continuity of the social self, 
from being able to take on a role to having the self-reflective understanding of the 
organizational dynamics and structure of different roles as a unit or community. 
To adopt the position of a player, one has to be able to situate oneself as an 
object, as an intentional other and thereby take a third-person view on oneself. It is, 
in the words by Bernard Suits (2005 [1978]), to embrace a lusory attitude, which im-
plies an intention and aboutness of il-lusion (literally: “in-play” and beginning of a 
game). In other words, a lusory attitude both enables and holds gameplay together 
(Huizinga, 2014 [1950], p. 11; Caillois, 2001 [1961], p. 19; Deterding, 2013, p. 30). 
Taking on a lusory attitude is oftentimes all that is needed for license to play, that is, 
for permission to interact according to a predefined set of regularities (Abrahams, 
2005, p. 92).  
 
 
Discussion: Metacommunicative Play? 
 
Now that I have specified how the self of the player is understood in the enactive 
phenomenological stance of this thesis, let me return to Deterding’s (2013, p. 140) 
description of play as a “form of transformation of a source activity.” For if we con-
ceptualize play in a similar way as Deterding, we postulate play as a profoundly met-
acommunicative practice, which leads us to the writings by Gregory Bateson.  
In 1955, an important article called “A Theory of Play and Fantasy” by Greg-
ory Bateson was published (2000 [1955]). In this paper—as well as in another article, 
The Message “This is Play”, which was published a year later (1971 [1956])—
Bateson famously argued that human communication operates on different levels of 
abstraction. The levels include the denotative level of the ‘surface meaning,’ that is, 
how the inherent qualities of an object are directly available for perception, the met-
alinguistic level in which the messages concern language, and the metacommunicative 
level where the subject of discourse is the communication between individuals.  
Bateson (2000 [1955], pp. 178–179) gave play as a prime example of a met-
acommunicative practice: “This phenomenon, play, could only occur if the participant 
organism were capable of some degree of metacommunication, i.e., of exchanging 
signals which would carry the message ‘this is play,’” and continued (1971 [1956], p. 
265) to say, “[P]lay itself is a category of behavior, classified by context.” Since the 
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publication of the abovementioned papers, the Batesonian idea of play as a meta-
communicative frame has been discussed and endorsed by many game scholars (e.g., 
Goffman, 1986 [1974]; Schwartzman, 1979, p. 169; Sutton-Smith & Kelly-Byrne, 
1984; Sutton-Smith, 2001 [1997]; Salen & Zimmerman, 2004, pp. 371–372; Deterd-
ing, 2013; Nachmanovitch, 2009; Stenros, 2012). 23  
In his studies of animal behavior in Fleishhacker Zoo in San Francisco, 
Bateson realized that the message “this is play” generates a paradox of a Russellian 
or Epimenides type: “These actions in which we now engage do not denote what those 
actions for which they stand would denote” (2000 [1955], p. 180). An oft-cited exam-
ple by Bateson is how a nip by a dog denotes the bite but not what would be denoted 
by the bite. These observations led Bateson to suggest that play may have been an 
important phase in the evolution of communication. Bateson continued to stress that 
play is not paradoxical only on the usage of the word ‘denote’ on two different levels 
of abstraction, but also because the bite in play is fictional: “Not only do the playing 
animals not quite mean what they are saying but, also, they are usually communicating 
about something that does not exist” (ibid., p. 182).  
According to these two criteria, play establishes its own paradoxical meta-
communicative system of premises or expectations, that is the play frame, that distin-
guishes play from non-play; “the frame is involved in the evaluation of the messages 
which it contains, or the frame merely assists the mind in understanding the contained 
messages by reminding the thinker that these messages are mutually relevant and the 
messages outside the frame may be ignored” (ibid., p. 188). Thus, Bateson argued that 
in animal play, three types of messages emerge, the “mood-signs” that elicit automatic 
responses to, e.g., olfactory signs; the “messages which simulate mood-signs” or do 
not denote what which they seem like they would denote; and messages that com-
municate the ‘frames’ or modes of communication, e.g., “this is play” or “I am only 
joking.” Bateson’s (2002 [1979], p. 116) studies on behavior of monkeys, dogs, dol-
phins, river otters and other nonhuman mammals in the 1950s led him to conclude 
that mammals recognize play as a type of communicative activity and are thus able to 
classify their types of interchange on a metacommunicative level.  
In this thesis, I have adopted a stance similar to Mead’s (2015 [1934]) by 
proposing that a player of a game plays as being something, whereas in a non-gaming 
play-activity a person plays at something. Mead’s understanding of playing at some-
thing may seem congenial with Bateson’s well-known portrayal of play as a meta-
communicative event—“This is play” (Bateson 2000 [1955], p. 180)—but I suggest 
that this might be too quick of a conclusion.  
When Bateson argues that a playful bite denotes, or stands for, a bite but not 
what a bite would denote, we enter the realm of symbolic representation. In such a 
situation, we have a perception of ‘a bite,’ which posits context-dependent, or first-
order, indexical meaning: “there is biting going on.” We also have a second-order 
indexicality, which concerns the metapragmatic meanings. On this second-order level 
of indexical meaning, what is perceived here re-presents or stands in for meanings 
absent from the ongoing situation. To argue that something is metacommunicative for 
a subject is therefore to say that meanings are not only indexically present for the 
subject in the situation at hand but also present as absent, i.e., symbolically present. If 
                                                 
23 See especially Deterding (2013, pp. 54–56) for an intriguing discussion of Bateson’s theory 
on play as metacommunication. 
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this is correct and if we agree with Bateson that all play is metacommunicative, then 
we must thereby accept that all creatures that play are capable of operating with “ludic 
symbols.” But is this conclusion acceptable?  
In Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood (1962 [1951]), Jean Piaget ex-
amined the relationships between ‘assimilative play’ and ‘accommodative imitation’ 
in the development of symbolic thought and conceptual thinking. He presented a clas-
sification of games into practice games, symbolic games, and games with rules, based 
on their function in the development of the human mind. According to Piaget (ibid., 
p. 3), representation arises from the permanent equilibrium between assimilative and 
accommodative practices. Only through both accommodation (imitation) and assimi-
lation (play), a subject is able to move beyond the immediate present to constitute 
symbolic functions. In other words, for Piaget, primordial play is not metacommuni-
cative, but it is only through play and imitation that we become able to metacommuni-
cate with concepts and symbolic relations. Play thus exists even before the ‘develop-
mental stage’ in which representation becomes possible. Practice games put into ac-
tion learned skills and behaviors without “modification of their structure.” These ex-
ercises (ibid., p. 113) do not include symbols, rules or make-believe. Instead they are 
merely reproductions of learned behavior and play with what is immediately present 
and available to the subject: 
 
Kittens which fight with their mother and bite without hurting her are 
not “pretending” to fight, since they do not know what real fighting 
is... When a kitten runs after a dead leaf or a ball of wool, we have no 
reason to suppose that these objects represent mice for it. When a cat 
plays with her kitten, using claws and teeth, she knows, of course, 
that the fight is not in earnest, but there is no need to explain it by 
saying that the cat imagines what the fight would be if it were real… 
The ball that the kitten runs after is merely an objective, and when he 
pushes it he is merely giving himself the opportunity to go running 
(Piaget, 1962 [1951], pp. 100, 110–111). 
 
I concur here with Piaget: we do not need to postulate an awareness of “playing a 
part” or “make-believe” to primordial play since the situation in which the activity is 
conducted provides the reason for the emergence of such a “practice game.” Similar 
to animals, humans begin their personal history of play with practice games, already 
during the first months of their life. In their cognitive development, children begin 
symbolic games (during the second year, Piaget, 1962 [1951], p. 142), which imply 
representation of an absent object and make-believe. Here the connection between a 
play object, such as a rock, and what it represents, ‘a car,’ for example, is entirely 
subjective; this is the emergence of the ludic symbol (ibid., p. 119). In a ludic symbol, 
what is imitated is related to the absent object instead of the present object and is thus 
assimilated for play (ibid., p. 103).  
Furthermore, Piaget (ibid., p. 112) argued that there is a phase of symbol in 
action, which can be understood as a transitional stage between practice games and 
symbolic games proper. In symbol in action, a child imitates, e.g., the activity of going 
to sleep first at the sight of his pillow and later with other objects. For Piaget, this 
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process of engaging freely with familiar activities (assimilation) by distancing the ac-
tivities from their immediate object-relations marks the beginning of representation. 
However, the process begins with what Piaget (ibid., p. 163) called “indices,” and 
what I call indexicals. Through indices, a child recognizes objects and relationships, 
but not yet the distinction between ‘signifier’ and ‘signified,’ which is enabled only 
through developed language skills and concepts.  
When symbolic understanding is achieved, it does not replace the sensory-
motor knowledge, but subordinates it instead—“Most symbolic games… are therefore 
both sensory-motor and symbolic, but we call them symbolic when the symbolism 
integrates the other elements.” Finally, in games with rules (ages 4–7), we find the 
sense of regularity and social order, established by intersubjective relationships. These 
games are “ludic activity of the socialized being.” (Piaget 1962 [1951], p. 142). Cru-
cially, Piaget (ibid., p. 113) argued that the three classes of games, practice games, 
symbolic games and games with rules correspond with the sensory-motor, represen-
tational and reflective forms of intelligence. Here, we can return to Mead and Bateson.  
I suggest that Piaget’s model of three categories of games and their corre-
sponding forms of intelligences dovetails with Mead’s theory of distinguishing play 
and game in the emergence of the social self. However, I also propose that both of 
these theories contradict Bateson’s view on metacommunicative play. When Mead 
(2015 [1934]) wrote about play as playing at something, he referred to what Piaget 
(1962 [1951]) later came to call ‘symbol in action’ and symbolic games. Here, the 
person who plays engages with play of representation in a nonreflective manner. The 
subject does accommodate oneself to the social rule-based order of a game, i.e, gen-
eralized other, but evokes the absent meanings and roles to her assimilative play. 
Games with rules introduce a change into this, since in these games the person must 
reflect on oneself as being a representative of the social reality established by the 
game. This becomes possible only through self-reflection and the knowledge of the 
position of the player.24  
When a subject is capable of communicating about communication, the sub-
ject has acquired the skill of representation and quite possibly the skill of reflection as 
well. However, as was already revealed by Piaget (1962 [1951]), most of the animals 
do not ever enter the realm of representation. Furthermore, other than humans, no 
animal seem to enter the realm of reflection, where playing as trying-out transforms 
into trying-on different selves (see Abrahams, 2005, p. 109), and finally into trying-
on different selves in a system of regulations and rules, i.e., gameplay. Consider the 
ruminations by philosophers Harry G. Frankfurt (1998) and Christine Korsgaard 
(2011).  
 
They (men) are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences 
and purposes, from what they are... No animal other than man, how-
ever, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is 
manifested in the formation of [these] second-order desires (Frank-
furt, 1998, pp. 12–13). 
 
                                                 




[A]n animal does not choose the principles of his own causality—he 
does not choose the contents of his instincts. We human beings on the 
other hand do choose the principles of our own causality (Korsgaard, 
2011, p. 108). 
 
Piaget’s take on practice games and symbolic games is further supported by enactiv-
ism. In their recent article on pretend play, Zuzanna Rucinska and Ellen Reijmers 
(2015) argue that treating one object as another does not necessarily require more than 
active exploration of objects that are present in the playful situation. In this view, we 
do not have to postulate metacommunication to primordial play, but contextual af-
fordances, i.e., possibilities for action, for the skillful subject. “[W]e can think of ob-
jects as affording novel possibilities in and through the play… these possibilities de-
pend on the actor’s sensorimotor skills and dispositions, as well as on the object’s 
properties” (Rucinska & Reijmers, 2015). In my reading, this is congenial with the 
philosophical stance of Shaun Gallagher (2005, pp. 224, 247), who defends a view 
according to which we oftentimes have understanding of others’ intentions because 
their intentions are embodied and expressed in their perceivable actions that make 
direct sense to our own skills and abilities to act. For this to happen, it is not necessary 
to postulate the premise of metacommunication; we are able to directly perceive our 
own action possibilities in the conduct of others.  
In enactive, Piagetian and Meadian understanding, playing at something is 
also possible for autonomous agents who do not exhibit developed languaging skills 
that encompass metacommunication. As a conclusion, I would like to propose that 
perhaps primordial play is not metacommunicative. However, when we enter the 
realm of symbolic communication, play does arise as metacommunicative. Thus, I do 
not suggest that human play, or any gameplay, would not be metacommunicative after 
early childhood. Rather, the onset of play does not communicate about communica-
tion, and therefore primoridial play retains its identity primarily as an activity. This is 
again in contrast with Bateson (Stevens & Bateson, 1979, p. 2), who wrote: “‘play,’ 
‘exploration’ cannot be acts or activities because they do not follow the ordinary rules 
of reinforcement characteristic of acts” (see also Schwartzman, 1979, p. 23; Nachma-
novitch, 2009).  
When Piaget wrote about how play develops from mere assimilation (practice 
games) towards play with the relations between assimilation and accommodation 
(symbolic games) and with alternative regularities or patterns of represented accom-
modation (games with rules), he accurately described how play retains its identity as 
an activity, regardless of whether it is metacommunicative or not. This is because, for 
Piaget, all play was assimilation over accommodation—appropriating the immedia-
tely present objects and relations by distancing them from the requirements of accom-
modation. In the view he held, practice games are communicative activities of assi-
milating the objects at hand; symbolic games are metacommunicative activities of 
assimilating the objects at hand as representatives of the absent; and games with rules 
are metacommunicative activities of assimilating oneself (reflective act) and the ob-
ject at hand as representative of the absent patterns or regulations. In my reading, 
Sutton-Smith (2001 [1997], p. 23) agreed with this view when he stated that: “[P]lay 
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is both a kind of communication (a [metacommunicative] mode) and also a kind of 
action.” 
Although many animals are known to play, and some primates have even been 
known to play video games, I suggest that non-human play may be profoundly differ-
ent from human play after early childhood. My proposal is thus that it can be mislead-
ing to assume that non-human animal play and human play, after the first year of 
childhood, are profoundly similar phenomena, although they do form a clear contin-
uum. Whereas many non-human animals play at something, we humans also play at 
being something (symbolic games) and, in game-play, as being something else than 
we otherwise are (games with rules). As Peterson (2002, p. 291) writes: “Abstract 
thinking in general, and abstract moral thinking in particular, is play: the game, ‘what 
if?’ Next, I proceed to investigate what kind of modes the player’s quality of “at being 






3. PLAYER PREFERENCES IN VIDEO GAME 
GAMEPLAY MOTIFEMES25 
 
The study of every unit of social organization must eventually lead to 




Gameplay is a widely used vernacular emic term in gaming cultures. For game devel-
opers as well as players, “good gameplay” indicates that a specific game is worth 
playing. As Laura Ermi and Frans Mäyrä (2007, p. 91) observe, gameplay is used in 
contemporary video game cultures to characterize the essential, yet fleeting, quality 
that defines a game as a game. They give a description of gameplay experience as “an 
ensemble made up of the player’s sensations, thoughts, feelings, actions, and mean-
ing-making in a gameplay setting.”26  
The importance of the popular concept of gameplay is displayed by Graeme 
Kirkpatrick (2012; 2013), who has shown that, since the mid-1980s, the concept has 
remained constitutive for recognizing gaming as autonomous cultural practice. Mi-
chael Mateas and Andrew Stern (2000, p. 643) indeed maintain that, “[t]he ephemeral 
quality of gameplay, the experience of manipulating elements within a responsive, 
rule-driven world, is still the raison d’être of games, perhaps the primary phenomeno-
logical feature that uniquely identifies the computer game as a medium.” 
As a research concept, however, gameplay has remained elusive and difficult 
to define. Some researchers doubt that a full clarification of the concept is even pos-
sible (Kirkpatrick, 2013, p. 167; Shinkle, 2008, p. 909). Olli Leino (2012, pp. 58–59) 
argues that the elusiveness of gameplay is due to the ontological hybridity and tem-
porality of the phenomenon; gameplay overlaps the domains of subjective experience, 
activity, and technological materiality.  
Most typically, gameplay is referred to as the interaction that takes place be-
tween the game and the player (see Landay, 2014). Richard Rouse (2001, p. xviii) 
states  that gameplay is equivalent to the modes of interaction in the game, including 
how the player can navigate the gameworld and how the game reacts to the player’s 
choices. Game designer and researcher Ernest Adams (2014, p. 9) has defined game-
play as the interplay between “the challenges that a player must face to arrive at the 
object of the game” and “the actions that the player is permitted to take to address 
those challenges.” Furthermore, Adams argues that gameplay is to be distinguished 
from the fictional gameworld. According to him (ibid., pp. 9, 16–17), gameplay arises 
from the fictional setup and the role afforded for the player. Scott Miller describes 
                                                 
25 The main findings of Study 1 in this chapter have been published earlier in the article, Game 
Dynamic Preference Factors and Player Types, by Vahlo et al. (2017). 
26 I return to the concept of ‘gameplay experience’ frequently as this thesis proceeds, as un-
derstanding both the invariant and changing experiential qualities of playing video games is 
indeed the very mission of the current work. At the moment, the definition proposed by Ermi 
and Mäyrä (2007) suffices a starting point to begin my investigation.  
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gameplay as being what you do as the participatory player (Scott Miller, in Newman 
& Simons 2004, p. 76; cf. Aarseth 2004, p. 48).27  
Jesper Juul (2005, pp. 83, 88) emphasizes the importance of understanding 
gameplay as the way that a game is played instead of equating the concept with rules 
or game fiction, that is, gameplay is an interaction between game rules, the player(s) 
pursuit of the goal, and the competence of the player and his or her repertoire for play 
strategies. Alexander Galloway (2006, p. 5) has noted also that “much of gameplay, 
the two actions (machine actions and operator [i.e., player] actions) exist as a unified, 
single phenomenon, even if they are distinguishable for the purposes of analysis.”  
For Bonnie Nardi (2010, p. 104) gameplay “is an identifiable human activity 
whose structure includes both subjective dispositions, such as a sense of freedom, and 
specific cultural constructs such as rules.” Landay (2014, p. 174) suggests that game-
play comprises the interactivity of the game system, the medium, and the user, and 
also deals with the concepts of user agency and immersion. Kristine Jørgensen (2008) 
further writes that “[G]ameplay is… an emergent aspect of interaction between the 
game system and the player’s strategies and problem solving processes... gameplay is 
how the game is played.” Thus, gameplay cannot be designed explicitly but rather 
enabled, restricted and facilitated through game mechanics (Jørgensen 2013, p. 33).  
To date, only a few full-blown attempts to define the concept ‘gameplay’ for 
research purposes have been made. In one such undertaking, Dominic Arsenault and 
Bernard Perron (2009, pp. 110–119) pointed out that gameplay should not be equated 
with spatial usages of the metaphor of ‘the magic circle,’ where a certain space is 
argued to demarcate play activity from non-play activity. In this view, a video game 
can be described as a symbiosis between the game and the gamer that consists of 
recursiveness and its own internal dynamics. 
I continue the analysis of the concept of gameplay in Chapter 5, where I de-
velop an enactive account on the phenomenon of single-player gameplay. In the cur-
rent chapter, however, I empirically examine the modes of interaction video games 
provide for players, and players’ preferences in video games that consist of specific 
dynamics (RQ2). Also in this chapter, I analyze statistical data that was collected dur-
ing the research project Play for Reward (see Acknowledgements). 
The mechanics of a given game are defined in the rules of that game; when 
we act according to the rules of the game, we invoke its mechanics, which generates 
effects in the game environment. For example, if I press button X on my game con-
troller, my character in the game picks up an item in front of him. The mechanic trig-
gered by my action of pressing X is thus “pick up.” When we play a game, we do not 
experience an isolated game mechanic as meaningful. A mechanic arises as meaning-
ful only in sustained player–game coupling. When a player plays a racing video game, 
for instance Forza 6 Motorsport (Microsoft Studios, 2015), she does not experience 
just steering the car (a mechanic), changing its gears (another mechanic) and braking 
                                                 
27 However, as several scholars such as Dovey and Kennedy (2006, pp. 89–93) have argued, 
the aesthetic qualities of a played character clearly have an impact on the experienced game-




(yet another mechanic), or even steering+changing gears+braking as a set of mechan-
ics.28 What she experiences is driving the car. The quality of ‘driving’ in this example 
is not a mechanic of the game but a dynamic.29  
Game dynamics emerge from game mechanics (LeBlanc, 2004) when multi-
ple game mechanics are triggered by continued player performance. “Game dynamics 
describe the run-time behavior of the mechanics action on player inputs and each 
other’s outputs over time” (Hunicke et al., 2004). Emergence comes forth in complex 
systems when they are set in motion. Game dynamics are thus designed to emerge 
from the game artifact in gameplay. As such, game dynamics are indeed characteris-
tics of the video game system but perceivable only when the game is conceptualized 
as a dynamic game-as-played. Similar to game dynamics, purposeful and motivational 
player performances do not emerge from player actions without the reciprocal player–
game coupling, but through this very reciprocity.    
On the level of a game mechanic, player participation can be described as an 
action. An action player takes has an effect on the ongoing gameplay. However, on 
the level of game dynamics, player participation is considered performance.30 Sus-
tained performative activity from the player causes a correspondent event in the game-
play. We cannot perform well or poorly if we consider just one player action or even 
several actions and the corresponding mechanic or mechanics. The player merely trig-
gers a mechanic or a set of mechanics to cause an effect, or she does not. Skill and 
expressivity arise only through sustained gameplay. Gameplay consists therefore of 
player performances, game dynamics and gameplay activities, which emerge from the 
actions in which the player enacts interrelated game mechanics (see Figure 2). The 
gameplay of Forza 6 comprises, e.g., gameplay activities of tuning the car, racing at 
a high speed, and collecting rare vehicles. Each of these activities consists of multiple 
gameplay practices, established by the game mechanics, frequently triggered by 
player actions.31   
                                                 
28 Sicart (2009) has discussed “compound game mechanics” as sets of game mechanics that 
are related to each other and thus frame a specific player–game interaction mode. However, I 
prefer to separate game dynamics from the “compound game mechanics” because the term 
‘dynamics,’ in contrast to ‘mechanics,’ refers directly to the changes that take place through a 
pattern of time. 
29 A ‘game dynamic’ is not to be equated with ‘emergent gameplay’ or ‘gameplay dynamics,’ 
which are both used in literature to describe complex patterns of the player’s and the game’s 
behavior that the rules and mechanics make possible. For instance, bluffing can be regarded 
as a form of emergent gameplay/gameplay dynamics in poker (see Salen & Zimmerman, 
2004). The experience of ghosts teaming up in the classic arcade game Pacman (Namco, 1980) 
is an example of emergent behavior that arises from the complexity of interactions between 
game mechanics (Adams & Dormans, 2012, p. 55). 
30 I return to the concept of performance in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
31 According to Adams (2014, pp. 40–42, 263), video games are structured into differentiated 
subsets of their complete gameplay, supported and facilitated with a particular user interface 
and camera mode. He coins these subsets as gameplay modes that provide the players concep-
tually related and consistent challenges and actions. As a concept, ‘gameplay mode’ is closely 
related to my understanding of game dynamics. However, a given gameplay mode can consist 
of several game dynamics and enable several gameplay activities for the players, and thus the 




Figure 2. Gameplay Emergence Model. A chart on how gameplay practices, game-
play activities and gameplay as a whole emerge from sustained reciprocity between a 
player and a digital game through time (see Vahlo et al., 2017). 
 
I associate the terms ‘action’ and ‘activity’ with activity theoretical approach as pre-
sented by Victor Kaptelinin and Bonnie Nardi (2006). A core argument of activity 
theory is that human consciousness is realized in practical, object-oriented activities 
and in our participatory agency. Activity theory understands activities as purposeful, 
motivated, and mediated interactions between an individual and its surroundings. 
Thus, activity as the basic unit of analysis is argued as a way to understand both the 
subject and the object.  
According to activity theory, each activity can be analyzed as consisting of 
three levels: 1) purposeful activity, which is oriented toward an object of desire; 2) 
actions directed by our immediate goals and; 3) operations that are our routine pro-
cesses by which we adjust our situated actions (Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006, pp. 59–70). 
These differentiated levels of activity can transform into one another. I suggest that 
when a player begins to play a game, she enacts the activity of gameplay in which the 
gameplay itself arises as the desired object. During the gameplay, however, new ac-
tivities and desirable objects may emerge from the reciprocity between game dynam-
ics and purposeful player performance (see Figure 2). Similar to the activity theoreti-
cal account by Kaptelinin and Nardi (2006), I define gameplay activities as purposeful 
participatory processes from which meaningful experiences may emerge.  
It is important to emphasize that in what follows, I utilize the terms ‘gameplay 
activity,’ ‘performance’ and ‘game dynamic (event)’ almost interchangeably. With all 
three of these concepts I refer to a purposeful phase in ongoing gameplay between a 
player and a game system. The only difference between these terms is that when I 
mention performance, I emphasize the player’s agency and its first-personal charac-
teristics, and when I write about dynamics, I refer to what emerges in the formal game 
system during gameplay. A gameplay activity is the combination of a player perfor-
mance and a game dynamic, and it thus answers the question: “What is going on dur-
ing a gaming session?”  
Gameplay Activity 
(racing at a high speed)
Gameplay Practice





































I approach game dynamics as traditions to reconstruct a player’s performances into 
rule-afforded models of vernacular imagination. In what follows, I present an empir-
ical study on the dynamics of video game gameplay and argue that these dynamics 
constitute a fundamental aspect of the morphology of video game gameplay. For this 




Revisiting Alan Dundes’ Game Morphology 
 
In 1964, Alan Dundes published an important article On Game Morphology: A Study 
of the Structure of Non-Verbal Folklore. Dundes suggested that children’s games are 
structurally similar to folktales and that this observation could be validated by con-
ducting structural analyses on the patterns found in games and by then comparing the 
results with the constituents of folktales.32 In this original study, Dundes stressed that 
“the application and the interrelationship of [the definite limiting rules] result in an 
ordered sequence of actions by the players, and these action sequences constitute the 
essential structure of any particular game” (Dundes, 2007 [1964], p. 156). 
 Dundes stated that any study on the structure of folklore must begin by delin-
eating a minimum structural unit. He proposed that in the case of games this unit is 
motifeme, or “a unit of action,” which was earlier utilized in structural studies of 
folktales. He was aware that games differ from folktales by typically offering what he 
called two-dimensional series of actions instead of unidimensionality found from 
folktales. With the concept of two-dimensionality, Dundes pointed that in children’s 
games one can oftentimes play as the protagonist or as the villain and thus both di-
mensions and vantage points to act are feasible. In contrast to this, in folktales the 
events between a protagonist and a villain are described from a fixed perspective. 
Provocatively, Dundes argued that “a folktale is, therefore, a two-dimensional series 
of actions displayed on a one-dimensional track, or, conversely, a game is, structurally 
speaking, a two-dimensional folktale” (Dundes, 2007 [1964], p. 156). 
Dundes’ structural analysis on games was a remodeling of Russian folklorist 
Vladimir Propp’s Morphology of the Folktale (1968 [1928]). Dundes, however, rela-
beled Propps’s functions of folktales33 as motifemes and allomotifs to relate these 
terms to motifs of folklore. In folkloristics at the time, motifs were generally consid-
ered to be the minimal unit of folkloristic analysis. Motifs are features of a product of 
folklore, indexed originally in the “Tale Type index” by Antti Aarne (1910) and Mo-
tif-index by Aarne and Stith Thompson (1961 [1928]). According to Simon J. Bronner 
(2007, p. 88), in the rhetoric of “motif” and “type,” key objects and incidents, such as 
                                                 
32 Dundes was not the only one making a comparison between games and folktales. John. M. 
Roberts, Brian Sutton-Smith and Adam Kendon (1963, p. 185) stated that: “Folk tales and 
games are quite different media of expression, but they are similar in that they model or rep-
resent behaviors occurring in other settings, both real and imaginary.”   
33 Frog, Koski and Savolainen (2016, p. 17) have suggested that Propp’s approach can be con-
ceptualized in the light of more contemporary text analyses as “generative grammar of narra-
tion, with a limited number of structural units that will occur in a predictable organization”. 
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a “glass shoe,” were treated as building blocks or components for stories and imagi-
nation. These motifs could then be organized and reorganized into a variety of themes 
and tale types worldwide. 
Both Propp (1968 [1928]) and later Dundes (2007 [1962]; 2007 [1964]) crit-
icized classifications based on non-structural component units of a narrative, and pro-
posed instead the usage of functions as minimal units in narrative. According to Propp 
(1968 [1928], pp. 9–10), functions are constantly occurring fundamental elements of 
tales, independent of who conducts them and how. A function is to be understood as 
“an act of a character, defined from the point of view of its significance for the course 
of the action.”  
 Dundes illuminated the distinction between motifemes and motifs by apply-
ing Kenneth L. Pike’s (1954) concepts of ‘etic’ and ‘emic.’ Etic constructs for Pike 
were the analytical categories fashioned by researchers and analysts to handle cross-
cultural comparative data, whereas by emic constructs Pike referred to the particular 
events within the cultural system in which they manifest and have their specific sig-
nificance. For Dundes, a motif was an etic construct since it was detached from its 
contexts of storytelling. A function, i.e., a motifeme, is an emic construct because its 
meaning is to be understood in its relation to the linear plot sequence and dramatis 
personae (Bronner, 2007, p. 27). A motifeme is a recurrent functional structure within 
a given genre of folklore, while an allomotif is a motif that appears in a given mo-
tifemic context. Allomotifs are thus variations of motifs which do not alter the mo-
tifeme of a product of folklore. Dundes (2007 [1962], p. 97) clarifies: 
 
An example of allomotifs in the folklore of a primitive culture may 
be found in the North American Indian test tales… In order to obtain 
a wife, the hero must survive any one of the following elements: a 
snapping door, caves which open and close, a closing tree cleft or 
canoe, a clam with crushing shells, dangerous animals guarding a 
door, or a vagina dentata. All these elements appear to be allomotifs 
of the same motifeme, which, incidentally, looks very much like 
Propp’s twenty-fifth motifeme, “A difficult task is proposed to the 
hero.” 
 
Dundes (2007 [1964]) proceeded to compare the morphological qualities of games 
with folktales by suggesting that many games begin with a lack or insufficiency, sim-
ilarly to folktales (Propp’s function VIII, Villainy, or Lacking). Dundes illuminated 
his analysis by examining how the structural qualities of the traditional game Hare 
and Hounds compared to the Proppian morphology of folktales. In Hare and Hounds, 
a chosen participant acts as the Hare and hides from the others. Seen from the view-
point of the participants playing as the Hounds, the game begins with a lack, i.e., the 
missing Hare. According to Dundes, the Hounds attempt to liquidate (Propp’s func-
tion XIX) their initial lack, similar to the protagonist’s aim in folktales. He offered 
that the Hare and Hounds includes the two motifemes (Functions VIII and XIX), em-







 Lack Interdiction Violation Consequence 
     
Hare 
wants to go 
home 
without being 
caught by Hounds 
is caught 
(isn’t caught) 





want to catch 
absent Hare 
 
before he arrives 
back home 
 
do not catch Hare 





Table 2. The motifemic sequences of Hare and Hounds by Dundes (2007[1964], p. 
157). 
 
In what Dundes (2007 [1964], p. 157) called a “motifemic sequence,” the Hare hides 
and tries to return home (lack). If she is caught by the Hounds before reaching home, 
she fails to liquidate the lack and loses the game. Observed from the viewpoint of the 
Hounds, another motifemic sequence takes simultaneously place wherein the Hare 
(lack) is successfully caught (lack liquidated) and the game is won.  
Dundes’ (2007 [1964]) article on game morphology is not amongst his best-
known papers on folkloristics. To date, it has remained almost completely unknown 
in contemporary game studies. The article, however, opens several intriguing views 
on studying game structure and morphology. Although I will not conduct a video 
game analysis as Dundes did, there are substantial continuities between his original 
work and the current study. However, I am not the first folklorist to consider video 
game morphology based on the approach by Propp or Dundes. In 1997, Sharon Sher-
man published an article called Gender and Genre in Video Games in which she anal-
yses the narrative structure of Super Mario video games (pp. 248–249): 
 
In Propp's terms, after an initial lack, [Mario] has moved from child-
hood to adulthood and from function XV (The hero is transferred, 
delivered, or led to the object of his search) to function XIX (The 
initial misfortune or lack is liquidated). The hero provides the ulti-
mate rebirth by eventually completing the game, and re-establishing 
human (or, in this case, mushroom) existence... Whether we call quest 
tales myth or Mädrchen, the appropriation of the folk narrative in both 
form and content elements by video games is obvious. 
 
I agree with Dundes (2007 [1964]) by postulating that the minimal unit of analysis in 
gameplay is equivalent to a motifeme. A unit is, according to Dundes (2007 [1962], 
p. 91) a logical construct, an abstraction of measure which makes comparison possible 
based on a shared feature between several products of folklore. To postulate a minimal 
unit is to define “the smallest significant unit for a given analysis with the implicit 
understanding that although a minimal unit could be subdivided, it would serve no 
useful purpose to do so” (ibid.).  
Similar to Dundes, I appropriate the terms motifeme, motif and allomotif 
since these terms make it easier to discuss variants of the same function (motifeme) 
in games and how they relate to the motif indices. I also agree with Dundes (2007 
[1964]) by emphasizing that a syntagmatic and synchronic approach is well-suited for 
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game analyses since games are, as Ian Bogost (2010) proposes, procedural artifacts; 
to understand the player–game coupling, we must study games as reciprocal sequen-
ces and patterns through time, rather than as fixed forms consisting of a set of com-
ponents. More important than the components of a given game (motifs) are thus how 
the relationships between these components constitute units of actions (motifemes, 
allomotifs) in relation to each other.    
I differ from Dundes (2007 [1964]), however, by proposing an alternative take 
on gameplay motifemes. For this purpose, let us again consider the game of Hare and 
Hounds. From the dynamical stance of the current study, “lacking” (Propp’s function 
VII) and “liquidation” (Propp’s function XIX) are not units of action (motifemes) of 
Hare and Hounds but rule-defined functional relations between constituents of the 
game. Similarly, the sequence of lack–interdiction–violation–consequence does not 
describe what the players do during gameplay, that is, meaningful gameplay activities, 
but how the given relationships between the Hare and the Hounds will determine the 
result of the game when set in motion by player agency. What is largely missing from 
Dundes’ approach is the agency of the player, that is, the first-person experience.  
While “relations between the constituents” in a narrative sequence is precisely 
what Propp meant by functions and Dundes by motifemes, these cannot be directly 
adopted from folktales to games, because such an approach only implies the player 
and ignores that the unit of action in games is not to be found from the game system 
nor from the player but only from the mutual dynamical relationships between them. 
Thus, instead of analyzing what kinds of player positions a game affords for a player 
and how these positions relate to each other, we should analyze how players appro-
priate these positions during gameplay.34 The approach delineated here is both dynam-
ical and morphological, i.e., morphodynamical, since it investigates the structures of 
gameplay experience as they appear through patterns of time (see Merleau-Ponty, 
2002 [1962], pp. 90–91).   
If we now reconsider the rule-defined functional relationships of “lack”, “in-
terdiction”, “violation” and “consequence” in Hare and Hounds (Dundes (2007 
[1964]), we will be able to observe that “lack” does not correspond to a motifeme but 
to the goal of the game. “Interdiction” is equivalent to challenge, and “violation” to 
what I call normativity and the evaluative aspect of gameplay.35 Only “consequence” 







                                                 
34 Furthermore, it is speculative that Proppian functions are directly applicable to game anal-
yses, given that Propp’s study was based on a randomly selected sample of 100 Russian fairy 
tales, and that he himself emphasized empirically observable sequential structures (see Dun-
des, 2007 [1962], p. 161).  
35 By normativity, I refer to how the acts taken by the player may strengthen or weaken her 
position within the system of the game. The normativity of an action separates a right action 




 Goal Challenge Normativity Outcome 
Hare 
wants to go 
home 
without being 
caught by Hounds 





want to catch 
absent Hare 
before he arrives 
back home 
do not catch Hare 




Table 3. The relations of the constituent components of Hare and Hounds, revisited.  
   
When relabeled as “goal”, “challenge”, “normativity” and “outcome”, we can note 
that the features described by Dundes (2007 [1964]) in the Hare and the Hounds con-
verge to definitional criteria of any game, whether it be a children’s game, a board 
game, or a video game. Goal–challenge–normative evaluation–outcome is thus argu-
ably a sequence that will result from all episodes of gameplay. Furthermore, recall 
from Chapter 2 (Table 1) that “goal or purpose,” “challenge for skills and abilities” 
and “normativity” are qualities of game-as-played rather than something we can pos-
tulate to a standalone game artifact itself.  
The differences between tale functions or motifemes and gameplay mo-
tifemes can be further examined by reevaluating an example Propp (1968 [1928], p. 
8) gave of fairy tale morphology by comparing tale events:  
 
(1) A tsar gives an eagle to a hero. The eagle carries the hero away to another 
kingdom;  
(2) An old man gives Súcenko a horse. The horse carries Súcenko away to 
another kingdom;  
(3) A sorcerer gives Iván a little boat. The boat takes Iván to another kingdom;  
(4) A princess gives Iván a ring. Young men appearing from out of the ring 
carry Iván away to another kingdom. 
 
Propp argued that although the names of the dramatis personae change in the four 
examples, the function of the actions does not. For determining a tale function, ac-
cording to Propp (ibid., p. 9), it is important to ask what dramatis personae of a tale 
do but not by whom or how the action was done, because “the questions of who does 
it and how it is done already fall within the province of accessory study.” Also, the 
identified action or function must be interpreted in its place in the course of the nar-
ration.  
Let us now return to games. Let the player be the hero of Propp’s example 
number (1). It is not given that the player, as the dramatis persona of the game, will 
receive an eagle from the tsar. Maybe the hero reaches the tsar too late in the game 
and, because of that, the tsar refuses to give the eagle. This notion is similar to what 
Propp meant with determining a function in its relation to the other events in a tale. If 
the player’s avatar arrives at the tsar’s residence too late, the total procedure of the 
game has changed. However, there are also other possibilities. Maybe the hero must 
negotiate with the tsar to get the eagle, or maybe she must perform a dangerous deed 
for the tsar before he even agrees to meet the hero. If she fails in completing the deed, 
maybe she must find an alternative path for traveling to another kingdom. To put it 
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differently, in games, how a thing is done cannot, in principle, be separated from what 
the dramatis persona manages to do, or what other player personae are able to do.  
We cannot distinguish the motifemes of games from how the players play the 
game, since to do something in a game, e.g., to travel to a distant land, becomes pos-
sible, not only when players do a set of things in a specific procedure, but also when 
the things are done in a specific manner. In games, how a thing is done thus converges 
with doing that thing. This is why I utilize the term ‘motifeme’ instead of ‘function,’ 
since the former, as defined by Dundes (2007 [1964], p. 156) is a unit of action that 
does not imply a distinction between how a thing is done from doing a thing. Thus, to 
determine the motifemes of games and video games, we should not ask what the func-
tions of the player position are but rather how the player “functions,” i.e., acts, in a 
given functional frame of the game. ‘Goal,’ ‘challenge,’ ‘normativity’ and ‘outcome’ 
are some of the key elements of the functional frame in which a player makes deci-
sions and takes actions.   
If “lack” and “liquidation of the lack” are not motifemes of Hare and Hounds, 
how then should we conceptualize its minimal units of action? I suggest that by asking 
both “how the game is played” and “what the player does during gameplay,” another 
possibility comes into view. The Hare hides from the Hounds, tries to navigate back 
home, and flees to get there alive, simultaneously as when the Hounds search for the 
Hare, hunt her when she starts to run, and catch her before she arrives at the safe 
haven. The motifemes for the Hare are thus hiding, navigating and fleeing whereas 
the Hounds engage with the motifemes of searching, hunting and catching.36  
What we are describing here are gameplay activities (see Figure 3), that is, 
motifemes of Hare and Hounds, made possible only through sustained player perfor-
mances and game dynamics that invoke consequent events. I prefer to call these “units 
of activities” instead of “units of actions” since, as I mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
in activity theory, ‘activity’ is the basic unit of analysis, which refers to a sustained 
and purposeful object-oriented endeavor of an individual. For instance, in Hare and 
Hounds, an action would be a step the player takes that triggers a mechanic within the 
game system, that is, a leap by the Hare. A leap, however, is not meaningful by itself, 
or even as a chain of interconnected leaps, but as a pattern through time, such as the 
activity of running, which transforms again into fleeing when the context of the activ-
ity is taken into consideration. When brought together with the constitutive relation-
ships of ‘goal,’ ‘challenge,’ ‘normativity’ and ‘outcome,’ we can conclude that the 
Hare’s goal is to navigate home, and her challenge is to hide from the Hounds, and 
flee if she is discovered. If she manages to perform the motifemes of navigating, hid-
ing, and fleeing correctly, the outcome of the game will be favorable to her. 
In what follows, I use the term motifeme to refer to a minimal unit of purpose-
ful gameplay, described in the form of gameplay activity, consisting of purposeful 
player performance and a game dynamic. Such an activity can be realized only in a 
reciprocal relationship between a player and the game system. Because of this, I do 
not appropriate the concept of ‘game motifeme’ but instead that of ‘gameplay mo-
tifeme.’ If we now revisit Propp’s (1968 [1928], p. 9) definition of function, it can be 
                                                 
36 Many traditional children games are, in fact, named based on their key motifemes. For ex-
ample, we have the games of Hide and Seek, Catch, Clapping games, Capture the Flag, Stone 
Skipping, Kiss Chase, and many others, which directly refer to their gameplay motifemes. 
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concluded that, a gameplay motifeme is an abstracted description of an activity ena-
bled by game dynamics and enacted by performative play, defined from the point of 
view of its significance for the course of the game.37  
 
Gameplay Activity = Gameplay Motifeme





Figure 3. A Gameplay motifeme of Forza Motorsport 6, that is, a description of a 
gameplay activity and how it emerges in the coupling between performative play 
and a game dynamic. 
 
The study, On Game Morphology, by Dundes is crucial to the current thesis since it 
argues for deep continuity between different forms of folklore and offers analytical 
tools for studying the structure and morphology of games. With these assets, I move 
forward to present the research questions and methods according to which a quantita-
tive study on game dynamic preferences was conducted in 2014–2015. The objective 
of the following empirical study is to investigate the motifemes of contemporary video 
games and, by doing so, illuminate what kinds of performative positions players prefer 
to take.  
  As Bogost (2010, p. 4) states, video game procedures constrain what kinds 
of actions are possible or should be performed in a certain game state. However, game-
play activities or motifemes emerge from game dynamics and from the player’s per-
formances as she makes decisions and takes sequences of actions that string game 
effects and events together. During gameplay, a unique connection between the player 
and the game design is thus forged as the player engages with performative play within 
a fixed type of ‘choreography’ (Miller 2008, p. 267; Aarseth 1997, pp. 3–4; Murray 





                                                 
37 As noted by Frog (2016, p. 54), the unit of analysis in folkloristics are typically “textual or 
performative wholes, even if these are embedded in larger contexts.” Thus, although it is rec-
ognized in this thesis that an item of folklore cannot be fully separated from its sociocultural 
and historical context of manifestation and purpose, a unit of analysis can be discussed apart 
from these broader contexts as long as the limitations of such a choice are also recognized.  
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A study on gameplay motifemes and players’ preferences in motifeme types can be 
conceptualized as an investigation of player types. Constructing classifications and 
typologies of tradition-bearers, that is, the persons or groups who have a degree of 
experience and knowledge on the cultural phenomenon under analysis, has a long his-
tory in folkloristics. For example, Eastern European fairytale researchers classified 
storytellers already in the 1920s based on their personality traits and by analyzing the 
relationship between the storytellers and their fairytale repertoire (e.g., Asadowskij, 
1926; Sokolov, 1966[1938]). Later, folklorist Anna-Leena Siikala considered, e.g., 
the qualities of storytellers’ fairytale repertoires, narration styles, and values, as well 
as the social position of the storyteller, in her studies on how storyteller types relate 
to the essential qualities of storytelling traditions (Siikala, 1990; see also Dégh, 1969). 
I consider my work on player types to be a continuation of the folkloristic research 
tradition of identifying distinctive ways of experiencing culture. 
Prior player categorizations have focused on either motivations to play or be-
havioral dimensions of players’ play styles (Hamari & Tuunanen, 2014, p. 34). Cate-
gorizations of players by play styles (e.g., Bartle, 2003; Mulligan & Patrovsky, 2003; 
Tseng, 2010) and motivations to play (e.g., Bateman, Lowenhaupt & Nacke, 2011; 
Przybylski, Rigby & Ryan, 2010; Sherry et al., 2006; Yee, 2006) as well as by ‘gam-
ing mentalities’ (Kallio et al., 2011) have mostly been formed by analyzing gaming 
habits or players’ personality traits instead of examining playing as a form of com-
puter-mediated designed interaction. These categorizations also do not typically in-
clude different types of digital games in the analysis. Behavioral observations of play-
ers’ play styles are usually based on only one game, most typically an online game, 
or at least on a set game genre, whereas studies on motivations to play aim to explore 
the reasons for why people play, for example, mobile games, online multiplayer 
games or digital games in general. 
In contrast, the shortcoming of genre categories as well as other design-ori-
ented classifications, such as the design patterns approach (Björk & Holopainen, 
2005) and design pattern library (Adams & Dormans, 2012), is that they imply that 
the player is an abstract ideal type without trying to understand the players’ purposeful 
activity during gaming. While valuable for design purposes, these approaches do not 
offer a satisfactory perspective on analyzing engaging gameplay experience or game 
choice. 
Whereas studies on motivations to play usually ask why people play games in 
general, and studies on play behavior ask how people play a specific game, the ap-
proach I report on in this chapter is devised to ask what kinds of gameplay people 
                                                 
38 This study has been reported earlier in Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 
(Vahlo et al., 2017). I was the first author of this article, responsible for the research design, 
content analysis and for making the descriptions of the identified factors and player clusters. 
The statistical analysis was carried out by Johanna Kaakinen, Aki Koponen and myself. In this 
thesis, I provide a more detailed description of the content analysis and provide an alternative 
interpretation of the results of the study by approaching the identified factors as motifeme 




prefer. This study can be situated between studies on play motivations and play be-
haviors, as it focuses on identifying patterns in what kinds of player–game interaction 
players prefer (see Vahlo & Koponen, 2018). 
The approach adopted in this study could thus be framed as a representative 
of a third option for player typology research, namely that of gameplay preferences. 
The main benefit of such an approach is that it enables us to consider both the prefer-
ences of the players and the qualities of designed games within a single research 
framework. This, I argue, is missing from other approaches, which emphasize either 
the general player preferences (motivations to play), game properties (design pat-
terns), or the combination of player preferences and game properties within a single 
game (player behavior). Therefore, I propose that the model reported in this study 




Research Questions of Study 1 
 
In this study, with Johanna K. Kaakinen, Suvi K. Holm and Aki Koponen, I investi-
gated the game dynamics of contemporary video games and players’ preferences of 
taking performative agency in these dynamics (Vahlo et al., 2017). I will, however, 
interpret the game dynamics here as gameplay motifemes, based on a folkloristic ap-
proach to gameplay analysis. Seen through the lens of ‘gameplay motifeme,’ the over-
all goal of this explorative study was thus to examine the RQ2 of this thesis: “How do 
players value, remember, and narrate their past experiences of video game game-
play?” by defining more specific questions of: 
 
RQ2.1: What are the most typical motifemes of contemporary video game gameplay?  
 
RQ2.2: Is it possible to identify players’ motifeme preferences, and do these prefer-
ences form categories, i.e., player motifeme preference factors?  
 




Content Analysis of the Video Gameplay Motifemes 
 
The current study was launched with a bottom-up analysis of gameplay motifemes of 
contemporary video games. In contrast to folktales, motifemes are not easily recog-
nizable from video games since games do not exist in fixed textual form. Therefore, 
the best methods for collecting data on gameplay motifemes would be playing the 
games or collecting other people’s detailed descriptions on their gameplay experi-
ences. I selected the latter approach for this study, based on the objective to investigate 
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a large body of video games regardless of the game genres39 or technological plat-
forms. For this purpose, I decided to analyze game reviewers’ depictions of the game-
play motifemes.    
Jaakko Suominen (2011) reports a content analysis he conducted on an exten-
sive body of game review articles published mostly in the magazine, MikroBitti, in 
1984–2010. Suominen, who analyzes how game reviews have constructed cultural 
identities and the cultural practice of gaming, notes that game reviews have not been 
studied much as a form of media critique, regardless of the fact that reviews are fun-
damental elements of game journalism. As he notes, game reviews are interesting in 
their combining role: they bring together game designers and their gaming audiences.  
Suominen (2011) observes that game reviews as a form of art critique always 
include a subjective tone. Emphasis is on the reviewer’s own personal impression and 
gameplay experience, including the game’s playability and aesthetic aspects. Many 
reviewers adopt a personal style, which emphasizes first-person experiences of play-
ing the game. This makes it easier for the reader to identify oneself with the reviewers’ 
depiction of the gameplay. Furthermore, José P. Zagal, Amanda Ladd and Terris John-
son (2009), who have studied online game reviews, have identified gaming experience 
as one of the recurrent themes of game critiques. They write (ibid., p. 216): “Perhaps 
the most evident or obvious theme for a game review... covers the description of the 
features, modes and/or characteristics, and gameplay of a particular game.” These no-
tions are important for the current study since they clearly suggest that analyzing game 
review articles from both printed magazines and online sources should result in a body 
of descriptions of first-hand game experiences, including depictions of the gameplay 
of the game under review.40   
The analysis of the current study was conducted by making a content analysis 
of a total of 700 written video game review articles from the Finnish video game mag-
azines, Pelaaja by H-Town and Pelit by Sanoma Magazines, as well as from the en-
tertainment websites, IGN.com and toucharcade.com. Both Pelaaja and Pelit review 
a versatile body of digital games, ranging from console and PC games to handheld 
games and mobile games. Both publish review articles about big budget games as well 
as indie games developed by small game companies. Similarly, IGN.com extensively 
reviews multiple types of games for all popular gaming platforms. TouchArcade, in-
stead, only covers mobile games published for Apple’s operating system, iOS. 
The analyzed game reviews published in Pelaaja included 19 issues from 2013– 
2014 and a total of 342 review articles. From Pelit, a total of 224 review articles were ana-
lyzed, out of which 203 were published in 2014 and additional 21 reviews during the 
                                                 
39 I return to this concept and its usages in video game cultures later in the current chapter. 
40 In 2012, Zagal, Noriko Tomuro and Andriy Shepitsen published an additional study in which 
they utilized Natural Language Processing (NLP), a field of computer science and linguistics, 
for the automated analysis of online game review data. By using this methodology, the authors 
clustered adjectives that modify the noun “gameplay” in user game reviews. The objective was 
to build an understanding of how ‘gameplay’ was used, discussed and negotiated by the play-
ers. For this purpose, the authors analyzed a massive amount of 397,759 user-generated game 
reviews, written by 111,943 unique users, and covering 8,279 individual game titles. The study 
conducted by Zagal et al. (2012) is, however, very different from the current one; where their 
study was based on analyzing the usages of the concept of ‘gameplay,’ my objective is to 
identify how the gameplay is described as a mode of ongoing activities between a player and 
a game.  
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years 1992–2004. The additional 21 review articles were chosen to cover earlier game 
genres and game types that were not reviewed in either Pelaaja or Pelit in 2013–2014. 
From IGN.com, a total of 66 game reviews published in 2014 were analyzed, and 
finally 68 mobile games were included in the analysis from toucharcade.com.  
The 700 game reviews were analyzed with qualitative content analysis. Con-
tent analysis was utilized in this study as a systematic method for classifying data into 
themes and patterns by the processes of coding and abstraction, as described by Hsiu-
Fang Hsieh and Sarah E. Shannon (2005). I conducted the analysis manually with the 
assistance of two game designer-researchers. The sample size was defined based on 
the saturation of the data during the process of the content analysis. The trustworthi-
ness of the analysis was considered according to the procedures suggested by Elo et 
al. (2014), who contend that specifying the trustworthiness of data collection is espe-
cially important in inductive content analysis since the data is usually categorized by 
the researchers without a theory-based categorization matrix. 
Elo et al. (2014, p. 3) propose that the trustworthiness of a content analysis 
process should be checked during each phase of the analysis. A content analysis con-
sists of three main parts: 1) a preparation phase in which the data collection method 
is chosen, sampling strategy is decided, and the basic unit of analysis is identified; 2) 
an organization phase including categorization of the data, interpretation of the cate-
gories, and representativeness of the data for the phenomenon under analysis and; 3) 
a reporting phase consisting of reporting the results and the steps of the analysis.  
The procedures of elucidating the trustworthiness of a content analysis in-
clude reporting each step of the analysis process accurately. Elo et al. (2014, p. 2) note 
that a researcher should take into account the following criteria of trustworthiness: 
credibility, dependability, conformability, transferability, and authenticity. Credibility 
means that researchers must be able to accurately identify and describe the researchers 
who participated in the study. The data must be stabile across varying conditions, 
which fulfills the criterion of dependability. Conformability denotes that the subjec-
tive interpretations by a researcher must be taken into account by letting several re-
searchers interpret the data, following an identical analysis process to find out whether 
they arrive at similar conclusions. Transferability means that the study must be, in 
principle, generalized or transferred to another similar data set. Authenticity refers to 
how the researchers depict and report the data “fairly and faithfully.”  
Our approach to content analysis was summative, and started by identifying 
certain content or keywords from text data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Propp (1968 
[1928], p. 9) emphasized that in the case of Russian folk tales, functions are most 
often given in the form of a noun expressing an action, such as ‘interrogation,’ ‘flight,’ 
or ‘interdiction.’ Similar to Propp’s analysis, we focused on coding the review articles 
with a pretested categorization matrix by highlighting the descriptions that could be 
reliably interpreted to provide data to one of the predefined questions: 1) “What will 
you be doing as the player of the game?” (performance-based description); 2) “What 
are the main activities the player will engage with during gameplay?” (motifeme-
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based description); 3) “What are the main modes of player–game interaction the game 
will provide for the player?” (dynamics-based description).41   
We began reading the reviews and highlighting the phrases describing the 
modes of activities significant for gameplay, that is, motifemes, which I identified as 
our unit of analysis by following the argumentation of Propp (1968 [1928]) and Dun-
des (2007 [1962]). Then, the highlighted data was read again to derive initial codes. 
Gameplay motifemes were quickly recognized as important structures and themes of 
game reviews. All of the analyzed 700 reviews included at least one demonstration of 
the gameplay motifemes the player would enact during gameplay, whereas a typical 
article included four of such characterizations. This result was to be expected, since 
the concept of ‘gameplay’ has been widely used as an evaluative category in game 
criticism and game development since the mid-1980s (Kirkpatrick, 2012). 
Next, the initial codes derived from the data were reviewed by myself and 
three other researchers who participated in the Play for Reward research project. After 
this phase of the analysis, dynamics-based phrases were coded again into a form sim-
ilar to motifeme-based phrases. For example, a dynamics-based description, “At its 
core, the game is about mastering fighting techniques and combo-attacks” would have 
been re-coded into “mastering fighting techniques and combo-attacks.” Similarly, a 
first-person performance-based description of “I truly enjoyed beating foes by learn-
ing close-combat skills and techniques” would have been re-coded into “beating foes 
by close-combat skills and techniques.” More precisely, reviewers’ descriptions were 
re-coded into finite verb phrases of abstracted gameplay activities, i.e., motifemes, 
that imply the player-subject in the head verb of the phrase and include its objects and 
complements. 
In the next step of the analysis, indirect connections between the reviewed 
game and, e.g., genre conventions or previous games in the same series were singled 
out. Finally, the indirect descriptions were transformed into a similar finite verb phrase 
form as the direct depictions by following the reviewer’s references to the character-
istics of other games. After conducting these phases, 2900 individual characterizations 
in total were coded into finite verb phrases. A content analysis of a review of Diablo 
III: Reaper of Souls (Blizzard Entertainment) (published in the Pelit 9/2014 maga-
zine), for example, revealed the following motifemes: “slaying demons,” “leveling up 
and gaining new skills,” “exploring new areas and villages,” “selecting abilities and 
equipment for upcoming battles” and “joining into an endless grindfest.” After iden-
tifying these motifemes, the results were compared to the gameplay descriptions of 
the other 699 game reviews.  
In this phase of the content analysis, the syntagmatic approach to a game re-
view article was changed into a paradigmatic approach, in which the focus was no 
longer on the individual 2900 characterizations of motifemes, but on whether these 
motifemes could be understood as allomotifs of a much smaller number of motifemes. 
For this purpose, the 2900 codings were compared and further categorized according 
                                                 
41 I explicate in Figure 2 and Figure 3 how the concepts of ‘performance,’ ‘motifeme/activity’ 
and ‘game dynamics’ relate to each other. In principle, all three of these concepts describe the 
phenomenon of gameplay, albeit from distinguished perspectives; performance emphasizes a 
first-person view and player experience, game dynamics highlights the designed properties of 
a game system, and motifeme brings these two aspects together by focusing on the ongoing-
ness of player–game coupling. 
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to the similarities in how a gameplay motifeme was described in the head verbs and 
the objects. Since game mechanics and game dynamics can be best described by verbs, 
the head verb was identified as the most important differentiating factor between mo-
tifemes. Abstractions of the recurrent objects and complements of the finite verb 
phrases were included in the process as secondary attributes of the identified core 
motifemes of video games.  
 The activity dynamic of “slaying demons” was, for example, combined with 
the findings from other game reviews that shared highly similar modes of player–
game interaction such as “killing guards” and “slaughtering, hackin’ and slashin’ 
orcs.” After the comparison process, these individual finite verb phrases were ab-
stracted and finally coded as the core gameplay motifeme of “Killing, murdering and 
assassinating by shooting, stabbing or by other violent means” (Table 4, The Core 
Gameplay Dynamics Scale, item 26). The exact wordings used in the final video 
gameplay motifemes were selected based on the frequency of the verbs and objects 
mentioned in the individual finite verb phrases. Let me present an example of how 
allomotifs and motifemes were identified from the game review articles: 
 
Tales of Xillia 2 is a Japanese counterpart for BioWare-like storytell-
ing in which the decisions made by the player affect the relationship 
between characters and the destiny of the gameworld (From the re-
view article on Tales of Xillia 2 in Pelit 11/2014 [translated by the 
author]). 
 
Although the story is about finding a murderer, the job of the player 
is not really to reveal the mystery… Instead the player constantly 
makes choices by which the player creates her own interpretation of 
the identity of Bigby (From the review article on The Wolf Among Us 
in Pelaaja 9/2014 [translated by the author]). 
 
By the finale you'll have made so many decisions—ranging from sim-
ple things like whether you play as a male or female all the way up to 
those governing life or death—that the result is a game that is yours 
and yours alone (From the review article on Mass Effect 2 on 
Ign.com). 
 
These three short excerpts highlight different descriptions of a single motifeme, that 
of “making meaningful decisions that affect development of the story” (Table 4, item 
27). Thus, these three games are to be taken as allomotifs of this recurrent motifeme 
in contemporary video game gameplay. Whereas phrases describing the motifeme of 
“acting as the protagonist and making meaningful choices” and “killing by violent 
means” were common among the 700 games, some of the items shown in Table 4 







Item Gameplay Motifeme Mean SD 
1 Solving problems that require logic, reasoning or analytic thinking 5.42 1.24 
2 Creating your own playable character 4.62 1.78 
3 
Stealing, breaking in, hacking, driving recklessly and breaking the 
law in other similar ways 
3.25 1.88 
4 Hiding, fleeing and running for your life 3.45 1.90 
5 Exploding, wrecking, crushing and destroying 3.55 1.93 
6 Building, expanding and enhancing a city, a village or a base 4.58 1.80 
7 Wild experimenting, testing and playing around in a game world 4.26 1.74 
8 
Building friendships between game characters and working to-
gether towards a common goal 
4.07 1.83 
9 Fighting by using close combat skills and techniques 3.59 1.88 
10 Showing affection like flirting, hugging, kissing or making love 3.25 1.80 
11 Racing or competing in sports to win 3.75 1.89 
12 Developing your own character and its skills and abilities 4.78 1.91 
13 
Defending your own territory, city, tower, property or characters 
against threats 
4.24 1.84 
14 Collecting rare items and treasures hidden in the game 4.72 1.76 
15 Managing groups, clans or cities and their residents 3.97 1.80 
16 








Skilled steering of a space ship, a plane, a car, an animal character 
or a game character 
3.96 1.80 
19 Jumping from platform to platform while avoiding obstacles 4.10 1.72 
20 Shooting multiple enemies and evading enemy fire with fast speed 3.63 1.98 
21 
Considering and coming up with a strategy and choosing resources 
for it 
4.59 1.78 
22 Planning and executing a battle tactic or another tactic 4.15 1.96 
23 Training and taking care of pets 3.22 1.77 
24 Upgrading and improving objects, vehicles and weapons 4.04 1.86 
25 
Exploring the gameworld and uncovering the game’s secrets, mys-
teries and story 
4.75 1.97 
26 
Killing, murdering and assassinating by shooting, stabbing or by 
other violent means 
3.38 2.01 
27 
Acting as the main character, immersing in the role and making 
meaningful decisions 
4.51 2.05 
28 Waging war and conquering territories, villages, towers and cities 3.67 1.99 
29 Building and crafting houses, ships, items, equipment or weapons 4.08 1.85 
30 
Reaching an agreement, for example by trading, negotiating or 









Acquiring food, equipment, energy or money through farming, 
mining or working 
4.02 1.85 
33 Gambling, betting and taking risks 3.39 1.78 
 
Table 4. The Core Game Dynamics (CGD) Scale, as identified in the Qualitative 
Analysis, and their mean preference sums and standard deviations in the survey.42 
 
As the result of the described content analyzing process, the 2900 coded phrases were 
eventually categorized into a total of 33 video gameplay motifemes (Table 4). The 
final number of 33 motifemes was deliberately kept large to avoid the problems of 
reducing the phenomenon of video game gameplay into too few categories in a similar 
fashion as commercial video game genre classifications arguably do. Instead of con-
tinuing to make higher-level abstractions by further interpreting the data by ourselves, 
we began to empirically investigate whether factors for gameplay motifemes could be 
revealed based on game players’ gameplay preference patterns. 
 
 
Survey of the Motifeme Preferences in Video Game Gameplay 
 
A survey was conducted by the Play for Reward research team to examine players’ 
preferences for the identified 33 video game gameplay motifemes. Two thousand par-
ticipants were recruited via a company specialized in survey research in order to ob-
tain representative samples from Danish (n=1000) and Finnish (n=1000) populations. 
Moreover, 594 participants were recruited by sending out invitations via social media 
and mailing lists of organizations at the University of Turku, Finland. A total of 2,594 
respondents participated in the survey during December 2014.  
The age of the participants ranged from 12 to 70 years. Only the data for the 
adult participants (age > 17 years) who reported playing more than one hour per week 
were included in the final sample, resulting in N=1,718. The mean age of the partici-
pants was 38.10 years (SD=14.18), and 46 percent (n=789) were women.  
The gameplay preference questionnaire of the survey consisted of the 33 mo-
tifeme items identified previously (see Table 3). When responding, participants were 
instructed to think about themselves as players and the games that they prefer to play. 
They then responded on a scale from 1 to 7 how pleasant (1 = very unpleasant,  
7 = very pleasant) they found each of the given gameplay motifemes, considering their 
own gaming experience as active players.  
The survey also included questions regarding the participant’s age, gender, 
and gaming habits and some other scales. The original version of the survey was writ-
ten in Finnish. The Finnish version was translated into English with a back-translation 
                                                 
42 Although the current study focuses on identifying the motifemes or core gameplay activities 
of video games, I chose not to relabel this scale accordingly but retain the original title “The 
Core Game Dynamics (CGD) scale” as published in Vahlo et al. (2017). 
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procedure by two of the project researchers, and the Danish version was translated 
from an English language version of the survey by a professional translator.  
Moreover, respondents’ motivations to play video games were studied by ask-
ing how important (1 = not at all important, 5 = very important) 12 general reasons to 
play were to the participants. The scale was constructed by a pilot study (N=50) and 
focus group interviews. It included items describing Immersion, Social, and Achieve-
ment (Yee, 2006): “I play because I want to immerse in games,” “I play online games 
because of the company,” and “I play for the experience of achieving,” as well as 
Competition and Challenge (Sherry et al., 2006): “I play because of the competition,” 
and “I play for the challenge.” 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the Gameplay Motifeme Preference Scale  
 
The descriptive statistics of the ratings for the 33 questionnaire items are presented in 
Table 5. An exploratory factor analysis using principal factors extraction and varimax 
rotation was conducted to explore the factor structure of the gameplay motifeme pref-
erence items, using data from 1,718 respondents. As J. J. Hox and T. M. Bechger 
(1998) write, factor analysis is a statistical technique for investigating whether covar-
iance between the observed variables (here: the 33 items of The CGD scale) can be 
explained by a more restricted number of latent variables, or factors. In exploratory 
factor analysis, there is no theory-bound hypothesis on the expected number of latent 
factors, and the relations between probable latent factors and observed variables is 
argued to be unknown.  
Since the data were Likert-scale responses, factor analysis was computed us-
ing polychoric correlations. The number of factors to be extracted from the data was 
first defined using Velicer’s minimum average partial (MAP) test. Factor loading > 
.50 was used as a criterion for defining that an item loaded on a factor. In the first 
solution, five items (1, 7, 11, 18 and 33) had factor loadings < .50, and they were 
dropped. The second iteration with the remaining 28 items produced a solution with 
5 factors, all items showing loadings > .50 on at least one factor (see Table 5). 
Eight items (3, 4, 5, 9, 20, 26, 28, 31) loaded on the first factor. High scores 
in these items indicate that the player expresses the desire to engage with the mo-
tifemes of killing and murdering; wrecking, crushing, destroying and blowing things 
up; shooting enemies and avoiding enemy fire; stealing, hacking, speeding and break-
ing the law; hiding, fleeing and running for your life; surprising an opponent or enemy 
by sneaking; and waging war and conquering territories, villages, towers and cities. 
This gameplay motifeme factor was labeled as Assault since all the motifemes de-
scribe aggressive or destructive player conduct. 
Eight items (6, 13, 15, 21, 24, 29, 30, 32) loaded on the second factor. These 
items reflect that the player is attracted by modes of interaction based on acquiring 
food, equipment, energy or money through working; developing and expanding a city 
or a base and; building and crafting houses, equipment or weapons. Moreover, mo-
tifeme items on this factor indicate high interest in defending one’s own territory and 
its inhabitants against threats; managing material resources, cities and their citizens; 
upgrading and improving objects, vehicles and weapons; planning a strategy and 
choosing resources to implement it; and reaching an agreement by trading or negoti-
ating. This gameplay motifeme factor was coined as Manage. 
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Six items (2, 8, 12, 14, 25, 27) loaded on the third factor. These items reveal that a 
player is fascinated by exploring the gameworld and uncovering its secrets and mys-
teries; acting as the protagonist by making meaningful decisions; befriending in-game 
characters; collecting rare and hidden items, weapons and treasures; creating a playa-
ble avatar; and developing its skills and abilities. The factor was named Journey.  
Two items (10, 23) loaded on the fourth factor. The items reflect that a player 
is attracted to performing in games by way of flirting, kissing, hugging and making 
love; and training and taking care of pets. The gameplay motifeme factor was labeled 
as Care.  
Three items (16, 17, 19) loaded on the fifth factor. The items illustrate that a 
player is drawn to motifemes of matching tiles or other elements together; jumping 
from platform to platform while avoiding obstacles; and by staying in rhythm through 
dancing, singing or playing instruments. This factor was coined Coordinate.  
Finally, the item of planning and executing a battle tactic or another tactic 
(22) showed cross-loadings on two factors, namely on Assault and Manage.  
By calculating Cronbach’s alpha, we estimated the internal consistency for 
each of the five scales, and how consistently the respondents replied in the survey. 
Generally speaking, alphas over .90 can be regarded as excellent, over .80 as good, 
and over .60 or .70 as acceptable (Kline, 2010, pp. 69–70). Descriptive statistics and 
Cronbach’s alphas for the game dynamics preference categories are represented in 
Table 5. The internal consistency reliability for a scale is higher if there are more than 
a few items in it (ibid.).  
 
 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Uniqueness 
2     0.5755     0.3829 
3 0.7866         0.2778 
4 0.7795         0.2844 
5 0.8352         0.2340 
6   0.7134       0.3466 
8     0.5046     0.3053 
9 0.7060         0.3247 
10       0.6040   0.4062 
12     0.6856     0.2216 
13   0.6249       0.2951 
14     0.5568     0.3833 
15   0.6972       0.2963 
16         0.6037 0.5929 
17         0.5551 0.4930 
19         0.5989 0.4443 
20 0.8249         0.2225 
21   0.6736       0.3300 
22 0.5748 0.5881       0.2634 
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23       0.5162   0.4441 
24   0.5029       0.3458 
25     0.6889     0.2160 
26 0.8673         0.1707 
27 0.5005   0.6164     0.2013 
28 0.7252 0.5271       0.1750 
29   0.6601       0.2813 
30   0.6441       0.3000 
31 0.7586         0.2130 
32   0.6920       0.3697 
Mean 3.5566 4.1750 4.5728 3.2309 3.8672   
Std. Dev. 1.6724 1.4945 1.5609 1.5492 1.3743   
Alpha 0.9514 0.9411 0.9077 0.6682 0.6630   
Note: Mean, standard deviation and Cronbach’s alpha are calculated using 
items with loadings above 0.5. 
 
Table 5. Factor Loadings (Loadings > .5 bolded), uniqueness for Items of The CGD 
scale and descriptive statistics for scale sums. 
 
In order to examine the discriminant validity of the scales, we computed bivariate 
correlations (Spearman rank-order) between gameplay motifeme preference factor 
scores and motivations to play variables. As a rule-of-thumb, correlations under .20 
can be considered very weak, between .21–.39 weak, between .40–.59 moderate, be-
tween .60–.79 strong, and over .80 very strong (Evans, 1996). 
Assault correlated positively with all five play motivations of Social (r=.40), 
Immersion (r=.36), Achievement (r=.32), Competition (r=.27), and Challenge (r=.27). 
Manage showed weak positive correlations with all play motivations (greatest r=.23, 
smallest r=.19). Journey correlated with Immersion (r=.41), and weakly with Achieve-
ment (r=.24), Challenge (r=.23), and Social (r=.11). Care correlated weakly with So-
cial (r=.12) but not with other motivations to play (greatest r=.05). Finally, Coordinate 
did not correlate with any of the motivations to play (greatest r=.09). 
 
 
Cluster Analysis of the Gameplay Motifeme Preferences  
 
Next, we identified clusters of players who shared gameplay motifeme preferences. 
First, factor scores for the preference categories of Assault, Manage, Journey, Care 
and Coordinate were computed for each participant based on the exploratory factor 
analysis reported above. The factor scores were z-transformed, that is, standardized 
per participant, and the standardized factor scores were then subjected to a complete 
linkage43 cluster analysis (K-Means) in order to recognize player types based on their 
motifeme preferences. The standardization procedure makes samples comparable, 
which then makes conducting a cluster analysis easier. The cluster analysis identified 




seven player types based on the Calinski-Harabasz pseudo-F stopping rule. Descrip-
tive statistics of the background variables for each player type are presented below: 
 
 
Measure Player Cluster 
Gameplay motifeme 
category 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Assault 1.039 -1.339 -0.194 0.419 -1.216 0.972 -0.361 
Manage 0.261 0.428 1.339 -0.776 0.369 0.292 -0.043 
Journey 0.319 0.371 0.264 1.323 0.948 -1.186 -0.291 
Care -1.584 0.648 -1.320 -0.727 -0.877 -0.824 -0.911 
Coordinate -0.034 -0.108 -0.089 -0.239 0.776 0.746 1.606 
Mean age (years) 31.6 40.8 37.8 31.5 42.3 39.6 45.3 
Proportion of wo-
men 
24% 72% 27% 45% 78% 31% 71% 
Play min/week 1030 640 820 910 630 650 600 
Play min/session 72 47 56 77 42 44 33 
n 335 137 322 178 271 249 225 
Note. Play Min/week = Game play minutes per week, Play Min/session = Gameplay 
minutes per session, n = Number of participants. 
 
Table 6. Means of Factor Scores of Gameplay Motifeme Preferences and the Back-
ground Variables for the Seven Player Clusters. 
 
Cluster 1 (335 respondents, 19.5%) showed the highest preference for Assault and a 
low preference for Care when compared to the other clusters. Most of the respondents 
in this cluster were men (76%), with a mean age of 31.6 years. They ranked the highest 
in average weekly play hours (17.1) and the second highest in play session times (72 
mins). Of the gameplay motifemes, they favored most sneaking, shooting enemies, 
killing and executing battle tactics. Other highly favored items included acting as the 
main character, developing its skills and abilities, and exploring the gameworld. The 
disliked motifemes for this player type were staying in rhythm by dancing and singing, 
and training pets. The player type was named The Mercenary. 
Participants in Cluster 2 (137 respondents, 8.0%) showed the greatest dislike 
for the motifemes of Assault of the player clusters. They indicated a moderate prefer-
ence for Care and a slight preference for Manage and Journey. A total of 72 percent 
of the cluster respondents were women, with the mean age being 40.8 years. On av-
erage, they played 10.7 hours weekly, with typical play sessions of 47 minutes. They 
reported relatively high preference scores for befriending in-game characters, creating 
an avatar, developing its skills and abilities, and developing a city or village. They 
revealed a strong dislike for killing, waging war, shooting enemies, and exploding. 
The player type was labeled The Companion. 
Cluster 3 (322 respondents, 18.8%) favored the gameplay motifemes of Man-
age strikingly more than other player clusters, and clearly showed lower preference 
scores for all the other dynamic types, especially for Care. A typical participant in this 
player type was a 37.8-year-old man (73%) who played 13.6 hours weekly in play 
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sessions of 56 minutes. These respondents were highly attracted to strategizing, build-
ing and developing a city or a base, defending their own territory, and managing cities 
and their citizens. They disliked the motifemes of Care but also stealing and breaking 
the law, hiding and running for your life, and staying in rhythm. The player type was 
named The Commander. 
As opposed to Cluster 3, Cluster 4 (178 respondents, 10.4%) displayed low 
scores for Manage, the highest score for Journey and a slight preference for Assault. 
A total of 45% of the participants were women, and their mean age was 31.5 years. 
They played 15.1 hours weekly, and 77 minutes at a time, which was the longest typ-
ical play session time of the identified player types. They showed very high prefer-
ences in creating a character, developing its skills and abilities, acting as the protago-
nist, exploring the gameworld and uncovering its secrets, and befriending in-game 
characters. They did not prefer racing and competing in sports, matching tiles, playing 
instruments and dancing, or taking care of pets. The player type was labeled as The 
Adventurer. 
Similar to Cluster 4, Cluster 5 (271 participants, 15.8%) showed a clear pref-
erence for Journey. In contrast to The Adventurer, however, this player type strongly 
disliked the motifemes of Assault. They also appreciated Coordinate but not Care. An 
average respondent in this cluster was a 42.3-year-old woman (78.0%) who played 
10.5 hours weekly in play sessions of 42 minutes. The player type revealed the highest 
preference of all the player types for collecting rare items and treasures. They enjoyed 
also exploring the gameworld, developing a character’s skills and abilities, and match-
ing tiles together, but disapproved of stealing, exploding, and running for your life 
more than any other player clusters. The player type was named The Explorer. 
Player Cluster 6 (249 respondents, 14.5%) enjoyed Assault the second most 
of the player types, and preferred Coordinate, similar to The Explorer. When com-
pared to the other clusters, the participants of this player type showed the strongest 
dislike for Journey, and also a clear disapproval for Care. Most of the respondents in 
this cluster were men (69.0%, 39.6 years) who played 10.8 hours weekly in play ses-
sions of 44 minutes. They favored racing more than other player types, and also mod-
erately exploding, sneaking and shooting. They did not show a strong dislike for any 
of the 33 game dynamics. The player type was labeled The Daredevil. 
Finally, Cluster 7 (225 participants, 13.1%) differed from previous player 
types by showing low preferences in all motifeme types with the exception of Coor-
dinate, which they enjoyed clearly more than the other clusters. A typical participant 
in this cluster was a woman (71.0%) of 45.3 years who played 10.0 hours weekly in 
play sessions of 33 minutes. They showed the highest preference score for matching 
tiles or other elements together as well as a moderate preference for jumping between 
platforms and collecting rare items, but disliked many other gameplay motifemes, es-








Figure 4. Gameplay Motifeme Category Preferences (Mean Factor Scores) Sepa-
rately for the seven player types.  
 
The identified seven player clusters suggest that player types cannot be described 
simply based on clear-cut differences between their favorite gameplay activities or 
motifemes. Thus, in Vahlo et al. (2017), we propose that player types can be identified 
not by classifying players according to a single most preferred gameplay motifeme 
category, but by examining the pattern of preferences for the five categories. For un-
derstanding player groups and gamer segments, it is paramount to also take into con-
sideration the motifemes players find neutral or downright unpleasant. By following 
this principle, we coined the player types The Mercenary, The Companion, The Com-
mander, The Adventurer, The Patterner, The Daredevil and The Explorer.44  
Journey was the most favored category of gameplay motifemes, with the item 
of “Developing your own character and its skills and abilities” being the most attrac-
tive of the 28 items included in the final analysis. The second most favored motifeme 
category was Manage, only marginally ahead of Coordinate. Remarkably, Assault 
was either strongly favored or just as heavily despised. Care, on the other hand, was 
the least preferred motifeme category, which may be partly because relatively few 
players have experienced this type of gameplay first-hand. However, the player type 
of The Companion implies that there might be a consumer segment willing to play 
more games of this type. 
The survey (N=1,718) included a question in which the respondents were as-
ked to specify how often (1=not at all, 2=less than once a month 3=a few times every 
month, 4=weekly, 5=daily) they had played with particular gaming technologies du-
ring past 12 months. Of the fixed options, playing with PC had the highest mean sum 
(3.4), while the second highest mean sum across the data was in free-to-play mobile 
                                                 
44 See Appendix 1 of this thesis for concept arts of the seven player types. 
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games (3.1). This was followed by browser-based games (2.4), multiplayer online ga-
mes (2.4), and console games (2.4). To study whether respondents who played mobile 
games more than PC and console games appreciated gameplay motifemes differently 
than game players overall, I computed a variable for those respondents who reported 
playing digital games at least one hour weekly and mobile games every week or more 
often (n=847). I then excluded from this sub-group those who reported that they also 
played PC or console games weekly or more often. This resulted in a smaller group 
of 238 respondents (142 women, 60%) who played mobile games relatively often but 
PC and console games relatively rarely.  
I then calculated mean motifeme category sums for the sub-group of mobile 
gamers. Also amongst this sub-group (n=238), Journey was the most favored mo-
tifeme category (mean 3.97) but Coordinate was equally highly appreciated (mean 
3.95). These were followed by Manage (mean 3.56) and Care (mean 2.96). Assault 
was the least favored motifeme category for the sub-group of mobile game players 
(mean 2.70). It is notable that the mean sums for every motifeme category were much 
lower in this sub-group than in the entire data set of 1,718 respondents (see Table 4). 
Moreover, the relative sizes of the seven clusters were different. Of the 238 mobile 
game players, 13 (5.5%) were of The Adventurer type, 21 (8.8%) of The Mercenary 
type, 30 (12.6%) of The Daredevil type, 33 (13.9%) of The Companion type, 35 of 
The Commander type (14.7%), 46 (16.8%) of The Patterner type, and 60 (25.2%) of 
The Explorer type.   
Importantly, although some of the revealed player types can be labeled typical 
for either men (The Mercenary, The Commander, The Daredevil) or women (The 
Companion, The Explorer, The Patterner), all of the clusters (N=1,718) included both 
male and female players. The player type of The Adventurer showed fairly equal pro-
portions of men (55%) and women (45%). These results contradict gaming stereo-
types, according to which gaming preferences of men and women greatly differ from 
each other. Somewhat similar findings have been reported earlier in a study conducted 
by Terlecki et al. (2011), according to which both men and women enjoyed, e.g., ad-
venture games (cf. Hartmann & Klimmt, 2006). 
The assessment of discriminant validity showed that game motifeme prefer-
ence categories are not to be equated with general motivations to play. The CGD scale 
does not assess play motivations, but preferences in different modes of player–game 
interaction. Importantly for future research, however, there may be relevant unex-
plored correlations between motivations to play and preferences in specific game dy-
namic types.  
The list of 33 core gameplay motifemes included in The CGD scale (Table 4) 
is not intended to be conclusive but to cover the most typical gameplay motifemes. In 
addition to the interpretation of analyzers, the list is influenced by game reviewers’ 
ways of describing gameplay as well as what types of games are being reviewed. The 
survey also included an open-ended question of preferred motifemes. Responses to 
this question revealed three potential core gameplay motifemes: decorating, dressing 
up, and creating gameworlds and levels. These could be included in the next version 
of The CGD scale. Moreover, the item describing flirting, hugging, kissing and mak-
ing love could be split into two or three individual items inasmuch as they do indeed 
describe distinctive types of activities rather than a single whole (see Grace 2013). 
The gameplay motifemes of gambling (33), being playful (7), problem-solv-
ing (1), racing and competing in sports (11) and skilled steering (18) were not included 
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in the present analysis since they did not show clear loadings on the five factors. There 
may be several reasons for this outcome. The items of taking risks and being playful 
can be interpreted to describe a player’s play style, i.e., how a game is played, more 
than a standalone game motifeme. Problem-solving can be argued to be an element of 
every digital game, as gameplay largely consists of in-game challenges (Adams, 
2014). Prior research also suggests that problem-solving in puzzles does not constitute 
a dynamic component, since many puzzles are static and can only be solved instead 
of played (Karhulahti, 2015a, pp. 25–34).  
Racing and competing in sports as well as skilled steering may indicate that 
The CGD scale could be complemented with items that describe different aspects of 
skillful maneuvering and athletic performances. These descriptions were scarce in the 
data of 700 game review articles since reviewers of racing, flying and sport simulation 
games tend to concentrate on describing singular game mechanics and technological 
solutions rather than game dynamics or gameplay motifemes. 
 
 
Study 2: Developing the Core Game Dynamics Scale 
 
In Study 1, we revealed that five of the 33 items of The Core Game Dynamics scale 
(Table 5) did not show clear loadings on any of the five factors. Furthermore, the data 
from open-ended questions of the survey indicated that a few additional items could 
be included in The CGD scale development. I report here an additional study in which 
I investigated whether a similar factor structure could be revealed from a new set of 
data when the indicated changes in the scale had been taken into account. 
First, as suggested previously, items 7: “Wild experimenting, testing and 
playing around in a game world” and 33: “Gambling, betting and taking risks” illus-
trate players’ play styles rather than gameplay motifemes. Thus, I excluded these two 
items from the second version of The CGD scale. Second, problem-solving and other 
items that describe the types of challenges players encounter in video games are not 
equivalent to gameplay activities but instead are of a higher-order. For instance, one 
can solve logical challenges, memory challenges, tactical challenges or challenges 
that require strategic or lateral thinking in games that include various types of game-
play motifemes. Gameplay challenges depict game dynamics, but these dynamics dif-
fer to gameplay motifemes, since they specify primarily what kinds of skills are re-
quired to successfully play, whereas gameplay motifemes are descriptions of an ac-
tivity enabled by a game and enacted by a player. The observation that game dynamics 
may be interpreted to cover both gameplay challenges and gameplay activities further 
justifies the current usage of the concept of gameplay motifemes (i.e., gameplay ac-
tivities) over game dynamics (Vahlo & Koponen, 2018). Based on this observation, I 
excluded not only item 1: “Solving problems that require logic, reasoning or analytic 
thinking” but also items 21: “Considering and coming up with a strategy and choosing 
resources for it,” and 22: “Planning and executing a battle tactic or another tactic.”    
Third, the data of the open-ended questions of Study 1 indicated that the scale 
could be complemented with items describing motifemes of decorating, dressing up, 
and creating new levels for a game. I constructed such items and these are included in 
the 2nd version of The CGD scale. Fourth, in Vahlo et al. (2017), we proposed that 
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item 10: “Showing affection like flirting, hugging, kissing or making love” could be 
divided into two items. Indeed, I propose that also the original items 11: “Racing or 
competing in sports to win,” 17: “Dancing, singing or playing instruments together 
and staying in rhythm,” 25: “Exploring the gameworld and uncovering the game’s 
secrets, mysteries and story,” and 30: “Reaching an agreement, for example by trad-
ing, negotiating or making a truce” could be split into two items or rephrased to ex-
press a single gameplay motifeme in a more clear fashion. Finally, I decided to remove 
item 13: “Defending your own territory, city, tower, property or characters against 
threats,” because I interpret it to describe in principle the same motifeme as item 28: 
“Waging war and conquering territories, villages, towers and cities,” albeit from a 
defensive perspective. 
As a result of these refinements, the 2nd iteration of The CGD scale consisted 
of 22 items that were very similar to the corresponding items in the original scale, 6 
items that consisted of 3 original items (items 10, 17, 25), each divided now into two 
individual items, 2 items that were simplified to more clearly describe a single game-
play motifeme (items 11, 30), and three completely new items. The refined CGD scale 
therefore also consists of 33 items:  
 
 
Item Gameplay Motifeme Mean SD 
    
1 Killing, murdering or assassinating 2.77 1.33 
2 Exploding or destroying 2.96 1.20 
3 Shooting enemies and avoiding enemy fire 2.68 1.26 
4 Stealing, hacking or breaking in 2.78 1.25 
5 Hiding and fleeing for your life 2.75 1.24 
6 Sneaking or laying traps to surprise an enemy 3.13 1.24 
7 Waging war and conquering 2.74 1.28 
8 Fighting by using close combat skills and techniques 2.67 1.21 
9 Building and developing a city or a base 3.23 1.15 
10 Managing and directing cities and their inhabitants 3.07 1.15 
11 Generating or gathering resources such as energy or money 3.08 1.14 
12 Crafting items and weapons by combining raw materials 2.99 1.17 
13 Producing vehicles, units or weaponry 2.95 1.19 
14 Exploring the gameworld and its locations** 3.74 1.12 
15 Developing skills and abilities 3.60 1.09 
16 Acting as the protagonist and making meaningful choices 3.53 1.17 
17 Creating your own character 3.49 1.12 
18 Searching for and collecting rare or hidden treasures 3.58 1.06 
19 Befriending in-game characters* 3.06 1.17 
20 Flirting, seducing and romantic dating** 2.59 1.23 
21 Taking care of pets and training them 2.71 1.16 
22 Matching tiles, diamonds or other objects together 3.15 1.11 
23 Jumping from one platform to another while avoiding obstacles 3.20 1.12 
24 Staying in the rhythm and moving to the beat** 2.71 1.07 
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25 Decorating rooms or houses*** 2.86 1.24 
26 Dressing up and make-up*** 2.66 1.27 
27 Racing at a high speed** 3.00 1.27 
28 Steering, piloting or maneuvering a vehicle or another object 2.99 1.19 
29 Investigating the story and its mysteries** 3.62 1.12 
30 Performing music, singing in tune or dancing** 2.75 1.25 
31 Making out or having sexual affairs** 2.55 1.27 
32 Trading items, weapons or resources* 3.10 1.12 
33 Designing and creating your own game levels or gameworlds*** 2.77 1.12 
    
* Item refined to describe a more specific motifeme   
** Item produced by dividing an item of the original scale into two items 
*** A completely new item added to the 2nd version of The CGD scale  
 
Table 7. The Core Game Dynamics Scale, 2nd iteration, and the mean preference sums 
and standard deviations of the 33 items in the survey (N=845).  
 
To investigate whether the refined CGD scale would result in a similar gameplay mo-
tifeme factor structure as was revealed in Study 1, I conducted an additional survey 
on players’ preferences in game dynamics. The research questions for the second sur-
vey were: 
 
RQ2.4: Will the refined CGD scale result in a similar factor structure as the original 
scale? 
 
RQ2.5: Could the refined CGD scale be regarded as an improvement in comparison 
to the original scale? 
 
 
Second Survey of the Gameplay Motifeme Preferences  
 
A survey was conducted to explore players’ preferences for gameplay motifemes. A 
total of 845 participants from Finland were recruited via a company specialized in 
survey research in December 2015. The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 55 
years. Similar to Study 1, the data was collected using a web-based survey tool. An-
swering the whole survey took about 20 minutes. 
At the beginning of the survey, the respondents were asked to specify, on a 
scale from 1 to 5, how interested they were in video games and playing them (1=not 
at all, 5=very interested). If a respondent replied that she was not at all interested in 
games, she was thanked for participating in the study and instructed to quit the survey. 
This was done because I was interested in how people who were at least slightly in-
terested in video game gameplay reflected on their gameplay preferences. The sample 
of 845 was representative in relation to age, gender, and regions in Finland. It is there-
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fore plausible to say that the data adequately represents the Finnish game player po-
pulation. The mean age of the participants was 34.57 years (SD=10.30), and 50.8% 
(n=429) were women.  
The gameplay motifeme preference inventory of the survey consisted of 33 
items (The CGD scale, 2nd iteration, Table 7). When responding, participants were 
instructed to think about themselves as players and the games that they prefer to play. 
They then responded on a scale from 1 to 5 how pleasant (1 = very unpleasant, 5 = 
very pleasant) they found each of the given gameplay motifemes, considering their 
own gameplay experience as players. As in the first study, the survey included ques-
tions regarding the participant’s age, gender, and gaming habits and some other scales, 
including a motivations to play scale, which I report on in Chapter 9. Since Study 2 
was explorative, like Study 1, I did not form hypotheses about its expected results. 
 
 
Factor Analysis of the Refined Gameplay Motifemes Preference Scale  
 
The descriptive statistics of the ratings for the 33 survey items are presented in Table 
8. I decided to analyze the data (N=845) in a similar manner as I handled the original 
data (N=1,718), by conducting an exploratory factor analysis using principal factor 
extraction and varimax rotation. By doing so, I aimed to reveal the latent factors of 
the gameplay motifeme preference items.  
This data set was also collected through Likert-scale responses, and poly-
choric correlations were used for computing factor analysis. The number of factors to 
be extracted from the data was again first defined by using Velicer’s minimum aver-
age partial (MAP) test. Only items showing clear loading > .50 on a factor were ac-
cepted. Item 33: “Designing and creating your own game levels or gameworlds” did 
not show loading > .50 on any factor, and it was dropped. The second iteration with 
32 items produced the final solution in which all items showed loadings > .50 on at 
least one factor (see Table 8). 
Ten items (1–8, 27, 28) loaded on the first factor. Eight of these items (1–8) 
were identical to those that loaded on the factor, Assault, in Study 1. In addition to the 
items of killing, exploding, shooting enemies, stealing, hiding and fleeing, sneaking, 
warfare, and close-combat, the items describing racing at a high speed (27) and pilot-
ing vehicles (28) loaded on Factor 1. Because of the shared qualitative characteristics 
of these 10 items and their similarities to the items of Study 1, I retain Assault as the 
name for this factor. 
Seven items (14–19, 29) loaded on the second factor. Five of these items were 
very similar to those that loaded on the factor, Journey, in Study 1. The two remaining 
items, 14: “Exploring the gameworld and its locations” and 29: “Investigating the 
story and its mysteries,” were constructed by dividing the original item of The CGD 
scale (Table 3), 25: “Exploring the gameworld and uncovering the game’s secrets, 
mysteries and story,” into two individual items describing singular gameplay mo-
tifemes. Interestingly, these two items showed the two highest loadings on factor two 
(Table 7). All of the items that loaded on this factor reflect players’ preferences in the 
motifeme type of Journey. 
Six items (9–13, 32) showed clear loadings on the third factor. Items 9, 10, 
11, 12 and 13 were all similar to those items that loaded on the factor, Manage, in 
Study 1. The additional item, 32: “Trading items, weapons or resources,” which was 
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extracted from the original item, 30: “Reaching an agreement, for example by trading, 
negotiating or making a truce,” (The CGD scale, Table 4) also loaded on this factor. 
The factor describes a player’s preferences in the motifeme type of Manage. 
Five items (20, 21, 25, 26, 31) loaded on the fourth factor. Similar to the fac-
tor, Care, in Study 1, these items include the motifeme describing taking care of pets 
(item 21, Table 7), and the motifemes that describe romantic activities (items 20 and 
31, Table 7). As hypothesized, the items on this factor reveal players’ preferences in 
the new motifeme items of decorating (item 25), and dressing up and make-up (item 
26). Thus, the factor label, “Care,” still seems fitting. 
Finally, four items (22–24, 30) loaded on the fifth factor. Identically to the 
factor, Coordinate, in Study 1, these items describe player preferences in matching 
tiles together (item 22) and jumping on platforms (item 23). Moreover, the items de-
scribing performing music (30) and staying in the rhythm (24) loaded on this factor 
of Coordinate. Descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alphas for the game dynamics 
preference categories are presented in Table 8.  
 
  
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Uniqueness 
1 0.8283     0.2006 
2 0.7557     0.3747 
3 0.8659     0.2023 
4 0.7067     0.3078 
5 0.6787     0.3845 
6 0.7288     0.2720 
7 0.7034     0.2313 
8 0.7634     0.3182 
9   0.7793   0.2584 
10   0.7394   0.2846 
11   0.7367   0.2914 
12   0.6442   0.3236 
13   0.5306   0.4649 
14  0.8164    0.2152 
15  0.6683    0.3842 
16  0.6871    0.2839 
17  0.6462    0.3268 
18  0.7006    0.3853 
19  0.5294    0.3316 
20    0.7950  0.2537 
21    0.5528  0.4645 
22     0.5821 0.6118 
23     0.5797 0.4884 
24     0.5584 0.5903 
25    0.7053  0.3279 
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26    0.6456  0.4302 
27 0.6460     0.4600 
28 0.6696     0.4292 
29  0.7319    0.3664 
30     0.5262 0.5565 
31    0.6142  0.3610 
32   0.5892   0.3138 
Mean 2.8467 3.5170 3.0698 2.6733 2.9503  
Std. Dev. 0.9818 0.8868 0.9341 0.9258 0.8121  
Alpha 0.9313 0.9003 0.8959 0.8061 0.6761  
Note: Mean, standard deviation and Cronbach’s alpha are calculated using items 
with loadings above 0.5. 
 
Table 8. Factor Loadings (Loadings > .5), uniqueness for Items of The CGD scale, 
2nd iteration, and descriptive statistics for scale sums. 
 
The factor analysis of Study 2 with another data set of 845 Finnish respondents re-
vealed five highly similar factors to those of Study 1. With the exception of item 33: 
“Designing and creating your own game levels or gameworlds,” all of the 32 items 
loaded on a single factor without showing cross-loadings on other factors. Although 
item 33 describes a type of player activity in relation to a game, it remains questiona-
ble whether this item portrays gameplay rather than free-form play. The practice of 
designing and creating, e.g., levels for a game may converge into merely playing with 
a digital environment instead of overcoming in-game challenges of any kind. This 
may be one reason why this item did not show loading on any of the five factors. 
All of the other items developed for The CGD scale did show strong and clear 
loadings on a factor. From these perspectives, Study 2 did improve the scale. It also 
revealed that the five-factor structure of gameplay motifeme type preferences is re-
peatable. However, I did not conduct a confirmatory factor analysis to study construct 
validity, convergent validity or discriminant validity of the five-factor model, and this 
is indeed an important research area for future research on gameplay motifeme pref-
erence factors. Another significant subject for research would be to analyze whether 
cultural differences influence the motifeme factor structure.  
It is important to further investigate whether items describing sports fit into 
the model of five factors or do they, for example, constitute a sixth factor. This is also 
relevant for confirming whether items 27: “Racing at a high speed” and 28: “Steering, 
piloting or maneuvering a vehicle or another object” load consistently on the Assault 
factor, given that both of these items cross-loaded in Study 1 between Coordinate and 
Assault.  
In Study 1, I report a discriminant validity test in which we revealed that the 
gameplay motifeme categories were not to be equated with motivations to play. Since 
gameplay is largely about the challenges the player encounters and the ways the player 
manages to overcome these challenges (Adams, 2014), it is also possible that the mo-
tifeme system measures players’ preferences in challenges instead of in performative 




The survey of 845 respondents included a set of items inquiring about the respondents’ 
preferences in different types of in-game challenge types (Likert-5 scale 1 = very un-
pleasant, 5 = very pleasant). The challenge-type items described: (1) spatial puzzles, 
(2) linguistic puzzles, (3) memory puzzles, (4) logical problem-solving, (5) creative 
problem-solving, (6) tactical challenges, (7) strategic challenges, and (8) cause-and-
effect puzzles. Three of these challenge types (4, 6, 7) were included in the original 
gameplay motifeme inventory (Table 4). The additional five were mentioned in the 
analyzed data of 700 game review articles (Study 1), and in the open-ended data of 
the first survey (N=2,595). They are also supported by the literature (Adams, 2014). 
 
 
 Assault Journey Manage Care Coordinate 
Cause-and-effect puzzles 0.09 0.40 0.25 0.01 0.16 
Creative problem-solving 0.19 0.44 0.28 -0.01 0.13 
Linguistic puzzles 0.01 0.29 0.17 0.14 0.26 
Logical problem-solving 0.02 0.16 0.16 -0.09 0.26 
Memory puzzles -0.07 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.43 
Spatial puzzles 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.13 0.25 
Strategic challenges 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.03 0.05 
Tactical challenges 0.56 0.18 0.47 0.12 -0.03 
 
Table 9. Bivariate correlations (Spearman rank-order) between the five motifeme cat-
egory mean scores and recurrent challenge types in video game gameplay (N=845). 
 
In order to study the discriminant validity of the gameplay motifeme categories, I 
calculated bivariate correlations (Spearman rank-order) between the five motifeme 
factor scores and the eight recurrent gameplay challenge types. I present the results of 
this additional discriminant validity test in Table 9. 
From Table 9, we can note that preference mean scores for both Assault and 
Manage moderately correlate with tactical challenges, and weakly with challenges of 
strategy and spatial recognition. Preference in Manage also weakly correlates with 
creative problem-solving and cause-and-effect puzzles. Journey, instead, moderately 
correlates with creative problem-solving and cause-and-effect puzzles, and weakly 
with strategic, linguistic and spatial challenges. Preference in Care is not correlated 
with any of the eight challenge types, and finally Coordinate is moderately correlated 
with memory puzzles and weakly with spatial and linguistic puzzles, and logical prob-
lem-solving.  
Although the discriminant validity test of Table 9 reveals connections be-
tween motifeme preference factors and challenge types, none of the correlations are 
strong (over .60) and only a few are moderate (between .40 and .59). The correlations 
are plausible: tactical challenges are often associated with battle tactics and warfare, 
which makes their correlations with Assault and Manage sensible. Games that empha-
size Journey tend to include puzzles that require both creativity and understanding of 
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causation, and memorizing patterns of actions are typical for games of the Coordinate 
type. Players who prefer Care perhaps seek experiences of free-form play, prefer to 
play casually, and do not enjoy challenging games as much as the others. Since the 
correlations between motifeme type factors and challenge types are mostly weak, it 
can be concluded that the motifeme approach measures different aspects of gameplay 




Study 3: Data Triangulation  
 
I continued the development of The CGD scale by making a data triangulation on the 
items of the inventory. The objective of this study was to confirm that the 33 items of 
the 2nd CGD scale (Table 7) gave a comprehensive portrayal of contemporary video 
game gameplay motifemes. Thus, I asked: 
 
RQ2.6: Would an additional content analysis on gameplay motifemes result in a sim-
ilar inventory to that of The CGD scale (Table 7), and could The CGD scale 
thus be developed further by such a process? 
 
As I mentioned early in this chapter, the best data sources for motifemes are first-
person characterizations of gameplay experiences. The primary data source for con-
structing The CGD scale consisted of game review articles. As a secondary data type 
for triangulation, I analyzed a sample of 166 game instruction booklets. I decided to 
analyze this data since, in game instruction booklets, game developers aim to describe 
how to play the game, which typically includes descriptions of gameplay motifemes 
of the game.  
Although the game instruction data of 166 game manuals is different from 
game review data, both of the data types aim to communicate essential elements of 
gameplay, and thus the core gameplay motifemes of the game to the players. There-
fore, I hypothesized: 
 
H1: The content analysis of the game instruction manuals will result in similar results 
as those of the content analysis of the game review articles.  
 
I analyzed instruction booklets for games published for Playstation, Playstation 2, 
Playstation 3, Playstation Portable (PSP), Nintendo GameCube, Nintendo Wii, Nin-
tendo WiiU, GameBoy Advance (GBA), Nintendo DS, Nintendo 3DS, Xbox 360, 
Xbox One and PC. Since my objective was to conduct a comprehensive analysis, I 
analyzed booklets of a great variety of games ranging from simulation games and 
graphic adventure games of 1980s to recent role-playing games. The full list of the 
game instruction booklets included in the analysis is reported in the Appendixes. 
When analyzing the data, I followed the qualitative content analysis proce-
dure specified in Study 1. During the analysis, I observed that the contents of booklets 
varied significantly according to three main factors: the ‘genre’ of the game (whether 
the game was, e.g., a platformer, a strategy game, or a pet simulation game), the plat-
form for which the game was published, and the year the game instruction booklet 
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was printed. Generally speaking, the instruction manuals of the games published in 
1990s and early 2000s were much more detailed than the manuals for games published 
more recently. Indeed, many games of the current game technology generation do not 
include any kind of game instruction booklet, or it is only available as a digital down-
load. Furthermore, mobile games do not usually have official instruction booklets at 
all. The data of Study 3 was influenced by these facts, and therefore, most of the game 
instructions included in the final analysis were of games published between 1995 and 
2010. 
While a typical instruction booklet included in the analysis (GBA, DS, 
Playstation 1, Playstation 2, Playstation 3) had 30–50 pages, some recent games had 
very short booklets. For example, the manual of Rayman Legends (Ubisoft, 2013) has 
only 8 pages, Portal 2 (Valve, 2011) 16 pages, and Nine Hours, Nine Persons, Nine 
Doors (Chunsoft, 2009) 11 pages. In contrast to this, several older strategy and role-
playing games have very long manuals: Sid Meier’s Alpha Centauri (Firaxis Games, 
1999) has a manual of 252 pages, and the game manual for Baldur’s Gate II: Shadows 
of Amn (BioWare, 2000) is 266 pages long. 
Typically, game instruction booklets for titles published for Playstation, 
Playstation 2, Nintendo DS and several other game consoles include sections such as 
“getting started,” “game controls,” “prologue/background story,” “main characters,” 
“game flow/how to play” and “credits.” Under “game controls,” the player is in-
structed about the core game mechanics of the game, that is, what kinds of actions are 
mapped to the different buttons of a game controller. The core gameplay motifemes 
are usually described for the player under the section titled “Flow of the game/ How 
to play.”  
Let me give three short examples. The instruction booklet of a dungeon-
crawler game The Dark Spire (Atlus, 2006) for Nintendo DS includes the sections of 
prologue, controls, starting the game, several sections describing the game flow, and 
the credits. In the manual (p.13), the player is instructed on how she can join “The 
Adventurers Guild” and “Create a new character… edit your party and adjust the 
party’s formation… gain levels, raise stats, and learn new spells or skills… talk to 
Eventail the Guildmaster [who] can provide you with information about monsters, 
quests and other relevant topics.” In the game manual of Deus Ex: Human Revolution 
(Eidos/Square Enix, 2011, p. 10) for Xbox 360, the player is instructed about 1) un-
lockable “Augmentations” that provide new skills and abilities for the player, 2) lev-
elling up, 3) engaging in combats, 4) stealth and taking cover, 5) hacking systems, 6) 
social interaction, 7) trading items and weapons, and 8) exploring the gameworld and 
uncovering its secrets. In the instructions for Deus Ex: Human Revolution, gameplay 
motifemes of the game are specified for the player as subheadings, which was indeed 
found to be quite common across the instruction booklet data. Under the subheading 
of “Playing the game” in the manual of Chrono Cross (Squaresoft, 2000, pp. 8–22) 
for Playstation, the game is described for the player as a combination of gameplay 
activities including “moving on the world map,” “gathering information through con-
versation,” “examining things and using key items,” “purchasing items from mer-
chants,” “forging more powerful weapons… by using the various ‘raw materials,’” 
“equipping characters with weapons, armors, and accessories” and “battling enemies 
by attacking, defending and using elements.” 
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I stopped analyzing game instruction booklets after 166 documents due to the satura-
tion of the data. As a result of the analysis, I was able to distinguish 44 recurrent 
gameplay motifemes. All of the 33 items included in the second iteration of The CGD 
scale (Table 7) were supported by the data triangulation, although the data triangula-
tion suggested minor modifications to the phrasing of several items. This confirmed 
the hypothesis of this study (H1). However, in addition to these slight changes, the 
data triangulation process suggested that eleven more items could be considered as 
additional core motifemes:  
 
Commanding units or troops 
Empathizing and taking on different roles 
Fighting by attacking, defending and using spells 
Gardening or taking care of a farm 
Guiding and herding a population or followers 
Hanging out with friends 
Hunting and capturing creatures 
Navigating in dungeons and overcoming its dangers 
Performing in lifelike sports such as basketball, ice hockey, or football 
Running at a fast speed while avoiding obstacles 
Equipping weapons, skills, and abilities for characters 
 
In future research, the next phase in The CGD scale development would be to conduct 
a theory-driven confirmatory factor analysis for data representing other cultural envi-
ronments than Finland or Denmark. By doing a confirmatory factor analysis, the con-
struct and convergent validity of the revealed five-factor construct could be investi-
gated. Also, the discriminate validity of the five-factor model could be further exam-
ined by studying how the identified gameplay motifeme type factors are related to 
player behavior typologies in addition to core motivations to play, which we report on 
in Vahlo et al. (2017). 
In the conclusions of Vahlo et al. (2017), we suggest that future research could 
focus on studying how The CGD scale relates to video game genre classifications, 
since the game industry categorizes games into genres mainly based on the type of 
gameplay they provide for players (Adams & Dormans, 2012, p. 7). In the final study 
of this chapter, I focus on this subject, which can also be regarded as a type of discri-
minant validity testing for the construct of five motifeme type factors. 
 
 
Study 4: The Motifeme System and Genre Classifications 
 
According to Rachel I. Clarke, Jin H. Lee and Neils Clark (2015), current video game 
genre definitions fail for five reasons. They: 1) do not put forward a concrete set iden-
tification, 2) offer poor collocation and retrieval, 3) inhibit creative development, 4) 
monopolize and/or skew sales, and 5) do not aid the players to find the video game 
content they seek.  
Since genre classifications help individuals find the content they are seeking, 
it has become a central criterion for marketing, producing and distributing cultural 
media. Clarke, Lee and Clark (2015, p. 7) note that in the consumption of literature, 
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genre is the second most popular reason to buy certain books after the author (see 
National Endowment for the Arts, 2009 in Clarke et al., 2015). In the movie industry, 
genre is the most important factor for making the decision to see a specific movie. 
The same trend is evident in the game industry: ‘genre’ is a major market driver.  
Clarke, Lee and Clark (2015) argue that video game genre labels appear as 
random rather than systematic since they are not based on a well-defined set of clas-
sification rules. While this is may be a justified conclusion, I would like to draw at-
tention to the fact that most of the game descriptions—also including those in the data 
analyzed by Clarke et al. (2015)—seem to emphasize one dimension over the others, 
that of “in-game activities.” Since game mechanics are defined as the actions available 
for the player in gameplay, “game mechanics” as another recurrent game classifica-
tion criterion is not different from “in-game activities” but rather only in its level of 
abstraction, as I argue earlier in this chapter.  
I would like to add that many online game databases utilize a genre system 
that emphasizes the criterion of “in-game activities.” This is hardly surprising since 
games are primarily marketed as action-games, role-playing games, platformers, ad-
venture games or puzzle games, that is, based on the primary in-game activity type 
they afford for the players. Ali Faisal and Mirva Peltoniemi (2015, p. 5) come to a 
similar conclusion based on their literature review of game genre classifications: 
“There appears to be a consensus on the existence of action, shooting, role-playing 
game, strategy, simulation, sports, racing and fighting genres.” All of these widely-
recognized genre labels describe the core gameplay of the games, albeit in a very 
general fashion. 
Thomas H. Apperley (2006, p. 7) states in his analysis of video game genres 
that: “Interactivity—the way in which the game is played, rather than watched—is a 
nonrepresentational feature common to all video games.” However, as both Apperley 
(ibid.) and Dominic Arsenault (2009) suggest, genre taxonomies should comprise 
both interactivity and thematic or semiotic representation. This would lead to a situa-
tion in which games could be classified according to their gameplay into a specific 
group, and according to their theme and representation into another group. Separately 
observing gameplay and representational qualities of a game does not, however, entail 
that the fictionality of a game can be completely separated from the gameplay. Game-
play arises from the game’s fictional setting, as noted by Adams (2014, p. 9) and Da-
vid A. Clearwater (2011).  
As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Kirkpatrick (2012; 2013) has 
revealed, in his extensive analysis of video game review articles, that ‘gameplay’ has 
prevailed as the most significant factor for establishing video games as an autonomous 
form of culture. The concept of ‘gameplay’ describes precisely “in-game activities” 
and “game mechanics,” where the term ‘activity’ approaches the phenomenon from 
the vantage point of the ongoing gameplay, and ‘game mechanics’ from the perspec-
tive of the designed game system. Gameplay denotes what the players do during 
gameplay, which is simultaneously what the game designers aim to present to the 
players and what the players expect to experience from a game during play. In prior 
research, for example, Mark J. P. Wolf (2001) and Landay (2014) have arrived at the 
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same conclusion: game genres should be defined based on the different forms of in-
teractivity. “Interactivity in video games is what a player can do in them—the choices 
and action that comprise gameplay” (Landay, 2014, p. 182). 
Since the concept of ‘gameplay’ is adopted by game journalism, the game 
industry as well as the gamers as a means to search for, describe and communicate 
about games, it appears as the criterion with the most potential for genre classifica-
tions. The challenge here is to put forward a system that manages to describe ‘game-
play’ in a systematic fashion. Thus, the real question is, as Clarke et al. (2015) recog-
nized: “What is really being described when we say ‘action’ game or ‘role-playing 
game’?” They were indeed correct to note that in many games players play a character, 
and technically all games are action games since all gameplay necessitates taking ac-
tions (Galloway, 200 6, p. 2).  
In game studies and game design literature, there have been several attempts 
to develop rigorous video game genre classifications. However, Juul (2014) has ob-
served that this undertaking is still largely neglected in the study of video games. Juul 
notes that although genres do change in, e.g., literature and music constantly, this con-
tinual transformation happens much faster within the video game industry. Instead of 
pondering genre systems, according to Juul (2014), game studies discussions are more 
occupied with either big definitional questions or smaller units such as game mechan-
ics and design patterns.45  
The approach I take here is related to a genre classification model presented 
by Wolf (2001), who has constructed a list of game genres on the criterion of “the 
dominant characteristics of the interactive experience and the games’ goals and ob-
jectives, and the nature of the game’s player‐character and player controls” (ibid., p. 
116). Similar to the model I am developing, Wolf focuses on the interactivity of the 
player–game coupling rather than on the interactivity that can take place between 
players if the game supports a multiplayer setup. The genre list by Wolf appears as 
follows: Abstract, Adaptation, Adventure, Artificial Life, Board Games, Capturing, 
Card Games, Catching, Chase, Collecting, Combat, Demo, Diagnostic, Dodging, 
Driving, Educational, Escape, Fighting, Flying, Gambling, Interactive Movie, Man-
agement Simulation, Maze, Obstacle Course, Pencil-and-Paper Games, Pinball, Plat-
form, Programming Games, Puzzle, Quiz, Racing, Role-Playing, Rhythm and Dance, 
Shoot ’Em Up, Simulation, Sports, Strategy, Table-Top Games, Target, Text Adven-
ture, Training Simulation and Utility. 
Although there are some similarities between the current approach and that of 
Wolf’s (2001), there are also several crucial differences that must be elucidated. First, 
the model I present is not based on the researcher’s reflection on different games but 
on identifying recurrent gameplay motifeme preferences by first conducting a quali-
tative data analysis of 700 video game review articles, and by including the list of 33 
motifemes into statistical analyses on gameplay preferences (N=1,718, ages 18–70; 
                                                 
45 However, there is a moderate body of literature in game studies on game genre classifica-
tions. For instance, Chris Crawford’s (1982) early taxonomy of video games was based on two 
main categories: skill-and-action and strategy. Skill-and-action games (e.g., combat games, 
maze games, sports games, paddle games, and racing games) emphasize perceptual and motor 
skills, whereas strategy games (e.g., adventures, Dungeons & Dragons-style games and war-
games) emphasize cognitive effort. The theme has also been discussed extensively, e.g., by 
Aarseth et al. (2003), Aarseth (2004), Apperley (2006) and Arsenault (2009). 
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N=845, ages 18–55). Second, since the system by which the motifemes were identi-
fied and later included in the surveys was kept rigorous, the results are also coherent. 
In the current model, e.g., “Artificial Life,” “Board Games” and “Interactive Movie” 
would not be acceptable since they do not describe the modes of player–game inter-
action from the vantage point of ongoing gameplay, and they do not answer the ques-
tion of “what the player does during gameplay.” Third, and this is a critique by Aki 
Järvinen (2002) on Wolf’s (2001) approach, the purpose of genre classifications is to 
make sense of a large body of works, and a list with more than forty items cannot be 
regarded as very successful in this regard.46 This problem is, however, a double-edged 
sword: Clarke, Lee and Clark (2015, p. 6) observe that, if inexplicit definitions leave 
genre definitions too vague, the genre labels become applied into very large number 
of games, which makes the genre system so general that it is eventually rendered 
meaningless. For example, the genre of action-adventure games encompasses so many 
games that the information value of this “genre” becomes questionable.  
Although the current motifeme list (The CGD scale, 2nd iteration, Table 7) 
includes a total of 33 items, and the content analysis of game instruction booklets 
suggests that eleven other motifemes could be considered to be added to the scale, 
The CGD scale does not face the kind of problem that the list fashioned by Wolf 
(2001) faces. The problem of a large number of motifeme items was overcome by 
including the items into surveys and by then investigating players’ preferences of 
playing games with these motifemes. The results from Study 1 (N=1,718) revealed 
that players’ preferences in performative play manifest in five dimensions: Assault, 
Manage, Journey, Coordinate and Care. Very similar results were revealed in Study 
2 (N=845) with an improved version of The CGD scale. Taken individually or to-
gether, both Study 1 and Study 2 reported in this thesis suggest that video games could 
be categorized into the five main genres of Assault, Manage, Journey, Care and Co-
ordinate. Two things must be immediately clarified about these five main categories. 
First, it is a possibility that the five categories are too general and thus these 
labels can become meaningless if too many games are to be classified, e.g., as assault 
games. However, it must be emphasized that each of the five motifeme type categories 
consists of several individual motifemes. Based on this structure (see Table 7), it is 
possible to develop a hierarchical model of game genres, for instance, Assault–Stealth 
(1–6), Assault–Killing (1–1), Assault–Warfare (1–7) or Assault–Surviving (1–5), 
where the number “1” represents factor 1, that is Assault, and the following number 
the respective motifeme, as numbered in The CGD scale (Table 7).  
Moreover, by devising a system that evaluates the priority of a particular mo-
tifeme over other motifemes in the gameplay of a given game, the classification sys-
tem could be further refined into, e.g., assault games that emphasize aggressive mo-
tifemes, but also, for instance, character development (2–15) or racing at a high speed 
(1–27). This could be studied by dividing the motifemes as primary, secondary, and 
tertiary from the perspective of their significance in the course of the game. However, 
as I mentioned earlier in this chapter, the list of gameplay motifemes must be studied 
                                                 
46 Järvinen (2002) wonders whether we must accept that video games cannot be categorized 
into a sensible number of genres because “game genres are complex sums of interaction and 
rule mechanisms, audiovisual styles, and popular fiction genre conventions.”  
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further with additional sets of data representing different cultural backgrounds to be 
able to validate the factor structure and The CGD gameplay motifeme inventory.  
The results from Study 1 and Study 2 reported in this chapter not only suggest 
that player types can be defined by utilizing the players’ preferences in gameplay mo-
tifemes and gameplay motifeme factors, but also that games can be classified accord-
ing to the same criteria. This proposal is not to say that other factors (e.g., theme of 
the game, the types of challenges in the game, whether the game is turn-based or not, 
and the emphasis put on game narrative) would not matter to players nor that these 
factors would not matter for identifying game genres. My argument is that gameplay 
motifemes manage to grasp the primary quality of video games—in-game activity 
enabled by game mechanics when set in motion by the player’s agency—and that this 
characteristic is the most important single feature in developing a rigorous system of 
game genres that makes sense to game developers and to gamers worldwide. Just as 
Clarke, Lee and Clark (2015, p. 4) observe, it is of paramount importance that the 
genre labels map the language commonly used by both the commercial industry and 
the players.   
Arsenault (2009, p. 150), furthermore argues that a genre model must be able 
to account for the transformations, reinventions and adaptations of game cultures. 
Folklorist Frog (2016, p. 51) similarly stresses that “‘[g]enres operate as frameworks 
generative for the production of expressions and in relation to which such expressions 
are also received and interpreted when the genre is recognized.” I concur with these 
statements and propose that an added value of motifeme-based video game genre clas-
sification could be that this system does not restrict new game genres from emerging. 
More precisely, the system outlined in the current study could work as a generative 
framework instead of being a collection of static ideal categories (see Abrahams, 
2005; Frog, 2016). For example, survival horror platformer games would make sense 
within this system, as they would combine the primary motifemes of Assault (1–5; 1–
6; 1–1) and Coordinate (5–23).  
Since established genre models offer tools for developers to emulate existing 
combinations and to communicate their market potential to investors and audiences, 
the motifeme system could also be utilized in fashioning new sub-genres by combin-
ing motifemes under and across a preference factor in creative ways. The motifeme 
system, just as any genre classification, must remain open for changes in rapidly 
evolving game cultures. Genres are historical constructs, as argued by Arsenault 
(2014): what emerges today as an important motifeme may be absent a decade later, 
and new motifemes will surely arise. The current list of 33 motifemes and 11 candi-
date motifemes should not be seen then as a permanent result but instead as open to 
critical analyses with different sets of data (e.g., big-data analyses utilizing deep learn-
ing algorithms of both player-generated data and game database data). Correspond-
ingly, the five gameplay motifeme factors should also be regarded as first findings 
rather than as final results. An evident question must still be asked:  
 
RQ2.7: How different, if at all, is the list of five motifeme preferences factors from 
the game genre listings applied in popular game media? Could we not, e.g., 
just equate the factor of ‘assault’ with ‘action games’?  
 
I investigated this question by studying data introduced in Study 1 (N=1,718). The 
survey included a question that inquired about the video game genre preferences of 
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the respondents. The participants responded to this question by marking from a fixed 
list 0–5 genres that they were the most familiar with as players. The list was put to-
gether by studying the classification systems of several popular gaming websites, in-
cluding Metacritic.com, Gamefaqs.com, Gamerankings.com, IGN.com as well as 
Wikipedia.org. The list was also piloted with a set of 50 respondents and further de-
veloped into a selection of 15 game genres: 
 
1. Action games (e.g., Metroid, Halo, Half-Life, Call of Duty) 
2. Action-adventure games (e.g., Assassin's Creed, Resident Evil, Zelda, GTA) 
3. Adventure games (e.g., Heavy Rain, Monkey Island, Zero Escape) 
4. Driving games (e.g., Forza, Mario Kart, Need for Speed, Wipeout) 
5. Puzzle games (e.g., Tetris, Candy Crush Saga, Professor Layton, World of Goo) 
6. Role-playing games (e.g., Skyrim, Final Fantasy, Fallout, Pokemon, MMORPG) 
7. Simulations (e.g., SimCity, The Sims, Flight simulators, driving simulations) 
8. Sports games (e.g., NFL, NHL, FIFA, Tony Hawk's Pro Skater, SSX, Wii Sports) 
9. Strategy games (e.g., Civilization, Fire Emblem, Clash of Clans, MOBA games) 
10. Platformers (e.g., Super Mario games, Sonic, LittleBigPlanet, Rayman) 
11. Sandbox games (e.g., Minecraft) 
12. Arcade games (e.g., beat 'em up fighting games and shoot 'em space shooters) 
13. Party games (e.g., Singstar, Dance Dance Revolution, Rock Band) 
14. Pet simulations (e.g., Neopets, Nintendogs) 
15. Serious games (e.g., educational games and health games)  
 
In order to study the relationships between the five motifeme type factors and recur-
rent video game genre descriptions, I conducted a logistic multivariable regression 
between a binary outcome variable of playing/not playing each of the 15 abovemen-
tioned video game genres, and predictor variables of preference in the five motifeme 
type factors. Regression analyses are techniques to model the relationships between 
identified independent variables and dependent variables (Yan & Su, 2009, p. v). In 
this study, the independent variables were the five gameplay motifeme categories as 
well as the age and gender of the respondents. The dependent variable was the fre-
quency to play games of specific genres. By using logistic regression, I assumed that: 
 
H1: There are linear relationships between preferring gameplay motifeme types (pre-
dictor variables) and playing games of particular video game genres (outcome 
variables).  
 
I made relative risk ratio (RRR) calculations, which make it possible to investigate 
relationships between predictor variables and outcome variables from the perspective 
of probabilities (Acock, 2008, p. 275).47 I investigated how an increase in a predictor 
variable increases or decreases the “risk,” that is, the probability, of playing games of 
                                                 
47 See also Introduction to SAS. ULCA: Statistical Consulting Group by Karla Lindquist. 
From: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/faq/relative_risk.htm, Accessed 21st of February 
2017 and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relative_risk. 
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a specific genre. To make the analyses more robust, I included the background varia-
bles of gender and age in the regression model. I present the results of the logistic 
regressions in Table 10.  
 
 
  Assault Manage Journey Care Coordin. Age Men  
          
Action 
 1.46*** 1.11*** 1.18*** 0.96* 0.98 0.98*** 1.38*** RRR 
 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.09 Std. Err 
Action- 
Adventure 
 1.32*** 1.14*** 1.36*** 1.00 1.01 0.98*** 1.12* RRR 
 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.06 Std. Err. 
Adventure 
 1.21*** 1.16*** 1.53*** 1.04 1.13*** 0.96*** 1.17 RRR 
 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.11 Std. Err. 
Racing 
 1.23*** 1.03 1.17*** 0.97 1.07* 0.98*** 1.66*** RRR 
 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.19 Std. Err. 
Puzzle 
 0.91*** 1.01 1.05** 0.93*** 1.14*** 0.99*** 0.74*** RRR 
 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05 Std. Err. 
Role- 
Playing 
 1.25*** 1.24*** 1.60*** 1.03 1.00 0.96*** 1.27*** RRR 
 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.07 Std. Err. 
Simulation 
 1.03 1.29*** 1.23*** 1.11** 0.94 0.96*** 0.82 RRR 
 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.09 Std. Err. 
Sports 
 1.13*** 1.13*** 1.12** 0.99 1.01 0.98*** 2.42*** RRR 
 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.37 Std. Err. 
Strategy 
 1.11*** 1.35*** 1.22*** 0.91*** 0.93** 0.96*** 1.14 RRR 
 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.09 Std. Err. 
Platformer 
 1.08** 1.00 1.36*** 0.94* 1.37*** 0.97*** 0.92 RRR 
 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.09 Std. Err. 
Sandbox 
 1.16** 1.33*** 1.39*** 1.05 0.91 0.96*** 0.96 RRR 
 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.17 Std. Err. 
Arcade 
 1.15* 0.92 1.19* 0.93 1.23* 0.97** 1.38 RRR 
 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.35 Std. Err. 
Party 
 0.96 0.97 1.24*** 1.11* 1.37*** 0.97*** 0.76 RRR 
 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.12 Std. Err. 
Pet Simu-
lation 
 0.88 1.06 1.23 1.29** 1.22 0.97** 0.38* RRR 
 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.16 Std. Err. 
Serious 
Games 
 0.90 1.03 1.01 1.07 1.17* 1.00 0.68 RRR 
 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.18 Std. Err. 
          
***p < 0.001 **p < 0.01 *p < 0.05  N = 1718 
 
Table 10. Results of the logistic regression analyses between preference in gameplay 
motifeme factors (predictor variables, factor scores) and playing games of a particu-
lar genre (binary outcome variable) in the data reported in Study 1 (N=1,718).  
 
Let’s consider an example of the results. The relative risk ration (RRR) of Assault for 
playing action games is 1.46 (p < 0.001). Since the relative risk ratio is above one, it 
means that an increase in the preference for Assault increases the risk to play action 
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video games, i.e., playing action games is more likely to happen. In this case, we can 
say that a raise in the preference of Assault increases the relative risk to play action 
games by 46 percent. Indeed, preference in Assault did predict playing action games 
more than any other game genres. Moreover, Assault predicted the RRR to play ac-
tion-adventure games by 32 percent, role-playing games by 25 percent, racing games 
by 23 percent, and adventure games by 21 percent. An increase in Assault preference, 
however decreased the probability of playing puzzle games. 
Preference in Manage showed more moderate effects on the RRR to play par-
ticular genres than Assault did. The clearest relation was found between favoring 
Manage and the relative risk ratio of playing strategy games (35% increase). Prefer-
ence in Manage also increased the probability of playing sandbox games by 33 per-
cent, simulation games by 29 percent, and role-playing games by 24 percent. An in-
crease in enjoying Manage did not have negative effect on playing any of the game 
genres.  
Enjoying Journey had a positive effect on playing a variety of game genres. 
By preferring Journey, the relative risk to play role-playing games increased by 60 
percent, which was the strongest effect revealed in this study. Also, the relative risk 
to play adventure games was increased greatly, by 53 percent. Preference in Journey 
also had a clear positive relation to playing sandbox (39%), platformer (36%), and 
action-adventure (36%) games.  
An increase in the preference of Care resulted in an RRR of playing pet sim-
ulations by 29 percent, party games by 11 percent, and simulations by 11 percent. 
However, a higher preference score in Care had negative relation to playing strategy 
games (decrease of 9%), puzzle games (decrease of 7%) and action games (decrease 
of 4%). An increase in the preference score of Coordinate predicted a 37 percent 
growth in the relative risk of playing both platformers and party games. Also, the RRR 
of playing arcade games (23%), serious games (17%), puzzle games (14%), and ad-
venture games (13%) was increased. As with Care, preference in Coordinate slightly 
decreased the ratio of the probability of playing strategy games. 
Finally, an increase in age value had a significant negative relationship to 
playing all of the game genres, save serious games. This means that younger respond-
ents reported playing games of more versatile genres than older respondents. The gen-
der of respondents also had a clear effect on the habits of playing specific genres. This 
is very clear in some cases: an increase in the number of male respondents increased 
the relative risk of playing sports games by 142 percent, racing games by 66 percent, 
action games by 38 percent, and role-playing games by 27 percent. In contrast to this, 
being a male decreased the RRR for playing pet simulations and puzzle games in the 
data of 1,718 respondents.  
The result of logistic regression analyses I report here (Table 10) suggest that 
the gameplay motifeme factors are not to be equated with common genre categories. 
However, the regressions reveal interesting contingencies between these two distinc-
tive approaches on understanding game preferences. The overall result was that game-
play motifeme factor preferences (predictor variables) suggest dependencies on the 
habits of playing certain game genres (outcome variables) over the others, as well as 
not playing specific genres. As a conclusion, I offer that a player preferring Assault 
cannot be regarded simply as an action game player, nor can one that prefers Journey 
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only be considered a RPG player. The connections between the five motifeme type 
factors and game choice are more complex than that, and yet are contingent with this 
primary association.  
This study confirms the hypothesis (H1): preferences in motifeme type factors 
predict habits of playing games of specific genres, and yet these two classification 
systems are not to be equated. Therefore, this study can also be considered an addi-
tional discriminant validity test for The CGD scale (Table 8) and the revealed five-
factor structure. By itself, the motifeme approach does not account for a full-blown 
genre classification system, but I propose that the approach presented here could be a 
significant aid for fashioning such a system. Furthermore, the results of Study 4 sug-
gest that the gameplay activity preference approach could be utilized in constructing 
models for predicting game choice. This is to propose that game players have lasting 
personal dispositions, interpersonal influences and habits that affect their game media 
choice (Webster, 2014), and that the structural and dynamical characteristics of games 
including gameplay motifemes constitute a significant factor in this process (see 
Wolling, 2009). This is indeed an important subject area for future research (Vahlo & 
Koponen, 2018).    
Faisal and Peltoniemi (2015) have recently argued in an article on utilizing 
machine-learning methods in identifying game genres that genre organization should 
be data-driven instead of based on manual classifications. While the model outlined 
in the current study is based on a theoretical framework, the model remains open-
ended, and thus gameplay motifemes could be further analyzed by applying data-
driven modeling as well as machine-learning algorithms.  
 
 
Discussion: Folkloristic Continuum of Game Classifications 
 
I conclude this empirical chapter by returning to the theme I visited in the beginning 
of this chapter, by analyzing the motifemic sequences of Hare and Hounds (see Dun-
des 2007 [1964]). I propose that the way in which games alter a player’s activities into 
in-game occurrences should be investigated carefully to highlight the possible conti-
nuities between social games and video games. For this purpose, let us consider a type 
index for children’s games as proposed by folklorist Gareth Whittaker (2012). 
Whittaker (2012) argues that there is no apparent reason why children’s 
games could not be classified into a set of categories. Similar to folktales, games have 
an opening, action, and an outcome, which remains uncertain during the actual expe-
rience. Games are passed on from one generation to another, and they can be broken 
into recurring basic elements, which makes it possible to recognize variants of the 
same item of folklore. There are several major folkloristic collections of children’s 
games, including those by Alice B. Gomme, Paul G. Brewster, Brian Sutton-Smith 
and Iona and Peter Opie. However, in contrast to the motif indexes of folktales, no 
useful classification system for children’s games has been proposed, save possibly the 
one proposed by Whittaker (2012) himself. 
Although games have structural similarities to narratives, which makes the 
objective of developing type and motif indexes for games feasible, Whittaker (2012) 
contends that games should not be classified according to similar criteria as folktales 
are grouped, because many games do not have dramatic or narrative content. This is 
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how Whittaker criticizes Dundes (2007 [1964]), Mellie Leandicho Lopez (1980) and 
Uta Schier-Oberdorffer (1993), all of whom have attempted to apply type and motif 
indexes developed for folk tales to games. Indeed, Whittaker (2012) argues that chil-
dren’s games that have narrative elements are typically singing games or dialogue 
games that lack a developed rule system and uncertainty of outcome, elements he 
takes as definitional characteristics of a game proper. Here Whittaker agrees with the 
Opies (1969), who divided children’s games into two categories of true “acting 
games” with rules and an uncertain outcome and “pretending games,” i.e., mini-dra-
mas or “playlets” that have dialogue, determined outcomes and fixed plots. To an 
extent, this classification is congenial with Abrahams’ model of Play I, Play II, and 
Play III (see Chapter 1). 
In order to proceed to present his classification of children’s games, Whittaker 
(2012) reviews a body of game definitions utilized by earlier folklorists. The purpose 
of this review is to find the essential element of games that could be applied as the 
focal point for devising a stable classification system. He concurs with a well-known 
definition by Avedon and Sutton-Smith in The Study of Games (1971, p. 7, see Chap-
ter 2), according to which a game is “an exercise of voluntary control system in which 
there is an opposition between forces, confined by a procedure and rules in order to 
produce a disequilibrial outcome.” In Whittaker’s interpretation, this definition comes 
to mean that each game proper must include four elements: 1) actions taken voluntar-
ily; 2) a contest or challenge; 3) rules; and 4) an uncertain outcome.  
Whittaker states that the definition by Avedon and Sutton-Smith (1971) dove-
tails with both classic and contemporary folkloristic studies on children’s games. The 
four elements of actions, contest, rules and outcomes are the “features recognised by 
folklorists as definitional of games” (Whittaker, 2012, p. 277). He argues that “one of 
these [four] elements should be chosen and used throughout the classification, thereby 
grouping game-types into the different kinds and sub-kinds of actions, contests/com-
petition, rules, or outcomes” (2012, p. 278). To evaluate the adequacy of each of the 
proposed four conditions of games as potential features for classifying children’s 
games, Whittaker applies a set of validation criteria for scholarly classifications, as 
proposed by Vladimir Propp in Theory and History of Folklore (1984). 
Propp (1984, pp. 43–46) provides a checklist of three criteria as basic princi-
ples for making classifications. First, any classification must be based on a single 
criterion that echoes relevant aspects of the phenomenon. The relevancy is to be eval-
uated in relation to the inherent and constitutional features of the object of the study. 
Second, the selected criterion must remain unchanged throughout the classification. 
Thus, a change that takes place in the selected criterion changes one item of folklore 
into another within the same genre. If this does not happen, the criterion has been 
selected poorly. In Propp’s (1968 [1928]), a change in functions of a folktale changes 
it into another tale type, but a change in characters does not generate such a change. 
Third, the basic criterion or feature of classification must be formulated accurately. 
The selected feature must thus be relevant, stable, and unambiguous for the classified 
phenomenon. Furthermore, in order to have cognitive value, a classification should be 
divided into basic classes (genus) and subordinate coordinate classes leading up to 
members (species) by precise multilevel divisions.  
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By following this procedure, Whittaker (2012) first evaluates the feature of ‘con-
test/competition.’ He notes that this feature is not the best option for classification 
because many children’s games can be played, e.g., as solitary pursuits, as co-opera-
tive play, as a duel, as a group versus a group, or as an individual versus a group. The 
criterion of contest/competition fails the test of stability. A game remains largely the 
same game regardless of whether it is played as a duel or as a solitary pursuit.  
Whittaker proceeds to assess ‘uncertainty of outcome.’ Here he notes that 
folklorists and anthropologists have classified children’s games by studying how dif-
ferent factors of a player’s skills define the outcomes of games. A game could be 
classified as a strategy game if strategizing were the main principle that affects the 
outcome; we would have a physical game if a player’s sensorimotor skills would de-
termine the outcome; and we would have games of chance if the player’s skills would 
not matter for the outcome. This is indeed how, for instance, John M. Roberts and 
Brian Sutton-Smith classified games (1971 [1962]).48 While this approach seems 
promising, it also fails the test of stability. For example, cheating in a game of strategy 
will affect the outcome, but surely it does not change the game. If a parent decides to 
play a game with his children, but plays poorly to let the children win, his choice of 
playing badly affects the outcome regardless of whether the game in question is a 
physical sport game, a board game of chance or, e.g., Go. Also, strategy games may 
include many elements of sensorimotor skills and physical games tend to have a stra-
tegic element as well as an element of unexpectedness. We may exhibit different styles 
of playing without the game changing into another type.  
Further, rules fail the test of stability. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, rules are 
negotiable, and they can be transformed without changing one game into another. A 
game remains the same as long as the participants agree to the altered rules. The ‘of-
ficial’ rules of a board game may define how the designer intends the game to be 
played, but the interpretation of the rules are made by the participants present in the 
actual gaming situation. As Whittaker notes (2012), the many forms a game may be 
played are known as variants of the same game instead of different games in their 
own right.  
Importantly, Whittaker (2012, p. 280) arrives at the same conclusion when 
developing an approach for classifying children’s games as I did above in the case of 
video games: “actions prescribed by the rules for attaining the outcome required to 
win the contest or to succeed in the challenge” is the most stable feature of games and 
thus primary for developing scientific classifying systems. Just as it is difficult to im-
agine the game Hopscotch without hopping, it is difficult to think that Super Mario 
Galaxy (Nintendo, 2007) would remain the same game without jumping on platforms. 
“The moves in a game, like the plot in a story, are the elements which most firmly 
identify it as the game that it is” (Whittaker 2012, p. 280). What is more, actions are 
readily observable elements of games, and thus they largely constitute what we un-
derstand an activity of playing a game to be like. Rules, and the presence or absence 
of the element of randomness or strategy are not as instantly obvious for an observer.  
Whittaker concludes his analysis by noting that choosing the classes for ac-
tions is difficult since a game may include multiple actions. It is thus the task of the 
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researcher to analyze games to identify the most central actions by which a game may 
be classified—since an item can only have one main place in a type-index, while re-
taining several cross-references to other classes and subclasses. Another challenge is 
that some features are on a higher level of abstraction than the others. For example, 
chasing and seeking consist of several first-level bodily movements such as running, 
leaping and touching. Whittaker’s (2012) own take on classifying children’s games is 
based on the feature of ‘action’ and divided into three main classes of “1. Purely in-
tellectual activity games´,” “2. Physical activity games” and “3. Willpower games.” 
Each of these three classes includes several subclasses. As the author notes, however, 
the main classes of Whittaker’s (2012) model are arbitrary, and there is no rigorous 
scientific method by which a type of activity is selected as a member of a main class.  
Whittaker’s (2012) article is relevant for the current study for several reasons. 
First, the main observation is that just as ‘activity’ is the most stable feature of chil-
dren’s games, it is also the most important element of video games. I would therefore 
like to propose that classifying games should be focused on identifying the core game-
play activities regardless of whether we are studying children’s games, video games, 
board games, or card games. It is the type of activity present in a game that most 
reliably separates one game from another.49 Second, the article by Whittaker (2012) 
demonstrates how game studies could benefit from research knowledge of folkloristic 
methodologies. Propp’s (1984) checklist for selecting a classification principle is a 
potential tool for developing a solid video game genre system that could aid in inter-
disciplinary game studies, game companies as well as players looking to find appro-
priate game content. Third, the article can be argued to illuminate that the game me-
chanics of video games have continuities with the action procedures of social games.  
What a player encounters when playing different types of contemporary video 
games is not a far cry from the action procedures of traditional children’s games. 
Merely by observing children game classification systems by Paul G. Brewster (1952) 
and several other folklorists (e.g. Opies, 1969), we can readily recognize that, e.g., 
traditional children’s gameplay motifemes of courtship games, battle games, puzzles, 
dancing games, dramatic acting games, treasure games, dexterity games, racing 
games, hopping games, elimination games and spying games are all present also in 
the motifemes of contemporary commercial video games (see The CGD scale, Table 
7; see also an extensive list prior folkloric classification of children’s games in Whit-
taker, 2012, pp. 285–286 and Schwartzman, 1979, pp. 61–97). There is a deep conti-
nuity between informal children’s games and contemporary video games: the tradi-
tions of re-configuring players’ actions into in-game effects prosper in contemporary 
video games in a myriad of variants without showing any signs of disappearance.  
Finally, in contrast to the list by Whittaker (2012), The CGD scale presented 
in Vahlo et al. (2017) and further examined in this thesis is based on the results of a 
systematic content analysis and players’ preferences to play specific types of games. 
Because of these reasons, I offer that the preliminary list of “video game genres” I 
present here is not arbitrary on the level of subclasses nor on the level of the main 
classes. Yet, one must mention that the labels of the factors are subjectively chosen, 
                                                 
49 Peter and Iona Opie (1969) propose that, e.g., chasing, catching, seeking, hunting, racing, 
and seeking are to be understood as basic motifs of games rather than activities. 
96 
 
and that the content analysis procedure always encompasses an element of qualitative 
interpretation. Also, additional research should be done to confirm the five-factor 
structure of gameplay motifeme categories, and, for instance whether the cross-loaded 
items of Racing at a high speed and Steering vehicles load on Assault or Coordinate. 
Since these two items showed different loadings in Study 1 and Study 2, I decided to 
exclude from the preliminary “video game genre” list.  
By following the procedure of Whittaker (2012) and the principle of fashion-
ing a multi-level classification system, an initial video game genre classification based 
on the principle of gameplay motifeme appears as follows (*item included in The 
CGD scale, 2nd edition, Table 7; **an item revealed in data triangulation; ***removed 






 1.1. Attacking, defending and casting spells** 
 1.2. Exploding and destroying* 
 1.3. Fighting by using close combat skills and techniques* 
 1.4. Hiding and fleeing for your life* 
 1.5. Hunting and capturing creatures** 
 1.6. Killing, murdering or assassinating* 
 1.7. Selecting and equipping weapons, skills, and abilities** 
 1.8. Shooting enemies and avoiding enemy fire* 
 1.9. Sneaking or laying traps to surprise an enemy* 
 1.10. Stealing, hacking and breaking in* 
 1.11. Waging war and conquering* 
   
2. CARE   
 2.1. Decorating rooms or houses* 
 2.2. Dressing up and make-up* 
 2.3. Flirting, seducing and romantic dating* 
 2.4. Gardening and taking care of a farm** 
 2.5. Hanging out with friends** 
 2.6. Making out or having sexual affairs* 
 2.7. Taking care of pets and training them* 
 
3. COORDINATE 
 3.1. Jumping from one platform to another while avoiding obstacles* 
 3.2. Matching tiles, diamonds or other objects together* 
 
3.3. 
Performing in lifelike sports such as basketball, ice hockey, or 
football** 
 3.4. Performing music, singing in tune or dancing* 
 3.5. Running at a fast speed while avoiding obstacles** 





4. JOURNEY  
 4.1. Acting as the protagonist and making meaningful choices* 
 4.2. Befriending in-game characters* 
 4.3. Creating your own character* 
 4.4. Developing skills and abilities* 
 4.5. Empathizing and taking on different roles** 
 4.6. Exploring the gameworld and its locations* 
 4.7. Investigating the story and its mysteries* 
 4.8. Navigating in dungeons and overcoming its dangers** 
 4.9. Searching for and collecting rare or hidden treasures* 
  
5. MANAGE  
 5.1. Building and developing a city or a base* 
 5.2. Commanding units or troops** 
 5.3. Crafting items and weapons by combining raw materials* 
 5.4. Defending your territory, city or base*** 
 5.5. Generating or gathering resources such as energy or money* 
 5.6. Guiding and herding a population or followers** 
 5.7. Managing and directing cities and their inhabitants* 
 5.8. Producing vehicles, units or weaponry* 
 5.9. Trading items, weapons or resources* 
 
Whittaker (2012) stresses that one should not equate a type index with a motif index. 
Whereas a type index of games aims to cover and classify all games according to a 
single feature and give them a class and a number, the purpose of a motif-index is to 
help one to analyze games. The units of gameplay motif-index would not be individual 
full-blown games but comprising recurrent elements, consisting of, e.g., performers, 
actions, and spatial organization. For instance, a genre analysis tool by Lauri Honko 
(1989) argues for including content, form, style, structure, context, function, fre-
quency, distribution, and origin into a genre classification, and thus the proposal by 
Honko is to be considered as a motif-type approach. However, ignoring all but one 
element as the primary classification criterion does not entail losing these other im-
portant features altogether. It merely means that in order to put forward a logical clas-
sification system, the system must be developed based on a single feature. The other 
recurrent features can be added to the system afterwards by defining how these other 
elements are related to the selected one feature. 
The method outlined in this chapter is similar to that of type-index since it is 
based on a single feature, but the motifeme classification could also be utilized in 
fashioning a motif-index for video games. In this latter approach, the motif-index of 
video games could include, e.g., aesthetic style, player perspective, gaming technol-
ogy, diegetic features, and the game’s spatial composition. The motif-index approach 
takes into consideration what Deterding (2013) has called in his thesis gaming modes: 




Finally, I want to emphasize that the primary objective of the studies reported in this 
chapter is not to develop an alternative approach of classifying games into genres and 
subgenres, but rather to study facets of meaningful gameplay experience by scrutiniz-
ing players’ preferences in particular aspects of performative gameplay, i.e., mo-
tifemes. The presented view on game genres emerged during the analysis of the data, 
and thus this aspect of the analysis is reported as a result of these statistical studies. It 
is time, however, to return to the main subject area of this thesis and proceed to ana-
lyze the different invariant structures of the video game gameplay phenomenon and 
the meanings players attach to their gameplay experiences. For that purpose, let me 
next introduce the interview process on gameplay experiences in which I interviewed 
a total of 32 game players in 2015–2016.  
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4. INTERVIEWS ON MEANINGFUL 
GAMEPLAY EXPERIENCE 
 
To tell a story is to try to understand it (Abbott, 2002, p. 102). 
 
 
There are many ways to outline meaningful gameplay experience. For instance, Salen 
and Zimmerman (2004, pp. 156–157) write that meaningful play arises “from the re-
lationship between player action and system outcome; it is the process by which a 
player takes action within the designed system of a game and the system responds to 
the action.” Salen and Zimmerman (2004, pp. 34–35) further describe that meaningful 
play has the qualities of discernability, meaning a player’s ability to perceive the im-
pact of her actions in the game, and integration, meaning that the impacts a player 
generates have an effect on the progression of the game as a whole. This description 
argues for a relational and processual understanding of, and an enactive approach to, 
meaning (Chapter 1). 
However, there are two major differences between the current approach and 
that of Salen and Zimmerman (2004) when it comes to how meaningful play is con-
ceived. The enactive phenomenological approach emphasizes embodied situatedness 
and an experiential first-person view of meaning rather than the design-oriented third-
person view advocated by Salen and Zimmerman. Furthermore, in Chapter 3, I have 
adopted an activity-theoretical take on meaning, which stresses that meaningful expe-
riences must be conceptualized on the level of a purposeful activity rather than on the 
level of actions and their effects (Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006). No action is meaningful 
by itself or even as a series of actions, but only in relation to a sustained activity and 
a broader cultural context within which the activity takes place.  
Thus, although Salen and Zimmerman write about meaningful game experi-
ence as an emergent quality and shortly mention second-order cybernetics, they nev-
ertheless study a first-order ‘action’ as the unit of analysis rather than a second-order 
‘activity,’ which is argued in this thesis as the core unit of meaningful play. The dif-
ference between first-order and second-order approaches can be illuminated in the 
framework of cybernetics, which is indeed the theoretical stance of Salen’s and Zim-
merman’s (2004) systems analytic study.   
As a representative of first-order cybernetic thinking, Salen’s and Zimmer-
man’s (2004) writings on ‘meaning’ are closely related to those of Bateson (2000 
[1972]; 2002 [1979]). In his magnum opus, semiotician Søren Brier (2008, p. 177) 
stresses that Bateson unfortunately did not develop a satisfactory theory of the ob-
server, qualia and first-hand experience. For Bateson, the core concept of ‘mind’ is 
without real subjectivity and appears instead as a cybernetic phenomenon: “the ecol-
ogy of mind” of information-processing systems. Bateson’s theory does not manage 
to explicate to whom information or “difference that makes a difference” (Bateson, 
2000 [1969], pp. 271–272) matters (Brier, 2008, p. 179).  
For Bateson and for all first-order cybernetics, ‘minds’ were systems to be 
observed. However, by emphasizing biological and organic systems, Bateson was also 
a forerunner for the development of a later theoretical framework of second-order 
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cybernetics and an inspiration for authors such as Heinz von Foerster (1981). Foerster 
and other second-order cyberneticians no longer observed systems but instead took 
observing systems as their point of departure (ibid., p. 104). To put these notions in 
other words, Bateson’s and first-order cyberneticians’ view is one of third-person, 
whereas second-order cybernetics considers the first-person experientiality as well. 
By introducing the position of the subject, second-order cybernetics neglected 
investigating things Ding an sich. Brier (2008, p. 27) notes that although the theory 
of autopoiesis by Maturana and Varela (1980) is a representative of second-order cy-
bernetics since it takes the self-referential and recursive stance on information, both 
second-order cybernetics and the theory of autopoiesis still leave first-person experi-
ences and emotions largely unexplained. Brier’s own strategy to overcome this lack 
is to combine Peircean biosemiotics with the theory of autopoiesis and, consequently, 
also with core arguments of second-order cybernetics. In this thesis, I have followed 
authors such as Di Paolo, De Jaegher, Gallagher, Noë, and Zahavi and appropriated 
phenomenologically inclined enactivism for a purpose similar to what Brier (2008) 
does with Peircean semiotics and biosemiotics.  
We can conclude here that the decision to focus on actions and effects rather 
than on purposeful activities is to interpret human gameplay activity as a first-order 
mechanic rather than a second-order self-referential phenomenon. Although Salen and 
Zimmerman (2004) shortly discuss second-order cybernetics, their game analysis is 
ultimately an example of a first-order cybernetical take on games and gameplay and 
thus they cannot convincingly include themes such as motivations to play, affective 
play, or even meaningful play in their analysis. After all, one cannot adequately dis-
cuss meaningful play without postulating an intentional subject who desires to play.  
Although Salen and Zimmerman (2004) do write about meanings, emotions, 
and player agency, these subjects are inevitably something that they can only add as 
a new layer of examination to their first-order system analytic approach. In contrast 
to this, from the phenomenological enactive stance, I offer that we cannot separate 
meanings from activities, and thus intentions, motivations and emotions must be con-
stitutional for any theoretical framework that aims to study meanings; “Playing game 
for the sake of games is always playing games for the sake of games in a particular 
social context with its own particular social arrangements” (Sutton-Smith, 2001 
[1997], p. 120). 
In the following chapters (Chapter 5–Chapter 9) I ask how the invariants of 
video game gameplay (RQ1) induces emotions and memorable experiences. This 
theme is crucial for building understanding of why people play video games and why 
these experiences are memorized, valued and shared with other people in various cul-
tural practices (RQ2). Remembering a gameplay situation indicates that the experi-
ence has had some emotional significance to the person. Earlier research has shown 
that emotional information is remembered more vividly than neutral information. In-
dividuals are also able to give more detailed descriptions of events that had emotional 
relevance for them. Thus, emotional arousal enhances both the vividness and accuracy 
of a memory (Jeong, Biocca & Bohil, 2008, p. 193). I return to the theme of emotions 
in gameplay in Chapter 6.  
Not all gameplay experiences are regarded as worthy of remembering or nar-
rating to others. We can here again appropriate the distinction between experience and 
an experience, an occurrence significant enough to be set aside from the everyday life 
(see Abrahams, 2005, p. 76; see Chapter 1). The personal recounts and narratives that 
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are brought forth by the players during interviews are therefore to be understood as 
signifiers for meaningful gameplay experiences. A researcher must take into conside-
ration that these personal narratives are re-presented and often constructed by the in-
terviewees for the purpose of the interview.  
Constructing narratives of prior gameplay situations is a practice by which 
players make sense of their past experiences and the researcher tries to make sense of 
the interviewee’s descriptions (Jørgensen 2013, p. 13; Abbott, 2002, p. 102). Although 
it is plausible to assume that the described experiences are not invented in the inter-
view but instead part of the respondent’s self-narrative, the researcher should remain 
conscious of the fact that most of these experiences have not been narrated before the 
ongoing interview situation. Finally, the interviewer should remain conscious of the 
interpretive context and her own responses and sensitivities to the situation.  
Emphasis on performances and shifts in ethnography toward more reflective 
reporting have increased not only descriptions of the researcher’s own experiences 
but also of the experiences of the observees. Many contemporary folklorists pay at-
tention to how people prepare for expressive culture, judge their experiences, and how 
they feel about them before, during, and after the event. Some of the experiences are 
recognized by the subjects as meaningful as they occur, and are remembered therefore 
to signify something of personal value. Personal experiences are also important for 
identifying oneself as a member of particular community or to separating oneself from 
a particular social or cultural group and its activities. The important objective of bring-
ing together the ongoing performance of narrating experiences, the context of inter-
preting these performances, and the interpreter’s own responses is called contextual-
izing in literary folkloristic methodology (Stahl, 2008 [1989], p. 43).   
Because stories about ourselves are able to grasp both the personally signifi-
cant particularity and how we establish our identity in relation to others, experience is 
indeed a core concept for any folklorist aiming to understand vernacular culture from 
within that culture, from the perspective of the experiencer. This brings into focus 
investigation of what people do, how they do what they do, and why they engage with 
varied forms of expressive culture. Anthropology and folkloristics of experience aim 
therefore to investigate cultural “experience as a way of connecting the everyday with 
the special and the ordinary person with the representative human” (Abrahams, 2005, 
pp. 118–119). 
A challenge for the current study is that, although I emphasize the lived game-
play experience, the data gathered is mostly about how players re-present and narrate 
such experiences. In accordance with the title of this thesis “In Gameplay,” methods 
such as participant observation or auto-ethnography could have been applied to ana-
lyze ongoing gameplay experience.50 However, since the focus of this thesis is on the 
varieties of meaningful and memorable gameplay experiences, I did not find these 
alternative approaches to data collection very promising. In the case of participant-
observation, the presence of a researcher would have had an impact on the constitution 
                                                 
50 Tom Boellstorff (2008, p. 68) calls interviews and surveys “elicitation methods” since by 
utilizing these methods the researcher assumes that respondents are able to express the “vari-
ous aspects of cultures that shape their thinking.” This is in contrast to participant observation, 
which does not work primarily on the level of reflective consciousness.  
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of the gameplay experience under observation. Auto-ethnography, on the other hand, 
is a challenging method for analyzing gameplay experience. To analyze one’s own 
unfolding gameplay experience is difficult since to play a game is a significantly dif-
ferent activity from analyzing such an experience.  
Furthermore, one does not know beforehand which gameplay experiences 
will come to have a distinctive meaningfulness. Meaning, in this sense, is a quality 
we largely attach to our experiences only afterwards. Thus, it makes sense to study 
meaningful gameplay experience by focusing on players’ self-reflection of their past 
experiences.  
As a folklorist, my interest is largely on how cultural experiences of being the 
player can come to have value for the individuals, how they reflect on their experi-
ences, and how they interpret, make sense and narrate the past events in the current 
moment. However, I aim to remain attentive to how these self-reflections re-construct 
the respondents’ actual experiences of player–game coupling. From the viewpoint of 
this study, it is relevant to observe what the players remember about their gameplay 
experience, how they reflect on these experiences, and why certain aspects of game-
play experience are remembered clearly but the others are not (RQ2). Therefore, 
‘video game gameplay experience’ remains at all times the unit of analysis in the fol-
lowing analytical and empirical chapters. 
 
 
Selecting and Recruiting the Interviewees 
 
My objective with the interviews was to cover the versatility of different video game 
players and their gameplay preferences, especially from the viewpoint of gameplay as 
a meaningful first-person experience. Because of this objective, I studied the results 
from the factor analysis and cluster analysis reported in Study 1 of this chapter to be 
able to identify different player types. Throughout the following chapters of this the-
sis, I analyze the empirical data using a mixed-methods approach. This means that I 
investigate the theoretical considerations (RQ1) I present by putting statistical and 
qualitative data into a constant dialogue. The purpose of a mixed-methods approach 
is to provide informed qualitative interpretations of the findings of statistical data 
analysis, and to develop the statistical framework based on these iterative data analysis 
processes. My approach in this sense is neither quantitatively nor qualitatively driven, 
but instead is dialogical.  
Furthermore, a mixed-methods approach provides means for data integration; 
by triangulating the results from quantitative data with those of qualitative, and qua-
litative data with those of quantitative data, I am able to triangulate the findings with 
another kind of data set and thus provide a stronger case for the phenomenon under 
analysis. This opens the possibility to reconsider the theoretical arguments anew. As 
Andreas Lieberoth and Andreas Roepstorff (2015, p. 281) write, each data triangula-
tion provides a genuine vantage point on the research subject, which enables a more 
comprehensive analysis on the latent aspects of the more readily observable pheno-
menon. A mixed-methods approach also makes it possible to fashion an iterative re-
search strategy that aids in developing more efficient and accurate research tools. 
In the final section of the survey reported in this chapter (Study 1, N=1,718), 
the respondents were asked whether they were willing to participate in possible future 
research. This question was included only in the online version of the survey, which 
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we (Vahlo, Kaakinen, Holm, and Koponen) circulated in the Turku region ourselves. 
This local version of the survey was marketed by us through social media channels 
such as Facebook and Twitter. The survey was open for three days, during which we 
received 594 completed individual responses from 894 people who opened the survey.    
In October 2015, I began sending invitation emails to the respondents who 
had given me this possibility by letting me know their email addresses and by giving 
the permission to send emails regarding follow-up research. I did not write a separate 
consent letter. Instead, a description of the purpose of the study, the ethical issues and 
anonymity, the role of interview participants, and how both the survey data and the 
interview data would be handled and archived were specified to the participants in the 
survey form and also in the invitation email. Furthermore, I went through these issues 
at the beginning of each interview before I turned on the audio recorder device.  
From the 594 respondents of the locally circulated survey, a total of 529 were 
included in the factor analysis and cluster analysis I reported in Study 1 of the current 
chapter. The remaining 65 respondents were excluded since they reported playing 
digital games less than one hour weekly, or because they reported playing more than 
eight hours every day. Of the remaining 529 respondents, 308 (58%) indicated that 
they would be interested in participating in possible future research. In the data of 529 
respondents, there were a total of 148 mercenaries, 30 companions, 134 commanders, 
69 explorers, 20 patterners, 18 daredevils and 110 adventurers. Of these, 94 merce-
naries (64%), 14 companions (47%), 86 commanders (64%), 33 explorers (48%), 2 
patterners (10%), 7 daredevils (39%) and 72 adventurers (65%) indicated an interest 
to participate in possible interviews, experiments and additional surveys. I considered 
the total number of possible interviewees (n=308) very high, and this was indeed a 
good situation in which to begin planning the interview procedure. Approximately 
half of these respondents, however, lived in other parts in Finland and were thus ex-
cluded from the list of possible interviewees. I made this decision because I wanted 
to keep the interviews similar to each other and conduct all of them face-to-face. 
From the short-listed respondents (interested in future research, living in the 
Turku region), I selected respondents according to three criteria: 1) I wanted the group 
of interviewees to represent male and female players in similar proportions to those 
in the cluster analysis of Study 1 (N=1,718). For example, since 76 percent of merce-
naries (n=335) in our data were men, I sent invitations to three male mercenaries for 
each female mercenary I invited; 2) I emphasized in the selection of the potential in-
terviewees their factor scores on the five motifeme factors (Assault, Manage, Journey, 
Care, Coordinate) as well as how closely their response scores matched the scores of 
the ideal types of The Mercenary, The Companion, The Patterner, The Adventurer, 
The Commander, The Explorer and The Daredevil; and 3) where possible, I wanted 
to interview players of different ages so that both young and older players would be 
included in the study. 
Only a few who received an invitation to participate in an interview refused 
the offer. However, I was not able to specifically reach men (M) and women (F) as 
efficiently as I had hoped, and thus the proportions between sexes as interviewed does 
not represent the results of the cluster analysis in the cases of all seven player types. 
Between November 2015 and September 2016, I interviewed a total of 32 players, 
consisting of 8 Mercenaries (6M, 2F), 7 Adventurers (5F, 2M), 7 Explorers (7F), 6 
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Commanders (4M, 2F), 2 Companions (1M, 1F), a Daredevil (M), and a Patterner (F). 
The youngest interviewee was 20 years old and the oldest was 49 at the time of the 
interview. The mean age of the interviewees was 29 years. I interviewed a total of 14 
male players (44%) and 18 female players (56%).51 In addition to the interviews, the 
qualitative data I analyze in this thesis includes the open-ended answers of the two 
surveys (N=1,718, N=845) and of 10 written open letters about players’ most memo-
rable gameplay experiences, which were submitted to a call I organized in 2016 after 
conducting the 32 interviews.    
As soon as I knew which survey respondents accepted the invitation to addi-
tional interviews, I conducted an additional analysis of the survey data to identify not 
only the primary player type of each interviewee but also how their game motifeme 
or gameplay dynamics preferences related to the other six player types. The player 




Figure 5. The player types of the 32 interviewees (P1–P32) and 10 persons who sub-
mitted writings on their memorable gameplay experiences (W1–W10), based on their 
gameplay motifeme preference scores in the survey of December 2014, as reported in 
Chapter 3.  
                                                 
51 See Appendixes for a more detailed description of the 32 interviewees. 
  
105 
In Figure 5, the outermost circle represents the typical gameplay motifeme preference 
score for each seven player types. By calculating the Euclidean distance between a 
respondent's actual preference scores in the survey (N=1,718) and those of a typical 
player of each player type (i.e., The Mercenary, The Companion, The Patterner, The 
Commander, The Adventurer and The Daredevil), I was able to present a ranking order 
of the most similar and the least similar player types for each respondent. For example, 
the motifeme preference profile of the interview participant P20 matches almost per-
fectly to that of a prototypical mercenary in our data (N=1,718). The primary profile 
of P20 is thus that of The Mercenary, followed by secondary player type of The Com-
mander and The Daredevil. On the other hand, the gameplay preferences of P20 differ 
most significantly from those of a typical player of The Companion type. 
I chose to conduct the interviews as semi-structured for three reasons. First, 
semi-structured interviews were fitting for the current study since I was able to include 
the themes of the survey52 form (N=1,718) in the interviews as subject areas. Second, 
in contrast to fully structured interviews, semi-structured ‘theme interviews’ made it 
possible for me to identify latent subject areas that were not covered by the survey 
and its conceptual framework. I put this strategy into practice by prompting the inter-
viewees to narrate freely and in-depth about their personal experiences of video game 
gameplay. I then asked follow-up questions such as “Why do you think so?” and 
“Please tell more about that.” to encourage the interviewees to describe in more detail 
their experiences and opinions (see Boellstroff, et al. 2012, p. 96). Third, all the inter-
viewees had participated in the study already in December 2014 when they replied to 
the survey reported in Chapter 3. Therefore, the interviewees had expectations regar-
ding the structure of the interview. I tested the interview structure and the form with 
two preliminary interviews before sending email invitations to the selected survey 
respondents.  
The interviews lasted from 45 minutes to 110 minutes, a typical interview 
being 80 minutes long. All interviews were recorded with two audio recording devices 
and later transcribed by a company providing transcription services for academic pur-
poses. The transcripts were imported into NVivo Pro, a software designed for manag-
ing qualitative data and making data analyses. The interview data and the transcrip-
tions are archived in a password protected file. The archive file is stored on a computer 
owned by the University of Turku, which is also protected by a network password. 
Each interview was made in the same room at the facilities of Turku School 
of Economics. The room casually decorated, and includes many brightly-colored bean 
bags, dark grey walls and a large television screen. Basically, the room has the looks 
and feel of a living room more than that of an office room. I met the interviewees at 
the main lobby of the building and chatted casually with them as we took the elevator 
to the fourth floor, where the interviews were held.  
As we walked towards the interview room, I began to tell some details of our 
Play for Reward research project and how the interviews were related to that project 
and my dissertation. I also asked whether the participant played any video games cur-
rently. Many of the respondents expressed that they remembered next to nothing about 
the survey or how they had responded in it. I replied to this worry by ensuring that 
                                                 
52 I return to these themes shortly. 
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they did not need to remember the survey because the interview was about how they 
currently perceive their video game preferences, playing habits and their personal his-
tory of playing games.  
In the survey of December 2014, the respondents were encouraged to list five 
of their all-time favorite games. Before each interview, I went through the responses 
of the upcoming interviewee and pre-constructed a 40–60-minute-long YouTube 
playlist consisting of five let’s play gameplay videos of his or her favorite games. 
Each interview was launched with a session of watching these video clips and dis-
cussing the portrayed games. The videos were muted so that the interviewee and I 
could discuss freely, but I typically left the video running in the background although 
the subject we discussed did not necessarily deal with the particular game any longer. 
Depending on the flow of the discussion, I changed the videos if the interviewee 
started to refer to other games or if I myself wanted to introduce a new subject to the 
discussion to keep the interview dynamic.  
Originally my purpose was to make a video recording of the facial expressions 
of the interviewees as they watched videos of their favorite games and another video 
when they remembered their most memorable gameplay experiences with these 
games. I tested this procedure with the two initial interviews but decided to drop video 
recording completely from the interviews because the presence of a video camera 
clearly made the situation uncomfortable for the interviewees. Also, when watching 
the video recordings from these two preliminary interviews, I noticed that the emo-
tional expressions of the interviewees were entangled with the ongoing interview in-
teraction with me. This made it impossible for me to separate whether the emotional 
expression was due to 1) watching gameplay videos of their favorite games, 2) re-
membering past gameplay experiences or 3) interacting with me in the interview.  
I decided to keep the element of watching the videos, since I noticed in the 
two preliminary interviews that watching a gameplay video of one’s favorite game 
worked very well as the first subject area. Based on the initial interviews, I figured 
that these videos helped to build up trust and rapport, which made the whole interview 
process much more open and dialogical (see Boellstroff et al., 2012, p. 95). Also, this 
made it possible for me to begin the discussion by asking whether these same games 
were still favorites of the interviewee, and continue by asking why these games were 
especially valuable to him or her.  
The method of including material familiar to the interviewee to encourage 
reminiscing is called stimulated recall. Jori Pitkänen (2015) describes that, in game 
research, stimulated recall is most typically utilized as post-participation. The behav-
ior of an informant is first video-recorded in a situation in which she plays a video 
game. Later, the video is shown to her, and she is asked to recall her thoughts and 
feelings during the event. This has been found to be a useful strategy since games tend 
to be so engaging that it is very difficult to both play and discuss the gameplay expe-
rience simultaneously. Although the videos I showed to my interviewees were general 
let’s play videos rather than videos of their own experiences, my purpose was partly 
similar to what Pitkänen (2015) describes: to aid the informants to recall their personal 
experiences when playing the specific game, to remember how they felt and what they 
thought during that time, and how they feel now about their past experiences.  
All of the 32 interviews included four phases and areas of discussion that re-
sembled the structure of the survey form (N=1,718). In the first phase of the inter-
views, I talked with the interviewee about his or her all-time and current favorite 
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games, and what kinds of games he or she currently played. Although the interviews 
were quite different from each other, in this first phase, we typically discussed the 
interviewee’s opinions on gameplay interaction and on what kind player performance 
they preferred. These subjects often led us to talk about the interviewee’s opinions on 
the qualities of a good game in general. In short, in the first phase of the interviews, I 
asked, “What kinds of games you prefer to play and why?” 
In the second phase of the interviews, more attention was usually paid to how 
the interviewee prefers to play. We discussed the preferred type of attention allocation 
of the player, his or her desire for facing and overcoming difficult challenges or rather 
wandering freely in the gameworld. These subjects led us to the third theme of pre-
ferred emotional outcomes, and to the questions of why they play video games at all, 
and how they perceived themselves as players. The fourth and the final theme covered 
reflections of the interviewee’s social relations and personal narratives of memorable 
video game gameplay experiences.  
Each interview was launched with a talk about the participant’s favorite video 
games and why the participant appreciated those specific games over others. The dis-
cussion encompassed themes such as what the participant prefers to do as the player, 
and how he or she reflects on whether a game is good or bad. I wanted to start with 
this theme since it was a direct follow up to the statistical study on game motifeme 
preferences and player types I conducted in 2014 and 2015. The participants were, at 
this phase of the interview, unaware that such a categorization had been made and that 
they were also classified into a particular player type. 
I aimed the interview to develop into a type of discussion rather than remain 
a series of questions and answers. To be able to succeed in this, I also discussed my 
own game preferences with the participants and reflected on my own memorable 
gameplay experiences. I found this to be a good approach because several interview-
ees seemed at first a bit skeptical about the purpose of the interviews. When they 
noticed that I also liked to play games and knew quite a lot about gaming cultures, the 
interviews started to resemble more informal discussions, which was my objective. 
 
 
The Motifeme Approach in the Player Interviews 
 
I took the survey of December 2014 myself, and I was categorized as The Adventurer 
player type. Throughout all the interviews, I remained reflectively conscious of my 
own gameplay history (see Introduction) and preferences and shared these with the 
participants only where I thought that sharing could help the situation develop into an 
open discussion. During the interviews, I continued to reflect on my own sensitivities 
as a player. I wanted to avoid any kind of self-presentation that could direct the inter-
view situation towards me talking through the interviewee. To the best of my 
knowledge and expertise, I tried to encourage the interview participants to share their 
thoughts, values and memories with me without leading the discussion in any partic-
ular direction. 
All of the participants were positively surprised to see gameplay videos of 
their own favorite games, and it was easy to begin to discuss these titles with each of 
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the interviewees. Most of the 32 participants moved quickly to reflect on their mo-
tifeme preferences. These descriptions were contingent with what I presented in The 
Core Game Dynamics scale (The CGD scale, Table 7):  
 
Yeah, wandering around and searching for stuff, I may be the most 
hardcore looter ever. Especially in Fallout 2, I could spend many 
gaming sessions... for hours and hours on just looting without making 
any progression in the game. I did not kill any enemies, either. I just 
searched every place and wandered around making sure that I had 
certainly explored every place through and through. (P2, adventurer) 
 
Well Okami is nice, I like to be a wolf. I like animals very much, and 
in Okami I could empathize with one. And the world is beautiful, you 
can draw the moon, and the night begins. So, I loved to explore the 
gameworld, and jump around. (P1, adventurer) 
 
When I play single-player games, the progression is so important to 
me. I want to develop and grow during the game. I am not interested 
in merely gaining levels just to be more powerful, it has to be con-
nected to how the game progresses. (P4, adventurer-mercenary) 
 
After just a few interviews, I realized that players structure their descriptions of game-
play experiences by referring to their favorite gameplay motifemes. The participants 
P2, P1, and P4 all reflected on motifemes of Journey when telling me about their 
favorite kind of gameplay. P2 emphasized the motifemes of searching for and collect-
ing rare items (The CGD scale, item 18), and exploring the gameworld (The CGD 
scale, item 14), while P1 mentioned her preference for taking the role of a character 
and acting it. The practice of talking about favorite kinds of gameplay experiences via 
motifemes was a recurrent theme across all the player types: 
 
I enjoy this game, and especially its story. It is full of plot-twists, and 
I could not anticipate how it would end. And I like the games in which 
I must sneak and be really careful and all. So, it is not so much about 
killing or shooting but remaining unnoticed and hiding. (P18, merce-
nary-adventurer) 
 
Well it could be that some players are gentleman-like, but I enjoy 
most playing unfairly and surprisingly as long as it does not violate 
the rules of the game. For me, warfare and pondering strategies for 
conquering are very enjoyable. And engaging in combat, well it 
brings the tactical dimension to the battles, too. (P27, mercenary) 
 
For example, SimCity games, I think it is fascinating to be able to 
construct a city as you please… but some of my friends seemed to 
enjoy building big cities just to then destroy them with disasters. I 
never understood that, I just wanted to decide which detail would go 




[Talking about the video game Black & White and its ‘pet’ character] 
You can command it and direct it to places. But then again it acts 
rather independently. For example, if you teach it to use magic to 
water flowers, at some point it starts to water them autonomously. I 
have always wanted a pet, so it was very nice for me… I always tried 
to treat my pet as well as I could. (P29, companion-explorer) 
 
Since the interview participants clearly expressed that they made sense of their favor-
ite and undesired gameplay experience types by describing gameplay motifemes, I 
propose that the motifeme approach is well-suited for a framework for analyzing the 
interviewees’ views on games and gameplay experiences at large. It is my hypothesis 
that the desire of players to perform in games with a specific motifemic structure is 
connected not only to their preferred emotional outcome of the games but also to other 
factors they find compelling and meaningful in video games. In this sense, I presume 
that gameplay motifemes and the identified player types can be important organizing 
principles for emotional, meaningful and memorable gameplay experiences.  
In Chapters 5–9 of this thesis, I cover each of the abovementioned four inter-
view themes by analyzing the theme first from the theoretical standpoint of enactive 
phenomenology and folkloristics (RQ3), and then by conducting a mixed-methods 
analysis of both statistical and qualitative data of the subject area (RQ2).  
In Chapter 6, I investigate the performative position of the player from an 
enactive phenomenological framework, and proceed then to analyze how the respond-
ents of the survey and interview participants reflected on this subject and on their 
emotions induced by gameplay. In these two chapters I investigate the interview sub-
ject area of how players like to play video games. In Chapter 7, I examine the alterna-
tive environment of ‘the gameworld’ and how it affords a temporary spatial setting 
for the player’s agency. I then conclude the chapter with empirical analyses to what 
kinds of gameworlds the players appreciate and why. This chapter is an exploration 
to the interview theme of what players prefer to play. I continue then in Chapter 8 to 
offer a theoretical and an empirical investigation on interactive and narrative qualities 
of video game gameplay and how the players make sense of their most memorable 
gameplay experiences in reflection. In this chapter, I consider the qualitative interview 
data in relation to the theoretical arguments of this thesis. The final chapter of this 
dissertation is a theoretical and empirical take on motivating video game gameplay 
experience. I conclude the chapter with mixed-methods analyses on motivations to 
play, that is, on why we play video games. 
The goal of the following empirical analyses is not only to study meaningful 
gameplay experience and the personal gameplay narration (RQ2) but also to follow 
phenomenological epoché procedure (see Chapter 1, p. 21) and develop a conceptual 
framework for studying the invariants and varied experiences of video game gameplay 
(RQ1). Since the empirical analyses of the following chapters are based on theoretical 
arguments, the empirical analyses do not follow the lines of grounded theory, which 
aim to ‘bracket’ existing theoretical assumptions and generate theory inductively from 
empirical data. The research attitude of this study is better described as ethnographic 
in the sense that it does not develop the theory inductively from the data (grounded 
theory) nor it does rely on existing, well-established ‘grand theories.’  
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As specified by Tom Boellstroff, Bonnie Nardi, Celia Pearce, and T. L. Taylor in 
Ethnography and Virtual Worlds (2012), ethnography is often based on theoretical 
work from many fields of research, and then taken as a lens through which the data is 
interpreted. However, rather than trying to prove whether a theoretical model works 
or not, ethnographers place theories in dialogue with empirical data. By doing so, the 
theory can inform the data analysis, but the empirical data can also offer new perspec-
tives on understanding and developing the theoretical foundations for studying the 
particular phenomenon (ibid., pp. 45–46, 162–164). By following these guidelines, 
my objective in the following chapters is to examine the interview data from a theo-
retical framework while keeping the framework open for revisions by remaining ‘sen-
sitive’ to the characteristics of the data. Through this sensitive attitude, new dimen-







5. AUTONOMY OF VIDEO GAME GAMEPLAY53 
 
[T]he true gamer is the one who understands and appreciates good 
gameplay and the ‘gamer’s game’ is the one that has it in abundance 
(Kirkpatrick, 2012). 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to develop a rigorous enactivistic understanding 
of video game gameplay and analyze how players’ experience the process of playing 
games (RQ3). In contrast to the term ‘game,’ which can refer to either a game as an 
object or a game as a process, ‘gameplay’ exclusively stands for ongoing interaction 
between a player and a game, and denotes therefore the phenomenological qualities 
of ‘game.’ The question of how ‘gameplay’ should be conceptualized is vital for track-
ing the invariants of video game gameplay experience (RQ1). Also, it is paramount to 
understand what goes on during gameplay to be able to grasp how players evaluate, 
remember and interpret their own past experiences of playing games (RQ2).  
In this chapter, I pursue open research questions, including conceptualizing 
gameplay as a form of human–technology interchange by examining the conditions 
in which gameplay may appear and disappear, and building an understanding on how 
the game artifact may or may not dictate the continuity and meanings that emerge 
from gameplay. The focus in this chapter is on single-player video game gameplay, 
but its core arguments are applicable to all forms of video game gameplay. I propose 
that defining gameplay as a theoretically solid research concept may have considera-
ble potential for both interdisciplinary game studies and game development. I also 
argue that ‘gameplay’ is a valuable concept for folklorists who aim to study any kind 
of game activity, or ‘game’ as a genre of folklore. 
Graeme Kirkpatrick (2012; 2013) has revealed that the concept of ‘gameplay’ 
is applied as a shorthand for discussing the meaningfulness of playing a game. 
Through good gameplay, a video game validates itself as an object of intrinsic value. 
Therefore, to study the autonomy of gameplay is also to study how gameplay experi-
ence obtains innate compelling and engaging qualities. As we saw in the introduction 
part of Chapter 3, ‘gameplay’ is generally considered in prior literature as the ongoing 
interaction that takes between a player and a game. Similar to the metaphor of “the 
magic circle,” the phenomenon of gameplay has rarely been analytically considered, 
and thus a careful theoretical consideration is called for.  
I begin this chapter by presenting an enactive take on how gameplay arises as 
a self-sustainable autonomous organization, i.e., as a system of endogenous meaning 
between a player and the game (RQ1). This is followed by an analysis of three video 
game gameplay experiences, and an empirical investigation into how the survey re-
spondents (N=1,718) and interview participants (N=32) perceived the process aspects 
of gameplay experiences (RQ2). I conclude the chapter by discussing how the enac-
tive approach to gameplay can reveal new aspects of meaningful and compelling play 
as a phenomenon of social participation and vernacular imagination (RQ3).  
                                                 
53 The main arguments of this chapter have been previously published in the journal, Game 
Studies (Vahlo, 2017). In this chapter, I present an extended version the mentioned article. 
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Participatory Sense-Making and the Autonomy of Interaction 
 
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) have developed an enactive understanding of social 
cognition that I find valuable for research into gameplay experience. Their theory is 
based on a second-person approach and the concept of participatory sense-making. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a second-person approach to cognition emphasizes reci-
procity, i.e., the mutual trust developed in sustainable social connections and ties be-
tween agents or constituents (Klabbers, 2009, p. 122). According to this view, we 
come to understand others’ minds from the mutual interaction with intentional social 
agents (Zahavi, 2014, p. 247). De Jaegher and Di Paolo define participatory sense-
making as “the coordination of intentional activity in interaction whereby individual 
sense-making processes are affected and new domains of social sense-making can be 
generated that were not available to each individual on her own” (De Jaegher & Di 
Paolo, 2007, p. 497).  
De Jaegher and Di Paolo argue that a participatory sense-making process be-
tween two or more social agents can emerge as an autonomous organization.54 Ac-
cording to the complex of systems theory and enactivism, in an autonomous organi-
zation the constituent processes 1) depend on each other in a recursive manner that 
realizes them as a network; 2) constitute a unity in their domain of coexistence and; 
3) determine the possible interactions the organization can have with its environment 
(Varela, 1979, p. 55; Thompson, 2007, p. 44). Thus, when an individual changes itself 
in social interaction, this change also influences someone else. Through the changes 
that take place in the other, the individual again changes oneself (De Jaegher & Fro-
ese, 2009, p. 452).  
In the social interaction of two or more autonomous social agents “(1) the co-
regulation and the coupling mutually affect each other, constituting an autonomous 
self-sustaining organization in the domain of relational dynamics in which (2) the au-
tonomy of the agents involved is not destroyed” (De Jaegher et al., 2010, pp. 442–
443). Di Paolo, Rohde and De Jaegher (ibid., p. 78) offer social play as a prime ex-
ample of an autonomous organization that emerges from co-regulated social interac-
tion because it engenders a network of activities that sustain themselves: “When the 
child becomes the regulator of the play, the activity takes off as a proper form of life... 
The norm [of the play] is arbitrary, invented by the child, but in allowing his or her 
body to submit to it, it becomes as serious as other social or biological norms.” 
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007; 2008) make an enthralling argument by stat-
ing that participatory interactions can emerge as autonomous organizations. In an au-
tonomous organization, the coordination that arises when participants couple within a 
system facilitates its own continuation and modulates what kind of coordination is 
more likely to take place in its dynamics. Social interaction can affect individuals in 
ways that invite them to sustain the encounter, which thus comes to have a tendency 
of facilitating itself. In an enactivistic approach to autonomous interaction, the inter-
action constitutes a level of analysis that cannot be reduced into its constituents. 
In what follows, I argue that autonomous organization emerges in video game game-
play, regardless of the number of the players above a single player. There is autonomy 
                                                 
54 As Kyselo (2014) notes, enactivism distinguishes thus two types of autonomous organiza-
tion: the identity of an individual and the identity of social interaction, maintained by autono-
mous individuals.  
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to gameplay, and seen from a first-personal stance, the experience of interactional 
autonomy is the gameplay—indeed, if there is even just one autonomous agent pre-
sent. To rephrase this argument in relation to the theory of De Jaegher and Di Paolo 
(2007), I contend that an autonomous organization may emerge in an agent–environ-
ment coupling if certain preconditions are met. More precisely, I argue that since 
gameplay as an emergent phenomenon achieves temporary autonomy not unlike an 
engaging debate between two humans, gameplay is to be understood as an autono-
mous form of social participation. 
Next, I analyze the two requirements for autonomy of interaction (De Jaegher 
et al., 2010) to emerge in relation to video game gameplay: 1) the co-regulated cou-
pling and 2) the need for two social agents. Let us first investigate the two systems of 
the player and the game and how they are coupled in the real-time coordination dy-
namics of single-player videogame gameplay. 
 
 
Player–Game Coupling  
 
A video game is a dynamic system that can be generally described as a network of 
related processes that an observer would conceptualize as a single whole changing 
over time (Thompson, 2007, p. 39). What changes over time is the state of that system; 
future states of the system causally depend on the current state of the system, as Louise 
Barrett writes (2011, pp. 129–130).  
As a dynamic system, a game is heteronomous, that is, an other-governed and 
state-dependent system that arises in the realm of human design. Heteronomous sys-
tems have an algorithmic constitution, and they are made for a purpose. They are un-
able to maintain or reproduce themselves; these systems need to be activated and sus-
tained from outside (Thompson, 2007, p. 98). This condition can be contrasted to the 
autonomous, self-governed and self-producing living systems discussed in Chapter 1. 
The organization of a heteronomous dynamic system is defined by its input–output 
information flow, internal processing of the input, and the external mechanics of con-
trol (Varela, 1979; Barrett, 2011, p. 130).  
A self-individuating system, such as a player, maintains itself as metastable. 
It has tendencies and transients rather than states. Such a system is always on the 
move; it focuses on an attractor for a while and changes its focus once again to another 
attractor. A game, instead, can be described as a state-machine (Juul, 2005, p. 142).55 
Whereas the model of autonomous systems is a living cell (Thompson, 2007, p. 44), 
the model of a heteronomous digital game-system is a binary digit, a bit.  
A heteronomous system processes information, while an autonomous system 
is meaning-constructing: “[A]n organism, animal, or person does not process infor-
mation in a context-independent sense. Rather, it brings forth or enacts meaning in 
structural coupling with its environment” (Thompson, 2007, p. 58). Correspondingly, 
and as argued by Søren Brier (2013), a bit in a computer works through differences, 
and it is not a sign by itself precisely because it does not require a living system to 
                                                 
55 A ‘game state’ stands for the current formal status and the internal condition of a game in a 
given moment (Salen & Zimmerman, 2004, p. 218). 
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interpret it. The code of a computer exhibits dyadic proto-signs that operate without 
an autonomous system’s perception. 
In enactivism, regulation is understood as an intentional and value-laden ac-
tivity by which a subject modulates its coupling to achieve meaningful goals for its 
own autonomy and individuation (see Cuffari et al., 2015). Since only autonomous 
agents are able to regulate their behavior, then the gameplay between a player and a 
video game is not co-regulated in the same fashion as are the social interactions be-
tween two humans. Rather, gameplay is co-coordinated in its own reciprocal dynam-
ics that are sustained by its constituents. However, social play between two or more 
players, e.g., children’s school yard play, a card game or a board game, is a co-regu-
lated activity. In these latter cases, the rule system of the game facilitates the interac-
tion between players but does not sustain it by itself. Between these two types of 
gameplay, we can situate multiplayer video game gameplay, which is sustained by 
both the heteronomous responsive game system and the players who intend to play. 
Playing a multiplayer video game is thus a co-regulated activity, facilitated by a dy-
namic video game system.   
The player does not merely regulate the player–game coupling. She also self-
reflectively regulates herself as the player of the game by adopting a lusory attitude 
(Suits 2005 [1978]). For the player, participating in the gameplay thus consists of 
regulating herself and her actions in relation to the coupling. To rephrase Mead’s well-
known words (2015 [1934], p. 147), a person who is playing a game is also playing 
a game of herself, otherwise she does not know that there is a game going on.  
For a video game, “participating” is equal to coordinating its states accord-
ingly to an external input and the rules or code. In the case of the heteronomous system 
of a video game, the coupling can be depicted as input–output procedures; in the case 
of the autonomous system of a player, we then can speak of monitoring dynamic af-
fordances and taking effective complementary actions. From the perspective of the 
player, the complementary actions can often be conceived as demands for a specific 
kind of participation and performance. The game provides normative affordances that 
act as possibilities for both actions and restrictions for when and how these actions 
should be performed. However, the player constantly chooses to continue to regulate 
that coupling. Gameplay emerges from the dynamics of this reciprocity, and it is an 
accomplishment of the dyadic system that requires constant overcoming by both its 
constituents. Through this reciprocity, gameplay arises as an autonomous organiza-
tion: its constituents, i.e., the player and the game system, depend on each other re-
cursively; together, they constitute a unity; and they determine the possible interac-
tions between each other and their environment (see Varela, 1979, p. 55; Thompson, 
2007, p. 44). 
The temporary autonomy and specific identity of gameplay can sustain itself 
only if the autonomy of its constituents, the player, and the responsiveness of the game 
are also sustained. Gameplay can be described as precarious since the tendency for 
both the player and the game is to stop. There is no gameplay if neither the player nor 
the formal game system “feeds” into the coupling: “[I]t is not possible for a precarious 
process in an operationally closed network to exist on its own in the circumstances 
created by the absence of the network” (Di Paolo & Thompson, 2014).  
As a phenomenon, gameplay manifests as a dynamic co-emergent (see 
Thompson, 2007, pp. 38, 65) in which the whole “gameplay” not only emerges from 
its constituents, but the parts, the “player” and the “game” also arise from the whole. 
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The whole and its constituents mutually give each other their own identities that last 
as long as the coupling is reciprocal. This reciprocity means that gameplay is both an 
original and an irreducible phenomenon; that is, it is characterized by both local-to-
global and global-to-local determination of circular causality and organizational clo-
sure (Thompson, 2007, pp. 60–62, 66). I name the player identity that arises in the 
dynamic co-emergence of gameplay player proper and the game identity game proper 
since “the primary phenomenological reality of games is that of action… it is the act 
of doing… that imbricates the player with the game” (Galloway, 2006, p. 83). 
In contrast to De Jaegher’s, Di Paolo’s and Gallagher’s (2010) arguments, I 
assert that the autonomy of gameplay does not require co-regulated coupling as do 
social interactions. Instead, the co-coordination in the dialogical relations between a 
player and a dynamic game system suffices because the game is designed to be re-
sponsive to the player’s self-regulative and coordinative acts in ways that enable the 
coupling to continue. Next, I analyze the second requirement that De Jaegher, Di 
Paolo and Gallagher (2010) offer as necessary for autonomous organizations to 
emerge, namely, the need for two social agents.  
 
 
Social Participation in Solitary Gameplay? 
 
In individual forms of agency, an agent acts to achieve her own goals without the need 
to co-regulate or co-coordinate the acts. These individual acts are then contrasted with 
social acts that involve more than one autonomous agent. Cuffari, Di Paolo, and De 
Jaegher (2015, p. 1101) name the act of ‘gift-giving’ as an example of a social act. An 
act of gift-giving is initiated by a social agent, but it requires another agent to be com-
pleted. Such an act has a double nature. It is simultaneously a change initiated by a 
constituent, such as a person, and a move in the social encounter between the constit-
uents. 
When the acts that a player conducts in a single-player video game gameplay 
are compared to individual acts and social acts, an important tension is revealed. The 
acts in single-player video game gameplay are individual acts in the sense that there 
is only one agent present who aims to fulfill her own desires. However, she cannot 
succeed by adopting an attitude to follow only her own norms in individual acts. If 
she does, the gameplay may soon perish. The player has to involve the dynamic game 
system in her consideration. I call this choice the performative normativity of game-
play: The changes that take place in the game artifact as well as the actions taken by 
the player may or may not contribute to the self-sustaining autonomy of the gameplay. 
Here we can note that, similar to social acts, the actions an individual takes during 
gameplay are also moves in the gaming encounter. A “bond of reciprocal dependence” 
(Goffman, 1959, p. 82) exists, linking the game and the player together.  
In the enactive view on gameplay, lusory attitude (Suits, 2005 [1978]) means 
abandoning the demand of individual acts in our agent–environment coupling and 
adopting instead patterns of social acts, or performative normativity. The player has 
to perform shared actions with the game system by adopting the game’s ‘point-of-
view’ in her own sense-making. Just as one cannot schedule a meeting with a friend 
if one does not make suggestions and consider them to find a shared deliberation, we 
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cannot progress in the game if we do not embrace our own social skills. Shared nor-
mative actions in gameplay are self-constitutive for the identity of the player proper, 
since “action is self-constitution... what makes actions good or bad is how well they 
constitute you,” as philosopher Christine M. Korsgaard (2011, p. 25) has argued.  
The dynamics of co-coordination in gameplay bear similarities to the cou-
plings between two humans in social interaction, and precisely these aspects of phe-
nomenal sameness render the autonomy of gameplay possible also in single-player 
video game gameplay. However, a game nevertheless remains invariably a heterono-
mous system that is unable to produce meanings in and of itself or shape the player’s 
intentionality directly. Seen from the vantage point of the autonomous agent of the 
player, the game belongs to the environment, but as an environment, it is distinctive 
since it is approachable in ways that echo the dynamic patterns of social interaction. 
Lori Landay writes (2014, p. 177): “The difficult task facing programmers and de-
signers is to construct games that give the experience of gameplay that has a conver-
sation’s reciprocal feeling of exchange of effect.”  
The proposed account on video game gameplay holds that human players are 
profoundly social creatures, and game players also rely on their social interaction 
skills in their encounters with game media. This view is supported by The Media 
Equation theory developed by Byron Reeves and Clifford Nass (2002 [1996]) who 
observe, based on the empirical evidence of more than 35 studies, that our interactions 
with media share extensive similarities to our human–human interactions. “[H]uman 
responses to media are determined by the rules that apply to social relationships and 
navigating the world” (ibid., p. 10). Existing neuropsychological and behavioral evi-
dence indeed suggests that we are hardwired to socially respond to cues that suggest 
the presence of an intentional entity (Nowak & Biocca, 2004, p. 482). 
In the case of single-player video game gameplay, we expect, for example, 
that the game we play responds to our communicative acts, that it evaluates us and 
praises us when we succeed, and provides us with consistent, reliable, immediate, 
clear and relevant information. All of these expectations of these ‘Gricean maxims’ 
are derived from the very foundations of interpersonal social interactions (see Grice 
1975; Reeves & Nass, 2002 [1996]). Therefore, seen from the first-person vantage 
point, in solitary video game gameplay there remains two response-present56 dynam-
ical systems, albeit only one of these systems is autonomous.   
During our ongoing activities, media appears to us as being social without 
effort. As Reeves and Nass (2002 [1996]) have shown, this effect is not primarily due 
to advanced AI or realistic representations the media may provide, but rather, it relies 
on our human way of automatically perceiving media as social. We perceive our dy-
namic surroundings as social individuals and respond to it accordingly (Ibid., p. 27; 
see Biocca, 1997). Indeed, as Landay (2014, p. 173) observes, “The persons may per-
ceive that they are interacting with the computer [game] system in a reciprocal way 
as if they were participating in a conversation.”57  
                                                 
56 Deterding (2013), in his reading of Goffman, applies this term to describe whether human 
players are present in the same immediate environment with each other or not.  
57 Interestingly, the phenomenal sameness between games and forms of social interaction was 
noted already in 1972 by folklorist Robert A. Georges (p. 185), who observed that in many 
games players adopt a role of a strategist or a fortunist. These ‘roles’ are not different from 
what emerges in riddling, where the riddler is a strategist and the answerer is a fortunist. 
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De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) describe human-to-human social interaction as an 
activity in which a person must alter her actions contextually to re-encounter the other 
participant. Within this process, the person must encounter herself inasmuch as the 
other participant’s sense-making modulates her own. We can now note that these di-
mensions also exist in the coupling between a player and a dynamic video game sys-
tem. Playing a video game is a practice of re-encountering the other ‘participant,’ i.e., 
the game system. The player must metaregulate herself and her own sense-making as 
she encounters in-game situations that require self-reflection. For example, when a 
player must make meaningful decisions that will affect the game’s story, she will often 
reflect on herself before taking action.   
As we saw in Chapter 2, according to Mead (2015 [1934], pp. 199), we must 
apply the attitude of the other on oneself in order to belong to a community, to become 
its citizens, that is, to realize ‘the self’ in the social situation in which it arises. 
Goffman (1966, p. 8), furthermore, contends that “[A]ny game may be viewed quite 
properly as an instance of social order,” in which ‘social order’ is defined as “the 
consequence of any set of moral norms that regulates the way in which persons pursue 
objectives.” I would like to combine here the arguments by Mead (2015 [1934]) and 
Goffman (1966, pp., 196, 243) and propose that we can characterize rule-bound games 
as social order and a social reality in which we become “citizens” through gameplay. 
During engaging gameplay, we reflect on our identity and realize ourselves in relation 
to the social order of the game and its normativity to gain “the value that belongs to 
all members of that community,” as Mead (2015 [1934], p. 217) writes. 
These views dovetail well with Klabbers (2009, pp. 3, 99–116, 120), who 
argues that games are social systems that are also models of other social systems. 
Players as the actors of a social organization of a game constitute systems of interac-
tions by drawing on social resources and the rules of the game in their player-perfor-
mance. As argued by Jean Piaget (1962 [1951], pp. 112–113), “[R]ules necessarily 
imply social or inter-individual relationships… rules are a regulation imposed by the 
group, and their violation carries a sanction.” As Piaget wrote, to play games, we must 
first agree to the rules. Therefore, collaboration precedes rules as the first principle of 
gameplay. This also renders games with rules in a sense institutional; “[T]hey are 
social realities which are passed on” (ibid., p. 143) from one generation to another 
(see Fine, 2002 [1983], pp. 182, 231; Juul, 2008; Calleja, 2007, p. 98; Deterding, 2013, 
p. 123). 
I agree with De Jaegher et al. (2010) and postulate that a dynamic social pro-
cess is required for autonomous organizations to emerge. I differ, however, by arguing 
that such an autonomy can also emerge in single-player videogame gameplay because 
single-player gaming is 1) co-coordination between an autonomous player and a het-
eronomous game, which can be argued as sufficient for a temporary autonomy of in-
teraction, and 2) because the specific kind of co-coordination enabled by a game con-
verges gameplay phenomenally to a form of social participation.58 
                                                 
58 The social aspects of single-player gaming have been previously discussed, e.g., by Jaakko 
Stenros, Janne Paavilainen and Frans Mäyrä (2011), who argue that playing alone may in-
crease social and cultural capital. Players of any single-player game can also be argued to be 
conscious of the game designer and other players playing the same game. 
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I also argue that single-player gameplay as a phenomenon is a form of social partici-
pation because we automatically socially perceive and respond to the dynamically 
changing game media. Gameplay is social participation because social interaction 
skills and shared actions are constantly required to progress in the game, and to sustain 
gameplay in general. Finally, it is a form of social participation because each instance 
of gameplay necessitates adopting the position of the social self as the player of the 
game, which renders gameplay a meta-regulative and self-reflective practice. Next, I 
consider how precarious gameplay comes forth and manages to sustain itself—or 
faces a breakdown. 
 
 
Coordination and Exploration in Precarious Gameplay 
 
In participatory sense-making, two or more systems are coupled in dynamic interre-
lations of coordination and exploration. The concept of coordination comes from dy-
namical systems theory, which analyses coordination as a ubiquitous phenomenon in 
physical and biological systems. Coordination means “the non-accidental correlation 
between the behaviors of two or more systems that are in sustained coupling” (De 
Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007, pp. 489–491). Coordination is interactional if two or more 
social agents correlate their behaviors on purpose during an ongoing situation and in 
the rhythm of the situation, find similarities and coherences with each other. If the 
coordination between two or more social agents aims to continue the interaction, it is 
called functional coordination (Di Paolo et al., 2010, pp. 62–69). 
Bateson (2002 [1979], pp. 130–131) offers exploration as an example of be-
havior that is both self-validating and addictive. According to him, exploration is al-
ways success, whether the result is pleasant or unpleasant. Interestingly, Bateson con-
nects exploration and play by stating (ibid., p. 128): “The game and the creation of 
the game must be seen as a single phenomenon, and indeed, it is subjectively plausible 
to say that the sequence is really playable only so long as it retains some elements of 
the creative and unexpected. If the sequence is totally known, it is ritual.” 
I argue that processes of both coordination and exploration are pivotal in all 
gameplay. In coordination, a participating system changes its state or regulates itself 
in relation to the coupling, e.g., through synchronization, anticipation, mirroring, or 
imitation, as Gün R. Semin and John T. Cacioppo have specified (2009, p. 114). Ex-
ploration, however, can be interpreted as the counterpart for rules of the game; rules 
of the game restrict how the gameplay can be continued, but exploration is the element 
of creativity to use to traverse and test, bend, and even break the rules. 
A social embodied agent participates in gameplay by exploring and coordi-
nating the contingencies between itself and the environmental other, the formal dy-
namic system of the game. In social interaction, these contingencies are negotiated 
during the encounter itself (McGann & De Jaegher, 2009). In solitary gameplay, how-
ever, the contingencies are partially predefined by the game artifact and thus only 
limitedly negotiable by player agency. Rather, the contingencies are enacted, discov-
ered, and mastered by the player. A game, unlike most other worldly objects, is not 
available to us in a complete fashion. A game becomes more known and transparent 
through exploration, skill acquisition, automatization, and sustained playing (see 
Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2006, p. 79). However, an element of opaqueness remains in it. 
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More precisely, in the experience of gameplay, there is an “uncertainty of outcome” 
(Goffman, 2013 [1961], p. 69; see Costikyan, 2013) or an unpredictability that origi-
nates in its dynamics (Karhulahti, 2015a, p. 34). 
In exploration, a player experiments with the game environment from a per-
formative vantage point. Exploration may be object-oriented or mere curiosity in delv-
ing into the possibilities of the game. Through coordination, she regulates her cou-
pling with the game to achieve the accord needed for producing an effect. The recur-
sive and environmental process of exploration and coordination is adaptive. As De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007, p. 496) state: “viewing interactions from this perspective 
is akin to understanding the growth of an adaptive system.”  
In the autonomy of gameplay, an adaptive player proper must be able to de-
termine how the current events she faces are shaping her trajectory or progression in 
relation to her viability within the gameplay. Moreover, she must have the means to 
regulate the conditions of this trajectory and to do so appropriately. Thus, adaptivity 
is integrated into the capability of evaluating the needs and expanding the means for 
realizing and preserving one’s own identity (Di Paolo, 2005, p. 445; Froese & Di 
Paolo, 2009). Adaptivity is how the player sustains and realizes her player identity by 
exploring possibilities and coordinating couplings during the gameplay. This condi-
tion cannot be achieved if the player does not care about her identity as the player (see 
Fine, 2002 [1983], p. 185). The raison d'être for game artifacts is that, during the au-
tonomy of gameplay, players will develop an attachment to their identity as being the 
players of that specific game. This attachment keeps gameplay going as long as the 
player retains her autonomy and the game retains its responsiveness.  
Let us next consider how the principles of coordination and exploration may 
manifest in first-person experiences of video game gameplay. This may be best illu-
minated by considering a few gameplay examples in which the balance between ex-
plorative and coordinative practices becomes endangered. For this purpose, I reflect 
on three of my own past gameplay experiences.  
In Okami (Capcom, 2006) the player comes to face a character called Mr. 
Orange in an event known as The Konohana Shuffle. During this event, the task of the 
player is to use the Celestial Brush to rejuvenate the divine cherry-blossom tree of 
Konohana. After a rather long cut-scene, the player has to pause the game five times 
at exactly the correct moment to call up a canvas, draw five circles to rejuvenate the 
cherry blossoms, and succeed in this task in perfect sequence within a very limited 
time-frame. If she fails, then the sequence starts over, and another cut-scene is initi-
ated. 
When the player first encounters the event, she finds herself watching the cut-
scene in which there is no coordination whatsoever, but only the story of the game to 
be explored (as in all cut-scenes in video games). As the cut-scene ends, the player 
may or may not grasp what to do. I did not, and thus I missed the short possibility to 
draw the first circle. This moment I missed was a moment of active exploration of the 
gameplay possibilities. Mr. Orange immediately re-appeared to announce that I had 
failed. After this cut-scene, which again did not include any coordination and only 
very limited exploration, I was prompted to try again. This time I knew what I was 






Figure 6. The Konohana Shuffle in Okami (2006, Capcom) 
 
The remote controller of a Nintendo Wii console can hardly be described as accurate, 
and the little circles I tried to draw failed one after the other. It took several tries of 
active exploration and coordination before I knew how the circles were supposed to 
be drawn. During this process, my frustration started to grow, as I realized that the 
circles did not need to be perfect. Instead, it was more important to draw the circles 
in a certain rhythm. Sometimes drawings that resembled more of a spiral than a circle 
were accepted by the game. After dozens of tries and forced viewings of the cut-scene, 
I knew exactly how I must move my wrist to generate acceptable drawings. All of my 
exploration in the sequence had vanished. What was left was the mere coordination 
of my movements and, frankly, I now hardly felt like playing anymore.  
An experience of playing the action role-playing video game Diablo III: Ul-
timate Evil (Blizzard, 2014) provides another example of the imbalance between co-
ordination and exploration. When a player’s character hits level 70 in Diablo III, the 
gameplay experience changes drastically. Quite typically, exploring the main story at 
this stage is only a memory, and the player is engaged in grinding character levels 
and, especially, in collecting endless amounts of rare loot in the procedurally gener-
ated levels. For some players, this is where the game starts. For others, its marks the 
end of the game. 
It is up to the player to choose a difficulty level of her own liking for her 
constant adventures of grinding and looting. If one chooses a difficulty level lower 
than the current skill level of her character, then the gameplay practically has no co-
ordination. The experience is one of mere exploration that consists of finding out 
whether those anticipated green and orange lights that shoot to the sky after massive 
killings appear or do not. If they do, you just may have found an extremely valuable 






Figure 7. Loot in Diablo III: Ultimate Evil (2014, Blizzard) 
  
My local co-op playing ended because the experiences of many consecutive nights of 
playing the game started to resemble each other too much. We decided to quit playing 
the game since it did not seem to lead anywhere anymore. We realized that the stuff 
we had collected did not provide any kind of growth or adaptation for us as players of 
the game. There was little to be explored and no coordination left in the gameplay, 
which then, because of this perceived lack of balance, was terminated by us. The ex-
perience was not necessarily boring, but it started to feel pointless. It did not make 
sense for us to continue, since the imaginative experience had reached its saturation 
point, as Donald W. Winnicott (2005 [1971], p. 70) describes it.59 
The autonomy of gameplay suffered greatly in the episode of Konohana Shuf-
fle in Okami and also in the endless looting of Diablo III: Ultimate Evil. Both games 
failed to generate the changes in the player–game coupling that I perceived meaning-
ful for my experience as the player. In Diablo III, I was not able to evaluate the need 
for my efforts anymore; in Okami, I suffered from my lack of expanding the means to 
overcome the unfairly difficult challenge. 
Finally, Dungeon Master (FTL, 1987) provides an example of the disappear-
ance of both the dimensions of exploration and coordination in its autonomous organ-
ization. Shriekers are the second creature type that the player encounters in this classic 
dungeon crawler game. Beating these shriekers does not require much effort from the 
player during the first encounter and even less so when the player meets them again 
as she descends further into the dungeons. 
  
                                                 
59 As Bonnie Nardi has observed in her ethnographic study on massively multiplayer online 
role-playing game (MMORPG) World of Warcraft (2004, Blizzard Entertainment), “farming” 
loot, i.e., repeating the same easily played in-game sequence over and over to find valuable 
items, and “grinding,” or engaging oneself with repetitive events with low challenge to gain 
more experience for playable characters in order to level them up, diverge from play experi-




Figure 8. A group of shriekers in Dungeon Master (1987, FTL) 
 
After running for my characters’ life from the menace of magenta worms, I found 
myself in a room full of shriekers. The room had a closable iron door, so I was safe 
there from the deadly worms after I killed the shriekers. I decided to rest in the room. 
To my surprise, I was awoken by a new group of shriekers that had respawned in the 
room. At the time I was a 10-year old kid, so I figured this was an excellent oppor-
tunity to gain some highly needed levels without any risk. Thus, I set the mouse cursor 
on the icon of an empty hand that symbolized a Priest attack and figured that by con-
necting a QuickShot II Turbo joystick to the Atari ST instead of a mouse with which 
Dungeon Master was supposed to be played, I could gain priest and fighter levels 
automatically if I put the “auto-fire” option of the joystick on. I watched the process 
in action for a moment, then turned the TV set off, and went to school. 
The re-encounter with shriekers did not include any coordination. It consisted 
of mere routine operations since there was no real need for player skills. However, 
when I explored the fact that the shriekers had respawned in the room according to a 
certain pattern, exploration also vanished. In the absence of both coordination and 
exploration, the autonomy of the gameplay withered, and I found myself without per-
formativity. I was no longer a constituent in the gameplay of Dungeon Master. The 
game was not playable, because it appeared to me as fully known and mastered in that 
room.  
In many games, we may find ourselves within activities that are completely 
known. Yet, if there is no element of exploration, these activities no longer necessarily 
count as playing the game. Moreover, there is no coordination in those activities that 
we have mastered. If there is no experienced effort in adjusting oneself in relation to 
the gameplay events, then the experience does not strike us as full-fledged gameplay 
since it does not demand our attention or our effort. As an experience, it is similar to 
riding a bike. We become self-conscious of how we do it only during rare and unex-
pected occasions.  
Without any coordination, the player appropriates the game for what Roger 
Caillois (2001 [1961], p. 9) called “playing at ‘playing chess,’” and what has more 
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recently been labeled toyplay (Bateman & Boon, 2006; Sicart, 2009). Correspond-
ingly, without any exploration, a player will just be trying to use the system. Further-
more, as argued by Goffman in Frame Analysis (1986 [1974], p. 358), “an individual 
can be overthrown as an interactant and find himself sustaining no particular role” in 
interaction. This “self-removal” is indeed what happened to me when playing Dun-
geon Master. Goffman (1986 [1974], p. 509) also noted that complete knowability is 
not a quality of interactions proper between individuals. We can here notice again the 
profound social character of games: gameplay remains intriguing to us by retaining 
an element of unpredictability, which is a constitutive principle of social interactions.  
The absence of exploration or coordination in the gameplay experience does 
not equal an instant breakdown of the autonomy of gameplay. Sustained lack of ex-
ploration and coordination do, however, neglect the performative normativity of 
gameplay. As long as the game does not provide changes that emerge for the player 
as novel affordances for exploration and coordination, the game artifact will deprive 
the self-sustaining autonomy of gameplay instead of nourishing it. 
Preserving gameplay is the shared responsibility of both the game system and 
the player. Game mechanics are the tools for the player to use to fulfil this responsi-
bility (see Sicart, 2009; Chapter 1). A player is able to co-coordinate gameplay recip-
rocally with the dynamic game system only by triggering game mechanics. For in-
stance, the coordination that takes place in toyplay is not truly reciprocal, since the 
player appropriates game mechanics for individual acts instead of normative social 
acts guided by gameplay.  
Some games emphasize coordinative practice, whereas others offer a plethora 
of possibilities for explorative activity (see Barr, 2007). Experiences of exploration 
can be enabled by, e.g., an element of randomness, complex story, multiple endings, 
an extensive gameworld, role-taking, and character customization. Also, viewing a 
cut-scene may be regarded an explorative practice. As long as there is something novel 
to be explored, a cut-scene still has value as a part of gameplay, although the player 
momentarily merely observes the in-game events without the possibility to generate 
changes (see Klevjer, 2002). Correspondingly, coordination can cover such tasks as 
solving logical or spatial problems, adjusting oneself to the rhythm of the gameplay 
and coordinating fine motor skills, negotiating and considering a strategy, and making 
tactical moves. To put it differently, coordinative practices are more immediately con-
nected to the game’s challenges than explorative practices.60 
The relationship between the player proper and the game proper is mutual and 
not unlike that found in adaptive living systems; “The changes in environment that 
organisms produce generate new selective pressures as an integral part of this process, 
                                                 
60 Jonas Linderoth (2013) has provided an intriguing take on the types of challenge a player 
faces in gameplay. Linderoth proposes two main categories for designed challenges in games: 
in exploratory challenges the player is assumed to know how to take actions, but the real chal-
lenge is in deciding which actions to take. In performatory challenges the player knows what 
to do, but the challenge is in how she manages to do what is required. Linderoth’s concepts 
are related to what I mean with explorative and coordinative player practice, but not identical; 
both of Linderoth’s (2013) concepts describe telic coordinative player practices, i.e., chal-




and as organisms adapt, they again, simultaneously, change the nature of their envi-
ronment” (Barrett, 2011, p. 78). By exploring, our repertoire of possible actions ex-
tends. By coordinating our actions successfully, our skills develop. Gameplay can thus 
be described as a sociocultural practice of growth in adaptation achieved by the in-
tentional processes of exploration and coordination in player–game coupling.        
In gameplay, the player evaluates the needs for her growth in adaptation and 
thus the needs for making in-game progress, and then explores the possibilities the 
game offers. She then expands her means by coordinating her couplings as they relate 
to the challenges she encounters. By learning how to better cope with the game envi-
ronment, she gains more efficient tools for evaluating any additional needs for more 
successful adaptation. Then she explores the environment again from her renewed 




























Figure 9. Growth in adaptation in video game gameplay consists of explorative and 
coordinative player practice. 
 
The notions of exploration and coordination in gameplay bear significant similarities 
to the concepts of paidia and ludus, as described by Roger Caillois (2001 [1961]). 
Caillois (ibid., pp. 13, 27–28) articulated paidia as the play of free improvisation, 
spontaneous self-expression and carefree gaiety, whereas by ludus, he referred to play 
as an institutionalized activity that requires effort, skill, and patience from the players. 
For Caillois, ludus introduces regulations, rules, defined goals and conventions to 
play, and thus formalizes and enrichens explorative and open-ended paidia. Im-
portantly, Caillois (ibid., p. 53) stated that paidia and ludus should be understood as 
ways of playing rather than as categories of play (see Barr, 2007, pp., 66–67, 79–80; 
Deterding, 2013, p. 145). 
In enactivism and in this thesis, the concepts of exploration and coordination 
are understood as general and focal processes that manifest in all forms of social in-
teraction. First-person experiences of gameplay entail practices of exploration and co-
ordination not unlike other forms of social participation, but these practices are not 
unique to gameplay. Thus, exploration and coordination are not reducible to “ways of 
  
125 
playing,” similar to paidia and ludus (cf. Caillois, 2001 [1961] p. 53). They are play-
ers’ regulative, interactive and constitutive practices to encounter dynamic systems, 
whether these are autonomous humans or heteronomous games. 
 Constitutive principles describe the ways in which an agent directs herself in 
a certain activity. For example, putting one foot in front of another is a constitutive 
principle of walking. If you are not guided by this principle, then you are not walking 
(Korsgaard, 2011, pp. 28–29). I contend that exploration and coordination are con-
stitutive principles of gameplay. If you are not guided by the principles of exploration 
and coordination in gameplay, then you are not performing game player activity.  
 
 
Data Analysis: The Ludic Involvement in Ongoing Gameplay 
 
The constitutive practice of coordination is closely related to how skillfully a player 
manages to perform in gameplay. The best-known investigation into the connections 
between gameplay experience and skill was conducted by Csikszentmihályi (1975; 
1990; 2002 [1992]). Csikszentmihályi’s theory is an examination on why people are 
highly motivated in activities of personal excitement and enjoyment. He studied, for 
instance, chess players, rock climbers, and surgeons, and concluded that their peak 
experiences resembled each other because each type of experience encompassed a 
state of being in “flow.” Since Csikszentmihályi’s theory has been discussed exten-
sively in several other publications in game studies, I will consider his theory of flow 
as an optimal experience here only briefly. 
Csikszentmihályi (1975, pp. 38–46; 1990, pp. 53–70) presents six aspects of 
the flow experience: 1) action and awareness of the action merge together, and one 
does not reflect the act of awareness itself; 2) the person focuses and centers her at-
tention on a limited stimulus field and excludes, for example, sounds irrelevant to the 
task at hand; 3) the individual is said to experience a “loss of ego” or forget herself in 
the midst of the activity; 4) she consequently gains more control over her actions and 
her immediate environment; 5) the environment provides non-contradictory demands 
for action, clear goals, and unambiguous feedback to the actions the person takes; and 
6) the experience is autotelic, or intrinsically rewarding. Later Csikszentmihályi 
(1990, p. 66; 2002 [1992], p. 49) added that, in a flow experience, the sense of time is 
also altered.   
A flow experience affords possibilities for action that meet the person’s skills 
and abilities. If a task is too demanding, it can result in anxiety; if it is too easy, she 
gets bored. Thus, “the state of flow is felt when opportunities for action are in balance 
with the actor’s skills; the experience is then autotelic” (1975, p. 49). As noted by 
Csikszentmihályi and many authors since, games are prime examples of activities that 
constantly produce a state of “flow.” Game scholar Katherine Isbister (2016, p. 3), in 
fact, suggests that the qualities of flow and choice separate games from other media:  
 
To the human brain, playing a game is more like actually running a 
race than watching a film or reading a short story about a race. When 
I run, I make a series of choices about actions I will take that might 
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affect whether I win. I feel a sense of mastery or failure depending on 
whether I successfully execute the actions in the way I intended. 
 
The central argument by Csikszentmihályi is that a precondition for flow is that the 
skills of the individual and the demands of the environment align. These arguments 
are well-known in contemporary game research, but I wish to add another perspective 
to the discussion of games and flow experience by remarking on what philosopher 
and enactivist Alva Noë has written about skillful access.  
Noë (2009) argues that when we are learning any new skill, we must first pay 
careful attention to the mechanics of what we are trying to do. Hitting a baseball is, 
for most of us, very difficult the first time we try to do it; “Psychologists have demon-
strated that, as a rule, novice performance improves with this kind of focused attention 
on the mechanics of the task—you improve your performance when you pay attention 
to yourself and what you are doing” (ibid., p. 99–100). An interviewee of mine de-
scribed this kind of transformation in gameplay experience: 
 
In principle, you can play through this game without any other weap-
ons than your fists. Just run naked and use your skills. If you do not 
level up and fight only with your fists, this is a game of pure skill like 
an arcade shoot ’em up. And just like in Metroid: Prime, you slowly 
grow into the character and its movements and realize that you begin 
to act automatically. All the blocking moves, rolling moves and at-
tacks come naturally for you. You have to be one with your charac-
ter’s movements. (P13, mercenary) 
 
The more skillful an individual is with the task at hand, the less attention she allocates 
to the mechanics of the task. As Noë (2009, p. 100) notes, expertise, in fact, requires 
an individual to turn her attention from the mechanics to, for example, the tactics and 
strategies to utilize the learned mechanics in creative ways, to be able to improvise. 
Novices and experts thus have qualitatively distinguishable manners of involvement 
with their immediate environment.  
An expert player does not pay attention to the game mechanics but to the ways 
to manipulate mastered mechanics, and to improvising within the restrictions of the 
mechanics and the rules of the game—at least if we are dealing with games of strategy. 
On the other hand, if we are dealing with games that have an immersive gameworld 
(Chapter 7) and a complicated story (Chapter 8) to be explored, the expert player may 
be able to pay more attention to the narrative qualities of the game and role-playing, 
and empathize more with the in-game characters. Some of my interviewees expressed 
being drawn to play games precisely because of the experiences of virtuosity: 
 
For me the best thing is... how the progression happens and how I 
come to grasp the game system and its interactions… I am fascinated 
by how the mechanics when combined create a work of art. So, it is 
not only the numbers and algorithms behind the interface, not only 
mastering how the system works, then. This is why puzzles do not 
interest me, you just solve them, puzzles are so quickly experienced 
for someone like me… complex options [in a game] means that I can 
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play it uniquely, not as most of the other players do but in my own 
way, expressing something singular. (P4, adventurer-mercenary) 
 
These observations emphasize that, although flow is indeed an important and recur-
rent quality of gameplay experiences, it is not the only emotionally rewarding experi-
ence one can have in gameplay. Flow, as described by Csikszentmihályi, requires 
constant change in both the requirements of the environment and the skill develop-
ment of the player. This theory strongly stresses the coordinative and ludic aspects of 
gameplay, but I argue that explorative paidic activity is a constitutive principle of 
gameplay, as well. The description of flow does not satisfactorily capture the playful 
aspects of gameplay that the player may experience after she has passed the novice 
phase of learning how to play.  
Indeed, ludic accommodative play is hardly the primary gameplay experience 
for all players. Some players specifically seek games in which they can wander freely, 
which offer emotionally touching stories, fascinating characters and vast gameworlds:  
 
Well, for starters, I enjoy The Sims because I can construct an alter-
native reality and live everyday life and stuff. So, it is like: “What if 
I could live like this too?” And then I can build it to be my own little 
world. And take care of others. But I have to also be organized and 
careful or my sims [in-game characters] will die. (P25, explorer) 
 
If I remember anything from my childhood at all, then maybe I re-
member Worms: Armageddon. Me and my brother, we did not only 
play the game as you were supposed to, fighting against each other. 
We designed our own places and strongholds and mansions… The 
game was a bit like a toy for us. (W9, commander) 
 
The emotions one feels when trying to learn to play by getting used to the game me-
chanics is surely different from the emotions one experiences when she navigates the 
gameworld, customizes her character and learns details of the mythological creatures 
that roam in the game’s fictional setting. Players do indeed have quite different pref-
erences on whether they enjoy the explorative or the coordinative conduct more in 
gameplay: 
 
Minecraft was too open for me. It can be really fun and all, but when 
I played it, I was like “what I am supposed to do now?” You must 
decide your own goal in it, otherwise it is just boring. It was quite an 
awful experience for me, I want clear missions and tasks, please. 
(P10, adventurer) 
 
Ok, in Mafia I did like to drive around, the city looks great and the 
cars are fun, and it was quite amusing to steal cars, shoot its owner 
and just drive away. It was fun for a while, but it got meaningless 
quite soon, so I wanted to play the game through and see the end. So, 
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I do enjoy, in the end, the challenges more than free wandering with-
out a clear goal. (P31, daredevil) 
 
Although players differ in how they appreciate the explorative and the coordinative 
practice and the balance between them, a common factor between players seems to be 
taking interest in making progress. During the interview processes, it became evident 
to me that the pleasure in making progress is not necessarily to be equated with being 
closer to, e.g., winning or completing the game. Some players emphasized the im-
portance in progressing in the game’s narrative development: 
 
I want to experience everything that is related to the main storyline 
of role-playing games. I am not the kind of player who spends endless 
hours doing some side-missions or grinding levels. The plot develop-
ment is what interests me, and the characters. If the storyline screams 
that “you must save the world now, hurry!” and then you ignore that 
and go collecting some rare mushrooms for tens of hours, what’s the 
point of the story? (P11, mercenary-adventurer)  
 
For other players, the most significant experience of making progress was not related 
to revealing the story but rather to opening new possibilities and locations in the game-
world: 
 
In platformers, I enjoy exploring and finding. It gives me quite strong 
emotions to find a new level, or gain access to new places, for me it 
is the best thing in gaming. As a kid, it was something really special. 
(P6, commander) 
 
These Zelda games have such amazing gameworlds, and you can 
travel to places. You can go to the desert, to the sea, and then there is 
a sort of dangerous moorland area and so on. Just being in the game-
world feels like an adventure. That is what draws me to play… The 
joy of finding out is the driving principle. To explore the strange new 
world. (P10, explorer) 
 
One player-interviewee (P26, mercenary) told me that he would easily get addicted to 
Spelunky and other games in which the levels are procedurally generated, meaning 
that each time you play, you practically start a unique adventure since the game envi-
ronment is never exactly the same. In these roguelike61 games, the progression con-
sists of never-ending exploration of unknown levels and their secrets. Some players, 
however, did not stress the importance of progressing in the game’s narrative or in 
                                                 
61 The name roguelike is an emic term for a subgenre of role-playing video games. In the 
original Rogue (1980, Epyx) game, players controlled a character and explored procedurally 
generated dungeons that changed every playthrough. If a player’s character died, the game did 
not continue, but the players had to begin a completely new game instead. This design feature 
is called permadeath in gaming cultures. The contemporary videogames that adopt procedur-
ally generated dungeons, turn-based combat and permadeath are called roguelike.   
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exploring its gameworld but progressing towards “a perfect completion” by finding 
and succeeding in every task available:  
 
I have played this game through three times with Playstation 3. I am 
a completionist, I cannot play and study at the same time, because I 
have to get all the achievements. (P13, mercenary) 
 
I loot everything rare. Sometimes I like to play games in which there 
is not so much rare and hidden stuff, because then I do not have to 
spend tens of hours on searching for them all. I am really bad at 
throwing things away both in real-life and in games, because then I 
start to think… “What if I will still need that somewhere?” (P30, com-
mander) 
 
The survey of 1,718 respondents (see Chapter 3, Study 1) included a question in which 
the participants were asked to specify what kind of play style they enjoyed by choos-
ing whether they disagreed or agreed with a set of fixed statements (Likert-7, 1=disa-
gree completely, 7=agree completely). The question included a total of 12 items, half 
of which described either aspects associated with explorative play style (1: “I want to 
explore the gameworld extensively and do all the side quests,” 2: “I like that I can 
choose my own way to play and wander the gameworld freely,” and 3: “I like linear 
play in which following the storyline of the game is the main thing”) or coordinative 
play style (4: “I like that games put my skills to a real test,” 5: “I like games that really 
test my wits,” and 6: “I enjoy that I have to work hard in games.”).  
In order to study players’ preferences in explorative and coordinative player 
conduct, I made an exploratory factor analysis for these six items (1–6) of the scale 
with principal factor extraction, varimax rotation and polychoric correlations. I de-
cided to exclude the other six items from the analysis since they clearly described 
separate aspects of play styles, e.g., “I only want to play games that are very recently 
published” and “I only play games I am good at.” The MAP test suggested two factors 
to be extracted. All of the six items loaded on a factor with loadings > 0.5 and without 
cross-loadings, and therefore I decided to retain the first solution.  
As suspected, items 1, 2, and 3 loaded on factor 1 with corresponding factor 
loadings of 0.770, 0.681, and 0.614. I named this factor explorative play style. Simi-
larly, items 4, 5, and 6 loaded on factor 2, which I call coordinative play style, with 
the loadings of 0.760, 0.754, and 0.608. The Cronbach’s alpha for the first factor was 
0.837 and for the second factor 0.860. These results indicate relatively high internal 
consistency for both of these scales. I then calculated mean preference sums for ex-
plorative and coordinative play styles for the seven player types (see Chapter 3). 
From Table 11, we can note that players of The Adventurer type appreciate 
an explorative play style clearly more than a coordinative one. Also, mercenaries ty-
pically enjoy an explorative a bit more than a coordinative style of playing, but players 
of all the other five types enjoy ludic coordination over paidic exploration in ga-







Explorative style Coordinative style 
Obs. 
mean std dev mean std dev 
Adventurer 5.46 1.19 4.63 1.23 179 
Commander 4.88 1.32 5.01 1.17 323 
Companion 3.97 1.71 4.19 1.38 138 
Daredevil 3.85 1.54 4.22 1.42 250 
Explorer 4.61 1.41 4.64 1.31 272 
Mercenary 5.33 1.09 5.17 1.08 336 
Patterner 3.53 1.66 4.05 1.42 226 
 
Table 11. The mean sums and standard deviations for the seven player types and 
explorative/coordinative player practices (N=1,718).  
 
Kristine L. Nowak et al. (2008) noticed in their experimental study of violent video 
games that frequent gameplay reduced players’ frustration and increased their sense 
of presence.62 In their study, a greater sense of presence correlated with increases in 
aggression, which led the researchers to suggest that “aggression results from true 
involvement [i.e., presence] in the video game and not from gameplay as a means to 
pass time” (ibid., p. 265). It was also observed that when the participants of the study 
got frustrated, this interfered with their experience of presence. Since the level of frus-
tration was reduced in long-term play, and the level of presence was correspondingly 
increased, the authors concluded that the familiarity with gameplay was the key ele-
ment for perceiving the game as more violent.  
The study reported by Nowak et al. (2008) has important implications for un-
derstanding the different emotions that may emerge from video game gameplay. Their 
study indicates that the level of skill and competence to play a video game has signif-
icant impacts on how the game is experienced: the more skilled players are more 
deeply involved in the fictional gameworld and thus experience the game contents 
differently than the players who are merely trying to learn how to play. If the results 
of the experiment by Nowak et al. (2008), Noë’s observations of skill acquisition and 
Csikszentmihályi’s theory of flow are brought together, we can hypothesize that the 
emotional experience of an expertise player may indeed be very different than that of 
a novice player. This is an important subject area, and I return to it in Chapter 6. 
 
 
Discussion I: Let’s Play Master and Servant 
 
In the course of this chapter, we have seen that enactivism argues for an imbalance 
between a living being and its environment: a living being is able to modulate its 
environment because it is both autonomous and adaptive. This generates interactional 
asymmetry between a subject and its environment. Thompson (2011, p. 121) contends 
that “[i]f we lose sight of this interactional asymmetry, then we lose the ability to 
account for the directedness proper to living beings in their sense-making.” When the 
enactivistic stance to interactional asymmetry—which it shares with many other 
                                                 
62 I focus on the concepts of ‘presence’ and ‘performance’ in Chapter 6. 
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branches of cognitive sciences—is considered in the case of gameplay, it becomes 
evident that the player regulates the parameters of the player–game coupling. This 
view on coupling between a player and a game differs, however, from how self-sus-
taining gameplay has been understood in prior game studies.  
Following Ihde (1990), Leino (2012, p. 59) defines computer games as a sub-
type of a technological artifact “which makes players responsible, in an existentialist 
sense, for the freedom it endows them with” (Leino, 2012, p. 59). He calls this envi-
ronment the gameplay condition, which he argues is an invariant in the game experi-
ence. Leino states that the player’s desire to play can be assumed as a given: “[I]t is 
only lucid to assume the player as someone who desires to remain a player, as some-
one onto whom the gameplay condition is imposed” (Leino, 2010, p. 147). This argu-
ment leads Leino to revisit Aarseth’s (2007a) writings on the ‘implied player.’ 
Aarseth (2007a, p. 130) states that by following Gadamer “[T]his defines the 
player: a person subjected to a rule-based system; no longer a complete, free subject 
with the power to decide what to do next.” From his phenomenological first-person 
stance, Leino then argues that players do not subject themselves to the rules of the 
game, but rather they find themselves as being subjected to the gameplay condition: 
“In the player/game relationship... the player is fulfilling the requirements set by the 
game... the player and the materiality of the game are not equal partners when deciding 
about the nature of the relationship” (Leino, 2010, pp. 272–275). 
From the framework of enactivism, the asymmetry between a player and a 
game appears differently than in the writings by Leino or Aarseth. In enactivism, it is 
maintained that our environments cannot impose a condition on us which would dic-
tate how we act. Instead, it is the autonomous agent, the player, who intends to con-
tinue the activity regardless of the resistance she may encounter. “There is always an 
intention to the play,” argues Sutton-Smith (2001 [1997], p. 198). Or, as Karhulahti 
(2015a, p. 16, 18) observes: “[V]ideogames can never (en)force me to act in a ‘partic-
ular’ way even if I salute their gameplay conditions by fighting resistance and main-
taining my player position.”  
Rather than being able to shape the intentionality of the player, or dictate the 
continuity of the gameplay or its meanings, a game generates opportunities and pos-
sibilities for actions, i.e., affordances (see Chapter 7). This demarcation designates 
that in first-person enactivism the player’s desire to play, and hence the autonomy of 
gameplay, should not be understood as a given but as precarious. 
Kelso (1995) has shown that the dynamics of coupling are typically not fully 
determined by any one participant or an object of a situation: Instead, the dynamics 
emerge from their mutual influence (McGann et al., 2013). I argue this is also the case 
in the autonomy gameplay, where there are mutually constraining characteristics be-
tween the player and the game, and the emergent yet precarious state of gameplay is 
based on the intrinsic dynamics of both. Behind the wheel of the autonomy of game-
play is neither the dynamic game system nor the player, but the emergent reciprocity 






Discussion II: The Dialogical Gameplay 
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Piaget (1962 [1951]) analyzed how mental representa-
tion and symbolic function arise from the developmental stages of the human mind. 
He traced the origins of representation to sensory-motor assimilation and accommo-
dation. He defined assimilation as a process in which an individual “takes in” new 
objects to existing mental schemas. In accommodation, contrastingly, one “fits” ex-
isting mental schemas to perceived worldly objects. Piaget stated that sensorimotor 
play is essentially assimilation over accommodation, whereas imitation is accommo-
dation for its own sake. In contrast to accommodative imitation, assimilative play does 
not require “real effort” (ibid., p. 90), but it is instead the egocentric “pleasure of being 
the cause,” as Piaget (ibid., p. 91) emphasizes, following Karl Groos (1912 [1901]).63  
My model of exploration and coordination as the constitutive principles of 
gameplay is congenial with Piaget’s (1962 [1951]) theory of assimilative and accom-
modative practices in intelligent adaptation, although exploration does not simply 
equal assimilation nor does coordination equal accommodation. One does not assim-
ilate game mechanics and the objects of gameworld for the egocentric pleasure of 
exploration but rather one explores based on the recognized needs and within the 
boundaries of the game’s rule system. Between the poles of purely assimilative play 
and completely accommodative imitation, exploration resides on the side of assimila-
tion, but not at the far end of this continuum.  
Sutton-Smith (1983, pp. 232–235) states that exploration is more closely con-
nected to adaptation than play, and more directly connected to learning. Exploration 
has also been called investigation (ibid., p. 233), which further illuminates the distinc-
tion between exploration and free-form play. In the words of Corinne Hutt (1976, pp. 
211–212), where epistemic exploration asks, “what does this object do?” ludic play 
asks, “what can I do with this object.” Exploration has a tendency to be obligatory and 
investigative and happen in novel situations, but play can be characterized as optional 
and idiosyncratic activity that takes place in known environments.  
Thus, explorative paidic activity emerges in gameplay in relation to the ‘ex-
ternal reality,’ i.e., to the challenges set by the game. This is so because exploration 
in gameplay is subordinate to the purpose of making progress in the game; as a type 
of activity, exploration is directed (see Sutton-Smith, 1983, p. 233). The same can be 
stated of coordination: coordination in gameplay is not accommodative imitation for 
its own sake but only in relation to expanding the means to make in-game progress. It 
can be therefore concluded that within gameplay, coordination entails accommodative 
                                                 
63 “Ludic activity,” for Piaget (1962 [1951], pp. 90–104), equals egocentric assimilation of 
exercising activities “for the mere pleasure of [already] mastering them,” and thus it does not 
include any game-like qualities of normative acts or challenges.  
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ludic emphasis, and exploration is characterized by predominance of paidic assimila-
tion over ludic accommodation.64  
Let me make another remark on the dialogic relations between explorative 
and coordinative conduct in gameplay, which has additional value for understanding 
the connections between folkloric practices and gameplay. Graham H. Jensen (2013) 
has observed that the relationship between ludus and paidia can be interpreted as an-
alogical to Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1981 [1934]) concepts of centripetal and centrifugal 
forces in language. Centripetal forces are processes of unification and centralization 
of verbal and ideological norms. In contrast, centrifugal forces are decentralized and 
disunified. The centripetal and the centrifugal are not mutually exclusive but in con-
stant dynamical and dialogic relationship in any forms of discourse (ibid., p. 279).  
Jensen (2013) notes that centripetal forces can be described as analogous to 
ludic procedures that act on paidic restrictions (including rules of the game), and the 
ways by which the game persuades the player to engage herself with the game me-
chanics. Centrifugal forces, on the other hand, encompass the ‘carnivalesque’ and an-
archic, open-ended paidia that challenges and even transforms the ludic or the cen-
tripetal forces of a game.  
Similar to Bakhtin’s writings on centripetal and centrifugal forces that coexist 
in all forms of discourse, the coordinative and explorative practices are present in all 
instances of gameplay. Here we can recall the writings of Mead (2015 [1934]) and the 
constant dialogue between the “I” and “me” aspects of the social self. For we can now 
note that “I” corresponds to the explorative centrifugal force in gameplay, whereas 
“me” is the ludic and normative component of centripetal coordination. We have thus 
arrived again at a position from which gameplay appears as a profoundly dialogical 
process between the expressivity of the individual and the social order of the game in 
relation to which this expressivity manifests. Gameplay is an attempt to adjust oneself 
                                                 
64 An additional notion should be made about Piaget’s theory (1962 [1951]). The theory has 
been criticized by several authors, most notably by Sutton-Smith (1966). In Sutton-Smith’s 
reading of Piaget, play is reduced into an activity of repeating, which cannot originate a 
change. Based on this interpretation, Sutton-Smith argues that for Piaget (1962 [1951]) intel-
ligence cannot proceed without imitation, but it can proceed without play. However, as Piaget 
(1966) wrote in his response to Sutton-Smith, his theory on the development of thought does 
not assert that knowledge would be a result of imitation, i.e., ‘copies of reality,’ but it instead 
emerges from the permanent equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation. In my 
reading of Piaget (1962 [1951]), Sutton-Smith’s critique misses the mark here. George Forman 
(1983) arrives at a similar conclusion. He notes that in Piaget’s constructionist theory of equi-
libration, play must have a constitutive role in the cognitive development similarl to imitation; 
“Imitation and play are equally important for adaptive thought… play pulls imitation away 
from mindless empiricism and imitation pulls play away from objectless idealism” (ibid., p. 
252). However, Sutton-Smith hits another mark in his reply (1971) to Piaget (1966). In this 
paper, Sutton-Smith emphasizes that play does not subserve “adaptive” thought but remains 
as a sui generis expressive form that serves to express personal meanings.  
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to the social order that is the game by the practices of assimilative exploration and 
accommodative coordination.65  
Furthermore, we can now begin to discuss how gameplay relates to folkloric 
practices as a whole. I would like to suggest that—in addition to the possibility to 
describe gameplay as a dialogic process between exploration/coordination, paidic/lu-
dic, assimilation/accommodation and centrifugal/centripetal—the dynamics of folk-
lore can be approached using a similar framework. Folklore, I propose, emerges in the 
tension between these dialogical poles. Perhaps folklore can be positioned towards 
the left-hand side (paidic, assimilative, explorative and centrifugal, see Figure 9) of 
these continuums, but it never resides only there. Instead, folklore is always about the 
dynamical relation between unofficial/institutional and varied/regulated. In this sense, 
folklore is not equal to pure play of the culture, but instead resembles precisely game-
play as a phenomenon, i.e., play within a social order of regulations, institutions and 
centripetal forces. In a sense, folklore is the gameplay of the vernacular. 
I propose that ‘gameplay’ as a phenomenon can be understood as substantially 
folkloric because, similar to any item of folklore, gameplay combines an aspect of 
participatory vernacular agency in relation to the official, the institutional and the so-
cial order. In this chapter, I have argued that single-player video game gameplay is a 
form of social participation, regardless of the absence of other individuals. I have not 
yet examined whether solitary video game gameplay in particular can be understood 
as a folkloric practice. I return to this theme in Chapter 8.  
However, it is important to note here that the possibility of single-person folk-
lore has been previously studied in folkloristics. In 2006, Jay Mechling published an 
article titled Solo Folklore to re-visit an argument he made originally in 1989: we can 
have communication not unlike ‘folk communication’ with animals and even inani-
mate objects such as cars, toys or computers. As I have proposed in the current chapter 
from the theoretical stance of enactivism, Mechling contended that a person can be 
the audience for herself, and that this is indeed what happens in every performance, 
because performance is not only interpersonal but also a reflective practice. A person 
can form something similar to a folk dyad with her environment and develop ‘rela-
tionships’ with the items she finds valuable or meaningful to her.  
Just as Mechling (2006, pp. 437–438) observed, our ways of interacting with 
appliances do not seem to differ completely from our social interactions with other 
individuals. Indeed, it would be troubling to presume such a total difference since, 
whether we are alone or in the company of others, we surely make sense of our inter-
actions with the world through culture. We do not suddenly drop outside culture in 
solitary settings. Mechling (ibid, p. 438) himself examines, for example, solitary ima-
ginary play by asking whether a child’s ‘pretend’ tea party play should be called a 
folk event. He offers that solitary play is indeed a folk event since it very hard to 
                                                 
65 Sutton-Smith did exhibit a dialogical or dialectical approach to play. In The Ambiguity of 
Play (2001 [1997], pp. 196–197) he offers that play is characterized by relationships between 
play and the playfulness. Here, play is contained by metacommunicative frames of communi-
cation, whereas the playful is disruptive in relation to the frames. This he calls ludic dialectic. 
The other dialectic, i.e., referential dialectic, deals with how the actions in play are also about 
the actions in the non-play world.  
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pinpoint which qualities, other than the lack of social interaction, distinguishes soli-
tary play from social play; “The kids might be more interactive than the dolls, but if a 
child imagines the interaction, is that less real?”   
Mechling argues that solitary play and gameplay trains us for social encoun-
ters with others. According to him, playing alone should be studied as solo folklore, 
folklore performed in the absence of the others. When Mechling (2006, p. 443) writes 
that “[T]he locus of reality of solo folklore is in the mind,” I find myself agreeing with 
him. However, drawing on enactivism, I emphasize that the mind is relational, em-
bodied, dynamical, and intersubjectively open. It is how we communicate with the 
world around us, and with ourselves as parts of that world.66 
Folkloristics, in my view, is a discipline that studies how the vernacular re-
news and reforms its relation to the traditional, institutional and established. This, I 
suggest, is what is at stake in every instance of gameplay: the changes that a player 
proper triggers in a game environment force her to renew herself in relation to altered 
game events. Curiously, this demand to renew ourselves makes us feel like time has 
slowed down; “It is a tantalizing trade-off. One gives up comfort and, in a way, 
productivity; in return, one gets time and youth” (Noë, 2009, p. 51). Gameplay brings 
about disruptions in our routines that may feel afterwards like an enchanted eternity, 
akin to our experiences when traveling in foreign countries.  
I have now argued for two invariants of video game gameplay experience. 
First, by reading Mead (2015 [1934]), and enactive phenomenological theories on 
‘self,’ I argue in Chapter 2 that any instance of gameplay experience necessitates that 
the person who intends to play take a third-person view on herself as the player of the 
game. This is how the player realizes a lusory attitude (Suits 2005 [1978]). Second, I 
argue that explorative and coordinative player practices are constitutive principles of 
the precarious autonomy of gameplay. Next, I examine how we as the players renew 
ourselves in gameplay, and what kind of participatory access we gain to the game 
during an act of gaming. 
  
                                                 
66 I am not, however, in full agreement with Mechling (2006). Mechling represents third-per-
son folkloristics, which observes phenomena from an outside third-person perspective, 
whereas I advocate for first-person folkloristics that does not set apart that what is done from 
how the person participating experiences it. A person listening to an urban legend about a killer 
does not need to believe the story to be true to feel scared, amused or fascinated, and expected 




6. PLAYER PERSONA 
 
The Persona... is a side of you that shows itself when you face the 
world around you. Perhaps you can think of it as...a facade of deter-
mination you wear to face various difficulties in life (Igor, an in-game 
character in the video game Persona 4: Golden, Atlus, 2013). 
 




The purpose of this chapter is to examine the position of the player in relation to video 
game gameplay experience, and the emotions that may be induced by it. I explore how 
the player experiences gameplay by investigating the crucial concepts of presence, 
performance, and emotion. Similar to Chapter 5, I continue here to study the process 
ontology of games and ask how gameplay should be understood as a form of partici-
patory practice (RQ1). 
Since my objective in this thesis is to better understand how gameplay expe-
riences come to have varied meanings for players, the position of the player must be 
rigorously investigated. The premise for focusing on ‘presence’ is that for a gameplay 
experience to matter for a player, the player and the game must be available to each 
other. The experiences of presence in gameplay are important for the emotions that 
can and will emerge from play, and therefore presence is presumably relevant for the 
many meanings players attach to the cultural practices of playing video games. ‘Per-
formance,’ furthermore, is how the player is able to make sense of gameplay by par-
ticipating in it. 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section is influenced by phe-
nomenology and enactivism, whereas the emphasis in the second part of this chapter 
is on analyzing writings by Goffman, and interpreting the experience of video games 
from a stance that entwines Goffman together with enactivism and folkloristics 
(RQ3). Goffman’s works, introduced to game studies by Gary Alan Fine (2002 
[1983]; see Deterding, 2013, p. 25), have been deployed in prior game studies to un-
derstand both presence (e.g., Calleja, 2007) and performative play (e.g., Fine, 2002 
[1983]; Pearce, 2009). I conclude the chapter by conducting empirical analyses with 
the qualitative interview data (N=32) and statistical data (N=1,718). In these analyses, 
I consider players’ preferences for experience games from the vantage point of the 
player and propose that gameplay experiences can be argued to be inherently mean-
ingful and emotional (RQ2). 
 
 
‘Presence’ in Video Game Gameplay 
 
The role of presence in virtual environments has been studied extensively for more 
than three decades in human-computer interaction (HCI), media psychology, and 
game studies, to which it is closely related, and is sometimes directly associated with 
the concept of ‘immersion’ (see Calleja, 2007, pp. 83–88; Ermi & Mäyrä, 2007, pp. 
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94–95; Murray, 1997, p. Wirth et al., 2007, p.98). In HCI research, presence is gener-
ally conceived as the sense of “being there” in mediated environments: “[T]he essence 
of presence is often described as the perception of nonmediation” (Tamborini & 
Skalski, 2006, p. 226). Presence is not understood to be a rare phenomenon. In fact, 
in a literature review by Kristine L. Nowak and Frank Biocca (2004), it was revealed 
that people experience some level of presence in most mediated environments (Nowak 
& Biocca, 2004; see. Reeves & Nass, 2002 [1996]; Schroeder, 2002).  
Importantly, the experience of presence has been argued to be central in shap-
ing the experience of video game gameplay (Tamborini & Skalski, 2006, p. 225), 
memory effects (Jeong et al. 2008, p. 197), and gameplay enjoyment (Shafer, Car-
bonara & Popova, 2011; Klimmt & Vorderer, 2003). Most typically, ‘presence’ is 
considered to consist of the dimensions of spatial presence and social presence 
(Nowak et al., 2008; Tamborini & Skalski, 2006, p. 226).  
Spatial presence is characterized as the physical sensation of being trans-
ported into a mediated environment such as the gameworld67 (Biocca, 1997; Tambo-
rini & Skalski, 2006, p. 227). According to Jonathan Steuer (1992), communication 
technologies vary in their potential to induce spatial presence in two respects: vivid-
ness of sensorially rich stimuli, and interactivity (pp. 10–11). Wirth et al. (2007, pp. 
497, 517) make a related conclusion in their review article by describing spatial pres-
ence as a two-dimensional construct of self-location portrayed by the medium, and 
the perceived possibilities to act.  
Social presence is the perception of being with another through a medium 
(Biocca, 1997; Biocca et al., 2003, p. 460; Nowak & Biocca, 2004). Frank Biocca, 
Chad Harms and Judee K. Burgoon (2003) identify three relevant perspectives of so-
cial presence. In copresence (see Goffman, 1966, pp. 15–17), a person has direct sen-
sory awareness of the availability of the embodied other.68 In psychological involve-
ment, one experiences the presence of another’s intelligence and intentionality (Bi-
occa, 1997). Furthermore, behavioral engagement is the interdependent, multichannel 
exchange of behavior in which a person can encounter another person or ‘social pres-
ence’ reciprocally in a virtual environment. In other words, behavioral engagement 
focuses on the co-coordination and co-synchronization of behavior (Biocca et al., 
2003, p. 461; Tamborini & Skalski, 2006, p. 232; see Chapter 5).  
Although presence is a widely studied subject in HCI sciences, these studies 
have two drawbacks from the perspective of the current thesis. First, HCI studies have 
not extensively analyzed how the active role of the player affects the experienced 
presence, although the current approaches on social presence focus on both the prop-
erties of the technology and the psychological questions of how humans perceive so-
cial presence (Skalski & Tamborini, 2007, p. 389). Taking a player’s agency into care-
ful consideration is important in the case of video game gameplay in which the player 
does not merely observe her environment but participates in constituting this very 
environment (see Chapter 5). Several game scholars (e.g. Salen & Zimmerman, 2004, 
                                                 
67 I return to the notion of ‘gameworld’ in Chapter 7.  
68 Furthermore, for Goffman (1966, p. 22), copresence includes a dimension of mutual aware-
ness wherein the other person is not merely bodily present for the perceiver but the perceiver 
is simultaneously available for the other’s immediate perception.  
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p. 452; film studies scholar Elena Gorfinkel quoted in Salen & Zimmerman, 2004, p. 
452; Calleja, 2007) have suggested that the player’s activity in gameplay might be at 
least as important for experienced immersion as is a game’s “sensory realism.”69 
Second, HCI studies are typically based on a different understanding of the 
self than is taken in the current work. In Chapter 5, I argue video game gameplay is a 
dynamical form of human–media coupling, which engenders perceptions of social 
presence. As shown by Reeves and Nass (2002 [1996]), people’s social responses to 
media are largely unconscious and unrecognized by the media users themselves. Yet 
the argumentations of HCI presence theorists seem to focus on the narrative con-
sciousness, that is, on how people reflect on their experiences and express these ex-
periences when inquired about them.70 I propose that it is important to pay more at-
tention to how media users, such as game players, experience social and spatial pres-
ence both reflectively and pre-reflectively.  
Whereas in a HCI framework, ‘presence’ is conceptualized as a quality ena-
bled by mediated environments, in a phenomenological enactive stance, presence is 
taken as a general concept not reserved to mediated experiences. Rather, it is analyzed 
as an invariant of every agent–environment relation; “Presence is a matter of degree, 
things are more or less present” (Noë, 2012, pp. 19, 33–34). The concept of presence 
in enactivism is closely associated with the concept of agency, which is crucial to any 
gameplay experience. To illuminate the differences between these two research tradi-
tions on ‘presence,’ let us consider writings by philosophers Alva Noë (2004; 2009; 
2012), Evan Thompson (2007; 2011) and Shaun Gallagher (2005; 2012). 
 
 
Enactive View on Presence and Agency 
 
In the stance proposed by Noë (2012), presence equals availability. To evaluate the 
presence of an object, we must consider how it is available to a perceiver. An object 
may have perceptual presence. A perceptually present object is accessible and avail-
able in relation to our sensorimotor skills. When we consider, for example, a character 
of a fictional novel, the character is not perceptually present but thought present, 
which requires, e.g., conceptual and language skills. Thought presence may be de-
scribed as extended perception in the sense that “all thought is directed to its object 
thanks to the thinker’s skillful access to the object [and] to know [what objects] are, 
in the relevant sense, is to have the right kind of skillful access to them” (Ibid., pp. 
28–29).  
Thought and perception are, according to Noë (Ibid., p. 45) merely different 
styles of gaining access to the world. Accessing the world requires agency. The sense 
of agency is one’s experience of being able to cause or generate actions (Gallagher, 
2012), and it is how we make sense of our being in-the-world through narrative un-
                                                 
69 I analyze this question further in the empirical part of Chapter 7. 
70 Although Nowak, Krcmar and Farrar (2008, p. 259) state that suspension of disbelief re-
quired for experiences of presence can be conscious or not, they nevertheless consider presence 
as something the person accepts as “real.”. Thus, they operate primarily on the level of reflec-
tive and inferential self-consciousness and do not analyze the aspects of pre-reflective phe-
nomenal experience.   
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derstanding (Popova, 2015). In phenomenology, the sense of agency can be distin-
guished from sense of ownership, the state in which one knows that “I move.” For 
example, when slipping on ice, a person has no sense of agency, but she still knows 
that the event is happening to her. Although we often reflect on our reasons to act, 
both sense of agency and sense of ownership are primarily pre-reflective and manifest 
at the level of phenomenal minimal self-experience: 
 
We do not attend to our bodily movements in most actions. We do 
not stare at our own hands as we decide to use them; we do not look 
at our feet as we walk; we do not attend to our arm movements as we 
engage the joystick… we also experience, pre-reflectively, a form of 
intentional feedback, which is not afferent feedback about our bodily 
movements, but a perceptual sense that my action is having an effect 
in the world. This effect is not something that we reflectively dwell 
on, or even retain in memory (Gallagher, 2012). 
 
We also experience the sense of agency when we are immersed in activities without 
consciously reflecting on our doing. On this level, agency is sensed implicitly. We are 
aware of what we are doing, but the ‘I’ is not explicitly present as an object on which 
we reflect during the activity. However, Thomas Buhrmann and Ezequiel Di Paolo 
(2015) stress that sense of agency also exists on the level of reflective self-conscious-
ness when we consider and reason our actions and their effects. In this introspective 
stance, we detach and distance ourselves from the ongoing activity and acquire a po-
sition in which we can monitor and plan our future actions.  
There are at least two contributors to the sense of agency: the motor or effer-
ent aspect of agency, and the intentional aspect. The motor aspect is the sense of caus-
ing and controlling one’s own bodily movements. The intentional aspect is the sense 
of accomplishing or having an effect with the respect to intentional or goal-driven 
tasks (Gallagher, 2012; see Bell, 2008, p. 241). Furthermore, the experience of success 
in achieving a meaningful effect can fuel the experience of agency. The success of 
one’s actions typically requires perceiving distal action effects in the world. The con-
tingency between mental states and action effects must be identified to experience 
agency (Buhrmann & Di Paolo, 2015). Since the sense of agency is always experi-
enced in the present agent–environment coupling, we must scrutinize how in-game 
contents and events are present for the player and for her participation to understand 
organization of the gameplay experience. For this purpose, let us consider the third 
dimension of presence studies (see Tamborini & Skalski, 2006), that of self-presence. 
In the case of video games, self-presence in HCI literature is conceived as a 
state in which players experience their virtual self or avatar71 as it were their actual 
self, which may result in a sensation of self-awareness within the gameworld. Self-
presence is a concept close to spatial presence, although it emphasizes the first-person 
                                                 
71 Rune Klevjer (2006, p. 87) defines avatar as “an instrument or mechanism that defines for 
the participant a fictional body and mediates fictional agency; it is an embodied incarnation of 
the acting subject.” 
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perspective of active subjectivity, whereas in spatial presence players perceive them-
selves to be in a virtual environment (Lee, 2004; Tamborini & Skalski, 2006, p. 226; 
Biocca, 1997).  
According to phenomenological enactivism, we can experience self-presence 
both pre-reflectively and reflectively. On a pre-reflective level, we sense ownership 
of our experience as we are engaged in activities or projects that direct our attention 
away from our own body. In contrast to this, on a reflective level, we attend to our 
body and reflect on our thoughts or feelings. In object-oriented perception at the re-
flective level, we appear differentiated from our immediate environmental activities 
as we focus on our ways to experience the world (see Gallagher, 2005, p. 29). This 
observation can be further clarified by distinguishing body-as-object from body-as 
subject, as proposed by Dorethée Legrand (2006). The concept of body-as-object 
(body image) is one’s perception of one’s own body, whereas body-as-subject (body 
schema) is the body-structure through which one experiences the world pre-reflec-
tively by being-in-the-world. Thus, during our everyday first-hand experiences, body-
as-subject remains transparent to ourselves (Legrand 2006; see Thompson & Staple-
ton, 2009; Gallagher, 2005).72 
Presence is how objects are available to us from a specific vantage point 
(Noë, 2012, p. 19). When one reflects on herself, she emerges as an object in her own 
consideration. Therefore, in reflection we become available to ourselves. In this un-
derstanding, every pre-reflective experience is an experience of presence, but we pay 
attention to our degree of presence only in our reflective introspective practices, which 
inevitably separate us from our ongoing environmental projects.  
I believe that an enactive approach to presence is not contradictory to HCI 
approaches, although the enactive stance argues presence to be an invariant of every 
experience rather than a quality that may manifest during media usage such as video 
game gameplay. I propose, however, that an enactive phenomenological account 
could enrich current research on presence by introducing ‘self’ as both a pre-reflective 
and reflective construct and ‘body’ as both the locus of dynamical functioning and an 
object of self-reflection. I contend that the conceptual constructions of pre-reflec-
tive/reflective self and body-as-subject/body-as-object are crucial for understanding 
                                                 
72 The differences between HCI studies on presence and enactive stance can indeed be further 
illuminated by analyzing the concept of ‘self’ in self-presence. According to Biocca (1997), 
self-presence is users’ or players’ “mental model of themselves inside the virtual world.” He 
further describes that in virtual environments the user who is embodied in an avatar’s virtual 
body may acquire an alternative mental model of her body, and that this virtual body may have 
a dissimilar social meaning than the user’s own body. Here Biocca (ibid.) adopts the concept 
of ‘body schema,’ which he equates to ‘body image.’ The main argument in Gallagher’s phil-
osophical, enactive and phenomenological book, How the Body Shapes the Mind (2005), is 
that body image and body schema are two separate systems. Following Merleau-Ponty (2002 
[1962]), Gallagher (2005, pp. 24–25; see Legrand 2006) defines body schema as “a system of 
sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual mon-
itoring,” existing below self-referential intentionality; whereas “a body image consists of a 
system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one’s own body.” Thus, these two 
concepts are related to our capacity to move, act and accomplish (body schema, or body-as-
subject) and our intentional perceptions and reflections of our own body and its affective states 




the player position, player–character identification, experienced presence and game-
play experience.  
 
 
Presence of the Video Game Player 
 
Drawing from Noë (2012) and the enactive stance, spatial presence is the extent to 
which our surroundings are perceptually present to us, i.e., available and accessible to 
our sensorimotor skills in agent–environment couplings. Social presence is our read-
iness to interact in a given situation, based on our interactive experiences, abilities and 
skills to act. The extent of social presence depends on our interactive skills and the 
perceived social relevance of the situation (See Di Paolo & De Jaegher, 2012). In an 
enactive approach, self-presence is constitutional for both spatial presence and social 
presence. Self-presence is the degree and type of involvement that entails preserving 
and nourishing pre-reflective first-person position towards the unfolding environmen-
tal events and reflecting on one’s feelings and thoughts about that which has happened 
or that which we expect to happen.  
After making a self-reflective decision to take up the position of player, the 
player involves oneself into gameplay and its activities. According to Goffman (1966, 
p. 36), to be involved entails being both committed, i.e., liable and responsible for 
one’s decisions and actions, and attached, i.e., vesting one’s identification and feel-
ings in the immediately present object. Similar to Goffman (ibid., p. 37), by involve-
ment I mean “situated involvements, those sustained within the situation.” By allocat-
ing our involvement towards the game, we can note that we acquire participatory pres-
ence in relation to the in-game events, which, in turn, present themselves to us during 
gameplay. To continue gameplay, one has to be able to conserve the lusory attitude 
even in the presence of disturbances, as argued by Sutton-Smith (1967). 
 
To clarify these delineations, we can investigate situational presence as: 
 
Involvement, where a person enacts in a situation as a subject committed and attached 
(Goffman, 1966, pp. 36–37) to the unfolding events. Involvement defines how present 
the person is in a situation.73 This is the dimension of both pre-reflective and reflective 
self-presence. 
 
                                                 
73 Calleja (2007) has suggests the term ‘incorporation’ instead of ‘presence’ or ‘immersion.’ 
In his PhD thesis, he proposes a ‘digital game experience model’ consisting of six modes of 
involvement that build experiences of incorporation: performative involvement (ability to ex-
ert agency), narrative involvement (formation of meaningful personal narrative during game-
play), tactical involvement (knowledge of possible actions and their consequences), shared 
involvement (interaction with others), spatial involvement (the mapping of habitable space), 
and affective involvement (the usage of representational media to induce emotions). While I 
find these six aspects of involvement relevant, Calleja’s approach to game experience is based 
on different theoretical grounds, and therefore I do not consider it extensively here.  
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Availability, where the person’s perceived possibilities for action, that is affordances, 
define how present the environment, including its objects and intentional agents, is in 
that situation. This is the dimension of both spatial and social presence. 
 
Experience, where involvement and availability together constitute a sense of “being 
there,” where this sense refers to social presence, spatial presence, and self-presence.  
 
Finally, I consider ‘immersion’ as a self-reflection of an elapsed experience of height-
ened presence. To describe an experience as immersive requires yet again a third-
person reflective view on oneself. An experience that is perceived by the subject as 
immersive entails a situated agent–environment relation to which (1) the person allo-
cates involvement and which (2) is widely available for her and her skills. 74  
I argue that, as a form of cultural experience, video game gameplay is more 
present for us than reading a book, browsing pictures, listening to music or watching 
a movie. First, in addition to the fact that all gameplay requires active participation 
form the player, I propose that most video games demand that we allocate our main 
attention to this activity. Goffman (1966, p. 43) stated that both men and animals are 
capable of dividing their attention into main and side involvements; “A main involve-
ment is one that absorbs the major part of an individual’s attention and interest, visibly 
forming the principal current determinant of his actions.” It is my suggestion that 
adopting the player position brings about the cultural expectation to allocate one’s 
main involvement to the gameplay activity, although this expectation is not as clear 
in casual mobile gaming as it arguably is in more immersive PC and console game-
play.    
Second, video games make comprehensive use of our access spaces. As Noë 
(2012, pp. 34–36) argues, presence is a matter of degree and quality. Objects may be 
more or less present to us depending on how near they are to our access space—the 
combination of our skills and know-how. During gameplay, our intention is directed 
to the game environment,75 both in how things are within the game, and, importantly, 
also in how we relate to the game. Games utilize mostly visual, auditory, and sen-
sorimotor modalities, and objects that emerge in gameplay may become accessible to 
us in all of these manners simultaneously. An object is perceptually present, that is 
available or accessible, when the perceiver understands the relation between herself 
and the object from the perspectives of movement-dependence, i.e., how the move-
ments of the agent change her perception of the object, and object-dependence in 
which object movement produces sensory changes (Noë, 2004, pp. 172, 240). Thus, 
things are present to us not only how they are but also in our relation to them (Noë, 
2012, pp. 22–23). 
In contrast to, e.g., photographs, video game contents may be both movement-
dependent and object-dependent. If I, as the player, move towards an in-game object, 
my relation to that object changes. Furthermore, in-game objects may dynamically 
change “by themselves,” and thus my perception of them can vary. Importantly, what 
                                                 
74 Notably, McMahan (2003, p. 69) has argued that immersion may occur in video games if 
the conventions of the game align with the player’s expectations, if the game affords mean-
ingful things to do for the player, and if the game presents a consistent gameworld to partici-
pate in.  
75 I return to this notion in Chapter 7. 
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is presented in gameplay to the player can be accessed by engaging with game me-
chanics, which both enable and restrict experiences of object-dependency and move-
ment-dependency. Since game mechanics determine the modes of interaction availa-
ble for the player as well as the behavior of those in-game entities that change (rela-
tively) independently from the player’s input, game mechanics precisely define how 
in-game objects, including the spatial gameworld as a whole, can become perceptually 
present to us during gameplay. 
Third, video games trigger our social readiness to interact. Di Paolo and De 
Jaegher (2012) have developed an “interactive brain hypothesis” to investigate the 
dynamics of social interaction and enactive cognition. They argue that our participa-
tion in socially meaningful situations can be evaluated by our readiness to interact. 
The dispositions of socially meaningful situations vary from face-to-face interactions 
to perceiving contextual stimulus, e.g. a photograph, a voice, or a film, that present 
another intentional social agent. The authors suggest that the closer a situation is to a 
full-blown embodied social interaction, the higher our readiness to interact is in that 
situation. I propose that our readiness to interact with video games and in-game enti-
ties, such as the characters of the game, is significantly higher than it is with movies, 
books or photos, and that video games are, in this sense, closer to social interactions 
than other media. Games make use of a broader range of our social access spaces by 
introducing entities that we readily, but often pre-reflectively, perceive as intentional 
(Nass & Reeves, 2002 [1996]), and challenges and events that require fine motor 
skills, perception skills, and cognitive control (Dale & Green, 2016). Finally, I con-
tend that all video game gameplay inevitably alters the player’s self-presence. Since 
this argument is central to my thesis, let me elaborate on it in more detail.  
Wirth et al. (2007, p. 506) suggest in their HCI article that spatial presence is 
media-bound and that it can occur only if players accept the mediated egocentric ref-
erence frame as their primarily frame.76 Otherwise the media-users remain located in 
their everyday environment. Spatial presence would, then, require the player to will-
ingly adopt a character’s viewpoint as the dominant vantage point for her first-hand 
experiences to be able to experience ‘being there’ in the virtual environment. In other 
words, a change in a player’s self-presence enables a change in her spatial presence. 
However, if spatial presence requires that the player’s primary egocentric frame of 
reference is positioned within a game, does this mean that spatial presence requires a 
playable character, an avatar, with which the player can identify herself? Or is it pos-
sible to experience spatial presence in, e.g., real-time strategy games, city-building 
games or social simulations such as The Sims (Electronic Arts, 2000) in which the 
player acquires a seemingly bodiless omnipresence over the unfolding events? This 
question is related to a more general question: does the player have to be reflectively 
self-conscious about the change in her primary egocentric reference frame to experi-
ence spatial presence? I propose that ‘no’ is the correct answer to the latter question. 
                                                 
76 In the condition of “primary egocentric references frame”, a person self-locates oneself in 
the mediated environment and pays attention to her action possibilities within that environment 
instead of the environment where her body resides. 
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When a person begins to play a video game, she adopts a third-person view on herself 
as being the player of the game, that is, as the object of the game session. When game-
play has begun, or continues, one experiences the events through the vantage point of 
‘the player proper.’ Here, play becomes activity. I argue that within the activity of 
play, gameplay inevitably emerges as the primary egocentric frame of reference for 
the player. The player’s attention is on the present game events and on her agency and 
possibilities for taking actions within the game.  
During a video game gameplay experience our constitutional sense of agency, 
or “primary egocentric reference frame” is not to be understood in relation to how we 
press the buttons of the game controller but instead in relation to the distal action 
effects in the game environment. Since our actions have an effect within the game, 
the intentional aspect of our agency resides in that environment and in its regularities. 
However, we continue to perceive the actions we take during gameplay crucially as 
ours. Because we pursue making changes in the game, we evaluate our efferent or 
motor aspect of agency primarily by ourselves in relation to the in-game events. In 
video game gameplay, self-concept and agency are not experienced as separated by 
the player, but rather the ‘player position’ is appropriated by the subject into her self-
concept (see Ganesh et al., 2011; Pearce, 2009). Although a player can identify herself 
with an in-game avatar and experience a change in her self-presence in this way, an 
in-game avatar is not necessary for a change in self-presence to occur.  
Gallagher (2012) argues that, phenomenologically, there is no awareness of 
action without awareness of the agent. Therefore, in video game gameplay, whenever 
we initiate an action, any action, we perceive ourselves as intentional agents in rela-
tion to the game. More specifically, the game can be a first-person shooter, a third-
person role-playing game, a strategy game, a simulation game or an abstract puzzle 
game such as Tetris, and still we view ourselves as intentional agents in relation to the 
game environment since our sense of agency, i.e., the “I,” relies on the player–game 
relation during the gameplay. This is not to say that we would reflect ourselves in, 
e.g., SimCity (Electronic Arts, 1989) as some well-defined character who has a per-
sonality, and that we would role-play that imagined personality whenever we play 
SimCity. It is to say, however, that just as we pre-reflectively sense the social presence 
of an agent when we perceive intentional behavior, we also sense the presence of such 
an agent in the intentional activities that we take as players of any game.  
To play a game is to adopt an alternative and temporary primary egocentric 
frame of reference, or an I-position. Players themselves make this evident when they 
speak aloud during gameplay and frequently use the first-person singular pronoun “I” 
when they refer to the play activity and their player–game relations. Thus, I argue that 
self-presence is the third invariant of the gameplay experience. Precisely as Abrahams 
(2005, p. 104) writes, “A transformation of self emerges directly from the playing 
situation, in which players get outside of themselves or more deeply into themselves.”  
Consider Merleau-Ponty’s argumentation (2002 [1962], p. 102): “[F]ar from 
my body’s being for me no more than a fragment of space, there would be no space 
at all for me if I had no body.” How I experience my body is directly linked to how I 
experience the world; the body is the source for spatiality, and an egocentric frame-
work is required for all action. We are organized by an implicit reference to our bodily 
being (Gallagher, 2005, pp. 39, 137). In phenomenological enactivism, “the body 
functions as the ‘zero point,’ ‘null point of orientation,’ or absolute indexical ‘here’ 
in relation to which things appear perspectivally” (Thompson, 2007, p. 248).  
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During video game gameplay, we easily seem to forget that we are constantly pressing 
the controller’s buttons. Similar to the experience of driving a car, the routine opera-
tions remain recessive. We are not reflectively self-conscious of how we change gears 
and steer the car. However, we remain pre-reflectively conscious of these actions at 
all times (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 73). If either of the efferent or intentional 
aspects of our sense of agency fails, or if we do not perceive reinforcing feedback, we 
get disruptions. In these situations, we often rely on a reflective sense of agency and 
re-evaluate our reasoning and the causes for the failure. In video game gameplay, both 
succeeding and failing may encourage us to self-consciously reflect on our agency 
and actions and re-forge the lusory attitude; “[W]hen the body appears in conscious-
ness, it normally appears clearly differentiated from its [game] environment… when 
I am immersed in [gameplay] experience, however, the limits of the body and envi-
ronment are obscured” (Gallagher, 2005, pp. 36–37). 
How does the proposed invariant change in self-presence embedded in the 
vantage point of the player relate to changes in self-presence due to identification with 
an in-game avatar? Klimmt et al. (2009, p. 354) argue that video games facilitate mo-
nadic user–character relationships in which players perceive playable in-game char-
acters as merged with their own self as the protagonists of the game. They suggest 
that this nondyadic understanding of a user–character relationship is closely related to 
the concept of identification. As Klimmt et al. (2009) correctly note, their explication 
of video game identification converges with role-playing. They argue that the act of 
simulating an agent’s identity is different from a person’s normal identity. In this way, 
video games allow players to try on ideal selves (Przybylski et al., 2012). 
Although the approach by Klimmt et al. (2009) is related to that of the current 
research, the two must be seen as alternative investigations into player–game rela-
tions. The authors of the former suggest that the relationship between media users and 
in-game characters is not dyadic but monadic, which entails the possibility to identify 
oneself with the playable protagonist. I suggest likewise that a monadic “I”–“I” rela-
tionship emerges in gameplay, but I argue that this relationship is invariantly present 
in all gameplay and that it arises in the relation between a person and the person-as-
the-player of a game. In other words, whereas Klimmt et al. (2009) devise a frame-
work for studying modes of person–character relationships, my primary attention is 
on building a systematic understanding of person–player relationships. The relation-
ship between a person and a player is the focus of my investigation in the latter half 
of the current chapter. First, however, let me illuminate the arguments I have made so 
far with an example. 
 
 
How Excessive Presence Declines Gameplay 
 
We do not completely “lose ourselves” in video games, we are still sitting in front of 
the screen and manipulating the game controller. Instead, what happens is that ongo-
ing gameplay becomes a genuine first-person experience. When we are living an ex-
perience, we are not reflectively aware of ourselves but of that very activity and our 
participation in it (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 221). Again, however, a gameplay 
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experience is not fully understandable without the capability of stepping back and 
reflecting on the experience and our position as the player.  
As an example, consider the movie The Game (1997), directed by David 
Fincher. In this thriller movie, Nicholas Van Orton (Michael Douglas) is a successful 
and busy businessman who is emotionally detached from his friends and his family. 
For his 48th birthday, Nicholas receives a game as a present. The game is an alterna-
tive reality game designed to integrate itself directly into the player’s real life. The 





Figure 10. Michael Douglas in the thriller movie The Game (1997). 
 
Nicholas is not fully aware of when the game has begun. It is hard for him to identify 
whether what he experiences are genuine real-life experiences or part of this pervasive 
game that has now integrated into his life. As the story unfolds, the game does not 
seem to be an alternative ‘game reality’ for either Nicholas or for the movie viewer, 
but rather it becomes impossible to separate the game from the Nicholas’ real life 
anymore.  
In the first part of the movie, Nicholas tries to figure out which of his experi-
ences belong to the game. Later, he is certain that nearly everything he faces is part of 
it, but the game has so tangible and real consequences that it does not feel like a game 
anymore. In the ending scenes of the movie, the game becomes perceivable again as 
it is revealed for Nicholas that the game was not real after all, although it included 
many of Nicholas’ real-life friends and family members and was based on important 
events from his life. Nicholas’ brother, Conrad, had organized the game to shake Nich-
olas back to reality and to cause him to pay more attention to the people close to him 
instead of his career. 
Drawing from Noë (2004; 2009; 2012), I have proposed that situations in 
which we experience more intense readiness to interact are more present and thus 
more accessible to us. In the movie The Game, the events of the game are exactly as 
present to Nicholas as any of his real-life events, and exactly as accessible for his 
skills to interact with. Since the unfolding events are fully present for Nicholas, they 
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become experientially real. The movie watcher is not capable of perceiving what is 
game and what is not, and the same happens to Nicholas. When this happens, is it 
even a game anymore? If we consider the question from the viewpoint of Conrad and 
other organizers of the game, we can conclude that it truly was a game all along. 
However, if we ponder the same question from Nicholas’ viewpoint, this conclusion 
does not make sense. Nicholas does not perceive himself as being the player of the 
game. Regardless of his efforts, he is not able to take a third-person stance on himself 
as the object of the game. Instead, he lives through the game exactly as he lives 
through his everyday life. 
To put it differently, Nicholas is not the player of the game regardless of the 
fact that there is a dynamic game system present. At first, he does not manage to adopt 
the player’s position because he cannot identify that there is a game system present 
that would provide such a position. Furthermore, when he is sure that such a system 
is in place, he cannot retain the position of the player or a lusory attitude because the 
game has real consequences that directly affect his person rather than him as the player 
of The Game. 
Fritz Redl observed already in 1955 that a game breaks down if it is no longer 
safe and “when the ‘as if’ character cannot be maintained, or when the reality prox-
imity is too great… if one comes too close to reality, then the activity may lose its 
game character, as do some games that are too far from reality” (Redl, 1956, cited in 
Goffman, 2013 [1961], p. 71). Thus, as media scholar Kristine Jørgensen (2013, p. 
35) notes, the idea of complete transparency is indeed a fallacy of game design; “Cre-
ating the impression that interacting with the game is an unmediated activity is neither 
desired nor achievable if one wants the experience to remain a ludic experience.” If 
Nicholas was aware of the game, he could have adopted the position of the player and 
played the game from that vantage point. Since he does not take on the lusory attitude 
of the player, however, no player emerges, but rather only his person, who does not 
even know what is real, i.e., what is really happening to his person, or what is sup-
posed to be part of the game, i.e., what is real only for his person as being the player, 





In Frame Analysis (1986 [1974]), Goffman proposes two formulas for role-taking ac-
tivity: person–role formula and role–character formula. The person–role formula re-
fers to the inevitable distinction between an individual and her participation in an ep-
isode of activity in which she realizes certain capacities or functions. Goffman (Ibid., 
pp. 269–270) argues that the relationship between an individual and a role is never 
fully free nor completely restricted. In other words, there is an inherent aspect of ex-
pressivity entangled with every role-taking activity.  
The person–role formula differs from role–character formula, which is not 
only about functions or capacities but rather “transformed versions of the whole” per-
son. In the person–role formula, we assume that there is a continuity of subjectivity 
beyond the performance of each role that is compatible and consistent with the role in 
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question (ibid., p. 286); “[I]n taking on a role, the individual does not take on a per-
sonal, biographical identity—a part or a character—but merely a bit of social catego-
rization, that is, social identity, and only through this a bit of his personal one.” 
Goffman speculates (1986 [1974], pp. 294, 298) that there is a distinction be-
tween the role–character formula and in the person–role formula. He suggests that, 
e.g., by reading a book we learn about the author (role), but this is to be differentiated 
from the writer (person) who wrote the book. We can familiarize ourselves with the 
writer by, e.g., reading magazine articles about him, listening to him at book fairs or 
watching his interviews on television. To put the distinction in other words, we learn 
about roles from mediated environments, whereas we learn about the person in actual 
dealings with him or her.77 
For Goffman, ‘role’ is fundamentally social, and he discusses it almost only 
in relation to face-to-face interactions between at least two humans. However, since I 
am not restricting my argumentation to social play or multiplayer online video game 
gameplay, I find the term ‘role’ confusing in the context of this study. Furthermore, 
‘role’ has evident connotations of ‘role-playing,’ which makes the concept even more 
difficult to appropriate in the context of this thesis. Instead, I propose the player posi-
tion, i.e., the vantage point a person adopts in gameplay, to be coined as the position 
of persona. Hence, I consider the formulas in the context of game sessions as person–
persona and persona–character, respectively.  
 
 
Dramatized Self of the Player Persona 
 
When we take on various social roles in our everyday activities, two factors remain 
unaltered. First, “no matter how inconsequential and insulated an individual’s moment 
is… he must be there in the flesh if the moment is to be his at all, and this is the 
selfsame flesh he must leave with and take wherever he goes” (Goffman, 1967, p. 
166). Second, our agent–environment relation remains highly contingent with our ex-
pectations. In each of our moments, there is a first-person perspective to our environ-
ment, there are social and psychological regularities, and events unfold according to 
our folk psychological narratives, that is, the practices of making sense of a person’s 
actions in terms of foundational beliefs and desires (Hutto, 2012, p. 3). In video game 
gameplay we still have “our flesh,” the actions we take remain ours in absolute simi-
larity to all of our experiences. However, I argue that our agent–environment coupling 
inevitably transforms in all instances of gameplay.  
Player persona is the presentation of the self in gameplay, it is how ‘I’ arises 
as the player identity within the in-game events. This is what I mean by stating that 
an experience of gameplay is an experience of altered self-presence; player persona 
is the first-person experience of acting through the position of the player proper 
(Chapter 5) in gameplay. It is my person(ality) and performativity as the player of a 
                                                 
77 Note that Goffman (1986 [1974], p. 395) contends reflexiveness to be destructive practice 
for both the role-character formula and the person-role formula. If an individual performing as 
a character makes comments on his role as the character, an interruption will result. The same 
is true if a person acting as a doctor suddenly makes comments on her role as the doctor. 
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game.78 It is the dramatized self; there is a distinction between it and the ‘real’ self, 
yet we are both ourselves and not ourselves during gameplay, as is also argued by 
Abrahams (see Abrahams, 2005, p. 85; Abrahams, 1982).  
I concur with Pentti Hakkarainen, Milda Brėdikytė, Kaisa Jakkula and Hilkka 
Munter (2013), who argue that an activity becomes play only if the player is able to 
perceive the situation and herself simultaneously from an internal and an external per-
spective. G.G. Kravtsov and E.E. Kravtsova (2010) label this condition “double-sub-
jectivity” and argue that it is necessary for all play. In this, they follow psychologist 
Shlomo Ariel (2002, p. 140) in his assertion that “[A] player has to be both inside of 
the play and outside it, a self-observer.” Indeed, Lev Vygotsky observed this condition 
already in the 1930s, when he wrote about the dual-position of the player being sim-
ultaneously both “inside” and “outside” the play activity (Vygotsky, 1967 [1933]; 
Vygotsky, 1986 [1934]; see Kratsov & Kratsova, 2010). 
Whereas a ‘writer’ is a person who writes, a ‘player’ is a person who plays. 
Whereas an ‘author’ (a writer persona) is the presentation of the self in written text, 
the ‘player persona’ is the presentation of the self in gameplay. One writes through 
the position of the author by enacting a storyworld; one acts, i.e., plays, through the 
position of the player persona by enacting a gameworld. Since gameplay encompasses 
an invariant change in self-presence, it also introduces a distinction between the per-
son and the player persona. Although one may engage with gameplay very seriously, 
indeed as one is expected to do, this seriousness is realized with the understanding 
that the person who plays is present as the player, not as the person. One can play 
board games with his children seriously without being serious about it. 
As a concept, ‘persona’ has been adopted by many renowned authors, includ-
ing Jung, Goffman, Butler, and Foucault. Folklorist Elizabeth Tonkin (1992, pp. 225–
232) notes that the term originates from Latin and ancient Greek, in which ‘persona’ 
was conceptualized as a mask that was worn in performances and acts. It referred to 
the public identity of a person such as a politician who clearly separated his or her 
private self from the public one as being a politician. In terms of origins, persona thus 
implies performance and self-presentation. For Jung, persona was a “mask of the col-
lective psyche, a mask that is a substitute for individuality, intending to make others 
as well as oneself believe one is individual” (Jung, 1928, pp. 164–165). In the Jungian 
tradition, persona is thus how an individual appears to herself and to the world; it is 
“a function of relationship” (Jung, 1946, p. 209) between the subject and her surround-
ings, as Ann Casement (2014) notes. Whereas persona is for Jung a semblance of an 
individual but not who the individual is (Jung, 1928, p. 165; 1968, p. 123), in the 
tradition of Goffman, persona comes to mean everyday performance of the self in 
social occasions (Barbour et al., 2014). 
In contemporary research, ‘persona’ denotes identity construction in various 
forms of social and cultural participation, including construction of self in social me-
dia, in celebrity culture and in online gaming communities. In the studies by, e.g., Kim 
                                                 
78 My notion of persona has affinities with Korsgaard’s (2011) concept of contingent practical 
identities. Korsgaard argues (ibid., pp. 23–25) that being a person necessitates that one consti-
tutes oneself as a particular person by endorsing practical identities (ibid., p. 42).  
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Barbour and P. David Marshall, persona-creation is typically understood as a con-
scious process of fashioning a consistent self-presentation. Indeed, the idea of inten-
tional presentation of a desired identity in social networks underlies most of the cur-
rent persona studies (Barbour & Marshall, 2012). Marshall (2014) has suggested that 
persona-constructing practices are characteristic of presentational media. In contrast 
to representational media, which is merely observed by the people, presentational me-
dia is at least partly self-performed, self-produced and self-exhibited by individuals 
and collectives. 
Although most of the contemporary persona studies investigate how individ-
uals self-consciously and intentionally produce narratives of themselves in different 
media, I define persona in a broader fashion: persona is how we constitute ourselves 
by enacting a perspective to the world around us. A persona can be self-consciously 
produced, but, importantly, persona is constituted in our activities whether we con-
sciously produce it or not; in all of our social participation, we participate by self-
constructing ourselves (Korsgaard, 2011). When reflecting on their own experiences, 
preferences and habits, individuals may easily speak of themselves as personae rather 
than as a single person. We can reflect ourselves, e.g., as ‘I, the music listener,’ ‘I, the 
professional worker,’ ‘I, the storyteller,’ ‘I, the diner,’ ‘I, the tourist’ and so on. 
From a stance of enactivism, Noë has proposed (2015) that human beings are 
organized and integrated by social and environmental activities. Organization is for 
Noë, as it is in this thesis, a biological concept (see Chapter 1). Living beings are 
organized wholes, and it is the activities, the phenomena, in which we participate that 
organize us. Organized activities79 are “natural” for us; they are arenas for exercising 
attention, and they exhibit a certain structure in time. They are also emergent, func-
tional, potentially pleasurable, and not governed by the deliberate control of any indi-
vidual. Dancing is an organized activity (ibid., pp. 11–18), and I would like to suggest 
the same for gameplay. Dancing and gameplay are examples of activities that consti-
tute, realize and structure us as humans. They are not only what we do but also how 
we become what we are; “Active experiencing subjects do not remain unaffected by 
the objectivity they help to constitute, but are rather reciprocally affected and consti-
tuted by it” (Thompson, 2007, p. 83). 
For Noë, the arts are practices for bringing our organization into view. Cho-
reography is not dancing but engagement with dancing as a phenomenon; it is im-
portant to us because we are dancers. Similarly, the practices of ‘game choreography,’ 
or game design, are meaningful to us since we are also organized as players—we 
conceive ourselves as player personae. “The intimate connection between person and 
action does not rest in the fact that action is caused by the most essential part of the 
person, but rather the fact that the most essential part of the person is constituted by 
her actions” (Korsgaard, 2011, p. 100). 
Instead of approaching the term ‘persona’ from a third-person view as a me-
dium-specific condition (Bucher, 2014) or as a method to model ideal type users or 
                                                 
79 As philosopher Eugen Fink stated (1968, p. 19): “Play is an essential element of man's on-
tological makeup, a basic existential phenomenon—not the only such phenomenon, to be sure, 
but still a clearly identifiable and autonomous one that cannot be explained as deriving from 
other existential phenomena.”  
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players based on archetypical traits of behavior,80 I study persona in this chapter as an 
activity-specific condition from a first-person centered phenomenological framework. 
A crucial trait of ‘persona’ is that it is not to be understood as a role one plays but a 
position from which one experiences the world. Such an I-position may very well 
include a role that the person takes in a social setting, but not necessarily. A person 
can dance in various situations and adopt several social roles as being a dancer, e.g., 
being the father of the bride or being a professional ballet dancer.  
If ‘role’ describes our expected conduct in social situations (Biddle, 1986, pp. 
67–72), then ‘persona’ describes our self-presentation in activities that constitute so-
cial situations. It is unlikely that a change in a social role would significantly change 
our persona. Similarly, it is unlikely that a change in our personae would change our 
reflection of ourselves as a specific person. Social roles and personae are robust; they 
both have the capacity of maintaining themselves in the face of situational changes.  
How does the understanding of the person–role formula as a person–persona 
formula relate to Goffman’s other formula, that of person–character? Here we can 
utilize the French term for character, personnage. As argued by Marshall (2014), the 
two variations of the word ‘person’—‘persona’ and ‘personnage’— gives us the con-
cepts for “understanding the particular and integrated configuration between a public 
persona and the fictional role that an actor inhabits”, i.e., the character. In contrast to 
persona, character—or personnage—is a fictive construction designed and intensified 
for specific purposes. In this sense, characters are scripted and dramatized versions of 
personae; characters are fictional persons within the frame of specific activities. 
Now that I have introduced Goffman’s two formulas in role-taking activity 
and the concept of persona, I move forward to analyze the player’s position and the 
player persona in relation to Goffman’s dramaturgical stance of the performative self. 
The main objective of this thesis is to better understand the constitution of the game-
play experience as a phenomenon (RQ1) and how players reflect on their memorable 
and meaningful game encounters (RQ2). For this purpose, it is crucial to investigate 
how players participate in games through the position of the player persona.  
In what follows, I analyze participation in gameplay by first reviewing 
Goffman’s approach and then by combining it with a phenomenological and enactive 
approach to ‘self,’ presence and agency. I especially pay attention to the performative 





                                                 
80 In human-computer interaction studies, ‘persona’ is primarily understood as a method to 
model behavior of individuals based on their usage of a specific medium, and then create dif-
ferent designs for identified ‘user types’: “Each persona represents a significant portion of 
people in the real world and enables the designer to focus on a manageable and memorable 
cast of characters, instead of focusing on thousands of individuals” (Canossa & Drachen, 
2009). Although I approach ‘persona’ here from a different angle than Canossa and Drachen 
(2009), I return to the theme of ‘user types’ and personae in the conclusion of Chapter 9. 
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Keeping the ‘Self’ Together 
 
Goffman introduced his dramaturgical approach to social life in The Presentation of 
Self in Everyday Life (1959). Especially in this book, Goffman considered everyday 
life and patterns of interpersonal communication to be practices of performative en-
deavors (Marshall, 2010).  
The dramaturgical approach by Goffman (1959) and symbolic interactionism 
to the self has been criticized for separating one’s ‘true’ self from the many personae 
she may exhibit in social roles. In 1986, an excellent critique of Goffman’s dramatur-
gical theory of self (1959) was published by Thomas G. Miller. In his article, Miller 
argues that Goffman (1959) did not offer an unambiguous account of the self but pre-
sented the self as nearly analogous to the roles one takes in social life. According to 
Miller’s critique, the dramaturgical approach by Goffman dissolves the self into a 
bundle of role activities. The self emerges as a thoroughly social construct and the 
enduring self and personality appear as an “illusion of person-perception, a fiction of 
common sense and psychology” (ibid., p. 178).  
Indeed, the self is for Goffman “the moments and their men” rather than “men 
and their moments.” It remains unclear how a social performance is, or even can be, 
generated or produced by the autonomous performers themselves. According to 
Goffman (1959, pp. 252–253), “The self… is not an organic thing… it is a dramatic 
effect arising diffusely from a scene that is presented,” and, “self, then, is not an entity 
half-concealed behind events, but a changeable formula for managing oneself during 
them” (Goffman, 1986 [1974], p. 573).  
Goffman’s view remains as a third-person approach to social interaction and 
situations, in which the role of the active, embodied and purposeful subject is blurred. 
Because Goffman largely standardized the active subject into a role-position within a 
given activity, he did not only approach subjectivity from a third-person viewpoint 
but also allegedly utilized a positivist view on social life; situational and situated ac-
tivities are observed from a bird’s eye perspective as objective phenomena. For Miller 
(1986), this approach brings Goffman close to behaviorism, which overestimates the 
properties of the social environment and ignores the active agency of the individuals. 
Although Goffman’s (1959) approach to the self as a social construction was 
developed based on Mead’s understanding of the self as a social process, in my read-
ing there is a crucial difference between these two approaches and how they concep-
tualize the self. For Mead (2015 [1934]), the process of self as constant dialogue be-
tween ‘I’ and ‘me’ constitutes the self-preserving and sustaining character of one’s 
own individuality and subjectivity. Mead therefore endorses a view in which the pro-
cess of the self pivots around the core of the dialogical I–me. Goffman, however, does 
not explicate such a centripetal understanding of self.  
If we now return to the notion of persona, a Meadian understanding could be 
that the process of the self, and its I–me dialogue, outlives any of the person’s perso-
nae, i.e., presentations of the self. Although Mead did not recognize the existence of 
the pre-reflective minimal self (Chapter 2), his writings are nevertheless closer to an 
enactive phenomenological understanding of agency and subjectivity than those by 
Goffman.  
Based on this observation, I have adopted Mead’s concept of the self and dis-
cuss it in relation to an enactive phenomenological approach in the previous chapters. 
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Furthermore, as Miller (1986) noted, Goffman’s individual did not seem able to per-
form self-defining acts but only acts that have a definitional purpose for the social 
activity at hand. This emphasis seems to be opposite to that of phenomenology, in 
which participations by an autonomous agent are seen as constitutive to its precarious 
identity and continuity (Di Paolo, 2005; see Chapter 1).  
However, a phenomenological enactive account to self as an enduring biolog-
ical organization and as a social process is not without challenges, either. Miriam 
Kyselo (2015) has noted that the self as both enduring, coherent individuality and a 
socially open construct is not easily conceptualized in enactivism regardless of the 
strong notions of pre-reflective/reflective self-consciousness and adaptive autono-
mous organization.81 She observes that in the theory of participatory sense-making by 
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (see Chapter 5), the self appears as relational and as acquiring 
its individuality from social interactions. This would mean that the individual needs 
to adapt to an external norm to be an individual. As a result, her identity presents itself 
as heteronomous—not unlike in the writings by Goffman—instead of being autono-
mous, the latter of which is the key argument of enactivism. 
Kyselo (2015) observes that Mead’s (2015 [1934]) writings of the social self 
seem to be congruous with an enactive stance since Mead envisions the self as both a 
social process and as an enduring process of (social) individuality. Furthermore, 
Kyselo (ibid.) argues that Hans Jonas’ (2001 [1966]) concept of needful freedom is 
important when we strive to understand individuation both as a biological principle 
and as a social process. An individual and its identity depends on how it relates to the 
world (needful) and how it differentiates itself from the world (freedom). We as per-
sons have a striving to be autonomous individuals in our own right, separate from the 
others, while also remaining closely connected to the others, to affect them and to be 
affected by them (Weber & Varela, 2002; Kyselo, 2015).  
The idea of needful freedom by Jonas builds on the principle of through and 
from a world. Kyselo (2015) then builds on this further by arguing that the autono-
mous and coherent self is constituted in acts of emancipation (distinction) and acts of 
openness and readiness for perturbations by others (participation). Both of these 
tendencies are rooted in the fundamental goal to realize and generate identity through 
participation and individuation. Where the sustained experiential self can be described 
as for-me-ness, the continuity of social self is the openness to the world. By accepting 
the notion of needful freedom (Jonas, 2001 [1966]), I continue in this chapter to inter-
pret Goffman’s writings through the lens of an enactive phenomenological stance.  
Let me now revisit the person–role and person–character formulas by 
Goffman (1986 [1974]) and label them instead as the person–persona–character con-
tinuum. In the approach that I am presenting, the character-taking activity always in-
cludes both the person and a persona. Thus persona, in itself, is not role-played but 
rather an enacted position, a vantage point to make sense of the agent–environment 
relation crucial to our identity. As Abrahams stated (1977, p. 11), a player is both 
himself and not himself while playing. Eugen Fink, a German philosopher and Hus-
serl’s pupil, subtly described (1968, p. 23) the very difference between a person and 
a player persona: 
                                                 
81 See Chapter 1 for definitions of these concepts.  
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[H]ere we find… peculiar “schizophrenia,” a kind of split personality 
that is not to be mistaken for a manifestation of mental illness. The 
player who participates in a game executes in the real world an action 
of a familiar type. Within the context of the internal meaning of play, 
however, he is taking over a role. Here we must distinguish between 
the real man who “plays” and the man created by the role within the 
play. The player hides his real self behind his role and is submerged 
in it. He lives in his role with a singular intensity, and yet not like the 
schizophrenic, who is unable to distinguish between “reality” and “il-
lusion.” The player can recall himself from his role; while playing, 
man retains a knowledge of his double existence, however greatly 
reduced this knowledge may be. Man exists in two spheres simulta-
neously… because this double personality is essential to play. 
 
Let me illuminate the aspects of person, persona and personnage using a gameplay 
experience of a Japanese role-playing game Shin Megami Tensei: Persona 4 (Atlus, 
2008). In Persona 4, the player plays the role of the protagonist, who moves to a fic-
tional rural town of Inaba, goes to the local school, makes friends with his school-
mates, and starts to get involved with strange murder mysteries. As he and his friends 
investigate the murder mysteries, the characters come across magical personae, which 
the characters can summon to help them in the battles they encounter.  
When in battle, the player controls the actions of the protagonist and she can 
direct the actions of the other party members. Each of these party members may ap-
propriate personae, the “party’s other selves.” Whereas the other party members have 
a unique single persona, the protagonist can hold many selves, or personae. Once a 
character takes on or invokes a persona, his skills and abilities change, and thus he 
experiences the unfolding events from that vantage point, while retaining his enduring 
self to which he returns when the battle ends, at the latest. The personae are illustrated 
in the game as tarot cards that represent different aspects of human personality as 
forms of mythical figures, familiar mostly from Japanese folklore.  
In Persona 4, personae are manifestations of the protagonist’s inner self. Each 
persona has certain strengths and limitations, which represent the fact that we cannot 
present ourselves in a uniform fashion regardless of the sociocultural situation at hand. 
The personae in Persona 4 are specific vantage points to the world, which bring about 
extended skills and abilities valuable for the situated self.  
Shin Megami Tensei: Persona role-playing games demonstrate what happens 
when we sit down to play video games. In the Persona series, the ‘person’ equals the 
protagonist of the game, who has different personae. These personae are related to the 
activities the protagonist takes. The personae are not characters, the protagonist of 
the game does not role-play the in-game personae he enacts. They are precisely posi-






Figure 11. An in-game lecture of Jungian theory of a Persona archetype in Persona 
4 Golden for Playstation Vita (Atlus, 2013)  
 
Similar to how we as individuals experience the world from different I-positions, such 
as I-as-the-dancer or I-as-the-player, the protagonist of the Persona games constitutes 
his identity as I-as-the-tactician and I-as-the-fighter. When playing Persona games, 
the player thus engages with nested, albeit certainly simplified, experience of identity 
construction; the protagonist is not brought forth for the player as a monolithic indi-
vidual that remains the same from one social interaction to another but rather as an 
individual that experiences the immediate world from different positions that consti-
tute his perspectives towards himself and the world around him. Yet, he retains his 
needful freedom, the enduring self (distinction) that outlives the activity-bound as-
pects of himself as a social participant (openness).  
The idea of the person–persona–personnage continuum in adopting the 
player position (persona) and the role of a character or an avatar (personnage) has 
similarities with Gary Alan Fine’s (2002 [1983]) well-known ethnography of pen-
and-paper fantasy role-playing as a form of social reality. Fine studied the process 
through which players orient themselves to these games and enact an orderly gaming 
world. Fine (2002 [1983], p. 60) does not offer a definition for the concept of ‘persona’ 
but utilizes the concept rather interchangeably with the role of a playable character 
and its personality traits, noting that “[g]aming… is a means by which… science fic-
tion fans feel that they can overcome their shyness-by adopting alternate persona… 
these personae have attributes that many players believe they lack” (ibid., p. 215). 
Fine examines the fantasy game as a social world by exploring Goffman’s 
theoretical writings and by presenting his own rendering of frame analysis. He intro-
duces both a two-level and a three-level model to study pen-and-paper role-playing 
gaming. For a two-level model, he suggests (2002 [1983], p. 144) that role-playing 
gamers can be described either as individuals who play the game with their real-world 
interests and values or as animators of persona in which only the interests and values 
of the played character matter. Later (ibid., pp. 186, 194, 205) he suggests three trans-
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formations or frames that occur in the activity of role-playing: “Fantasy gaming com-
prises three interrelated systems of meaning: commonsense reality, the gaming rules, 
and the content of the gaming fantasy”.  
Like the current study, Fine (2002 [1983], p. 204) conceived persons as col-
lections of selves and identities yet retaining the unavoidability of the real: “The ‘real 
world’ will always intrude, for the gaming structure is not impermeable to outside 
events” (ibid., p. 197). Second, the realization of multiple selves led Fine (ibid., p. 
205) to suggest that all games require role-taking activity from skilled players. This 
is to be differentiated from role-playing activity in which the player adopts a charac-
ter’s attributes, fears, and goals.  
Deterding (2013, p. 181) has criticized Fine’s (2002 [1983]) frame analytic 
study. Deterding contends that Fine’s three transformations or levels of meaning in 
pen-and-paper role-playing (Deterding calls these laminations), primary framework, 
gaming frame and fantasy frame, are inconsistent with Goffman’s theory. He holds 
that, contradictory to Goffman’s approach (1986 [1974]), Fine appropriates Alfred 
Schütz’s notion of a ‘finite world of meaning’ and of a ‘paramount reality.’ Deterding 
finds Fine’s approach to the ‘primary framework,’ i.e., the reality, problematic: “[A] 
central argument Frame Analysis makes is that there is no one primary framework, no 
one unframed ‘ultimate reality of events’... what Fine considers the ‘real world’ of 
‘people’ for Goffman is the gaming encounter of participants as either players or on-
lookers” (Deterding, 2013, p. 181). Deterding states (ibid., p. 182) that we do not need 
to posit a transformation between ‘gaming frame’ and ‘primary framework’ since, in 
principle, there is no ‘primary framework.’ 
Deterding’s (2013) critique precisely stresses the reasons why the current 
study steers away from being a representative of frame analytic studies. The postulate 
that there is no ‘real world’ positions frame analytic strongly in the tradition of social 
constructionism, in which the enduring self is threatened to dissolve into social en-
counters without an enduring core. As a result of this process, the realness of ‘reality’ 
is rendered virtually meaningless. As I have argued throughout this thesis, this is nei-
ther a position of phenomenological enactivism nor the stance I advocate.  
Now, a few concluding remarks must be made. I am in general agreement 
with Fine’s (2002 [1983]) model which introduces the primary framework, gaming 
frame, and fantasy frame. But I do not approach these transformations as different 
laminations or frameworks. Instead I parallel the former with the proposed person–
persona–personnage continuum and first-person approach to gameplay experience.  
Here ‘person’ represents the primary framework of the autonomous agent. 
Recall that person is the self-reflective embodied agent, and to be self-reflective al-
ways entails the pre-reflective self-consciousness of for-me-ness (Zahavi, 2014; Za-
havi & Gallagher, 2008; see Chapter 2). Although our access to the ‘primary frame-
work’ is mediated by reflection and therefore social and cultural ‘frames,’ we do not 
need to deny the existence ‘primary framework.’ Pre-reflective phenomenal experi-
ence and enduring self-experience comes prior to reflection as Thompson (2007, p. 
250) writes.  
The ‘persona,’ as argued earlier, comes forth as our activity-dependent van-
tage point to experience the world. It parallels with Fine’s “gaming frame,” inasmuch 
as the “gaming frame” refers to the organized activity type of gameplay as a form of 
human experience. However, I differ here also from Fine; I do not equate persona to 
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role-playing activity in which the player would identify herself with an in-game char-
acter’s viewpoint. My understanding of persona is closer, yet still different, to what 
Fine suggests role-taking activity to be. Finally, ‘personnage’ arises on the level of 
‘fantasy frame’ as a possibility to take on a character’s identity.  
On each of these three levels, we act through the position in which we find 
ourselves. Within the ‘primary frame,’ we pre-reflectively act through our body 
schema, which underlies all self-referential intentionality, and enter the domain of 
self-reflective persons. Within the ‘game frame,’ we act through the player position 
as personae and as reflective and pre-reflective subjects. Within the ‘fantasy frame,’ 
we act through a character by identifying with it, and we act through our player per-
sona as well as our person in a self-reflective and pre-reflective sense.82    
By acknowledging that the self does not dissolve into the social constructs but 
retains its autonomous adaptive organization in its openness in the continuum of per-
son–persona–personnage, we can proceed to analyze the player persona and its per-
formative characteristics in more detail.  
 
 
The Seven Facets of Performative Gameplay 
 
In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959, p. 15), Goffman does not explicitly 
define the term ‘performance’ but instead offers a general description of it: “all the 
activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any 
way any of the participants.” Although he does not clearly state here that “by any 
participants” he means other individuals than the performer himself, this becomes ev-
ident from the sentences that precede the definition. However, Goffman also states 
(ibid., p. 81) that a person may arise as the audience for oneself, which suggests that 
a performance does not necessarily include more than one self-reflective performer.  
Goffman discusses ‘performance’ under the broader notion of face-to-face 
interaction. Furthermore, by a ‘part’ or a ‘routine,’ he refers to the “pre-established 
pattern of action” that is presented or played through during a performance (Goffman, 
1959, p. 16). A few pages later (ibid., p. 22), Goffman returns to his definition of 
performance and offers a clarification of it as “all the activity of an individual which 
occurs during a period marked by his continuous presence before a particular set of 
observers and which has some influence on the observers.” 
Goffman (1959, p. 17) associates seven qualities or dimensions to perfor-
mances. First, the person playing a part asks his audience to believe or take seriously 
his presence and the impression brought in front of them. At one extreme, the individ-
ual performing the act may be taken by it fully. At the other extreme, she can be cyn-
ical about it. Regardless of how the performer posits herself on this continuum, her 
audience should retain a sincere belief in the performance. 
                                                 
82 Linderoth (2004; 2005) has arrived at a conclusion that is akin to what I am developing. By 
reading Goffman and conducting an interaction analysis process on empirical data consisting 
of 36 children (ages 6 to 11) playing video games, Linderoth suggests that three manifestations 
of “I” may emerge in a gaming situation: ‘a role’ of a fictive character, ‘a tool,’ which extends 
the player’s agency in gameplay, and ‘props’ the player can utilize when presenting herself.  
158 
 
Second, performance has a social front (Goffman, 1959, pp. 22–30). Front is the 
wholeness of different techniques or “equipment” by which the performer expresses 
the act to be a performance. These include the setting or the physical environment and 
the stage on which the performance takes place, and the personal front, consisting of 
the dimensions of appearance and manner. Appearance expresses the social statuses 
of the performer, whereas manner expresses aspects of the continuous style the per-
former puts forward. For example, one could exhibit an aggressive manner (ibid., p. 
248). 
Third, Goffman (ibid., p. 30) writes: “For if the individual’s activity is to be-
come significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will express during 
the interaction what he wishes to convey.” This, Goffman labels as dramatic realiza-
tion of the performance. Dramatic realization thus marks the decisions the performer 
takes and the utterances he emphasizes to express himself. Fourth, when presenting 
oneself to others, one tends to idealize the performed role. That is, performances usu-
ally present readily recognizable values and expectations of the society. These ideal-
ized expressions put forward “a reality” of the performance (ibid, pp. 35–36).  
Fifth, the performer makes efforts to maintain the performed role with expres-
sive control. The performer must take the audience into constant consideration in or-
der to provide experiences of consistency, coherence and believability. The impres-
sions of performative reality are to be considered delicate and precarious (Goffman, 
1959, pp. 51–58). Sixth, the performer can be misunderstood, and thus he has to put 
care into how he skillfully expresses himself in the performance. The audience of a 
performance is sensitive for evaluating whether the performer seems genuine, valid, 
or even authorized to perform before the audience. Finally, seventh, the performer 
calls attention to certain matters and enshrouds others. The performance conceals it-
self to give an impression of mysteries and secrets behind the act. 
Note that when Goffman describes performances as acts of belief, staged 
front, dramatic realization, idealization, expressive control, carefulness and secrecy, 
he does not only scrutinize the performer’s position but the situation in which the 
performance takes place between the performer and the audience. He discusses the 
constituents of a self-performance and the reciprocity between the subjects in the im-
mediate environment or setting.  
Drawing from Goffman’s description of performance and the act of perform-
ing, I suggest that the player position in video game gameplay can be understood as 
performance of the self by replacing the word “performer” with “self-reflective player 
subject”, “audience” with “game system”, and “setting” with designed game environ-
ment and the gameworld (see Chapter 7). 
The player must believe in his own position as the player. The player does 
this by embracing a lusory attitude. This entails a self-reflective vantage point through 
which the game is experienced. In social gaming and multiplayer video game game-
play, the player in question must also believe that the other players have adopted and 
realize a lusory attitude. All the players ought to care about the outcome of the game 
and play for the win, and thus players are expected to allocate their attention to the 
gameplay (Goffman, 1969, p. 143).  
The social front as the physical, spatial and temporal setting is the gameworld 
in which the player participates from his first-person vantage point. Depending on the 
design solutions, the player may participate in the constitution of the setting very much 
or very little. In some games, such as in the city-building video game, Cities: Skylines 
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(Paradox Interactive, 2015), the gameplay is about building a setting. Another exam-
ple could be the trading card game, Magic: The Gathering (Wizards of the Coast), in 
which players construct their own decks (i.e. settings) from a vast number of possibil-
ities and then duel with other players with their personalized decks.  
As for the personal front, again depending on the game design, the player may 
have many options to influence his appearance. For instance, in the video game series, 
Fallout, the player can choose from various character skills and attributes (strength, 
perception, endurance, charisma, intelligence, agility, and luck) when she creates a 
playable avatar. The manner in which the person presents oneself in gameplay is sim-
ilar to the play style a player adopts in gameplay. In the point-and-click adventure 
game, Indiana Jones and the Fate of Atlantis (LucasArts, 1992), the player can select 
from three paths emphasizing different manners of play, i.e., a cooperative manner, 
an aggressive manner, or an analytic manner. Choosing the appearance for gameplay 
and the manner in which the player plays together can be relabeled as style, which is 
realized in relation to the overall setting provided by the game system. 
Each decision a player takes is part of his dramatic realization of the per-
formative play. The player chooses the way she acts, and depending on the game, her 
decisions and actions may or may not affect the storyline or the destiny of other in-
game characters. Although some games put much more of an emphasis on dramatic 
realization than others, each instance of gameplay may be viewed as a continuum of 
decisions that have an impact on how the game unfolds. As Adele. H. Bealer (2012, 
p. 32) writes: “Within the constraints of any game’s coded parameters, multiple per-
formances take place, performances that vary individually even as they ultimately co-
alesce around a desired end.” Observed from the first-person viewpoint, dramatic re-
alization can be designated as the responsibility incorporated into the position of the 
player.  
The player often expects certain elements from different types of games, and 
she anticipates that her role as the player remains contingent with these expectations. 
Furthermore, the player is likely to assume that a game that adopts, e.g., in a science 
fiction theme, does not suddenly drop all of these characteristics. She also anticipates 
that in-game persons will behave according to the personality traits that fit their social 
status. Typically, the role of the player as the protagonist of a game is also archetypical 
in a given, partly scripted way. To put it differently, video games offer an idealized 
gameworld to the player, and the player exhibits an idealized role for his performative 
play. However, in gameplay the position that the player acquires is not only idealized 
but heightened; the character the player plays with, or the position the player adopts, 
is an opportunity to arise as praised, idolized and glorified.  
In performances of everyday life, to maintain expressive control is to “stay in 
the character” and express oneself contingently for the audience. In gameplay, this 
equals staying “in player position.” Expressive control comes to mean the skillful ad-
aptation to the normativity of the gameplay. To express oneself in relation to a game 
is restricted by the need to take performative normative acts (see Chapter 5) that fur-
ther constitute the player’s identity as the player of the game. Goffman called this 
normativity “shared dramatic contingencies” (Goffman, 1959, p. 66). One must also 
pay attention to the events that take place in the game, i.e., remain fully involved with 
the gameplay, and regulate one’s actions accordingly. 
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Misrepresentation marks the evaluative aspect of a performance. As Karhulahti con-
tends (2015b), a video game constantly evaluates the performance of the player who 
has to skillfully coordinate her actions towards a desired end. If the player’s perfor-
mance is evaluated as unacceptable, the endeavor is a failure and can result in termi-
nating the gameplay. The player must remain careful, attentive and focused to avoid 
such misrepresentations of his player activities; she must show skill. 
Finally, performative video game gameplay includes an element of uncer-
tainty not unlike other everyday performances of the self. The outcome of the game 
remains uncertain in gameplay (Costikyan, 2013). In social play, the player keeps her 
strategy and next moves hidden from the other players whereas in video games the 
game itself retains a noncommunicative (Bateson, 1988, pp. 80–81) aspect. In story-
driven games, the plot of the game is kept hidden from the player as it unfolds in 
relation to the player’s decisions and undertakings.  
  
 
Presentation of the Self  
in Daily Life 
— 
Presentation of the Player Persona  







Social front — Style  
Dramatic realization — Responsibility 
Idealization — Glorification 
Expressive Control — Normativity 
Misrepresentation — Skill 
Secrecy — Uncertainty 
 
Table 12. The seven facets of presentation of player persona in gameplay, compared 
to the original items of Goffman (1959) and the presentation of the self.  
 
The seven facets of presenting performative player persona in gameplay (Table 12) 
are not properties of the game system or the player, as such. Instead they result from 
dynamic couplings between a player and the game system during situated gameplay 
activity. The seven facets of performative gameplay are not by any means new notions 
of a player’s activity during a game session. Rather, the facets are recognized by many 
game scholars as definitional elements of playing games. What is novel in the current 
approach is that these facets are brought together and are argued to be thoroughly 
reciprocal, expressive and performative.  
I have analyzed the general characteristics and interaction constraints 
(Goffman 1959, p. 65) of gameplay as a performative activity by comparing the first-
person player vantage point, i.e., persona, to Goffman’s (1959) approach on presen-
tation of the self in social situations. The analysis of the seven facets of performativity 
reveals an extensive phenomenal closeness between the position of the player and a 
dramaturgical stance on self-presentation in everyday life.  
Let me now propose the fourth invariant of video game gameplay experience. 
We have seen that one must adopt and sustain a lusory attitude (Invariant i, Chapter 
2) in order to acquire the position of the player, which invariantly alters one’s self-
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presence (Invariant iii, Chapter 6) in the constitutive practices of explorative and co-
ordinative conduct (Invariant ii, Chapter 5). I argue now that such a position is that of 
a player persona—performative presentation of the self in gameplay (Invariant iv). 
When a subject takes a third-person perspective on herself and embraces the 
position of player persona, she acquires a relation of reduced personal responsibility 
for what her actions are. Goffman (1986 [1974], pp. 512–520) argues that reduced 
personal responsibility manifests, for example, when one repeats the words of some-
one else or tells a joke whose creator is not expected to be present. The notion of 
“reduced personal responsibility” brings us back to consider the genre of game.  
In Chapter 1, I presented Abrahams’ model (2005), according to which genres 
of folklore can be divided into four categories based on how much emphasis is given 
to conflict or resolution and whether the individuals present can be regarded as closely 
involved or more or less distant to enacted folklore (Figure 1). Abrahams divided the 
genres of folklore into conversational genres, play genres (play I–III), fictive genres 
and static genres based on the level of interaction and involvement the genres require 
from their participants (Abrahams, 2005, p. 45).  
In conversational genres of face-to-face interaction, such as prayers, boasts or 
greetings, the individuals involved encounter each other and the item of folklore as 
being persons. The close involvement within the situations means that the conflicts 
that takes place are considered as really happening to the people involved. For in-
stance, there would be little sense in praying if the desired effect would not have real 
consequences. However, in play genres the participating people are not supposed to 
act as being persons but as player personae. Although the player is the cause of events 
that take place within a game, these events do not happen to her directly, but through 
the mask of the player. Finally, when participating in fictive genres and static genres, 
e.g., listening to fairy tales, a person’s relation to the events enacted in storytelling is 
not that of a person or that of a persona, but rather vicarious involvement, which in-
duces sympathetic and empathic responses.  
In conversational genres, the participator does not typically assume a role or 
a function different than her own; in fictive and static genres the situation is the oppo-
site. However, all play genres (e.g. riddles, jokes, games) include an expectation of a 
participating ‘player’ or ‘joker’ who does not take the events too seriously, who is 
willing to take on the challenge of a riddle regardless of its absurdity (or maybe be-
cause of it), and who plays seriously without being too serious about it or taking losing 
personally.  
Here we can note that Murray (1997, pp. 112–114) observes that the game-
play experience is structured through a mask of the player. However, similar to Fine 
(2002 [1983]), Murray associates the mask and the ‘shared reality’ it provides with 
role-play and acting through an avatar. This is a narrower understanding of the mask 
of the player than I am advocating in this thesis. A relation of reduced personal re-
sponsibility is implied in all gameplay. What a player decides and does is supposed to 
matter in that relation and that relation only. A player may enjoy massacring thousands 
in a video game, but she is responsible for this action only within the agent–environ-
ment relation of the gameplay.  
Recall that the term ‘persona’ in its original Greek meaning referred to the 
masks worn in performances, rituals and acts. As a social construct, player persona, 
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or mask of the player, is a situational unity between traditional, representative and 
individual interpretation. By generating both paradigmatic meanings via its represent-
ativeness and syntagmatic meanings in its contextual performances, the mask of the 
player is rendered inherently compelling. Let me conclude this section by citing Eugen 
Fink, who investigated the cultic origins of play in his magnum opus, Play as Symbol 
of the World (2016 [1960]). When examining cult-play and the performance of the 
medicine-man as a mask-dancer, Fink (ibid., pp. 156–158) wrote: 
 
[O]ne does not play with the mask, one plays in the mask… As some-
one who is elevated in a superhuman manner in the mask, the medi-
cine man is, to be sure, not himself taken to be a daemonic being by 
his tribesmen; they know who is concealed under the mask, but they 
also know that the person concealed there is not the genuine truth of 
the mask… The medicine man has extraordinary powers and abili-
ties—yet not from himself, insofar as and to the extent that he is a 
member of the horde, the tribe, the clan; he has them thanks to the 
mask, by means of which he can touch and move the daemonic 
sphere.  
 
By describing the characteristics of cult-play, Fink perfectly illustrates my argument 
of all gameplay; the game provides the person who plays with a mask, that is, a posi-
tion for a persona with special elevated skills and abilities. A person conceals herself 
in this position and function, which opens up the game for the player. The crucial 
notion is, as expressed by Fink (ibid., p. 162) that “Every spectator knows that a hu-
man being is behind the mask, but this knowledge does not disillusion; the point is 
not that a human being has disguised himself but rather that within a human disguise 
the daemonic itself comes into view.” I argue that this “coming into view” is precisely 
what happens in all gameplay. A perspective of a person as being an in-game function 
surfaces as a vantage point, as an access for experiencing the game; “The mask is 
here not so much concealment for the masked one as it is rather human access, the 
door to the realm of daemons” (Fink, [2016] 1975, p. 221). Intriguingly, this portrayal 
brings us back to the writings of C. G. Jung.  
As noted, for Jung, persona is collective, a kind of situational mimicry of cul-
tural representations; a change in the milieu brings about a change in one’s persona. 
A man led only by his personae “has no real character at all: he is not individual but 
collective, the plaything of circumstance and general expectation” (Jung, 1946, pp. 
589–590), and the persona becomes “the individual’s system of adaptation to, or the 
manner he assumes in dealing with, the world” (Jung, 1968, p. 122). When considered 
in the context of gameplay, to become one with one’s player persona would mean 
total immersion into the gameworld, but as I argue earlier in this chapter, total immer-
sion is not possible in gameplay, because it would stand for a condition in which the 
individual is unable to make any distinction between herself and herself-as-the-player. 
Yet, one requires a player persona proper since this is how an individual demonstrates 
a lusory attitude and gains access to gameplay. These Jungian notes render gaming as 
a playfield of situational personae.  
In the next chapter, I turn my attention to the playfield, where the person gains 
access and focuses her intentionality during in gameplay, the gameworld. Let me next, 
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however, present how acting through the position of the player may generate emo-
tional experiences for the players. For this purpose, I first specify how emotions are 
understood in enactivism and return then to analyze the qualitative interview data. 
 
 
Enactive Account of Emotion and the Empathic Player 
 
Giovanni Colombetti (2014) investigates affectivity as a primordial quality tightly 
connected to the ways by which we make sense of our being. In Chapter 1 and Chapter 
5, I write that ‘sense-making’ in enactivism is defined as an inherent dimension of all 
autonomous living systems. Such systems are intrinsically purposeful since they gen-
erate their significant point-of-view within their own operationally closed autonomy; 
“[S]ense making… refers to the capacity of all living systems to enact a meaningful 
world from a point of view” (ibid., p. 15).  
Colombetti argues that the activity of sense-making is not only an act of cog-
nition but also always affective since an individual enacts a world of meaning for its 
own continuity. At this primordial level of affectivity, a living system becomes sensi-
tive to what matters to it in the world. This establishes an asymmetry between the 
living system and the world; things acquire meaningfulness from the vantage point of 
the living system and in relation to its adaptive autonomy (see Chapter 5). An enactive 
approach resonates with Spinoza’s notion of conatus as the endeavor to preserve one’s 
being. Similar to Spinoza, the concept of enactive account argues that we do not first 
evaluate how desirable or undesirable situations are for us, but we are instead oriented 
to the world by our fundamental striving to sustain our autonomous identity. Accord-
ing to Colombetti (ibid., p. 5) this view contradicts mainstream affective sciences, 
which state that our evaluations of situations engender emotions. 
As incorporated directly into cognition and the sense-making procedures of a 
living system, affectivity in enactivism is seen as a structure that underlies and pre-
cedes moods and emotions. The primordial capacity to be affected that derives from 
our purposeful way of being in the world makes emotional experiences possible. By 
sense-making, a living system assess its conditions and relations to its environment 
either as good or bad. Adaptive agency brings forth a more fine-tuned system of a 
graded scale of values. As mentioned, this fundamental sense-making process is not 
an evaluation made afterwards but is instead implicitly present as a function of the 
organization of the system (Colombetti, 2014, pp. 16–19). Here, we can note that an 
enactive account of an adaptive autonomous system (Di Paolo, 2005) already encom-
passes two key elements of affective science: the evaluation between good/bad for the 
continuity of the system (positive/negative valence) and a graded value system 
(high/low arousal). 
Colombetti (2014) presents a model of dynamical affective science for under-
standing emotions, which is based on enactive framework and principles of biological 
organization. Building on neuropsychological evidence, she criticizes the three main 
‘schools of emotion research’ (pp. 26–52): the basic emotions model, the psychologi-
cal constructionist model and the component process model, which is also known as 
the appraisal model.  
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Briefly stated, the basic emotions model argues that our basic emotions occur rapidly 
and independent of intention or meaning and do not thus involve beliefs about the 
world. They are seen automatic, bodily responses that are essentially separate from 
higher-order cognitive processing (Tomkins, 1962; Ekman, 1994; see Leys, 2011, p. 
437). The basic emotions model is criticized for, e.g., its building-block view on emo-
tions, according to which there is a discrete set of genetically determined instructions 
or affect programs that produce distinctive emotional changes in the brain as well as 
in behavior.  
Whereas researchers supporting the basic emotions model emphasize that the 
affect programs are natural kinds and thus independent from language, the psycho-
logical constructionist model takes a completely different stance. According to this 
more recent model, which is also known as the dimensional model (e.g. Russell, 2003; 
Barrett, 2006), emotions—including the so-called ‘basic emotions’—are not genet-
ically predetermined internal causes but rather cultural and psychological constructs. 
These constructs are learned mental models by which we make sense of our state of 
core affect, the always present affective state consisting of dimensions of valence 
(pleasure–displeasure) and arousal (ranging from sleepy to frenetic excitement) (Rus-
sell, 2003). In contrast to the basic emotions model, these theorists generally ignore 
the role of biological organization in emotions, regardless of the fact that there is neu-
ropsychological evidence of language-independent patterns in emotional episodes 
(Colombetti 2014, pp. 48–49). 
Finally, the component process model by Scherer (2009) is a recent develop-
ment of appraisal theories in affective sciences. The Appraisal approach is a cognitive 
approach to emotion research since it emphasizes the evaluative processes and per-
spectives of emotional experience. In general, the appraisal approach stresses that in-
dividuals do not respond to ‘naked’ stimuli but to appraised stimuli. In this view, emo-
tions are directly related to a person’s aims and goals, to their relevance to the indi-
vidual. Most appraisal theories have identified novelty, intrinsic pleasantness or va-
lence, certainty or predictability, goal significance, agency and control as key dimen-
sions of emotion appraisal, i.e., the constituents of an emotional experience (Moors et 
al., 2013). In short, emotions are seen as relevance detectors (Fridja, 2007; Ellsworth 
& Scherer, 2003). Although the body plays an important role in current appraisal ap-
proaches, there are still important differences between these theories and the enactive 
and dynamical approach to emotion suggested by Colombetti (2014). Recent appraisal 
theories still characterize appraisal itself as a cognitive process detached from em-
bodiment and the bodily aspects of emotion. This is regardless of the fact that current 
experiential evidence demonstrates that the state of one’s body influences the ap-
praisal and the emotional experience in general.  
In the enactive model that Colombetti (2014) proposes, emotional episodes, 
or emotion forms, are conceptualized as rapidly forming and self-organizing dynami-
cal patterns of the organism. Although the dynamical model builds on biological or-
ganization, it differs drastically from the basic emotions approach by arguing that 
emotions do not exhibit distinctive configurations because of internal instructions, i.e. 
affect programs, but because “they result from a history of mutual influences between 
evolutionary and developmental factors that shape the organism in a certain way” 
(Colombetti, 2014, pp. 70–71). This historical emphasis from the viewpoint of enac-
ting organisms introduces emotional episodes as context-dependent and flexible, yet 
  
165 
rooted in biological organization and of adaptive autonomy of the individual. The dy-
namical model sees the “emotional topology” as affected by both genetic and envi-
ronmental constraints. Furthermore, in enactive stance the organism remains affecti-
vely (primordial affectivity) engaged in between the emotional episodes since it con-
tinues to care about sustaining its own autonomous identity. 
I find the enactive approach by Colombetti (2014) to be valuable for under-
standing gameplay experience as a whole and the emotions induced from it. Similar 
to appraisal theories, enactive framework offers a well-founded theory on emotions 
as sense-making episodes. In the enactive view, individuals constantly evaluate how 
the ongoing events—and the world at large—emerge in relation to their purposes, 
goals and needs. However, sense-making is not a set of cognitive appraisal processes 
separable from embodiment but patterned processes of the embodied mind in its envi-
ronment.  
In a phenomenological enactive account, which I have adopted in this thesis, 
emotions can be generally conceptualized as a subclass of feelings, i.e., value feelings, 
which mark importance to us; “we experience emotions only in regard to that which 
matters” (Donaldson, 1992, p. 12). This means that with emotions we attain values to 
the things we encounter in the world. In fright we perceive something as frightening, 
in joy we experience something as joyous (Stein, 1964). Feelings such as anger or 
pain become understandable by attaching values or emotions to the situations in which 
these feelings emerge. Emotions emerge from embodied appraisals immanently, we 
do not first evaluate the world and then respond to it emotionally as distinct processes. 
Thus, in an enactive view the process of ‘appraisal’ can be characterized as an organ-
ismic activity (Colombetti, 2014, pp. 109; 112): 
 
[M]y fear comes as such a conscious evaluation; the conscious eval-
uation is not ‘add-on’ to my experience of fear—I do not feel scared 
and, as a separate experience, evaluate [something] as dangerous. The 
experience of fear is at the same time an experience of danger, which 
is world-oriented and evaluative. 
 
Emotion is thus not regarded as a distinct phase that follows perception and precedes 
action as a separable ‘cognitive’ appraisal. Rather, and in line with Noë’s (2004; 2009; 
2012) theory of actionism, it is integral and embodied to the constitution of perception 
as a way of acting (see Noë 2004, p. 1). Therefore, emotion can be conceptualized as 
ongoing goal-oriented intentionality that motivates the organism to act. Emotion and 
intentionality appear to be close concepts; both connote motivated movement beyond 
oneself toward the world (Thompson, 2007, p. 364).  
In phenomenology, intentionality is a fundamental principle of the lived body 
and consciousness. Consciousness is analyzed as intentional in the sense that it intends 
something beyond itself. In a narrow sense, consciousness is intentional as being ob-
ject-directed. In a broader sense, it is intentional by being open to the world, that is, 
by pointing in a broad sense to what is other than itself. In object-directed experiences, 
we are conscious of something such as a worldly object, another agent, or our own 
thoughts and memories. However, in absorbed skillful activities, our experience is not 
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directed towards objects. In activities like gameplay, dancing or writing, the inten-
tionality “is at its object rather than positing it” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1962], pp. 
518–519). Skillful coping lacks a subject–object structure yet retains the experience 
of for-me-ness. As I have argued in this thesis with the case of first-person gameplay 
experience, it takes a breakdown or a disruption for such an experience to take on a 
subject–object structure (Thompson, 2007, pp. 15, 22–24, 313–315). 
There is thus continuity between intentional behavior and emotions; emotion 
as the Latin verb literally means an outward movement (Thompson, 2007, p. 363).  In 
the context of the current study, Freeman’s (2000, p. 14) proposal of emotions as “the 
intention to act in the near future” is especially intriguing since in reflective practice, 
our intentionality is directed towards ourselves, but during gameplay our intentional-
ity resides in our agent–game environment relations instead.  
In Chapter 5, I offer that a player who desires to continue to play a video game 
must also care about her identity as being the player of that very game: “If the player 
does not care about his character then the game is meaningless” (Fine, 2002 [1983], 
p. 185). I take ‘care’ as a precondition for emotional and meaningful gameplay expe-
rience. A person has to care about her continuity of being the player of a game to 
experience emotions in gameplay.  
When one cares about being the player, video game gameplay may bring 
about emotions ranging from frustration to satisfaction and from pride to fear. Cru-
cially, the emotional experiences of gameplay manifest for the player primarily as 
first-hand experiences. They happen in relation to her, as player persona, instead of 
merely to a fictional character that the player observes on a screen. As I have argued, 
in video game gameplay experience, the player’s sense of self-agency remains em-
bodied but its environment-relation changes from immediate surroundings to player–
game relations. All gameplay is first-person activity that requires a third-person view 
on oneself, that is, the cognitive ability of perspective switching (Chapter 2). Perspec-
tive switching entails empathic understanding.  
Empathy involves understanding of the other in specific circumstances; em-
pathy is other-directed (Zahavi, 2014, p. 115). Empathic understanding—like imagi-
nation, recollection, and reflection—can be described as a ‘self-displacing’ or ‘self-
othering’ act (see Zahavi 2005, p. 150; Thompson, 2007, p. 251). The suggestion that 
empathic understanding is paramount for taking another’s position does not equal to 
feeling empathy; I do not mean to propose that a person would feel empathy for herself 
as the player of the game. In fact, she cannot since “in the case of empathy… the 
subject who is empathizing is not the same as the subject empathized” (Thompson, 
2007, p. 388). What I mean to say is that the player’s position as an alternative view-
point to make sense of unfolding events becomes comprehensible only through em-
pathic understanding. The ability to empathize thus underlies all intentional gameplay 
experiences and the emotions that may and will emerge from gameplay. It is a pre-
condition for persona, the person’s identity and self-expression as the player, that is, 
“I-as-player.” 
Shaun Gallagher (2012) proposes narrative understanding on empathy. He 
emphasizes that an empathic attitude is context-dependent and other-directed and that 
it requires narrative understanding of the other’s situation rather than simulating the 
other’s affective states. Experiencing empathy does not necessitate that the target is 
in an affective state or that the possible affective state of the target is similar to the 
empathizer’s state. Empathy results from our understanding of the situation in which 
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the target is, but it is not reciprocal in the same sense than solidarity is. In feeling 
empathy, we care about the other and take interest in the other’s experience. 
Empathy depends on having “the right story” about the other’s situation; we 
can relate ourselves to the other when we can place the other in a narrative framework 
(Gallagher, 2012, p. 377). “Empathic reactions are stronger when we understand the 
personal situation of an individual than if we have abstract, detached, or merely sta-
tistical information about the plight of others” (Gallagher, 2012, p. 374). In empathy, 
however, the affective state that is empathically understood remains that of the other. 
There is a distance, i.e. a narrative distance, between the situation of the empathizer 
and the target (Gallagher, 2012). 
S. G. Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2009) have further argued that empathy consists 
of two separate systems that arguably work autonomously: emotional empathy and 
cognitive empathy. Emotional empathy is considered automatic and developmentally 
basic, and it involves emotion recognition and empathic concern, whereas in cognitive 
empathy we take the perspectives of the others. According to the authors, every em-
pathic response evokes both systems to an extent depending of several variables. 
Adopting a player’s position thus requires empathic understanding, which Shamay et 
al. (2009) argue is cognitive empathy. Only by empathic practice are we able to per-
ceive ourselves from a third-person view in which we emerge as an object to ourselves 
(Mead, 2015 [1934]) as if we were the other.  
I offer now that a gameplay experience is inherently emotional, and that this 
marks the fifth invariant of a gameplay experience. A gameplay experience is neces-
sarily emotional because 1) taking the player position entails perspective switching 
enabled only by empathy. In gameplay, as long as the player intends to play, she 2) 
cares about her identity as player persona. Thus, although what happens in gameplay 
happens to an individual through the mask of the player, the events in gameplay are 
innately meaningful because they matter to her continuity as an autonomous agent, 
the player proper.  
 
 
Data Analysis: Emotional Participation of the Player 
 
The meanings one attaches to gameplay experiences may vary from a very loose bond 
to true embracement. Goffman (2013 [1961], pp. 106–107) describes embracing en-
gagement as a relationship in which an individual 1) expresses an attachment to the 
role (here, to the position of player persona), 2) has the capacity for  a full performance 
in that position, and 3) invests her full attention to the activity. “To embrace a role is 
to disappear completely into the virtual self available in the situation, to be fully seen 
in terms of the image, and to confirm expressively one’s acceptance of it” (ibid.). The 
subject of whether one’s relation to the player position is embracing or loose is closely 
connected to three invariants of gameplay experience, those of the position of the 
player (Invariant i), self-presence (Invariant iii), and presentation of the self in game-
play (Invariant iv).  
As Goffman (2013 [1961], p. 108) writes, to take a greater participatory dis-
tance is not to reject the role or the position itself but to deny “the virtual self” implied 
by that position or role. Although there is always a discrepancy between the self and 
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the player position, in an embracing relationship the player aims to minimize the dis-
crepancy, whereas in a loose relationship the discrepancy is either intentionally sus-
tained or at least not intentionally diminished. To put it differently, players looking 
for embracement are willing to be fully involved and emotionally attached83 to their 
position as the player—and often to their in-game avatar—and to skillful performance 
in that position (see Goffman, 2013 [1961], pp. 106, 119).  
In this section, I examine how players relate themselves to the position of the 
player and playable characters in first-person and third-person video game gameplay 
experiences. I call this factor participatory distance. By analyzing my interview data, 
I ask how different forms of participatory distance may influence the emotional qual-
ities of gameplay experience. Let us first consider the forms that participatory distance 
can take in gameplay. Following Goffman, I call different forms of participatory dis-
tance performative nodes of functioning. 
In Frame Analysis (1986 [1974]), Goffman introduces three positions that an 
individual can acquire in relation to the act she causes to happen: principal, animator, 
and strategist. These positions are “functional nodes in a communication system” ra-
ther than social roles (Goffman, 1981, p. 144), and they illustrate the functional dis-
tance one has in relation to the act. A person who is the source, the originator and the 
owner of an activity, is the principal of it. As being the principal of an activity, a 
person is “held responsible for having willfully taken up the position to which the 
meaning of the utterance attests” (Goffman, 1986 [1974], pp. 517–518). She does not 
only originate the activity, however. She also animates it in her bodily being. A per-
son’s body is not, however, the only thing one can animate by participating. 
Goffman (1986 [1974], p. 522) suggests that the distance from which anima-
tion is done may vary. An actress animates a character with her own bodily move-
ments and voice, i.e., with her own embodied configurations, but a puppeteer works 
from a distance and animates the dolls by pulling strings behind the curtain. A person 
does not always directly animate characters but nevertheless causes an action to be 
taken and, by doing so, she remains as the principal of the activity in question. Such 
a position is called a strategist; “the person in whose name [an act is taken] need not 
to be the person who decided what [was done]” (Goffman, 1986 [1974], p. 524). The 
position of strategist is given to an individual for conducting special tasks such as 
making decisions that affect other individuals. For example, a person who organizes 
how people are seated in a meeting exhibits a position of the strategist. She does not 
animate the individuals who then sit down according to the preconfigured order. Stra-
tegist thus makes plans, models and assessments, which other individuals later ani-
mate.  
When considered in the context of video game gameplay and player persona, 
performative self-presentation in gameplay entails being the owner (principal) of the 
actions, and typically being either the animator or strategist of in-game events. To be 
the source of an in-game activity, a person is both the principal, i.e., the owner who 
                                                 
83 By reading Goffman (2013 [1961], pp. 88–90), one could argue that a person may also be-
come committed to her recurrent player position if the position enables other highly valued 
possibilities in her life. For example, a person involved in an esport team may feel committed 
to that player position since it is both recurrent and valuable also from the perspective of social 
relatedness to the other players of the same team.  
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intends to act, as well as the animator or the strategist, i.e., the one who enacts the act 
in the afforded manner.  
In various video games the player appropriates a playable character and acts 
from that in-game position. Action games and shooter games, adventure games, ac-
tion-adventure games, role-playing games, and platformer games are prime examples 
of those video game genres that typically introduce this kind of position to the player.  
In many strategy games and simulations, the player often controls troops, peo-
ple, animals, tribe members or units from an above godlike position by directing the 
movements, activities and development of the others indirectly. The player commands 
the units to take actions, but she does not animate those actions as being an embodied 
being within the gameworld. She thus adopts the position of being the principal and 
the strategist of the activity. We can consider Chess as an example where one is the 
strategist. The player makes the decisions to act (principal), and then acts as the ani-
mator in the gaming situation by moving a chess piece, e.g., a knight, according to the 
rules. However, when we consider the position of the player from within the semiotic 
system of chess, the player does not animate the knight but acts as the strategist and 
commands the knight to capture a bishop. The player, instead of being an animator, is 
an entity referred to as “White” or “Black.”  
However, many games seem to lack the dimension of animating something 
altogether. Consequently, the positions of the animator and the strategist do not seem 
sufficient in these cases. Does the player animate something in the tile-matching game 
BeJeweled (PopCap Games, 2001), for example? A while ago I witnessed a gameplay 
situation in which my 14-year old boy played with a Perplexus Epic sphere (Figure 
12), which is a 3D transparent plastic sphere containing a ball-in-a-maze game. In this 
game, the purpose of the player is to turn and twist the sphere carefully to maneuver 
a small ball within the sphere and try to avoid it dropping from its track. My son, 
focused to keep the ball on its track in a difficult phase of the game, failed and uttered 
immediately to himself: “I fell.” What is the “I” in the “I fell” if nothing is animated 
when playing Perplexus? Clearly, my son did not animate the ball, nor did he act as a 
strategist in relation to it. If he animated anything, then he animated the game envi-
ronment itself. 
The enactive approach argues that the experience of agency is not an inner 
quality of a person but a relation that results from active exploration of the world 
(Buhrmann & Di Paolo, 2015; Chemero, 2009, p. 201; Kyselo, 2015). When we refer 
to ourselves and to our endeavors with the pronoun “I,” we thus refer both to ourselves 
and to our embodied couplings with the environment. I propose in this chapter that it 
is not sufficient to think that only specific video games, such as role-playing games 
with an identifiable avatar, could alter our self-presence (cf. Klimmt et al., 2009). 
More profoundly, and indeed inevitably, games arise as ephemeral, alternative envi-
ronments for our situated agency.  
Let me suggest a fourth functional node in addition to the principal, the strat-
egist and the animator. This fourth node is to be positioned in-between being the prin-
cipal and being the strategist or the animator of an activity. Recall that, for Goffman 
(1986 [1974], pp. 517–518), the principal is the owner of an activity, and that, in en-
active phenomenology, the sense of ownership can be differentiated from the sense of 
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agency. In the sense of ownership, we experience that whatever is happening is hap-
pening to me or by me. The sense of agency, in contrast, is the experience of initiating 
changes (Gallagher, 2012). Thus, we can distinguish being the principal who owns 




Figure 12. My son holding a Perplexus Epic sphere.  
 
In any instance of gameplay, we remain the principals of every action we take. We 
retain the pre-reflective for-me-ness of each of our experience, whether we identify 
ourselves with a griffon flying over a magical landscape in a gameworld or turn a 
Perplexus sphere in our hands. I argue, though, that just as inevitably as our node of 
being the principal remains unchanged, our node of being the enactor is transformed.  
 In all games it is “I” who enacts the game environment and makes in-game 
events happen. “I” is an intentional agent, whose embodied pre-reflective self remains 
on the couch although her agent–environment relation necessarily changes since this 
change is an essential quality of all gameplay. What does the player of Tetris, then, 
enact? She exhibits an alternative intentionality, alternative in the sense that its world-
relation is changed. The player does not need to reflect on this intentionality or imag-
ine any characteristics it may or may not have. It suffices that she herself remains as 
the principal (owner) of the actions taken and that she has a sense of agency (enactor), 
which emerges in the player–game relation.  
At one end of the participatory distance, the player identifies herself with an 
in-game character. Whereas especially in role-playing games the player may craft her 
own in-game personnage, i.e., avatar, and thus play through a personalized and iden-
tifiable vantage point, in many games (e.g., simulation games, mobile games, strategy 
games) the player plays through an intentionality that is only implied or left com-
pletely abstract by the game. At this other end of participatory distance, the game does 





Participatory Distance of the Animator Node 
 
I discussed the theme of participatory distance with the 32 interviewees during the 
first phase of the interview, because watching gameplay videos of the interviewee’s 
favorite games typically indicated player preference on specific participatory dis-
tances over the other options. I noticed quickly that many of the participants associ-
ated this theme with expectations of specific emotional outcome of gameplay: 
 
Sure, immersion is stronger in first-person games. And in those 
sneaking games it is much more frightening, which makes the expe-
rience much better since you have to constantly look around you to 
stay on top of things. (P20, mercenary) 
 
I enjoy more the third-person view. Or even the above view, like in 
The Sims. I do not want to identify with the characters too much. I 
easily take the other’s perspective, and seeing things through an-
other’s eyes can be too terrifying. It is not enjoyable to be too deeply 
involved in the gameworld. If something then jumps in front of you, 
you just get frightened too badly [laughs]. (P29, companion-explorer) 
 
Several players stated that a first-person animator view offers a more immersive ex-
perience, whereas the playable character seen from a third-person point-of-view was 
seen as “a proxy between the player and the gameworld” (P24, explorer), “a viewpoint 
to the game’s story” (P19, adventurer) or as a “narrator who opens the gameworld to 
the player” (P31, mercenary). This was also observed by another interviewee (P21, 
companion-adventurer) who pondered whether he preferred the functional node of a 
first-person or third-person animator: “It depends completely on whether I want to be 
the character or merely observe and control it. So, it is about whether being the char-
acter is the main thing or is it rather what the character does.” Another interviewee 
described the differences between first-person and third-person distance in a similar 
fashion: 
 
For me, it is nicer to see the character since the first-person view 
makes me feel like I was supposed to be the character and identify 
myself with it. To be it, really. But to me, the character’s story is more 
interesting than being that character. (P9, mercenary) 
 
A functional neuroimaging study by Shanti Ganesh et al. (2011) studied players’ iden-
tification with their in-game characters. It was revealed that the identification long-
time gamers had with their avatars resembled the type of emotional involvement we 
have with a close human, such as a family member or a long-term friend. Based on 
this study, experiencing through an avatar’s perspective can create emotional experi-
ences greater than we feel when interacting with distant others, yet weaker than those 
that concern ourselves directly. It has been suggested in prior literature that long-term 
players who play avatar-based online video games gradually build an avatar-centered 
autobiographical narrative (Yee, 2006; Miller, 2008).  
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Although Hefner, Klimmt and Vorderer (2007) correctly emphasize that non-dyadic 
models are required for studying players’ emotional identification with their avatars, 
dyadic models are also needed. It may be that one cannot empathize with oneself, but 
do the players really think about being their in-game avatars, and if they do, what kind 
of thinking we are dealing with? Let me consider this question by comparing self–
avatar relations and an empathy model proposed by Frédérique de Vignemont and 
Tania Singer (2006).  
 De Vignemont and Singer (2006, p. 435) approach empathy from a simula-
tion-based theory of mind. They propose that there are five necessary conditions for 
human empathy. The affective condition states that empathy requires an affective state 
from both the empathizer and the target. The interpersonal similarity condition argues 
that the empathizer’s and the target’s affective states are similar to each other. The 
vicarious state condition postulates that, in empathy, the empathizer adopts an “as if” 
state by taking on the perspective of the target. According to the ascription condition, 
empathetic understanding necessitates that the empathizer know that the target is the 
source for her own affective state. Finally, in the caring condition, one cares about the 
target’s affective life and position. 
In those video games in which a player plays a character from a third-person 
perspective she is given a viewpoint to visually observe her own actions as they hap-
pen. In non-gaming situations, a third-person view of the self is a self-reflection and, 
as such, a detachment from the ongoing activity. One can, of course, observe one’s 
mirror image during an activity, but these situations are exceptions and observing 
one’s image greatly restricts the activities that can take place. Curiously, in video 
games, the player may acquire a third-person view of ‘oneself’ in a non-reflective 
fashion. This means that the player-subject is able to perceive herself as the animator 
of the events in the instant in which she acts as the principal or the owner of the action. 
In these situations, our first-hand experiences become perceivable for us as we act. 
Thus, third-person games (and first-person games to an extent) provide for 
the player a unique position in which she acts through the avatar but also perceives 
herself to do so since the character she animates is directly observable. This became 
evident in a very interesting interview I had with a companion-adventurer: 
 
I really like to empathize with others and take on their perspective of 
the events. For example, in Life is Strange, you acquire the role of a 
high-school girl in seemingly everyday life. I take games as journeys 
to another world, like a virtual reality of a kind. So, some kind of 
empathy comes with it. And in Tomb Raider, I remember thinking 
aloud: “Lara, you can do this, you can do this!” and then there is later 
a sexual harassment kind of event, and I again empathized: “Lara, 
stop him, you can do it!” and it made me happy to be able to help 
Lara, although I played her myself. It is a bit funny: at the same time, 
you are the character but also empathize with her. (P21) 
 
The configuration of avatar-based video games has a peculiar quality of being both a 
first-person experiential experience that we live through and a third-person experience 
in which we observe “us” as an intentional object. Our avatar is deeply involved with 
the in-game events and we are involved in his or her endeavors, which fulfills the 
affective condition of empathy. As our character is, e.g., wounded and expresses pain, 
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we may empathize with it and “feel her pain.” This is the interpersonal similarity 
condition. As I argue throughout this thesis, the position of the player is the position 
of being something else than one is. This equals to the vicarious state condition of “as 
if” in empathy. We are fully aware that we feel the painfulness of the situation because 
we perceive our avatar’s suffering, i.e., the ascription condition is fulfilled. Lastly, 
similar to the caring condition, we care about the well-being of our in-game character 
as long as we care about our identity as being the player of the game. This care may 
develop into real attachment to characters, a phenomenon called parasocial interac-
tion by Horton and Wohl (1956). 
I would thus like to propose that identification with an avatar and then acting 
through that position does not mean that we could not empathize with our in-game 
avatar. We do not feel empathy for our avatar as we act through it, but whenever we 
observe our avatar rather than act through it, we regain the perspective in which em-
pathy becomes possible. For example, we can perfectly well feel interpersonal emo-
tions toward our avatar when we enter a graphic menu that portrays our avatar’s 
wounded body. To feel empathy for a position that arises as the position through 
which we enact is a curious feature of video game gameplay experiences (Figure 13).  
Zahavi (2014, p. 126) contends that “[W]hat is distinctive about empathy is 
precisely that the empathized experience is located in the other and not in oneself,” 
and continues later (ibid., p. 192), “when I empathically understand the other, the other 
is given to me not as a pure nucleus of experience, but as a centre of intentionality, as 
a different perspective on the very world that I also inhabit.” In gameplay we precisely 
experience the actions of the avatar through which we act as mine (first-person view) 




Figure 13. In the classic shooter video game, Doom (id Software Inc., 1993), the 
player enacts from the first-person view but simultaneously perceives “his” face on 
the game’s WIMP interface. The painful state of the protagonist is presented to the 
player from a third-person perspective that the player can empathize with. 
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It is my intention to highlight that empathic understanding is required for us to be able 
to appropriate the player’s position as being someone else, and that we can empathize 
our avatar as well as other in-game characters we encounter during video game game-
play. Thus, I suggest that empathy may be a significant factor for the emotions we 
experience during video game gameplay in which we experience distinct closeness.84  
Interestingly, studies on episodic memories have revealed that our memory 
for self-referent information is superior to our memories of events about others (other-
referent information). The closer the other person is to us, the better we remember the 
events that happened to these close others. Intersubjective closeness thus enhances 
our memory of the others (Ganesh et al., 2011). This observation is relevant for the 
current study for two reasons. First, it indicates that interviewees may remember 
mostly their personal gaming events but also events that happened to individuals close 
to them. It could also mean that memories of social gameplay that include both the 
interviewee and people close to her might be remembered even more vividly.  
Second, the study conducted by Ganesh et al. (2011) offers another intriguing 
hypothesis for the gameplay memories. Since long-term players in their study remem-
bered avatar-based gameplay experiences as clearly as their interactions with their 
close others, such as family members or friends, a player who has played avatar-cen-
tered video games and other types of video games equally as much may remember her 
experiences of playing through an avatar more vividly than the other gameplay expe-
riences. This could also indicate that the personal narratives of the players who play 
single-player avatar-centered games are more elaborated and detailed than the narra-
tives of the players who have equally played single-player games but not avatar-cen-
tered games. One could also speculate why avatar-centered gameplay memories are 
memorized better than other single-player gameplay experiences.  
In sum, although both the first-person viewpoint and third-person viewpoint 
are animator participatory nodes, they do not necessarily elicit similar experiences of 
presence and emotion. From a first-person viewpoint, the player may more easily 
identify with the character, as the interview data of this thesis suggests. However, a 
third-person vantage point may bring along a deeper sense of avatar presence, includ-
ing a perception of a virtual body and fictional identity, which the player can not only 
identify herself with but also empathize with.  
I appropriated in Chapter 2 a phenomenologically inclined stance, which ar-
gues that self-consciousness consists of minimal experiential pre-reflective self and 
narrative reflective self-consciousness. I consider next how these two forms of partic-
ipating may affect the emotions that are induced from video game gameplay. This 
theme is related to the proposed invariants of coordinative and explorative practice 
(Invariant ii, Chapter 5) and self-presence (Invariant iii, this chapter). 
 
                                                 
84 Katherine Isbister (2016, pp. 11–13) has suggested that the closeness between a player and 
her avatar can be evaluated on four levels. The visceral level is how the player’s body partici-
pates in making progress in the game by learning skills that are reflected in the new abilities 
her in-game character learns. The cognitive level is how the player is rewarded because of 
correctly chosen strategies and actions. On the social level, the player takes on the avatar’s 
social point-of-view. Finally, on the fantasy level the player can explore alternate identities 
through actual in-game performance.  
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Pre-reflective and Reflective Access in the Player Position 
 
In gameplay we act through our performative position either by being fully and pre-
reflectively engaged with the activity or by stepping back from it while still paying 
attention to our player position. In both of these possibilities, our intention stays in the 
player–game coupling. Only in the latter, though, are we reflecting in the player posi-
tion.  
To play pre-reflectively typically entails adopting the player position as an 
animator or as an enactor. In video games that encourage pre-reflective play, the 
player may, e.g., pilot spaceships, engage in fighting, perform in sports games, par-
ticipate in races, jump on platforms, fire enemies at fast speed, quickly manipulate 
falling blocks, or dance to the beat of music. All games in which we act as the animator 
or enactor are not pre-reflective, however. Here, we must note that the pre-reflective 
experiential self is closely related to time-consciousness and the experience of tempo-
rality (Zahavi, 204). In real-time games that progress continuously according to an in-
game clock, players must perform actions in a timely fashion without the possibility 
to ponder over, e.g., strategies or cause-effect relations, or to reflect on their own 
thoughts on the events. Although games do not factually have freely flowing in-game 
time, but rather discrete time units, in “real-time games” the intervals between these 
units can be so small that we as the players cannot perceive them. 
Similarly, reflectively self-conscious video game gameplay is often turn-
based, and the player’s position is that of the strategist, although this is not always the 
case. Turn-based gameplay consists of perceivable turns during which the player can 
consider her actions before making decisions. Many strategy games are turn-based, 
and although classic adventure video games are not similarly based on turns, the 
player of these games may take her time when trying to solve the in-game puzzles she 
comes across. When I am trying to solve an in-game puzzle or ponder my attack strat-
egy, I am fully playing the game, but I am doing it from a reflective perspective. 
However, and this is a crucial point, the self I am reflecting here is not some general 
“I” that persists unchangeable from one activity to another. This “I” is my experience 
of myself in relation to the game.  
The distinction between the position of the pre-reflective animator stance and 
the reflective strategist stance can be further explored by studying emotional experi-
ences. Gerald L. Clore (1992) has suggested that feelings can be categorized into af-
fective, bodily and cognitive feelings. Affective feelings refer to emotional episodes 
in a related fashion to appraisal theories discussed earlier. These feelings include emo-
tions, moods and affective experiences, and they typically arise from ongoing agent–
environment relations. Bodily feelings are reflections of proprioceptive feedback, i.e., 
of the movements of one’s own body as well as of physical states such as hunger, 
dizziness or pain. Cognitive feelings, however, are associated with thinking and 
memory processes (Clore, 1992; Greifeneder et al., 2010; Schubert, 2009). 
Cognitive feelings are “nonaffective” in the sense that they appear in situati-
ons that do not deal with direct evaluations of the situation as favorable or unfavorable 
for the person, but rather refer to feedback from one’s own cognitive processes. Cog-
nitive feelings, such as a feeling of certainty or a feeling of confusion are “not asser-
tions primarily about the state of our goals, or the state of our body, but about our state 
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Figure 14. In the role-playing video game, Final Fantasy VII (Square, 1997), the 
player mostly plays the protagonist, Cloud, from a third-person vantage point. The 
game includes an “Active Time Battle (ATB)” system, which blends together real-
time action and turn-based decision-making. The player has a bit of time to think 
about her next actions while waiting for her character’s action/time meter to be filled. 
Thinking too long may be costly since enemy characters also act according to their 
action/time meters.  
 
Whereas anger, fear and happiness are examples of affective feelings, the feeling of 
knowing is a primary example of a cognitive feeling or a cognitive experience. In 
addition to the feeling of knowing, memory retrieval, familiarity, easiness and diffi-
culty, expectation, distraction and boredom and uncertainty and understanding have 
been proposed as examples of cognitive feelings (Clore, 1992; Greifeneder et al., 
2010, p. 109). Furthermore, Wegner (2005) has suggested that the feeling of doing is 
also a cognitive feeling. The feeling of doing arises if we think about the consequences 
of our actions before we engage with the action. Alternatively, the feeling of doing 
could be conceptualized as the feeling of planning.  
I would like to suggest, then, that when we adopt the reflective strategist 
stance in gameplay, we engage ourselves primarily with cognitive feelings. These in-
clude, e.g., the feeling of knowing while we try to solve puzzles, feelings of planning 
and expectations while we ponder our strategy to surprise our enemies, and feelings 
of memory and certainty while we are getting ready for another level of a platform 
game. Indeed, in many games, we do not just play through the pre-reflective animator 
stance or through the reflective strategist stance, but rather appropriate both in turn.  
For example, when playing a fast-paced first-person shooter game, we may open a 
character menu screen, save the screen or just pause the game to engage with the re-
flective strategist stance before jumping back into the action. Furthermore, in real-
time strategy games (RTS) the player has the position of the strategist; she does not 
animate the actions directly but initiates them indirectly, typically from an isometric 
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perspective. However, the gameplay is fast and requires the player to focus on the 
unfolding events by using her intuition rather than only her skills of planning and 
strategizing. Consider the following interview excerpts: 
 
If you think about it, the required skills in turn-based games are quite 
different from the ones in which you must react fast and precisely to 
deal with whatever comes your way… Like playing Super Smash 
Brothers online. Your heart races as you squeeze the controller, but 
turn-based games are more, like, laid-back. In both you must think 
quite much, but in turn-based games you can take your time and focus 
differently. (P23, commander) 
 
I was just thinking that I enjoy most games in which I do not have to 
be really fast and have great reflexes. I want to think and ponder. It is 
not nice that some zombie comes running towards me and I must 
shoot it down quickly and then the next one is already approaching, 
you know. (P19, explorer) 
 
Experiences of being completely focused on fast events that require intuitive acting 
are prime examples of being engrossed. As Goffman (2013 [1961], p. 80) writes: 
“Something in which the individual can become unselfconsciously engrossed is some-
thing that can become real to him.” In such skillful activities, for instance, “the expe-
rience of fear is at the same time an experience of danger” (Colombetti, 2014, pp. 109; 
112), suggesting to the player to act accordingly if she desires to sustain her identity 
as the being the player.  
For Goffman (1986 [1974], p. 346), games are designed for providing en-
grossable experiences, in which the player is not fully aware of “the direction of his 
feelings.” Such a state of experiencing cannot be self-consciously maintained since 
maintaining engrossment is a different activity from being engrossed. What Goffman 
describes here is thus what I have called, building from a phenomenological stance, 
pre-reflective consciousness and skillful acting in which the object-orientedness of 
intentionality becomes absent. In Deterding’s (2013, p. 51) reading of Goffman, to be 
engrossed requires “letting go,” which becomes possible when “our spontaneous 
needs, wants, emotions, interests and involvement [are] aligned with the properties of 
the situation.”  
If we approach gameplay according to my suggestion as a person–persona–
personnage continuum, every gameplay situation is in principle a situation of the re-
flective strategist because we enact the gameworld as a persona rather than as a per-
son. Thus, a distance is invariantly present in all gameplay. This becomes evident if 
we, e.g., become frightened of an in-game monster while being in the pre-reflective 
mode of the animator. We may scream in horror for an instant but immediately after 
that we easily step back from this position as we become again observers of ourselves 
as being the person who plays, i.e., persona. From this reflective vantage, things do 
not appear as scary anymore, since it suddenly is evident that they did not after all 
happen to ourselves—but then again, we may fear to re-enter to the gameplay since 




Discussion: Social Emotions in Solitary Play? 
 
Karhulahti (2015a) has recently argued that mutual agreement between at least two 
players is required in order to be able to talk about ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ a video game. 
Postulating ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ in a single-player game entails for Karhulahti that 
the game would have to be assumed as a reasoning opponent (ibid., p. 19). In contrast 
to Karhulahti’s argumentation, I suggest that one can have meaningful experiences of 
winning and losing even in single-player gameplay—when we consider gameplay 
from the experiential first-person stance of the player. To acknowledge this, we do 
not need to presuppose the game as an intentional agent or as our opponent, nor do 
we have to conclude that you can only “beat yourself” in single-player gaming. We 
experience ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ always in reciprocal dynamic relations between 
ourselves and our environment. We win or lose in that relation. 
The recurrent experiences of social copresence, psychological involvement 
and behavioral engagement in single-player gameplay can be suggested to support the 
argument that participating in any kind of gameplay practice is profoundly sociocul-
tural. Although Di Paolo and De Jaegher (2012) state that social emotions make only 
little sense in the absence of the other, in video game gameplay the situation is argu-
ably different due to the internal dynamics of gameplay (see Chapter 5). Solitary 
gameplay does evoke social and self-conscious emotions such as envy, pride, shame 
and guilt.  
Di Paolo and De Jaegher also state that recognition is manifested in social 
interactions between two or more people—alongside neglect, admiration, desire, pity, 
love and hatred. Consider, then, how the interview participants of the current study 
described their most memorable gameplay experiences:  
 
In the best RPGs, you can develop a personal relationship with your 
character and the companions of your character. I think it is an es-
sential thing for RPGs… In Fallout I felt bad because I could not 
befriend mutant ’cause I chose something wrongly in the dialogue… 
I do not, somehow you start to feel attached to the characters, maybe 
even more than to your own avatar… I do not know how to compare 
it to the real-world relations, they are like loyal companions, you have 
seen and experienced so much together, after all. (P2, adventurer)    
 
In Dragon Age Origin, just before the final battle, you must choose 
who will go with you, and who you will leave behind. And honestly, 
I spent in that moment more than 15 minutes thinking, “damn it, this 
woman is my life partner, so I should take her with me, but what if 
she then dies in the battle?…” Afterwards, I got a feeling of longing. 
It is about missing the characters and the whole world. You like too 
much of the place, too much of the gameworld, and too much espe-
cially of the characters and their stories. It feels like an end of a 
friendship, too. You have had a group of people you have spent time 
with, saved the world and all, and then all of them go their own di-





I really liked the characters in Persona 4… I felt real companionship 
and friendship. Like we trusted each other, and we knew that we 
would be alright when we were together… It was very nice to be able 
to spend time with the characters and choose your closest friends. I 
felt bad when the game was over. I do not really like to cry, but if I 
do, I know that the game has really meant something to me. (P18, 
adventurer) 
 
You can be a good or a bad guy in Black & White, you know. I was 
always the good one, but sometimes I had to be harsh to my pet ape. 
Sometimes, it ate a human, so I had to slap in order to remain a good 
master. If I had not hit it, I would have accepted its bad behavior. So, 
I hit it, just once, and felt guilty and bad. One fair slap was fortunately 
enough to teach it a lesson [laughs]. (P29, companion-explorer) 
 
By reading these passages, one can concur with what Katherine Isbister (2016) has 
recently written about the ability of video games to elicit socially relevant emotions. 
She states (ibid., p. 8) that games are, in fact, the only form of media capable of evok-
ing, e.g., feelings of guilt from experiencing fiction. Isbister (ibid., pp. 13, 20, 44–45) 
also describes the proudness one can experience when a virtual crowd applauds one’s 
performance in, e.g., a snowboarding contest or a race (ibid., p. 13) and the amusement 
the player feels when participating in a witty and funny dialogue between the player 
and a dynamic non-player character (ibid., p. 20).  
The notion that solitary gameplay induces emotions we associate with social 
interactions is not to state that the emotional experience of single-player gaming 
would be similar to social play.85 Rather, it is to argue that “our embedding in social 
contexts and social interactions from the very beginning of our lives means that we 
develop within, and are integrated with, a social world just as completely as any phys-
ical world” (Di Paolo et al., 2013, p. 205). Thus, engaging with the world of cultural 
objects converges towards social participation. Furthermore, video game gameplay as 
a form of dynamical agent–environment coupling brings this participation to yet an-
other level, where social self-conscious emotions such as empathy may also be elic-
ited.   
According to Thompson’s (2007, pp. 383–385) reading of Husserl, three 
kinds of intersubjectivity emerge in our participation in the world. First, we have the 
intersubjectivity of face-to-face experience and other direct encounters with the self 
and the other. Second, we have ‘generative intersubjectivity’ of norms, traditions and 
                                                 
85 I do not claim that the emotions in single-player gaming and in multiplayer gaming are 
identical. Instead, as shown, e.g., in an fMRI experiment by Kätsyri et al. (2013) as well as in 
the experiments reported by Isbister (2016, pp. 43–45), social interaction context matters very 
much indeed in our emotional responses to gaming. 
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conventions that shape our experience while the others are absent.86 Third, our inten-
tionality is not closed upon itself but is intersubjectively open in advance to any actual 
encounter with another social agent. We are dealing with cultural artifacts, not with 
indifferent physical objects; physical objects appear to us as perceivable also by other 
subjects. Objects have, in Husserl’s language, hidden profiles, i.e., how they might be 
perceived and experienced from a different perspective that one presently exhibit. Ac-
cording to Husserl and Thompson (2007), these hidden profiles are to be taken “as the 
correlates of the possible perceptions of other subjects, who could perceive the object 
simultaneously with oneself, though from a different vantage point… for one to be 
able to appresent the hidden profiles of an object, no other subjects need be actually 
present” (Thompson, 2007, p. 384).  
Whereas the first kind of Husserlian intersubjectivity actualizes only in social 
gaming and in multiplayer online gaming, the second and the third kinds of intersub-
jectivity are also present in solitary gameplay. Games present us with norms, regula-
tions and traditions, and we approach them as sociocultural systems. We also pre-
reflectively know when we engage in solitary gameplay that a game we play can be 
played and experienced by others differently, and this knowledge shapes our own pre-
sentation of the self, i.e., persona, in gameplay.   
As a phenomenon of social self (Mead 2015 [1934]), gameplay adds to self-
awareness through reflective and dialogical inner speech consisting of at least two 
self-positions: “me, the agent who enacted the gameplay and exists after the play ses-
sion,” that is the person, and “me, as the performative player of the game,” or persona. 
Just as Deterding (2013, p. 141) observes: “Even if we are fully alone, we still make 
sense of what we are doing to ourselves… we can feel embarrassed or proud alone 
with ourselves and a mirror, though maybe less emotionally intense than under the 
judging looks of response-present others.” 
When we win or lose in a single-player game, we win or lose in our relation 
to the game environment. It depends on the game design as well as on the dimensions 
of self-participation, i.e., our pre-reflective/reflective stance, participatory distance, 
motivational relevance, and the level of skillful access, whether we feel like winning 
when we finish first, destroy the enemies, complete a level, watch an ending movie or 
end up holding a gold trophy after an in-game tournament.87 Indeed, we do not have 
to self-reflectively postulate the game system as an intentional opponent even when 
we “compete” against artificial intelligence in computer chess. Still, many of us would 
describe the moment of calling “checkmate” winning, even in solitary play. 
 
 
                                                 
86 This form of intersubjectivity is congenial with how Mechling (2006) describes ‘solo folk-
lore’ (see Chapter 5), and it is also noted by Goffman (1986 [1974], p. 81): “When a performer 
guides his private activity in accordance with incorporated moral standards, he may associate 
these standards with a reference group of some kind, thus creating a non-present audience for 
his activity… In other words, an individual may be his own audience or may imagine an audi-
ence to be present.”  
87 It must be noted, though, that Karhulahti (2015a, p. 19) approaches winning and losing by 
postulating a condition of “mutual agreements to rules.” According to this view, a player can-
not lose or win a single-player game since, for Karhulahti, there is no mutual agreement be-
tween an intentional player and non-intentional video game.  
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Player Preferences in Emotional Valence and Arousal in Gameplay 
 
We have now seen that both participatory distance and playing in a pre-reflective or 
reflective manner have an impact to the emotional characteristics of a gameplay ex-
perience. I conclude this chapter by exploring how players representing the seven 
player types considered their preferred emotional valence and level of arousal in the 
survey of 1,718 respondents. 
The survey (see Study 1, Chapter 3) included an inventory that described 
emotions that may be induced by gameplay experience. The scale was influenced by 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), which is a 20-item self-report 
scale for measuring positive and negative affect (Crawford & Henry, 2004).  
In the survey of 1,718 participants, the included scale consisted of 28 items, 
12 of which were similar to the PANAS scale (marked with ‘*’ in Table 13). Other 
items were included based on a literature review on games and emotions. The scale 
was tested in a pilot study of 50 participants and open feedback from these participants 
was taken into consideration when constructing the inventory. In the survey, the re-
spondents were asked to specify how pleasant they considered the following feelings 
(Likert-7, 1=very unpleasant, 7=very pleasant) during video game gameplay: 
 
 
Item Feeling Mean SD  Item Feeling Mean SD 
1 Distress* 2.51 1.61  15 Happiness 5.51 1.37 
2 Exaltation 4.82 1.62  16 Fear 3.08 1.77 
3 Despise 2.42 1.49  17 Determination* 5.01 1.45 
4 Shame* 2.24 1.44  18 Relaxation 5.49 1.36 
5 Relief 4.68 1.51  19 Sadness 2.73 1.65 
6 Amusement 5.44 1.36  20 Guilt* 2.54 1.56 
7 Passion 4.37 1.69  21 Attentiveness* 4.98 1.47 
8 Disgust 2.66 1.58  22 Activeness* 5.03 1.45 
9 Enthusiasm* 5.45 1.49  23 Frustration 2.63 1.55 
10 Excitement* 4.69 1.79  24 Satisfaction 5.39 1.36 
11 Shock* 3.17 1.77  25 Curiosity 5.31 1.46 
12 Interest* 5.45 1.41  26 Anger* 2.69 1.63 
13 Pleasure 5.52 1.42  27 Surprise 4.98 1.49 
14 Embarrassment 2.62 1.50  28 Pride* 4.86 1.61 
 
Table 13. Preferences in emotional valence and arousal scale, and the mean sums 
and standard deviations in the survey of 1,718 respondents. 
 
From Table 13, we can see that feelings of happiness, pleasure, and relaxation were 
the most preferred by the respondents, whereas feelings of shame, despise, and dis-
tress had the lowest mean preference sums. I then conducted an exploratory factor 
analysis to investigate latent factors of the scale described in Table 13. The analysis 
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was made by using principal factor extraction with polychoric correlations and vari-
max rotation. Velicer’s minimum average partial (MAP) test indicated that two factors 
were to be extracted. By using factor loadings over .50, the first solution resulted in 
the following final factor structure: 
 
 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
Distress (1)  0.781 0.390 
Exaltation (2) 0.665  0.493 
Contempt (3)  0.829 0.313 
Shame (4)  0.850 0.265 
Relief (5) 0.635  0.543 
Amusement (6) 0.733  0.462 
Passion (7) 0.559  0.603 
Disgust (8)  0.862 0.254 
Enthusiasm (9) 0.813  0.339 
Excitement (10) 0.579  0.523 
Shock (11)  0.800 0.303 
Interest (12) 0.837  0.300 
Pleasure (13) 0.783  0.384 
Embarrassment (14)  0.802 0.357 
Happiness (15) 0.766  0.400 
Fear (16)  0.801 0.310 
Determination (17) 0.766  0.386 
Relaxation (18) 0.679  0.520 
Sadness (19)  0.811 0.323 
Guilt (20)  0.871 0.241 
Attentiveness (21) 0.718  0.469 
Activeness (22) 0.768  0.395 
Frustration (23)  0.727 0.470 
Satisfaction (24) 0.794  0.362 
Curiosity (25) 0.816  0.333 
Anger (26)  0.836 0.294 
Surpise (27) 0.716  0.425 
Pride (28) 0.693  0.475 
    
Mean 5.1164 2.6624  
Std. Dev. 1.0823 1.2731  
Alpha 0.9636 0.9485  
 
Table 14. Factor loading (> 0.5), uniqueness and descriptive statistics for emo-




A total of 17 items loaded on the first factor. All of these items generally describe 
positive emotions and feelings that one may experience during gameplay. I label this 
factor Positive Valence. The remaining 11 items, which loaded on the second factor, 
denote negative and generally aversive emotions and feelings. Therefore, I call the 
second factor Negative Valence.  
The two factors of Positive Valence and Negative Valence describe in a very 
general way that the emotions in gameplay can be divided into two basic categories 
of being unwanted and wanted not unlike our other everyday experiences. However, 
I was interested to explore whether experiencing emotions of positive and negative 
valence in gameplay can be further divided into sub-categories or factors. Thus, I re-
peated the exploratory factor analysis independently first with the items that loaded 
on the Positive Valence factor and then with the items that showed > .50 loading on 
the Negative Valence factor. 
 
 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
Exaltation (2)  0.6663 0.4445 
Relief (5)  0.5325 0.5462 
Amusement (6) 0.6882  0.4292 
Passion (7)  0.5691 0.5927 
Enthusiasm (9) 0.5873 0.5532 0.3491 
Excitement (10)  0.7025 0.4675 
Interest (12) 0.6882  0.3068 
Pleasure (13) 0.7389  0.3495 
Happiness (15) 0.7683  0.3473 
Determination (17) 0.5638 0.5405 0.3900 
Relaxation (18) 0.7257  0.4459 
Attentiveness (21)  0.5816 0.4464 
Activeness (22) 0.5394 0.5696 0.3846 
Satisfaction (24) 0.7507  0.3332 
Curiosity (25) 0.6423  0.3391 
Surprise (27)  0.6449 0.4071 
Pride (28) 0.5136  0.4909 
Mean 5.3715 4.7541  
Std. Dev. 1.1127 1.2074  
Alpha 0.9446 0.8862  
 
Table 15. Factor loading (> 0.5), uniqueness and descriptive statistics for the items 
loaded on the Positive Valence factor (N=1,718). 
 
The MAP test suggested that two factors should be extracted from both the Positive 
Valence and Negative Valence. The second-order exploratory factor analysis for the 
items of Positive Valence resulted in a solution in which all of the 17 items showed 
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higher than .50 loading on a scale. I retained the first solution as specified in Table 
15. 
Eight items loaded on the first sub-factor of the Positive Valence scale. These 
items describe that the player appreciates the positive emotions and feelings of happi-
ness, satisfaction, amusement, pleasure, relaxation, interest, curiosity and pride. These 
items all characterize occurrences in which an individual experiences ease and is cer-
tain that her skills and abilities are sufficient. In such a situation, one may feel relaxed 
and safe enough to be curious about trying new things. An experience of self-pride 
may follow from such a situation. I label the first sub-factor of Positive Valence as 
Comfort.  
Six items loaded on the second factor that further specify the positive emo-
tions and feelings players attach to gameplay. These items were excitement, attentive-
ness, passion, surprise, exaltation and relief. In contrast to Factor 1 (Table 15), the 
items of Factor 2 signify a higher level of focus, concentration and attention alloca-
tion, and the possibility to be surprised in a gameplay. The items further stand for the 
relief that may follow from such a situation. I call this sub-factor of positive emotions 
Thrill.  
Three items cross-loaded between the two factors. These were the items of 
enthusiasm, activeness and determination. This observation indicates that three emo-
tions are relevant for all positive emotions and feelings players perceive to be related 
to gameplay experiences. 
I then continued to repeat a similar factor analysis for the 11 items that loaded 
on the Negative Valence scale (Table 14). Again, I retained the first solutions since all 
the 11 items showed a loading over > .50 on a factor:  
 
 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
Distress (1) 0.5605 0.5384 0.3959 
Contempt (3)  0.8219 0.1951 
Shame (4)  0.8449 0.1562 
Disgust (8) 0.5893 0.6327 0.2524 
Shock (11) 0.7447  0.2908 
Embarrassment (14)  0.6805 0.326 
Fear (16) 0.7701  0.2765 
Sadness (19) 0.7820  0.2559 
Guilt (20) 0.6867 0.5446 0.2318 
Frustration (23)  0.5934 0.4593 
Anger (26) 0.6856 0.5004 0.2796 
Mean 2.8420 2.4767  
Std. Dev. 1.4376 1.2764  
Alpha 0.9134 0.8872  
 
Table 16. Factor loading (> 0.5), uniqueness and descriptive statistics for the items 




From Table 16 we can note that five items clearly showed higher loadings on the first 
factor, whereas four items loaded on the second factor. The items distress (1) and 
disgust (8) cross-loaded between the two factors and those emotions cannot therefore 
be regarded as distinctive to either of the identified dimensions of negative emotional 
valence in gameplay. 
The five items that loaded on the first factor stand for the perceived emotional 
states of shock, fear, anger, sadness and guilt. I interpret that these items describe 
experiencing a threat and then the misfortune that may follow from such an experien-
tial episode. Intriguingly, the items of the first factor may be understood as an experi-
ence of thrill that went bad. This could connect the first sub-factor of the Negative 
Valence with the second sub-factor of the Positive Valence, i.e., Thrill. When an ex-
citing situation leads to shock and fear, and goes badly, experiences of loss may occur. 
I call this sub-factor Disaster, and hypothesize that it could be the counterpart for the 
sub-factor of positive Thrill.  
Finally, the four items that loaded on the second sub-factor of Negative Va-
lence denote emotional experiences of embarrassment, frustration, shame and (self-) 
contempt. These items can be interpreted to denote that the emotions one feels when 
she is incapable or unable to achieve what she desires. She may feel frustrated in the 
situation or embarrassed and ashamed. In contrast to the sub-factor Comfort, these 
items describe feelings of being uncomfortable, and emotions associated to feeling let 
down and Disappointment.  I propose that based on the data of 1,718 respondents, the 
most common feelings in gameplay as perceived by the players can be divided into 
two main categories of positive and negative valences, and further into the four sub-
categories of Comfort, Thrill, Disaster, and Disappointment.  
I conclude this chapter by studying how the identified seven player types dif-
fer from each other in relation to how they appreciate emotional qualities of gameplay 
experience. For this purpose, I calculated mean preference sums of the four factors of 
emotional valence for each of the seven player types, male and female players and 
those players who play mobile games relatively often but other games relatively rarely 
(see Chapter 3, Study 1).  
The results shown in Table 17 suggest that, in general, players appreciate 
emotions associated with positive valence much more than those associated with neg-
ative valence. The player types of The Mercenary, The Adventurer, and The Com-
mander find gameplay experiences of high arousal more pleasant than the player types 
of The Patterner and The Companion. Importantly, Table 17 shows that weekly play 
time has an evident impact on the preference to experiencing strong emotions in game-
play. The more time a player allocates to videogames, the more emotions she desires 
to experience in gameplay. This observation seems to support the argument made by 
Nowak et al. (2008): an expert player may find games more emotionally rewarding, 
and this may be result of an experience of heightened presence and involvement (see 
















Mercenary 5.52 3.16 4.59 1027 336 
Adventurer 5.51 2.86 4.47 911 179 
Commander 5.28 2.63 4.24 819 323 
Daredevil 4.56 3.52 4.15 648 250 
Explorer 5.27 1.93 3.96 629 272 
Companion 4.91 2.14 3.82 635 138 
Patterner 4.54 2.08 3.58 604 226 
Male 5.16 3.00 4.31 807 928 
Female 5.06 2.26 3.97 731 790 
Player/Mobile 4.82 2.29 3.83 465 238 
Player/Non-mobile 5.16 2.72 4.20 821 1480 
 Positive Valence     Negative Valence   
 Comfort Thrill Disaster Disappointment Obs 
Mercenary 5.70 5.22 3.50 2.76 336 
Adventurer 5.73 5.20 3.33 2.27 179 
Commander 5.53 4.89 2.88 2.39 323 
Daredevil 4.71 4.35 3.58 3.50 250 
Explorer 5.61 4.80 1.96 1.93 272 
Companion 5.28 4.42 2.22 2.09 138 
Patterner 4.87 4.14 2.09 2.11 226 
Male 5.35 4.86 3.24 2.74 928 
Female 5.40 4.62 2.38 2.16 790 
Player/Mobile 5.17 4.31 2.36 2.24 238 
Player/Non-mobile 5.40 4.82 2.92 2.52 1480 
 
Table 17. The mean preferences sums for Positive Valence, Negative Valence, and 
the four sub-categories of Comfort, Thrill, Disaster, and Disappointment for the seven 
player types, male and female players, and mobile game players. 
 
All of the seven player types appreciated the Comfort dimension over the Thrill di-
mension in Positive Valence. However, the difference between favoring Comfort and 
Thrill was highest in the player types Companion and Patterner. The data of the 1,718 
respondents suggests, then, that players generally enjoy the feeling of ease and cer-
tainty more than that of continuous excitement and attentiveness. 
From the dimensions of Negative Valence, we can note that feelings of Dis-
aster were regarded more acceptable than those of Disappointment and letdown. The 
player types of The Daredevil, The Mercenary, and The Adventurer had neutral opin-
ions of feeling Disaster in gameplay, whereas The Explorer especially found both the 
feeling types of Disaster and Disappointment very unwelcome. Only The Daredevil 
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had a neutral opinion of Disappointment. For all the other six player types, the feelings 
of self-contempt, shame, embarrassment and frustration were ill-favored. 
According to the data, both male and female players appreciate positive emo-
tions clearly more than negative emotions. However, female players dislike gameplay 
experiences of negative valence much more strongly than male players. Female play-
ers desire Comfort slightly more and Thrill slightly less than male players. Between 
the two genders, the difference of preferred emotions is largest in feelings of Disaster; 
while male players have an almost neutral opinion about fear, anger and other emo-
tions of Disaster, female players clearly dislike these emotions. Similar to female 
players but unlike male players, mobile game players enjoyed Comfort much more 
than Thrill and showed a clear dislike for emotional experiences of Disaster. The re-
sults I report in Table 17 suggest that, in general, male players enjoy a higher level of 
arousal in gameplay than female players, and that PC and console gamers enjoy emo-
tional experiences more than mobile game players. 
These results indicate that different player types do not differ greatly from 
each other but instead have consistent similarities in what kinds of emotions are con-
sidered pleasant in gameplay. However, I continued to investigate this question by 
calculating the multivariable linear regression between players’ preferences in ga-
meplay motifeme factors and the proposed four factors in emotional gameplay expe-
rience. In this final analysis, I assigned the four emotion factors of Comfort, Thrill, 
Disaster and Disappointment as dependent variables and the five gameplay factors of 
Assault, Manage, Journey, Care, and Coordinate as independent variables.  
A linear regression analysis is utilized to estimate the effect that a change in 
an independent variable may have on a dependent variable. By conducting theory-
driven linear regressions, a researcher studies to which extent an independent variable 
predicts an effect in the dependent outcome variable. However, linear regression anal-
yses do not by themselves imply causal relationship between an independent variable 
and a dependent variable (Schneider et al., 2010; Yan & Su, 2009). By following this 
procedure, I studied with linear regressions how a positive change in the preference 
for Assault and the other four gameplay motifeme factors predicted a change in the 
preference for the four factors of emotions in gameplay. 
In Table 18, the first number signifies the coefficient or the strength and di-
rection of the relationship between an independent predictor variable and a dependent 
output variable. The asterisks next to these numbers indicate the p-values or the sta-
tistical significance of each effect.  The numbers in brackets are values for robust 
standard errors for the coefficient. Finally, values of the R-squared stand for the 
amount of variance of the outcome variable is explained by the five motifeme factors, 
and the additional control variables of gender and age of the survey respondents.  
The regression analyses in Table 18 reveal that Journey is the main predictor 
for both Comfort and Thrill. This means that a higher value in a player’s preference 
in Journey predicts a higher value in the emotional sub-factors of Positive Valence. 
Enjoying exploration, collecting rare items, developing a character, and the story ele-
ments of a game are thus connected with favoring feelings such as pleasure, happiness, 





 POSITIVE VALENCE NEGATIVE VALENCE 
VARIABLES Comfort Thrill Disaster Disappointment 
     
Assault -0.069*** 0.060*** 0.468*** 0.359*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.024) 
Manage 0.120*** 0.072*** -0.062* 0.082** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.037) (0.032) 
Journey 0.408*** 0.393*** -0.017 -0.288*** 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.034) (0.032) 
Care -0.121*** -0.031* 0.179*** 0.245*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) 
Coordinate 0.083*** 0.112*** -0.018 0.065*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) 
Male -0.108** 0.073 0.354*** 0.228*** 
 (0.051) (0.050) (0.064) (0.061) 
Age 0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 3.274*** 2.034*** 0.921*** 0.822*** 
 (0.167) (0.157) (0.163) (0.160) 
     
Observations 1,718 1,718 1,718 1,718 
R-squared 0.345 0.463 0.412 0.287 
 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, and * p < 0.05 
 
Table 18. Results for regression analyses between the predictor variables of prefer-
ences in five gameplay motifeme categories and the outcome variables of four factors 
in emotional gameplay (N=1,718).  
 
In addition to Journey, a preference in Manage was also connected to enjoying Com-
fort, although this effect was weak. Preferring Care and being male predicted a lower 
preference for Comfort, but this negative effect was also weak. Preferring Coordinate 
weakly predicted an increase in the preference for excitement and Thrill. Assault was 
clearly the main predictor for both Disaster and Disappointment. Enjoying killing, 
shooting, warfare, destroying and surviving were significant predictors for a higher 
preference of e.g., shock, fear, anger and shame in gameplay. Also, being male pre-
dicted a higher approval for emotions of negative valence, and favoring Care pre-
dicted a higher preference in both Disaster and Disappointment with a weak positive 
effect. Finally, desire for Journey indicated a dislike for emotional experiences of 
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Disappointment. Interestingly, age had no positive or negative effect on the players’ 
preferences in emotions in gameplay.  
Based on these regression analyses, the data of 1,718 respondents suggests 
that an appreciation for Journey is a main predictor for wanting a gameplay experience 
to bring about positive emotions and feelings, whereas a preference for Assault is a 
main predictor for a higher preference for experiencing emotions of negative valence. 
These results indicate that female players prefer gameplay experience to bring about 
mostly positive emotions while male players tolerate emotions of negative valence. 
Although these statistical studies indicate that players desire gameplay to 
bring about mainly positive feelings of certainty and ease, and those of excitement 
and thrill, it cannot be concluded based on this data that feelings of Negative Valence 
would not be important for memorable and engaging gameplay experiences. Often-
times, the most meaningful gameplay experiences may combine feelings of Positive 
Valence and Negative Valence, and perhaps also Comfort, Thrill, Disaster, and Dis-
appointment.  
As a conclusion of this chapter, we can observe that gameplay motifemes or 
“abstracted descriptions of activities enabled by game dynamics and enacted by per-
formative play, defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of the 
game” and emotions are closely interrelated. Whereas emotions are current, inten-
tional and goal-oriented activities that motivate an individual to act, gameplay mo-
tifemes are characterizations and representations of specific types of goal-oriented ac-
tivities. By preferring one game motifeme over another, a person therefore indicates 
a motivation to participate and perform in specific kinds of emotional episodes. For 
example, we would have certain expectations of the range of emotions that we would 
probably encounter in the event of training a pet dog (Table 7, item 21). This emo-
tional spectrum differs significantly from the range of emotions we would expect from 
a situation in which we would search for and collect rare items (Table 7, item 18) or 
when we would try to knock our enemies unconscious by hitting and kicking them 
(Table 7, item 8).  
Anyone who has played video games is very likely to agree that gameplay 
induces emotions. Although emotions may manifest themselves differently in social 
play than in solitary play, we begin gameplay with a strong expectation to feel a range 
of emotions. As the analyses of this chapter reveal, we do not expect or enjoy a similar 
range of emotions in every instance of gameplay. I return to the theme of emotions in 
Chapter 8, in which I approach the research subject of meaningful gameplay by ana-
lyzing players’ qualitative descriptions of their most memorable experiences of play-
ing video games.     
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7. GAMEWORLD AND THE GAME ENACTMENT 
 
We are involved with the world around us. We are in it and of it (Noë, 
2009, p. 82). 
 
 
In Chapter 6, I investigated the position of the player, which I argue to be profoundly 
performative and emotional. In the current chapter, I return my focus to the coupling 
between a player and a video game by asking whether the phenomenon of gameplay 
can be considered a performance. This is a crucial question to be asked since examin-
ing this question opens new horizons for understanding ‘gameplay’ as a form of cul-
tural expression and experience.  
I begin this chapter by first considering how ‘performance’ has been appro-
priated in prior game research literature, and proceed to analyze how the term has 
been conceptualized in folkloristics. By doing so, I aim to examine what the folklor-
istic understanding of the concept adds to game studies (RQ3). In the second half of 
the chapter, I will introduce another important concept, that of ‘the gameworld,’ and 
I cogitate how the player participates in it during video game gameplay. I conclude 
the chapter with an empirical analysis on how players perceive and appreciate various 
qualities of video game gameworlds and their fictionality (RQ2). 
The questions of whether the phenomenon of gameplay can be understood as 
a type of performance, and what is ‘the gameworld’ that the player enacts in game-
play, are paramount when investigating the invariants of the gameplay experience 
(RQ1). To rephrase these questions, I ask: 1) “What is the ‘gameplay’ like as a cultural 
phenomenon? Is it best described and analyzed as a type of cultural performance?” 
and 2) “When the player engages with a game and participates in it, what kind of 
participation we are dealing with?” 
 
 
Gameplay—a cultural performance? 
 
Brian Sutton-Smith (2001 [1997], p. 192) wondered in his influential book The Am-
biguity of Play why there was no appropriate ludic performance theory with which to 
study gameplay. He stated that: “existing folklore performance theory emphasizes 
performance as aesthetic communication… that theory should be promising for un-
derstanding the centrality of the actions in play.” However, to date there is no folklor-
istic performance theory for examining gameplay regardless of the fact that ‘perfor-
mance’ has evolved into a key concept in game studies.  
Michael Nitsche (2011, p. 110) observes that performance as an inclusive 
concept has been applied in a wide range of game studies during past two decades. He 
sees ‘performance’ to have affinities with, e.g., the ergodic interaction (Aarseth, 1997, 
p. 1) of gameplay in which “non-trivial effort is required… to traverse the 
[cyber]text,” the approach of “computers as theatre” (Laurel, 2004), and role of the 
player in computer-player interaction (Murray, 1997).  
Indeed, the concept of ‘performance’ is far from unfamiliar to game scholars. 
To mention but a few, Fine (2002 [1983], p. 4) argues that the players must “bracket” 
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their selves and enact a fantasy self to perform in tabletop role-playing games. In Cy-
bertext (1997, p. 4), Aarseth describes the player’s position in relation to a cybertext 
as “personal improvisation.” Mäyrä (2008, p. 14) states that the basic characteristic of 
playing games is performance. Nardi (2010, p. 93) writes “participation in virtual 
worlds is not simulation but performance.” Roger Travis (2012, pp. 239–241) ap-
proaches gaming as manifestations of re-compositional processes in which “the player 
chooses how he or she will re-compose the performance materials of the game to pro-
duce his or her current performance.”  
From the many essays, articles, theses and books that describe gameplay or 
player participation as performance, two main traits can be identified. To present the 
traits, let us consider how Thomas Malaby (2007) and Jaakko Stenros, Janne Paavi-
lainen and Frans Mäyrä (2011) have utilized the term ‘performance.’  
Malaby (2007, pp. 103–104) defines performance as one of the four contin-
gency types found in games. For him, player performance comes to mean contingency 
of correctly performed actions that always risk a failure. Here player performances 
are understood as skillful acts, which Malaby identifies mostly with sports games and 
action-oriented games.  
Stenros, Paavilainen and Mäyrä (2011) describe player performance in a very 
different way. In their view, performance requires an element of aesthetic expression 
which is essentially social: “the player is playing for an audience” (ibid., p. 347). In 
contrast to Malaby’s understanding of player performance, the authors state that, e.g., 
often in SingStar (2004, Sony) “the performance is scored not for points in the game 
but social capital.” For them, player performance includes expressive and creative 
quality intended for audiences; “brilliant performances may have little to do with play-
ing the game properly or to win” (ibid., p. 348). 
It should be observed, that Malaby’s (2007) take on performance as execution 
of the player’s skills discusses the player’s endeavors on the level of individual actions 
whereas Stenros et al. (2011) interpret player performance to be fundamentally social, 
something that exceeds the actual gameplay dimension in a gaming session. Further-
more, Malaby (2007) defines performance as something that the player does during 
gameplay whereas Stenros et al. (2011) discuss performance as something that a gam-
ing event can become. In other words, ‘performance’ can refer to a constituent of 
player-game interaction (Malaby, 2007) or to the whole social situation in which 
player-game interaction takes place (Stenros et al. 2011).  
It should also be noted that gameplay is paramount for both of the approaches; 
a player cannot be skillful only by executing a skillful operation. She must perform a 
series of well-timed and well-thought-out actions, which becomes possible only in the 
dynamics of gameplay. Similarly, performing in, e.g., SingStar in front of the others 
is not just aesthetic expression but aesthetic expression encompassing normative acts 
that enable the video game gameplay to go on. As argued in the activity theoretical 
approach by Victor Kaptelinin and Bonnie Nardi, an activity becomes purposeful on 
the level of the activity as a whole (here: gameplay) instead of the level of singular 
actions or operations (Kaptelinin & Nardi 2006, pp. 59–72). Indeed, as Kiri Miller 
(2008, p. 264) contends, research that aims to study meaningful play should focus on 
play sessions and gameplay rather than on the game writ large. 
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Related earlier research describes player performance mainly as either skilled execu-
tion (Malaby 2007; cf. Jenkins 2004, p. 125) or aesthetic expression (Stenros et al. 
2011; cf. Pearce 2009, p. 59). It should be observed that these studies argue that per-
formance is a recurrent characteristic (Stenros et al., 2011) or a necessary quality 
(Malaby, 2007; Karhulahti, 2015b) of playing video games.  
In addition, there are also a few studies in which the gameplay has been ar-
gued to be a performance of its own right. In these views, performance is not some-
thing the player does or something that gameplay may become in a social setting, but 
something that gameplay is as a phenomenon. For example, Bealer (2012, p. 31) urges 
game scholars to conceptualize gamespace as an “imaginative place of performance 
and presence where behaviors generate immediate and material consequences.” Nardi 
(2010, p. 93) states that “participation in virtual worlds is not simulation but perfor-
mance.” Miller (2012, p. 5) takes a similar stance in her ethnographic analysis of 
Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas (RockStar Games, 2004): “Grand Theft Auto is pri-
marily a single-player game, but no one ever plays it alone; each player collaborates 
with the game designers to turn code into virtual performance, while remaining aware 
that millions of other players have engaged in the same endeavor.  
I argue in Chapter 6 that video game gameplay is, when considered from the 
first-person viewpoint of the player, a performative practice of self-presentation. 
When we play a video game, however, is the activity that emerges to be understood 
as a performance? To analyze this question further, let me introduce how the concept 
of ‘performance’ has been defined in folkloristics and performance studies. 
Richard Bauman (2012), who has studied, e.g., performative communication, 
ethnography of speaking, intertextuality and language ideologies extensively for four 
decades, has characterized performances as situated communicative acts of doing in 
which a subject claims to have special skills or expertise and seeks the limelight. 
When performing, one takes a stance, accepts responsibility and puts oneself forward, 
knowing that a performance includes a risk of failure. Performance is an interactive 
event that aims to elicit participative energies of the participants. It intensifies experi-
ence and heightens affective engagement. Formalization, intensification, enhanced 
self-consciousness, and the call of attention to the style of interaction makes a scene 
more performance-like (Abrahams, 2005, pp. 89, 91). Dell Hymes (1975, p. 18) offers 
another useful take on ‘performance’ by contrasting it with everyday ‘behavior’ and 
‘conduct’: “[T]here is behavior, anything and everything that happens; there is con-
duct, behavior under the aegis of social norms, cultural rules; there is performance, 
when one or more persons assume responsibility for presentation.” 
In Theories of Performance (2008), Elizabeth Bell reviews a large body of 
definitions of ‘performance’ from, e.g., anthropology, art history, folkloristics, eth-
nography, linguistics and philosophy. She notes (ibid., pp. 12–18) that existing theo-
ries account for performance mainly as a process and a product “doing and a thing 
done.” Performances can reflect and imitate (mimesis) the world of values, make and 
create (poiesis) value-laden worlds, as well as break the worlds and remake them anew 
(kinesis). As a result of her literature review, Bell offers three overarching themes that 
she argues that performances include and that are paramount for understanding per-
formances: constitutive, epistemic and critical dimensions.  
Performance is constitutive. It is created, given form and established through 
enacting. Identities and even cultures are argued to be constituted in performances in 
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which we create and recreate ourselves, e.g., as family members, citizens, profession-
als, and hobbyists. Second, performance is epistemic, since it arises as a distinctive 
way of knowing ourselves, others and the world around us. A performance epistemol-
ogy is grounded on immediacy, involvement, and intimacy (Conquergood, 1998, p. 
26). Finally, performance is critical. It is about the power to sustain or transform by 
taking a reflexive stance that entails responsibility for one’s actions; “Performance 
holds possibilities to imitate a life-world, to create a life-world, to transform a life-
world, and to stake claims about that life-world” (Bell, 2008, pp. 18–25).     
One can note that Bauman’s (2012) characterization of performance has many 
similarities to my approach on the player’s performative participation in gameplay. 
First, where a performer takes a stance, she adopts the player position by embracing 
a lusory attitude. Second, a performer claims to have special expertise and skill. Sim-
ilarly, a player must navigate skillfully in a game environment in order to proceed in 
the game. Third, a performer acknowledges the risk of failure. A player knows this 
risk and aims to take normative acts to continue the gameplay. Both forms of partici-
pation are expressive and communicative, both are affective, and both tend to elicit 
participative energies for those who are present.88  
When compared with Dell Hyme’s descriptions of ‘behavior,’ ‘conduct’ and 
‘performance,’ we can again note that the position of the player is similar to that of 
performance since the player is quintessentially responsible for the presentation. Yet, 
performances also entail “openness of presentation,” which makes it possible to eval-
uate the activity as aesthetically and morally significant (Abrahams, 2005, p. 84). This 
latter quality seems to be incomplete in the position of the player for two reasons: 1) 
the openness is held down by the rules of the game and the game mechanics, and 2) 
the position of the player encompasses “reduced personal responsibility” according to 
which the decisions made and the actions taken by the player matter only within the 
ongoing game. Players are, indeed, “relieved of accountability for their actions and 
motives” (ibid., p. 85).  
Furthermore, and similar to Bell’s description of performance, gameplay is 
constitutive. A main argument of Chapter 5 is that video game gameplay as a form of 
activity co-constitutes the player proper, i.e., the person who plays, and the game 
proper, i.e., the dynamic system of the game as played. I also argue for player persona, 
a first-person presentation of the self in gameplay which is, again, constituted in the 
acts of gameplay. Gameplay is epistemic since each gameplay activity arises as a way 
of knowing the player–game relation, the rules-system of the game, and contingencies 
of the game; gameplay is a conduct of knowing. Inasmuch as the player can express 
her values in explorative and coordinative conduct, gameplay is critical. In gameplay, 
we make statements by participating. Adopting the player’s position requires a reflec-
tive stance that can become a reflexive stance in which we examine how we are in-
volved in creating decisions in gameplay and what kind of values we express in our 
activities.  
                                                 
88 However, as Brian Sutton-Smith (2001 [1997], p. 193) reflects, Bauman probably would not 
have included gameplay in his performance theory since he emphasized verbal communication 




However, there are also differences between performance and performative gameplay 
that must be taken into careful consideration. First and foremost, performances are, in 
many theories (e.g. Goffman, 1959; Bauman, 1975; Schechner, 1988 [1978]; Abra-
hams, 2005; see Bell, 2008, p. 30), defined as interactive acts between social agents, 
such as performers and partakers, or performers and audiences. As Bauman describes 
in his influential article Verbal Art as Performance (1975), such an interactive act 
entails special competence, heightened experience, and audience evaluation. “Perfor-
mance makes one communicatively accountable; it assigns to an audience the respon-
sibility of evaluating the relative skill and effectiveness of the performer’s accom-
plishment” (Bauman, 1992, p. 44).  
Although uploading a series of artistic photos that one has taken onto her pro-
file page in a social media website does not necessarily have an immediate audience 
of which the “performer” would be aware, the act of uploading a photo is done be-
cause of the others. In other words, the intentional object of uploading such photos is 
another subject, granted that one can upload photos to social media allegedly for just 
oneself, for example to produce an online photo gallery for one’s own purposes. In 
most situations of gameplay, however, there is no audience present, only a player-
participant or several player-participants. 
Second, and even more importantly, performance as a form of event is about 
re-presenting rather than presenting. Goffman (1959, p. 65) characterizes performance 
by and large as idealized communication that accentuates certain traits and conceals 
others. A performance requires from the performer sufficient self-control and mainte-
nance of expressive coherence; “Instead of merely doing his task and giving vent to 
his feelings, he will express the doing in his task and acceptably convey his feelings… 
the representation of an activity will vary in some degree from the activity itself and 
therefore inevitably misrepresent it.” Bauman (1992, pp. 46–48) argues along similar 
lines that performances are reflexive, that is, performances have a feature of double-
ness to comment upon experiences (see Bell, 2008, p. 10). Now, if we conceptualize 
performance similarly as Goffman did, we must pay attention here to two remarks, 
“express the doing” and “representation of an activity,” since here ultimately lies the 
reason why I argue that gameplay as a phenomenon is not to be regarded a perfor-
mance. 
Gameplay is an expressive act of doing. As a phenomenon, however, it is not 
an activity in which the player necessarily would intend to express doing. Instead, 
gameplay remains an activity that is this doing in its own right. Although adopting the 
player’s position entails a third-person view on oneself as being another intentional 
agent, gameplay itself is not intrinsically re-presentation of an activity but a presen-
tation, a realization of it. “Video games are actions,” as argued by Galloway (2006, p. 
2). In contrast to Goffman’s take on performances as being something else than 
“merely doing,” gameplay preserves itself just as doing, praxis, and enacting a per-
formative perspective on the gameworld. Whereas “a representation of an activity 
will… inevitably misrepresent it” (Goffman, 1959, p. 65) and thus be something else 
than the activity itself, gameplay as a presentation converges with that activity and 
therefore cannot misinterpret itself. 
In the Husserlian tradition of phenomenology, perception is presentational, 
whereas imagination and memory are re-presentational. In a perceptual experience, 
an object, for instance an in-game dragon, is experienced as present and accessible to 
us, thanks to our sensory awareness of it and the game mechanics that define the 
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modes of interaction we can have with the dragon. The dragon appears in front of us 
in its digital ‘bodily’ being and its pre-reflectively perceived intentionality. However, 
when we think back to our encounter with that dragon or when we imagine what it 
could be like to ride that dragon, we are dealing with a re-presentational experience. 
In a re-presentational experience, the dragon is not there but phenomenally absent; 
“[A] re-presentational experience intends its object precisely as both phenomenally 
absent in its bodily being, and as mentally evoked or brought forth... in this way, the 
object is said to be mentally re-presented, rather than perceptually presented” 
(Thompson, 2010, p. 164; Thompson, 2007, p. 25). 
The dragon we encounter during gameplay is presentational in relation to its 
presence; it is a question of how we can gain access to it by making actions (move-
ment-dependence) and how our perception of it changes when the dragon acts (object-
dependence) (see Noë, 2012). In contrast to the movement-dependent and object-de-
pendent dragon, which we may encounter in the flow of the gameplay, a picture of the 
dragon has very limited accessibility. Whereas perception is presentational, picture-
viewing not unlike imagination is re-presentational. Thus, in gameplay, we encounter 
the dragon as presentational inasmuch as it is immediately and directly accessible to 
our skills and abilities. However, when the player is, for example, returned to a posi-
tion of watching a cut-scene of that dragon during a gaming session, the dragon does 
not appear to us as present but approaches again a more re-presentational form of 
experiencing.  
Sartre writes (2003 [1957], pp. 83–84): “The attentive pupil who wishes to be 
attentive, his eyes riveted on the teacher, his ears open wide, so exhausts himself in 
playing the attentive role that he ends up by no longer hearing anything.” Based on 
this passage, Goffman (1959, p. 33) suggests that individuals must often choose to 
either express or act: “Those who have the time and talent to perform a task well may 
not, because of this, have the time or talent to make it apparent that they are perform-
ing well.” Here we can note again the two dimensions of performativity: the act of 
performing something and the act of making that performing available to others, i.e., 
staging it in front of an audience. The position of the player is that of performing 
something rather than staging the performance for the others. Furthermore, I would 
like to suggest that sports also converge with the former, although sports events are 
staged as performances before audiences. Similarly, we can argue that this is case for 
electronic sports, or esports, as well. In competitive esports competitions, e.g., with 
the game Counter-Strike: Source (Valve Corporation, 2004), the players cannot focus 
on re-presenting their skillful moves for the audience. Focusing on anything but the 
ongoing frantic gameplay would surely mean instant death. 
The tension between expressing something and living through it did not es-
cape Goffman’s study on presentation of the self as a performance. He emphasized 
(1959, pp. 77–79) that “performance serves mainly to express the characteristics of 
the task that is performed and not the characteristics of the performer.” What is of 
paramount importance in performances is the manner by which the task is brought 
forth by the performer. Furthermore, the personal front of a person is not to be inter-
preted single-mindedly as the way the person would like to appear but also as a tool 
for influencing others and the person’s immediate environment. Finally, performances 
are co-constituted and co-sustained activities rather than personal or individual efforts.  
196 
 
Here we can see further synergies between the position of the player in reciprocal 
gameplay and presentation of self as a performance as argued by Goffman. In game-
play, the player embraces a position through which he makes decisions and acts. In 
this position, the player precisely expresses “the characteristics of the task that is per-
formed” and oneself in that relation. This is done by the means of enacting and reali-
zation rather than by re-presentation. For compelling gameplay experiences to arise, 
the manner in which the player adopts to conduct this “performance of a task” is cru-
cial.  
In gameplay, the player does not have intentions for the others, i.e., an audi-
ence, or even oneself but for that of her participation in the gameworld. Although 
gameplay can be easily staged as performance by, e.g., posting dramatized let’s play 
videos on youtube, intending something beyond the very activity of gameplay is not 
to be taken as a definitional quality of gameplay. In contrast, gameplay has its purpose 
in itself; gameplay is both praxis, doing, for its own purpose and poiesis, making, 
creating and establishing one’s own perspective by doing and participating. Fink 
(2016 [1960], p. 114) argued: “The image is essentially a product, play essentially the 
act of producing.” As such, gameplay is not re-presenting but presenting and bringing 
forth a perspective.  
The play within a performance has the distinctive character of display. A per-
formance states: “This is just pretending” as it is built on the relationship between the 
original and the imitation that is staged in the performance (Abrahams, 1982, p.6). As 
Abrahams (ibid.) observes, to witness something that is displayed is to observe the 
shown rather than the unknown. Play and gameplay, however, are never just pretend-
ing, representing, displaying (unfold), or showing— they are, above all, revealing, 
presenting, playing (folding), and doing. This argument is to be contrasted with that 
of Richard Schechner (1988 [1978], p. 30), who argues that games and play are per-
formances that include “the [definitional] function of audience,” although such an au-
dience would not be actually present. Instead, “a game is still a game, not a perfor-
mance,” as Abrahams (2005, 83) contends. In my view, Fink (1968, p. 21) was indeed 
correct to argue that play is in this sense autonomous; “[P]lay is characterized by calm, 
timeless ‘presence’ and autonomous, self-sufficient meaning.”  
 
 
The Game Enactment 
 
If gameplay is not to be characterized as performance, how it should be conceptual-
ized? I suggest that we could turn our attention to a closely related folkloristic concept, 
‘enactment.’ In 1977, Roger Abrahams published an article entitled Toward an En-
actment-Centered Theory of Folklore in which he attempted to put forward a theory 
for studying how expressivity manifests in practices and materials of folklore.  
At the heart of Abrahams’ (1977) endeavor is the realization that expressions 
of tradition mark the moments of cultural, personal and social meaning-making. He 
situated his theoretical article into the discourses of folklore as process and folklore 
as performance, both of which had gained much folkloristic academic attention in the 
1960s and 1970s. Abrahams’ article was a response to the recognition that a number 
of vernacular events, including games and rituals, were difficult to understand as per-
formances, which threatened to stretch the concept of performance out of its shape.  
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Abrahams introduced the term ‘enactment’ as a broad category that includes perfor-
mances as well as games, play and sports; rituals; and festivities. In short, for him, 
enactments were cultural events of potentiated and encouraged participation. Activi-
ties performed in enactments have a sense of realness and unrealness— “[U]nreal be-
cause of the felt departure from the ordinary toward the more heightened, self-con-
scious and stylized behaviors of named and framed activities-in-common; more real 
because the events take the motives and scenes of the everyday and bring them into 
some new perspective, allowing us to see them as part of some larger patterns of ex-
istence” (Abrahams, 1977, pp. 80–81). In enactments, ordinary objects, scenes or mo-
tives may be transformed into another, while retaining their mimetic connectedness 
and verisimilitude, i.e., the sense of truthfulness, to everyday life. Through this conti-
nuity, or making-strange as described by Abrahams (ibid., p. 89), the events that take 
place within an enactment appear to us as patterned, marked, and intensified.  
When describing the realms of enactments, Abrahams followed Alfred Schütz 
by positing a “paramount reality” that both precedes and follows our participation in 
any enactment. Abrahams contented that one must postulate a paramount reality be-
cause we, without effort, can separate what is a heightened experience and what is 
not. That what is not heightened is the paramount reality “against which all other re-
alities appear as finite and circumscribed provinces of meaning” (Abrahams, 1977, p. 
92). The other realities he described as ‘enclaves,’ areas of rules and authority.  
Importantly, Abrahams noted that enactments constitute genres of interac-
tion, that is, “set patterns of interaction with developmental expectations” (ibid., p. 
98). He suggested that enactments are marked and restricted by tools and devices that 
foreground movement and form for the participants. Enactments differ from others 
and from everyday experiences with regard to the regularity, predictability, redun-
dancy and preparation. To put it differently, enactments arise as patterned scenes of 
cultural behavior. Because they are patterned, they are available for re-enactment, and 
so we have strong expectations, responses and sensibilities for them.  
Abrahams thus emphasized (1977, pp. 99–100) the significance of patterned 
experience in all enactments, but he also noted that such patterns emerge in paramount 
reality, e.g., in courtship. This observation led him to suggest that there is no clear-cut 
distinction between finite worlds or enclaves and that of paramount reality. Instead, 
formality, regularity and social rules that are definitional qualities of enactments are 
pervasive in our everyday experience of paramount reality. An enactment, however, 
increases this everyday experience and dramatizes it into a stylized experience. Be-
tween enactments and paramount reality there exist both continuities and dialectic 
relationships. Therefore, any scene, ordinary or not, can be turned into a performance, 
a game, a ritual or a festivity (Abrahams, 1977, p. 108). 
Abrahams argued (ibid., pp. 100–103) that the types of enactments, i.e., artis-
tic performances; rituals; festivities; and play, games and sports are discrete because 
each are situated culturally differently by identifiable codes of participation and ex-
pressivity, conventions, occasions and conducts. We readily recognize what is a sport 
event, what is a festivity and what is a ritualized ceremony.  
Where rituals are “obligatory or compulsory patterned behavior attached 
somehow to the larger movements and processes of life” by fixed sequences, which 
are supposed to have transcendental effects beyond the enactment, performances stage 
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individuals to take skillful responsibility of an enactment. Games, in turn, do not stage 
an individual but garner a license to participate, in principle, for everyone and remain 
as immanent without continuity beyond the enactment. Festivities tend to enhance and 
intensify everyday roles. Although these forms of enactments can be treated as dis-
crete, they are oftentimes related and interlocked with each other. A ritual may very 
well include performances, and a festivity can consist largely of games.  
Abrahams’ theory of enactments has received only modest attention in folk-
loristics and in other fields of research. Abrahams himself rarely returned to this theme 
with the same enthusiasm that is evident in the article Toward an Enactment-Centered 
Theory of Folklore (1977). To my knowledge, the article has not been widely dis-
cussed, and it has remained unknown in contemporary game studies, although Brian 
Sutton-Smith underlines the potential importance of the article (2001 [1997], p. 193).  
Similar to Sutton-Smith, I find Abrahams’ considerations very useful, and 
thus I suggest the appropriation of the concept of ‘enactment’ for both game studies 
and folkloristics. However, and again similar to Sutton-Smith (ibid., p. 195), I do not 
postulate paramount reality in the same sense as Schütz and later Abrahams (1977). 
Sutton-Smith suggests that we could rather speak of mundane reality/virtual reality 
than of real/unreal as explicated in the categories of paramount reality/finite provinces 
of meaning.89  
As Abrahams writes later (2005, p. 122), ludic activities depart from the or-
dinary, not by being less real, but by calling our attention to the stylistic, focused and 
intensified qualities of the enactment. Such an activity in which we participate and act 
“at a high pitch” may become valued by us because of its ability to touch both “higher 
and deeper registers of feeling.” In this sense, gameplay may be experienced as very 
real indeed. Perhaps instead of utilizing the concepts of real/unreal to gameplay expe-
rience, we could name it ‘extraordinary,’ an expression appropriated by Abrahams 
(ibid., p. 124) for expressive enactments. 
In the vocabulary of Goffman (2013 [1961]), enactments can be called en-
counters consisting of focused interactions (pp. 7, 17–18). In contrast to unfocused 
interactions that consist of unstructured social interactions that take place in regular 
face-to-face gatherings, focused interactions occur when participants of a situation 
agree to focus their attention on a particular object and give it, therefore, a heightened 
situational relevance. In such encounters, the participants maintain the focus of the 
activity, which encourages or even demands attention from the persons involved in 
the situation.90 In Behavior in Public Places (1966), Goffman introduced an alterna-
tive concept of ‘social occasion’ that is also highly contingent with the term ‘enact-
ment’: “When persons come into each other’s immediate presence they tend to do so 
as participants of what I shall call a social occasion … These occasions, which are 
commonly programmed in advance, possess an agenda of activity, an allocation of 
management function, a specification of negative sanctions for improper conduct, and 
a pre-established unfolding of phases and a highpoint” (Goffman, 1966, pp. 18–19).  
                                                 
89 I consider this subject more in the final chapter of this thesis. 
90 Here Goffman (2013 [1961], p. 11) essentially wrote about autonomy of interaction as an 
achievement of interpersonal efforts and gave gaming as a prime example of such an activity. 
This view is contingent with my argument of the autonomy of gameplay, albeit I argue that 
this autonomous organization can be achieved also in solitary gameplay (Chapter 5). 
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I propose that by bringing together the writings by Abrahams (1977) and Goffman 
(2013 [1961]; 1966), ‘enactment’ can be described a focused cultural encounter in 
which the persons present emerge as participants rather than as audience through the 
dynamic and reciprocal character of the event at hand. By this, I want to emphasize 
that in artistic performances the ‘audience’ is not made up of passive receivers of the 
artistic expression, but rather inseparable subjects of the situation—which the per-
former must take into her constant consideration. Enactments are, similar to social 
occasions in Goffman’s writings, spatiotemporal structured and patterned events that 
include “an agenda of activity” and a set of sociocultural regularities that specify the 
proper conduct for the participants. According to Abrahams (1977, p. 106), enact-
ments are modes of experiencing,91 and as Noë writes (2015), organized activities 
through which we constitute ourselves and are constituted as the persons we are (see 
Korsgaard, 2011).  
Just as Abrahams argues in Everyday Life (2005, p. 83), there is a need to 
develop a folkloristic methodology for analyzing games, similar to how there is a 
folkloristic methodology for studying performances. Although all enactments share 
the quality of expressivity; games, festivities and rituals are not artistic in a similar 
fashion to how performances are. This is not to say that a game cannot be a piece of 
art, but it is instead to emphasize that gameplay is not an artistic event regardless of 
its inherently aesthetic qualities. Just as games have certain similarities to perfor-
mances, they have a close relationship with rituals and festivals, structurally speaking.  
Most enactments are interpersonal in the sense that the immediate situation 
includes more than one autonomous actor, but this is not mandatory. Goffman (1966, 
pp. 21–23) called the events in which there is only one social agent present situated 
activities to contrast them with social interactions proper. Single-player gameplay is 
a situated activity but remains a cultural enactment consisting of a specific patterned 
mode of experiencing and expectations of an emotional structure. Solitary play is 
merely situated but still a form of cultural activity and social participation (see Chapter 
5 and Chapter 6). Thus, we may call solitary gaming situated cultural enactment and 
social gaming situational cultural enactment.  
 In conclusion, game enactment is a type of focused participation in which 
gameplay takes place. Game enactment is not a performance, but the participating 
individual, the player, remains performative within gameplay; there is a performance 
to the player’s participation in gameplay, indeed player performance. More precisely, 
an expectation of performativity of the player is a constituent of a game as a cultural 
enactment. From this position, the player makes decisions and expresses herself by 
making sense of the gameworld.  
 
 
                                                 
91 Abrahams (1977, p. 106) wrote: “I differ from most folklorists and literary critics in viewing 
rites and play as unique types of interactive experience and modes of experiencing. They are 
types of experience in that they both are general terms for a range of specific and situated 
interactional events. They invoke unique modes of experiencing, for they involve the active 
engagement of our form-making abilities, the forms suggested by the type of event as seized 
upon by the enactors.” 
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Umwelt, or Making Sense of the Gameworld 
 
Now that I have suggested that gameplay as a phenomenon is not a performance but 
rather a cultural enactment of performative social participation, I move forward to 
explicate what this participation means in a player’s relation to the video game system 
as an (game)environment and a ‘(game)world.’ In what follows, I argue that ‘game-
world’ is to be understood as the sixth invariant of the phenomenon of gameplay and 
our experience of playing games.  
In Chapter 6, I propose availability as a perspective to understand situational 
presence. Together with a player’s involvement and agency, availability constitutes 
an experience of “being there,” or rather an experience of a transformed agent–envi-
ronment relation, which invariantly changes the player’s experience of self-presence. 
In what follows, I ask what becomes available for the player during gameplay. The 
focus in this section is thus on how the game arises as the environment in which the 
player participates during video game gameplay. To consider these questions, I return 
yet again to phenomenological enactive framework (RQ3).  
 In 1934, an important research article by Estonian-born biologist Jakob von 
Uexküll was published. In the article entitled A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and 
Humans, Uexküll studied animals’ perceptual life-worlds, and coined the term Um-
welt (literally: ‘environment’). The key argument by Uexküll was that even the sim-
plest forms of life, such as insects, have their own holistic Umwelt, an original and 
enduring way to encounter the reality. By developing this argument, Uexküll emerged 
as a forerunner for biosemiotics, ethology, cybernetics, systems biology, complex sys-
tems studies, bioconstructionism and posthumanism. In philosophy, his notion of Um-
welt has inspired many renowned scholars, including Heidegger (Dasein), Derrida, 
Sebeok, Deleuze and Guattari (Sagan, 2010; see Uexküll, 2010 [1934]).  
It is crucial to note that, for Uexküll, as well as for enactivism and for this 
study, the ‘world’ is always a world for someone, for a subject. With the perception 
of the world comes the presupposition that this perception is made by someone, from 
a vantage point of one’s biological and sociocultural existence (von Uexküll, 1926, p. 
xv; Thompson, 2007, p 153). Umwelt is the world as constructed from an experiential 
perspective of an autonomous agent. As such, Umwelt is the semiotic92 world of an 
organism, affected both by its biological organization and its history of interactions 
with the world (Kull, 1998). It is “the phenomenal world or the self-world of the ani-
mal” (Uexküll, 1957 [1934], p. 5; see Sutrop, 2001, pp. 452–456; Winthrop-Young, 
2010, pp. 216–217; Barrett, 2011, p. 80).  
 
We begin… a stroll on a sunny day before a flowering meadow in 
which insects buzz and butterflies flutter, and we make a bubble 
around each of the animals living in the meadow. The bubble repre-
sents each animal’s environment and contains all the features acces-
sible to the subject. As soon as we enter into one such bubble, the 
previous surroundings of the subject are completely reconfigured. 
Many qualities of the colorful meadow vanish completely, others lose 
                                                 
92 Meaning-making could be alternatively called semiosis, which comes from the Greek word 
semeion (Sagan, 2010, p. 14). 
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their coherence with one another, and new connections are created. 
A new world arises in each bubble (Uexküll, 2010 [1934], p. 43). 
 
Now, it is my argument that what happens in gameplay is precisely a reconfiguration 
parallel to what Uexküll described above. To better understand what kind of recon-
figuration we are dealing with in gameplay, let me introduce Uexküll’s theory in a bit 
more detail. 
According to Uexküll (1957 [1934], pp. 6–13), we humans live surrounded 
by perceptual tools and effector tools. Perceptual tools are the devices that aid our 
senses to perceive things otherwise beyond our perception. For example, spectacles, 
speakers and monitors are all perceptual tools. In turn, effector tools are the machines 
that extend our ways to act and have an effect on the world. Cars, computers, weapons 
and factories are examples of effector tools. However, in addition to these tools, we 
humans—indeed all life-forms—have perception organs and effect, i.e., operation or 
acting (Kull, 2001, p. 7), organs.  
Together with perceptual and effector tools, our perception organs and effect 
organs bring about our perceptual world, or the ‘world of senses,’ and our effector 
world, or the ‘world of action’ (Uexküll, 1923, p. 127). “[A]ll that a subject perceives 
becomes his perceptual world and all that he does, his effector world… perceptual and 
effector worlds together form a closed unit, the Umwelt” (Uexküll, 1957 [1934], p. 6).  
The functional cycle (or semiotic cycle as described by Kull, 2001, p. 4) by 
Uexküll (Figure 15; see Uexküll, 1923, p. 126) shows how subject and object are 
coupled with each other and constitute a holistic orderly whole. A simple organism 
may perceive only few aspects of the environment relevant for its meaning-making, 
but we humans as highly complex organisms live in an environment of manifold pos-
sibilities.  
By postulating not only the environment-relation (Umwelt) but also the inner 
world of the subject (Innenwelt), Uexküll’s approach concurs both with cybernetician 
views and with the theory of autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1980), and the phenom-
enological and Husserlian notion of ‘life worlds’ (Brier, 2008, p. 148). In these views, 
the environment, or ‘reality,’ does not have a stream of information as such, but rather 
information and meanings arise from the couplings between subjects and their envi-
ronment. Environment is conceptualized as having constraints, or structure, for the 
possible ways for the organisms to exist in it (Ibid., p. 339). “The environment (Um-
welt) emerges from the world through the actualization or the being of the organism” 






Figure 15. The functional cycle of an organism in its environment (von Uexküll, 
2010 [1934], p. 49). 
 
I suggest that gameplay introduces a change, a reconfiguration to the Umwelt of the 
player. Within gameplay, the perception signs of the environment, previously insig-
nificant for the person, now come to have salience for her and for her continuity as 
the player proper. As they do, a perception sign observed by the player transforms 
into a perception mark, i.e., into a feature, which the player may perceive as desirable 
or undesirable. A feature that a person perceives can also afford action possibilities 
for the person, and thus become an effect mark with a pragmatic tone (Uexküll, 1957 
[1934], p. 125). According to Uexküll (ibid., p. 49), living organisms have functional 
tones, i.e., “the use they need to make of certain stimuli if they are to do what they 
need to survive” (Sagan, 2010, p. 5). Functional tones of an organism constitute fit-
ting-in, a pragmatic and functional way to couple themselves with their environment.  
For example, a rectangular object that appears in the gameworld may be just 
perceived as such and nothing more. If the player desires to reach the rectangular ob-
ject it arises as a perception mark and an effect mark. By reaching the object and using 
it, the object gains an “entering tone” and is recognized as a door through which the 
player can enter to another level in the game. ‘Tone’ for Uexküll is how subjects see 
things in different light according to their intentional acts, moods and motivations 
(Brier, 2008, pp. 319, 344–345). The door, for instance, can receive a “fighting tone” 
if an in-game monster can be hit with it.  
Uexküll (2010 [1934], pp. 99–101) goes on to give an example of a blind man 
and his guide dog. The guide dog must learn perception marks relevant to the blind 
man, although many of these marks would not otherwise bear any significance to the 
dog’s Umwelt. The position of the guide dog has similarities with that of the player. 
The person playing a video game, too, must learn new perception marks relevant not 
for herself but instead for her player persona, i.e., her situated self as-being-the-
player. Through this process, she creates a path of her own through the game environ-
ment. This is how the player enacts the gameworld. 
If we especially seek for a perception mark, we call this search image; if that 
what we seek is an effect mark, we call this search tone. I can, for instance, try to see 
a rainbow after it rains (search image), or I can try to find a chair on which I can sit 
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on (search tone) (Uexküll, 2010 [1934], p. 117). Here we can note that the Uexküllian 
understanding of ‘tone’ converges to the concept of ‘game mechanics,’ which also are 
best described by verbs (Järvinen, 2008; Sicart, 2009). However, ‘tone’ includes a 
motivational dimension, which has not been explicitly connected to the definition of 
game mechanics, although game mechanics are often defined as properties of the 
game system and as qualities of player–game interaction. Typically, ‘game mechan-
ics’ describe the modes of player–game interaction from an objectivistic third-person 
stance, whereas ‘tone’ emphasizes from a first-person vantage point how the subject 
experiences the interaction.  
As both Brier (2008) and psychologist Louise Barrett (2011, p. 98) have ob-
served, Uexküll’s notion of organism-dependent action possibilities ties the theory of 
Umwelt to the discussions on affordances in ecological psychology, granted that it is 
not clear whether James J. Gibson knew about Uexküll’s original theory (Brier, 2008, 
p. 319). Affordances, as introduced by Gibson (1986 [1979]), are environmental, di-
rectly perceivable opportunities for actions. According to Anthony Chemero (2009, 
pp. 98–99, 110), perception is understood in ecological psychology as direct in the 
sense that it does not presuppose inferences performed on sensory representations. 
The purpose of perception is to guide actions, and the actions are, for their part, also 
for perception and cognition. “[P]erception and action are tightly intertwined, and… 
perception is, in part, action” (Chemero 2009, p. 127).  
However, affordances as environmental situational opportunities to action are 
available only to those agents that have supporting abilities that allow the agent to 
make use of them. In other words, affordances are particular relations between the 
experiencer and the situation in which the experiencer acts. They necessitate abilities 
from the perceiver and features from the environment; “[E]nvironmental relata in af-
fordances must be features, not properties” (Chemero, 2009, p. 143). You cannot find 
any affordances from any situations without postulating a subject who has correspond-
ing abilities. Furthermore, affordances elicit appropriate actions instead of represent-
ing an object’s determinate properties (Thompson, 2007, p. 247). When enactivism 
and ‘affordance’ are brought together, it can be stated that situational meanings 
emerge when a subject acts upon affordances and, by doing so, enacts a world of 
significance (see Chemero, 2009, pp. 152–154). Based on this observation, I consider 
both ‘Umwelt’ and ‘affordance’ congenial with phenomenological enactivism. 
‘Affordance’ is a widely used concept in game studies, and especially in game 
design literature. Instead of using ‘affordance,’ I have decided to investigate the 
player–game relation using the concept of Umwelt because, in my view, affordances 
as situated action possibilities fail to grasp the first-personal vantage point of how 
things appear to the subject. Furthermore, Umwelt stands for a higher order phenom-
enon than affordance; whereas affordance denotes that a knife has an action possibility 
of cutting for a subject, Umwelt stands for all the action possibilities and other rela-
tions the context in which the knife appears has for the subject. Since Umwelt includes 
multiple possibilities for action for an individual, it is better suited than affordance for 
describing the environment and, consequently, the gameworld-relation.  
A key argument of Chapter 6 is that all video game gameplay transforms a 
player’s self-presence by introducing a new agent–environment relation. The theory 
of Umwelt precisely describes this change. A person who plays a game is still the 
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same individual, but gameplay brings about a situational environment, a reality of a 
kind, in relation to which the player gains a new ephemeral identity as a player proper. 
She cannot remain the same during the gameplay since this new agent–environment 
relation inevitably, albeit temporarily, changes the Umwelt that partly constitutes her 
identity in that situation.  
Uexküll (2010 [1934], pp. 54–113) introduced several dimensions of how we 
participate in the environment. First, we have the effect space or an operational space, 
which equals to how we generate changes in ourselves and in our environment by 
movement. The effect space is the basis of all spatial determinations. Second, we have 
the tactile space, where “locus is the elementary unit, not a motor magnitude as is 
direction” (Uexküll 1957 [1934], p. 19). In other words, tactile space does not deal 
with directional movement but with the fixed perception of being in a place. In my 
view, these notions are compatible with how Gallagher (2005) describes body schema 
as the grounds for spatial experience. Third, objects may emerge in our visual space, 
which also has the farthest plane or the horizon in which objects do not appear closer 
or farther away but only smaller in size. The effect space, tactile space and visual 
space are all made of subjective perception signs; “there is no space independent of 
subjects” (Uexküll, 2010 [1934], p. 70).  
I suggest that a game environment that a player encounters during gameplay 
alters that player’s everyday Umwelt in all of the dimensions described by Uexküll. 
The change that takes place does not give the player new abilities as a person but as a 
player persona. In the game environment, we still have the same sensory organs as 
ever. While we as players have the same biological organization as we do as persons, 
our effect space is, during gameplay, aligned with our in-game effect space. Our effect 
space movements in the environment are re-configured, or mapped,93 into player ac-
tions in game environments by game mechanics; our tactile space or being in a place 
is presented to us as the vantage point through which we take in-game actions; and 
visual space is how the game environment becomes our primary focus for perceiving 
marks, i.e., features, and affordances in our in-game surroundings.  
According to Varela (1987, p. 63), the concept of ‘enaction’ can be described 
as the practice of ‘laying down a path in walking’ as we traverse through the environ-
ment. I suggest that this is also what happens in gameplay: we establish a path of our 
own in our Umwelt, which now comes to mean traversal through the gameworld from 
the vantage point of the player (see Aarseth, 1997). This traversal is a performative 
practice, and one’s path through it is unique. There are no two gameplay experiences 
exactly alike since each player’s self-experience is different, and thus their self-worlds 
or phenomenal gameworlds differ from each other. An in-game object or an event 
acquires meaning in relation to the subject who plays; designed game is not the path, 
but an environment, a dwelling-world, for the player’s path inborn (see Uexküll, 2010 
[1934], p. 125). 
The proposal that a game environment arises as a situational Umwelt for the 
player in gameplay complements the arguments made earlier in the current thesis 
(RQ3). Umwelt offers a broad interdisciplinary theory that illuminates how games-as-
played are “geared to the world,” as Goffman (1986 [1974], p. 248) expressed it. If 
the player presents herself in gameplay through performative practice, this practice is 
nevertheless restricted by the qualities of the game as an environment. Only in the 
                                                 
93 Mapping is how the player’s actions are related to the events that take place within the game. 
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reciprocity between the player subject and the dynamic game system, gameplay 
emerges as meaningful and comes to have the thickness of reality.  
I propose that Uexküll’s theory of Umwelt provides an intriguing account on 
how a game encounter presents “a world for its participants” (Goffman 2013 [1961], 
p. 80). Just as Goffman wrote later in Frame Analysis (1986 [1974], pp. 455–456, p. 
292): “When a set of individuals plays at a game, a real world can be generated for 
them, a complete psychological habitat.” In 1968 (p. 26), philosopher Eugen Fink 
illustrated the world-generating quality of play beautifully albeit rather romantically: 
 
Play is a creative act, a production. The product is the play-world, a 
sphere of illusion, a realm whose reality is open to question... The 
play world contains both subjective imaginary elements and objective 
ontic elements... But what is an objective, ontic illusion supposed to 
be? [A] tree at the edge of a lake is reflected in the surface of the 
water… As an image it is real—it is a real reflection of the original 
tree existing in reality. But a tree is also represented in the image; this 
tree appears on the surface of the water, yet in such a way that it exists 
only through the medium of the reflections and not in reality.  
 
Because consciousness is tied to the ongoing being-in-the-world, for enactivism “con-
sciousness isn’t something that happens inside us: it is something we do, actively, in 
our dynamic interaction with the world around us” (Noë, 2009, p. 24). As argued by 
Noë (2009, pp. 69–71, 82), what we are as subjects depends on where we are and what 
we can do. To a relevant extent, we are of the places in which we find ourselves. This 
does not lead to a conclusion that the self would dissolve into social and cultural prac-
tices. Following Kyselo (2015), I suggest that individuation happens through and from 
a world according to the principle of needful freedom by Jonas (2001 [1966]). As 
players, we gain our identity by participating in the gameworld and by emancipating 
ourselves from it. The player does not have to pretend to accept the game environment 
as her world-relation during gameplay because the game environment arises as such 
through the actions the player takes—through the medium, in the words of Fink (1968, 
p. 26).  
Thompson (2007, p. 147) writes: “Sense-making changes the physiochemical 
world into an environment of significance and valence, creating an Umwelt for the 
system.” Recall from Chapter 1 that minimal sense-making is how the environment 
arises as viable for the continuity of the organism; it matters to its identity and thus 
has an intrinsic emotional relevance, meaning and normativity. In gameplay, in-game 
events become value-laden to our identity as players proper: “[I]t is not possible to 
separate moves in games from their value, from their point” (Noë, 2012, p. 144). This 
is how a person as the player, persona, has an Umwelt different from the person by 
herself. In a sense, then, each game is both a game of you (Chapter 5) and ‘a game of 
Umwelten,’ a game of meaningful environment. Correspondingly, each game as 
played comes to have a gameworld in the gameplay experience. This marks the sixth 
invariant quality of video game gameplay experience. 
A gameworld is established by putting forward a system of regularities and 
normative rules that the player must take into account if she desires to continue to 
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play. As Goffman stated (2013 [1961], pp. 27, 41), games, by definition, are world-
building activities that present us with game-generated realities. Furthermore, play 
has been argued to bring about an alternative world, a playworld (Fink 2016 [1960], 
pp. 112–114) which ”creates a world of ’rule-governed’ fantasy—in episodic or im-
agistic representation—in which behavior can be rehearsed and mastered, prior to its 
expression in the real world, with real world consequences”, as Peterson (2002, p. 71) 
writes.   
I argue that every game-as-played comes to have a gameworld since a game 
arises as a significant environment for the player through her participatory agency. 
Questions remain, however: how should the gameworld be understood, and what con-
stitutes the ‘worldness’ of the gameworld in gameplay? In what do we, in fact, partic-
ipate when we participate in a gameworld?  
 
 
Discussion: Interacting with the Gameworld 
 
Media scholar Kristine Jørgensen studies video game gameworlds as informational 
spaces designed for specific kinds of activity. In Gameworld Interfaces (2013) she 
asks how the information provided by a game is made available for the player in ways 
that builds up worldness for the game. She defines gameworlds as “world representa-
tions designed with a particular gameplay in mind and characterized by game-system 
information that enables meaningful player interaction” (ibid., p. 3).  
Jørgensen’s main argument is that gameworlds are not traditional fictional 
worlds like we find in literature, tales or movies, but instead they are interfaces for the 
formal game system. Gameworlds are guided and held together by coherent and con-
sistent game mechanics rather than by fictional coherence. They are mediating inter-
faces between players and game systems (ibid., p. 20), which means that gameworlds 
are primarily ludic rather than fictional constructs. This is, in fact, an argument Juul 
made in Half-Real (2005, p. 200).  
As a concept, ‘interface’ is quite complicated to define. In this thesis, I appro-
priate a description that concurs with systems theoretical understanding: interface is 
“the point of transition between different mediatic layers within any nested system” 
(Galloway, 2008, p. 936). It is how two or more systems, whether autonomous or 
heteronomous, are able to interact with each other. Through this interaction, the two 
interacting systems become connected and mixed for a period of time. Jørgensen 
(2013, pp. 22–23) sees the user interface of a game as all the properties of the game 
that are revealed for the player and the information that aids the players to interact 
with the game system (ibid., p. 20). These elements contain the physical hardware 
such as the game controller; the window, icon, menu, and pointer (WIMP) information 
provided for the player on the screen; and “the gameworld environment” itself.  
For Jørgensen (2013, p. 4), gameworlds as interfaces to the game system are 
also content of the games since a gameworld is both “informational and interactive 
environment.” In gameworlds, video games merge fiction and game system infor-
mation together and thus a game creates a unique form of world representation of the 
abstract game system that is to be understood primarily as a technology-enhanced 
activity space for gameplay (ibid., pp. 5, 56–57, 143).  
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Drawing from Goffman, Jørgensen (pp. 113–123, 133) suggests that video games os-
cillate between a ludic frame, in which the game system information is addressed to 
the player, and a fictional frame, which addresses fictional information to the player 
as a character of the game. She sees this quality as a distinctive characteristic of video 
game gameworlds. For her, the understanding of gameworld as an interface explains 
why players do not experience a break in the fourth wall, that is, in the illusion that 
separates the ‘audience’ from the ‘staged action.’ Although superimposed overlay in-
formation, e.g., in-game minimaps or health bars, does not make sense from the per-
spective of the fictional gameworld, it is indeed understandable, even intuitive, for the 
player of the game if the gameworld is conceptualized a ludic interface rather than a 
narrative world of its own right.  
Although Jørgensen’s (2013) study on video game gameworlds is indeed very 
valuable, a few notions must be made from the perspective of the current thesis. Most 
importantly, the main argument by Jørgensen—that gameworlds are interfaces to for-
mal game systems—does not seem completely satisfactory from the phenomenologi-
cal stance of first-person gameplay experience.  
If, as Jørgensen (ibid., p. 24) suggests, “the gameworld interface indeed is the 
actual game itself,” what is the relevance of introducing the gameworld as an interface 
to the formal game system when studying gameplay experience? When I, as the player 
of a game, take actions and, e.g., move my character in the game, I do not experience 
any underlying abstract game system as such. Instead, I experience the gameplay of 
the game. I cannot experience the game system separated from my persona–game-
word relations, and thus the formal game system is rendered meaningful only through 
play. Inasmuch as we are interested in studying meaningful gameplay experience, we 
do not need to postulate the gameworld as an interface to an underlying formal system. 
This is so, because players are able to make sense of the regularities and normativity 
of the gameplay by participating in the gameworld rather than by trying to understand 
a formal digital code that underlies it. Relatedly, a car’s wheel can be argued to be on 
the interface between a driver and a car system. However, from the first-person per-
spective, steering the wheel, changing the gears and speeding are not how we interact 
with the underlying car system but our experience of driving the car (Chapter 3). 
When an individual begins to play a video game, she starts to operate a game 
controller. This controller is an interface between two systems: the autonomous per-
son and the heteronomous game system. When she turns on the screen, she sees the 
game’s start screen. Again, here she acts as a person who wishes to adopt the player’s 
position. The start screen is an interface between the person and the formal game sys-
tem. The same is true when the game is paused or when the person operates, e.g., a 
game options menu; for when she does, she is no longer player proper.  
During gameplay, the player may operate in-game WIMP menus, including 
information that is external to the game’s fictional world but internal to the gameplay 
of the game. As noted by Jørgensen, this information is addressed to the player. 
Jørgensen, however, misses the difference between being a person and being a person 
who plays since the ludic information of a game is not directed to the individual as 
being a person, but precisely for her player persona. Here we find an interface between 
a persona and the ‘gameworld’ since the information is ludic and thus directly related 
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to in-game regularities. From an experiential first-person perspective, it would be mis-
leading to say that WIMP menus of ludic information are interfaces to formal game 
systems since we are here already dealing with ongoing gameplay dynamics, and these 
ludic interfaces refer to observable rule-bounded in-game regularities the player en-
counters during play. Ludic interfaces are indeed necessary in all gameplay ranging 
from social play to board games and from card games to video games.  
Finally, we may face ludic interfaces that are internal to the fictional setup of 
the game in a fashion that enables us to conceive them as consistent to the fictional 
coherence of the game. Here, the information, as Jørgensen noted, is fictional. How-
ever, these interfaces remain ludic, and thus I call them ludonarrative interfaces (see 
Aarseth 2012 for another interpretation of ‘ludonarrative model’). Ludonarrative in-
terfaces are how the in-game entities, and the player’s avatar as one such entity, act 
by being-in-the-gameworld. These interfaces emerge between personnage, a persona 
who animates a figure or a character, and the gameworld. However, from the perspec-
tive of the personnage, the interface is supposed to appear as transparent.  
The argument is that just as we play every game by retaining ourselves as 
persons, we also retain ourselves as player personae, regardless of the possibility that 
we also play as being personnage, a character within the fictional gameworld. Inter-
faces may appear on each of these planes of being. As a person, the physical game 
hardware is the interface to make the gameplay possible. As a person and a persona, 
the in-game WIMP menus or other forms of ludic interfaces are presented for the 
player to play the game. As a person, a persona, and a personnage, we may encounter 
ludonarrative interfaces, which are ludic interfaces that make sense from the perspec-
tive of the playable fictive character. Finally, we may encounter narrative interfaces, 
such as cut-scenes, which are fictional interfaces without any ludic component that 
appear only within the diegetic structure of the gameworld.  
As a person, an interface connects me with the game technology; as a persona, 
a ludic interface connects me with the in-game regularities, rules, and the normativity 
of the game; as a personnage, a ludonarrative interface connects me with the in-game 
regularities and the diegetic construct of the gameworld. On the level of narrative 
interfaces, I fall back from the participatory position of the player proper into a posi-
tion of a mere observer of unfolding fictive events in which, e.g., a character uses a 
computer or engages with another responsive system (Figure 16).   
Celia Pearce (2009, p. 20) suggests that the worldness of virtual worlds con-
sist of a “sense of coherence, completeness, and consistency within the world’s envi-
ronment, aesthetics, and rules.” The accessible, sustainable, explorable and robust in 
a world representation build up a feeling of a gameworld that makes sense as a spatial 
and temporal environment. According to Jørgensen (2013, p. 56), the worldness of a 
gameworld results from the world representation and the forms of interaction within 
the world and its agents, including the experiences of expressivity and performativity 
provided for the player. In contrast to Lisbeth Klastrup (Klastrup, 2003, p. 104; 
Klastrup, 2008), Jørgensen proposes that ‘worldness’ should not be understood as a 
quality reserved only for multiplayer social online games, but that it may emerge in 
solitary gameplay, where the player interacts with the game system and its dynamic 
environment. However, Jørgensen suggests that not all video games feature a game-
world, “mostly because they do not add a fictional layer of representation on top of 
the game system.” In her view, games, such as Candy Crush Saga (King, 2012), that 


















AUTONOMOUS AGENT HETERONOMOUS SYSTEM
As an observer Narrative Interface
Fictional
Storyworld
Figure 16. The nested interrelations between an individual and the game system on 
the levels of lusory attitude, ludic activity/narrative activity, and ludonarrative acti-
vity. 
 
I differ from Jørgensen by arguing that each game has a game environment, which 
arises as Umwelt, a significant world-relation for the player during gameplay. In the 
sense of first-personal participation, each game comes to have a gameworld, although 
only some games make extensive use of this invariant quality. I am in agreement with 
both Klastrup and Jørgensen in that the world representation, modes of interaction, as 
well as the experiences of expressivity and performativity, all build up a sense of 
worldness. However, in contrast to Jørgensen (2013), who argues that “the gameworld 
is the information system that provides access to and represents the game system” 
(ibid. p. 57), I approach the gameworld as the first-person experience of a player’s 
agent–game environment relations. I agree here with Espen Aarseth (2004, pp. 47–
48), who states that, “[a]ny game consists of three aspects: (1) rules, (2) material/se-
miotic system (a gameworld), and 3) gameplay (the events resulting from application 
of the rules to the gameworld).”  
Goffman (1986 [1974], p. 573) wrote that the relationship between person 
and role (persona, in the current study) “answers to the interactive system—to the 
frame—in which the role is performed and the self of the performer is glimpsed.” 
Exactly in this fashion, the relationship between a person and a game in gameplay is 
constituted in that very interaction, and thus the only direct passage for us to the ga-
meworld is through the ludic interaction. Through gameplay, a gameworld appears; 
“[T]he world shows up thanks to our mastery and exercise of skills of access. We 
achieve the world by enacting ourselves. Insofar as we achieve access to the world, 
we also achieve ourselves” (Noë, 2012, pp. 12–13). Or as Peterson (2002, p. 291) 
writes: “A game… is played by constructing an image of ‘the world’ in imagination, 
in accordance with certain presuppositions – which are the rules (the ‘environment’) 
of the game—and then by acting in that imaginary world”. 
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In Chapter 6, I compare Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical dimensions of presentation 
of the self to those of the player’s persona in gameplay. I also indicate that the seven 
facets of performative gameplay, i.e., lusory attitude; style; responsibility; glorifica-
tion; normativity; skill; and uncertainty, should be understood in relation to the corre-
sponding dimensions of a dynamic game system, since the player and the game are in 
dialogical relationship in gameplay (Table 19).  
Approached from the perspective of the game environment and the game-
world, a game constantly provides (1) affordances, i.e., possibilities for actions for the 
player who embraces a lusory attitude. These affordances constitute what is known as 
space of possibilities (Salen & Zimmermann, 2004, p. 66). A game has (2) a setting, 
which, according to Goffman (1959, pp. 22–24), is the wholeness of the scenic parts 
of expressive equipment. The equipment includes the personal front of the performer, 
the style and manner in which she performs, and the items (e.g. gender, age, clothes) 
that we identify with the performer. I define the setting of the gameworld similarly to 
how Goffman defined the setting of a performance, but I also include temporal per-
spective and non-player characters in the setting.  
The player expresses herself by taking actions and by making responsible de-
cisions. These actions and decisions have (3) consequences in the gameworld. The 
consequences are not a kind of consequences, however, but (4) contingent with the 
in-game regularities, that is, with the social, cultural and ‘natural’ rule-order of the 
game. Through these contingencies the player is able to make sense of her heightened, 
highlighted and glorified performative participation in the gameworld.  
Furthermore, the actions the player takes must be normative in the sense that 
they do not break the (5) rules of the game in a way that would terminate the game-
play. Game mechanics provide the vehicles for taking such actions. If the player does 
not show expertise and execute her actions skillfully, the game (6) evaluates her efforts 
as faulty and the gameplay may be terminated. Finally, all gameplay can be argued to 
include an element of (7) uncertainty; the player cannot be fully sure how the game 
will resolve. This is because every game includes an element of noncommunication.  
I propose that the seven dialogical relations between the player and the 
game—i) lusory attitude/affordances; ii) style/setting; iii) responsibility/consequen-
tiality; iv) glorification/contingency; v) normativity/rules; vi) skill/evaluation; and vii) 
uncertainty/noncommunication—not only illuminate the performative position of the 
player, but also the worldness of the gameworld. The game environment gains quali-
ties of worldness by providing affordances or possibilities for taking actions. It further 
endorses these characteristics by presenting a spatial and temporal setting in which 
consequential and contingent events take place based on the decisions and actions of 
the player and the ‘social order’ of the gameworld, including its inhabitants, and its 
normative rules. Just like in any of our activities, the gameworld lets us know if our 
level of skill does not meet the set requirements. Thus, our conduct is evaluated, which 
we can perceive from the responsiveness or “feedback” that is generated. Finally, 









Performativity of Player Persona  — Dynamic Video Game System 
   
Lusory attitude — Affordances 
Style  — Setting 
Responsibility — Consequentiality 
Glorification — Contingency 
Normativity — Rules 
Skill — Evaluation 
Uncertainty — Noncommunication 
 
Table 19. Seven facets of player performativity in gameplay and their correspondents 
in dynamic video game system. 
 
A full-blown gameworld, then, affords versatile possibilities for taking actions and 
interacting in a rich spatio-temporal environment. The actions one takes have clear 
distal effects on the gameworld, and because the effects are contingent with both the 
player’s actions and the internal logic of the game, the player is able to experience 
growth in adaptation, skill-development, and progress (see Chapter 5). However, the 
quality of unexpectedness persists; the world does not seem to communicate to us 
what will happen next, and there is always some room for surprises and chance. 
As with the seven facets of performative player position, which I introduce in 
Chapter 6, I emphasize that the corresponding aspects of dynamic game systems (Ta-
ble 19) are not by any means new. Mark J. P. Wolf (2014, p. 125), for instance, con-
tends that a video game gameworld necessarily consists of a kind of geography, in-
habitants, actions and consequences of those actions. Murray (1997, pp. 71–90) de-
scribes digital environments as procedural, entailing a set of rules; participatory, 
since the user or the player is provided with an agency to induce these procedures; 
spatial, because they represent a navigational space and; encyclopedic, for computers 
are able to process, store and retrieve extensive quantities of information. However, 
the current study remains original in its arguments because it compares the qualities 
of games with those of the player participation under the concept of performative play 
and phenomenological enactivism (RQ3).  
 
 
Data Analysis: Elements of a Good Game 
 
Most aspects of gameplay experience discussed in the current chapter describe player 
preferences in games as ongoing processes. However, as we know from Chapter 1, 
“game as process” is only one of the two ontologies of games. What I present as play-
ers’ gameplay motifeme preferences and desired participatory distance do not fully 
describe how players valuate games as objects. To consider how players evaluate 
games from this perspective, I analyzed how the participants of the first main survey 
(N=1,718) specified the qualities that make a game a good game. The theme of how 
a player experiences a game as a good game is a facet of an invariant of gameplay 
experience, that of gameworld-relation (invariant vi), discussed in this chapter. Since 
the first survey (N=1,718) was conducted and partly analyzed before the interviews, 
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the results I report here worked as my guideline for making the 32 interviews. I ana-
lyzed the data according to a similar process as reported in Chapter 3 and the game 
motifeme analysis. The research questions for this statistical analysis were: 
 
RQ2.8: What are the core qualities of games with which players separate a good game 
from a bad game? 
 
RQ2.9: Is it possible to identify players’ game quality preferences, and do these pref-
erences form categories, i.e., factors of a good game? If so, can we identify 
how similarly or differently players of the identified seven player types valu-
ate a game as a good game? 
 
For studying these questions, I developed an inventory consisting of 16 items describ-
ing various qualities of video games as objects. It was my intention to keep these items 
clearly separated from the gameplay motifemes reported in Chapter 3. The items of 
the inventory were developed based on a literature review and what I had learned by 
reading the 700 game review articles in the content analysis reported in Chapter 3. 
Especially important in this regard was the study made by Ermi and Mäyrä (2007, p. 
99), in which the authors present a set of keywords that the interviewed children used 
to describe pleasurable gameplay experience. The inventory was further tested by a 
pilot group of 50 respondent before it was included in the survey analysis (N=1,718). 
The respondents were asked to reflect on “How important are the following qualities 
for a good game?” (5-point Likert: 1 = Not at all important, 5 = Very important): 
 
 
Item Element of a good game Mean SD 
1 There is a lot to do in the game 3.52 1.16 
2 The game has an interesting and impressive story 3.56 1.26 
3 The game has good and mood-appropriate music 3.16 1.33 
4 The game has good controls 3.68 1.22 
5 The game has believable characters I can identify with 3.12 1.30 
6 The game has technically top-level graphics 3.07 1.21 
7 The game has good humor 3.36 1.12 
8 The game progresses in a proper way and at a good pace 3.61 1.06 
9 The game has an impressive gameworld 3.49 1.24 
10 The game has an appropriate difficulty level 3.80 1.03 
11 The game has wonderful movie-resembling video scenes 2.53 1.21 
12 The game awards succeeding and progressing 3.58 1.12 
13 The game has unique, creative and inventive features 3.50 1.14 
14 The game lets me set my own goals and succeed in them 3.35 1.13 
15 The game manages to provoke strong feelings 3.15 1.28 
16 The game’s graphics are realistic and not, e.g., cartoon-like 2.55 1.32 
17 The game requires luck rather than skill 2.77 1.11 
  
Table 20. A scale designed for studying players’ reflections of the elements of a good 
game, and their mean preference sums (and standard deviations) in the survey. 
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Similar to the studies I reported in Chapter 3, I conducted an exploratory factor anal-
ysis using principal factor extraction, varimax rotation and polychoric correlations. I 
also defined the number of factors to be extracted by the MAP (Velicer’s minimum 
average partial) test, and accepted only factor loadings greater than > .50. The first 
solution resulted in a promising structure in which only the item 7, “The game has 
good humor,” had < .50 loading. I dropped this item and repeated the process. As a 
result of the second iteration, all the remaining 16 items showed loadings > .50 on at 
least one factor. The results are reported in Table 21.  
Seven items (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15) loaded on the first factor. These items indicate 
that a person appreciates games with a fascinating story and beautiful in-game music. 
A good game also includes an impressive gameworld that offers extensive play, and 
in-game characters the player can identify with. Such a game manages to induce 
strong emotions for the player. As a whole, the items on first factor describe the fic-
tional qualities of a game, and how the player can relate to these qualities. I label this 
the Diegetic factor of a good game. 
 Five items (8, 10, 12, 13, 14) loaded on the second factor. According to these 
items, a good game has an appropriate level of difficulty. It is equally important that 
the game progresses properly, smoothly and at a reasonable pace. A good game re-
wards the player for making progress and reaching in-game goals. A good game also 
includes creative and inventive solutions and lets the player to set her own achievable 
goals. Since all the items for factor two describe qualities of player–game interaction, 
I label this factor with good game of Ludic. 
 Four items (6, 11, 16, 17) loaded on the third and final factor. Based on these 
items, players appreciate that a game has realistic graphics and a coherent design. A 
good game has top-level quality graphics, and it manages to feel authentic, reasonable 
and plausible within its own logic and physical modelings. The audiovisual quality of 
a good game is not unlike movies with a high production value. There is a cinematic 
feeling to a good game, and room for mere luck as well. I name this factor Verisimil-
itude94 since it is perceived as important that the game manages to feel real-like, be-
lievable and reasonable within its logic and appearance. Rich details, precise presen-
tation, intuitive controls and camera angles, and plausible and consistent game design 
enhance the verisimilitude of the gameplay experience.  
 
 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
1 0.6419   0.3784 
2 0.7967   0.2298 
3 0.7972   0.2810 
4 0.6221 0.5123  0.3392 
5 0.7726   0.2828 
6   0.7038 0.3592 
8  0.7254  0.3032 
                                                 




9 0.6467   0.2705 
10  0.7360  0.3805 
11   0.6387 0.3509 
12  0.6729  0.3439 
13 0.5023 0.6137  0.3064 
14  0.5542  0.4441 
15 0.7329   0.3588 
16   0.7819 0.3548 
17   0.5412 0.6292 
Mean 3.3825 3.5699 2.7311  
Std. Dev 1.0309 0.8976 0.9510  
Alpha 0.9191 0.8778 0.7870  
  
Table 21. Factor Loadings (Loadings > .5), uniqueness for Items and descriptive sta-
tistics for scale sums (N=1,718). Mean, standard deviation and Cronbach’s alpha are 
calculated using items with loadings above 0.5. 
 
The identified three factors of ‘a good game’ helped me discuss this subject with the 
interviewees. I asked the interview participants first to freely describe what qualities 
make a game a good game. After their own reflections on the subject, I typically pre-
sented the three factors and asked whether the interviewee could put the three factors 
in an order starting from the most important. With some of the interviewees, this sub-
ject area was brought forth as we watched gameplay videos of their favorite games: 
 
The plot is important, and what I can do in the game. But I do not 
want to spend eternity in a game, I want to experience how it ends. 
All things that open the backstories of the characters are interesting. 
In Final Fantasy games all the characters seem to be flawed some-
how, and I like it. And the game music, it is so immersive. I can for-
give many elements of bad game design if the music is amazing. (P11, 
mercenary) 
 
Monument Valley was really nice. I study arts history, and this has a 
really Escher-like design, which I liked. I have liked Escher since I 
was a kid. The symbolism, ambient music, stylized characters, I liked 
them all... I do not really care about missions and tasks in games. (P3, 
adventurer) 
 
For me it is more important that the characters and world are interest-
ing. I can continue to play although the game is crap if I want to know 
what happens next to the characters. It is not so fun, but I can take it 
[laughs]... I also like to play visual novel games in which your deci-
sions matter for the story development. (P18, adventurer) 
 
Some interviewees reflected on how the game narrative is experienced. I observed 
that there were two main ways to describe this. A few participants emphasized how 
they enjoyed the ways in which the story unfolded through their actions, as enacted. 
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In these descriptions several players told how the character was “thrown into” the 
gameworld without a pre-fixed storyline that one could relate with:  
 
Good games throw you into the gameworld. You have to figure out 
what is happening and how it all relates to yourself… In the begin-
ning, the gameworld does not rotate around you, you are just one of 
the people living there. Nobody seems to care a shit about you at all… 
But all the things, the sounds, the armor types, are little pieces that 
build up… a coherent story. And you start to realize it little by little, 
what it all means. Without this experience, playing would be like just 
running around randomly and punching monsters in the face. (13, 
mercenary) 
 
Some players, however, expressed that they enjoyed games more as existing narra-
tives and stories, without the need to identify oneself as one of the main characters of 
the game. As I discuss earlier in this section, these players typically preferred the third-
person animator node over the first-person animator perspective. To put it differently, 
they preferred to retain a participatory distance, although simultaneously remain close 
to the events and the in-game characters:  
 
I like games as stories. I like to experience them from a bit outside. I 
do not have to experience myself “being there.” So, if I create a char-
acter, it does not resemble me. It is its own thing and it has its own 
story and emotions... I want to play games in which the story matters 
and I can get to know the characters. And if then some character dies, 
it can really hurt. (P14, adventurer) 
 
All the excerpts above describe game preferences that emphasize Diegetic over Ludic 
and Verisimilitude. However, in almost as many cases, the ludic qualities were per-
ceived by the interviewees as the primary quality for a good game:  
 
Yeah, the story matters, but I do not know whether the game must be 
story-driven as achieving the goals also matters, and winning also... I 
want to understand the logic of the game... and the strategies players 
have, why they do as they do, what’s their mindset, so that you may 
guess their next move. (P22, patterner-commander) 
 
Well, the most important thing is the complexity of game mechanics, 
so that I can do things in many different ways and find my own way 
to play. And it should be challenging and get me really thinking. Re-
ally, I do not care much at all about the plot of the games. (P23, com-
mander) 
 
The mechanics and progression are the things for me. When I think 
about it, when I play games of the same series, the plot is quite similar 
between the games. So, it is probably the game system that keeps me 
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engaged. But the high-level graphics, those do not matter much at all 
to me. (P1, adventurer) 
 
Although some interviewees emphasized the Diegetic aspect over Ludic when evalu-
ating whether a game was a good game, none of the interview participants thought 
that Ludic would be the least important of the three factors. There was, however, a 
smaller group of interviewees who did not regard the Ludic or the Diegetic as the most 
important aspect of a good game. Instead, they emphasized the importance of Verisi-
militude in the gameplay experience: 
 
It is very important that there are no inconsistencies. You cannot il-
logically get somewhere because it instantly makes you realize that 
you are watching a screen rather than playing the game. Some games 
manage to present a very lively world with citizens and all, it is truly 
amazing. The atmosphere can be truly impressive. (P26, mercenary) 
 
I am a really visual person, I enjoy a game that looks great. But the 
graphics must be logical. There must not be any bugs or glitches, be-
cause they break the illusion of the game. For example, in this one 
game, the character does not carry any kind of bag. So how come he 
still has tens of weapons to choose from in a battle? I hate it so much 
if the realism in graphics suddenly disappears. (P20, mercenary) 
 
The disappointment when anthropomorphically plausible characters do not act ac-
cording to their human-like appearance has been noted also in prior research. Nowak 
and Biocca (2004) observed in their experiment that human-like characters were more 
attractive and engaging to players, but they also set higher expectations, which were 
more easily violated if the design or, e.g., the AI was not consistent. This is indeed 
what several players who preferred verisimilitude aspects of games described to me 
in the interviews. Other interviewees, however, emphasized the audiovisual cinematic 
and photorealistic ‘wow’ effect good games are able to present to the player: 
 
In this game by Bioware, there are graphically stunning events. For 
example, there is an event in which an end boss lands on a space sta-
tion, and you have some gravity shoes, which enable you to walk on 
walls. Then you begin to see the biggest enemy in the world in front 
of you, and you run towards it guns blazing. Then you get the wow 
feeling, this is amazing! (P30, commander) 
 
In good games, I am drawn to... graphics and the action. The thing 
that pulls me to play is the photorealistic graphics in sports games and 
first-person shooters. It is the main reason why playing is fun. The 
mechanics and the progression are surely also important, and the dif-
ficulty level, too. I do not care about the story. Max Payne, for in-
stance, is like a book, but I mostly just skipped all the story parts and 




In the beginning of this section, I ask two research questions. We have now seen that, 
based on an inventory of possible dimensions a player may appreciate in a game 
(RQ2.8), players evaluate the elements of a ‘good game’ based on the three factors of 
Diegetic, Ludic, and Verisimilitude in a video game (RQ2.9). Although the interview 
excerpts above do indicate a certain connection between the seven player types (see 
Chapter 3) and how players appreciate elements of good game, a statistical analysis is 
required to be able to reveal the connections between these two constructs. To study 
these connections, I calculated the mean scale preference sums for the three factors of 
a good game for each player type (N=1,718). 
From Table 22, we can conclude that The Adventurer clearly appreciates Die-
getic over Ludic and especially Verisimilitude. Although the mean sums of The Mer-
cenary for Diegetic were relatively high, this player type held the Ludic aspect of a 
game in even higher regard. In fact, The Adventurer was revealed as the only player 
type to appreciate something else over Ludic in a good game. Especially the player 
types of The Patterner and The Explorer reflected that Ludic was by far the most 
important aspect in a good game. Finally, The Daredevil was the only player type to 
appreciate Verisimilitude almost as highly as Ludic in a ‘good game.’  
Whereas the Diegetic factors in games denote the explorative practice of 
gameplay, the Ludic qualities in games draw the attention to the coordinative practice, 
the game’s challenges, and the progression enabled through coordination, as I discuss 
in Chapter 5. Finally, the Verisimilitude factors in games specify what kind perceptual 




Diegetic Ludic Verisimilitude 
Obs. 
mean std dev mean std dev mean std dev 
Adventurer 3.49 1.09 2.99 0.81 1.49 1.08 179 
Mercenary 3.13 0.87 3.27 0.74 1.98 1.14 336 
Explorer 2.30 1.20 3.37 0.89 1.81 1.00 272 
Commander 2.77 1.04 3.26 0.89 1.67 1.13 323 
Patterner 1.64 1.11 2.94 1.12 1.82 0.92 226 
Companion 2.30 1.17 2.89 0.98 1.95 1.01 138 
Daredevil 2.17 0.97 2.47 0.91 2.33 0.91 250 
 
Table 22. The mean sums and standard deviations for the seven player types and their 
preferences in the Diegetic, Ludic, and Verisimilitude factors (N=1,718).  
 
To study whether mobile game players appreciate the dimensions of Diegetic, Ludic, 
and Verisimilitude differently than players in general (N=1,718), I calculated the mean 
factor sums for the sub-group (n=238) of players who reported playing mobile games 
at least once each week but PC and console games less than once a week (see Chapter 
3, Study 1). In this group, Ludic was appreciated (mean 3.4) more than Diegetic (mean 
3.0) and Verisimilitude (mean 2.6) dimensions of ‘a good game.’  
Importantly, the results of this study are similar to what Ermi and Mäyrä 
(2007) observed in their examination on fundamental components of the gameplay 
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experience: children describe pleasurable gameplay experience through three dimen-
sions of audiovisuality, fantasy, and challenge. The current study supports these ob-
servations and offers that all video game players structure the elements of a good game 
with the three factors of Diegetic (i.e., fantasy, fiction), Ludic (i.e., challenge, interac-
tion), and Verisimilitude (i.e., audiovisuality, sensorial authenticity). 
A remark must be made. Although many players quickly stated that specific 
qualities of games were more important to them than others, a few interviewees em-
phasized that what they understood to be ‘a good game’ was more complex: 
 
Well, if I reflect on my own game preferences, so in Final Fantasy, 
the story and narration is what matters and keeps me engaged. I have 
always thought that it is like I was playing a really long and really 
good movie. But then again, more competitive gaming is all about the 
player-game interaction, the controls, what happens when you act… 
When you speak about ‘a good game,’ there is this thought that peo-
ple have only one opinion of a good game. But… it is possible that 
one enjoys many kinds of games, which means that a person can have 
many kinds of good games, not only one. (P6, commander) 
 
What this interviewee (P6) highlights is that, not only do different players have dis-
tinctive preferences in gameplay and gaming, but crucially also in different modes of 
gaming. Whether a player appreciates a gameplay experience primarily for its die-
getic, ludic, or verisimilitude qualities is not to be analyzed without taking into con-
sideration the mode of gaming that the game enables, and that the player is willing to 
embrace. Whereas I analyze the statistical and interview data from a framework based 
on the eight invariants of gameplay experience—and the gameplay motifemes in par-
ticular—Deterding (2013) concentrates on different modes of gaming in his frame 
analytic dissertation. Deterding argues that these distinctive forms of play arise from 
the interrelations of a player’s desires, material qualities of the situation and the game 
artifact, and the social norms. I will return to this theme in Chapter 9. 
The diegetic, ludic, and verisimilitude dimensions of the gameplay experience 
can be further elucidated by asking how these qualities may enhance experiences of 
presence (Invariant iii). In Chapter 6 I argue for an enactive understanding of presence 
and suggest that presence should include: 1) involvement that specifies how the player 
allocates her attention in relation to gameplay; and 2) availability, including how in-
game objects are perceptually present and available to be interacted with.  
Understood together, the two dimensions of involvement and availability fa-
cilitate the experience of self-presence, spatial presence, and social presence (see Ermi 
& Mäyrä, 2007). In their study on video game engagement, Andrew K. Przybylski, C. 
Scott Rigby and Richard M. Ryan (2010) further argue that in addition to spatial pres-
ence of ‘being there,’ immersed players may experience emotional presence in which 
the game events acquire real emotional weight, and the narrative presence of being 





RQ2.10: How are the three elements of ‘a good game’ associated with gameplay ex-
periences that are perceived immersive—given that I have delineated ‘im-
mersion’ in this thesis as the player’s self-reflection of an elapsed experience 
of a heightened sense of presence (see Chapter 6)?  
 
If we now consider the three dimensions players appreciate in a good game, we can 
observe that Diegetic is connected to both emotional presence (Item 15: “The game 
manages to provoke strong feelings”) and narrative presence (Item 2: “The game has 
an interesting and impressive story”), as proposed by Przybylski, Rigby and Ryan 
(2010). Furthermore, the diegetic dimension emphasizes self-presence and social 
presence (Item 5: “The game has believable characters I can identify with”) and a 
spatial presence of experiencing a rich, alternative world-relation (Item 9: “The game 
has an impressive gameworld”).  
The Ludic is clearly related to how a game affords possibilities to act through 
its interactivity, and to perceive oneself to be the cause for the distal effects. As we 
see in Chapter 6, the possibilities to act engender experiences of spatial presence and 
social presence if we are interacting with another intentional agent (see Steuer, 1992; 
Wirth et al. 2007). The interactional aspects of presence are represented in the ludic 
dimension of a good game (Item 14: “The game lets me set my own goals and succeed 
in them,” Item 12: “The game awards succeeding and progressing,” Item 8: “The 
game progresses in a proper way and at a good pace,” and Item 10: “The game has an 
appropriate difficulty level”). Finally, the Verisimilitude in a game is connected espe-
cially to its vividness or sensory realism (Item 6: “The game has technically top-level 
graphics”, Item 16: “The game’s graphics are realistic and not, e.g., cartoon-like,” 
Item 11: “The game has wonderful movie-resembling video scenes”), which, with 
interactivity, has been argued as an important enabler of spatial presence together 
(Steuer, 1992; Wirth et al. 2007).   
My hypothesis (H3) is that the three main dimensions that players (N=1,718) 
appreciate in video games all facilitate experiences of presence, which in enactivism 
is understood broadly as how something is available to the skillful experiencer. As I 
mention in Chapter 6, previous research suggests that experiences of presence are 
likely to enhance memory effects, and that what is more present to us may also be 
experienced as more meaningful. Building on these arguments, it is imperative to ask 
if the three qualities of ‘a good game’ similarly contribute to the wholeness of pres-
ence? Przybylski, Rigby and Ryan (2010), for example, argue that in contrast to what 
many game designers and even players assume, immersion is not mainly based on 
high-quality graphics and authentic sounds (here: Verisimilitude).  
I analyzed this question by computing bivariate correlations (Spearman rank-
order) between the three factors of ‘a good game’ and a play motivation variable de-
scribing players’ desire for immersion—“I play because I want to immerse in 
games”— which is also included in Study 1 in Chapter 3 (see Vahlo et al., 2017). 
Appreciating the Diegetic dimension in games correlated with Immersion (r=.52). Lu-
dic showed a weak correlation (r=.17), but Verisimilitude did not show a significant 
correlation with Immersion (r=.03).  
These results support the arguments by Przybylski, Rigby and Ryan (2010), 
as they indicate that the role of verisimilitude, including realistic graphics, may be 
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quite insignificant for engendering presence. However, the moderately strong connec-
tion between Diegetic and Immersion may be partly influenced by the fact that players 
associate the concept of ‘immersion’ [in Finnish: “uppoutuminen”] with a specific 
kind of narrative presence (diegetic dimension) rather than with interactive (ludic di-
mension) or sensory presence (verisimilitude dimension). Therefore, it cannot be con-
cluded based on this analysis that appreciating and experiencing diegetic qualities 
would be the main contributor for sense of presence and what players describe as 
immersive. What this analysis shows, however, is that Diegetic, i.e., appreciating die-
getic qualities in a game, is more strongly correlated with immersion as a motivation 
to play than Ludic or Verisimilitude.  
If we accept as a general principle that 1) the more presence we feel in a sit-
uation, the more salient the experience is for us, and that 2) Diegetic elements are 
more strongly correlated with experienced immersion than Ludic and Verisimilitude, 
we can hypothesize that 3) players who appreciate diegetic experiences may find their 
gameplay experiences more meaningful than other players. Although additional stud-
ies are required to analyze whether Diegetic predicts Immersion and whether Immer-
sion contributes to meaningful gameplay experience, the qualitative data of this study 
suggests such an interpretation: the player types that prefer the diegetic qualities the 
most (Adventurer, Mercenary, Commander) were most likely to indicate an interest 
to participate in follow-up research when responding to the survey in 2014, as I report 
in the beginning of the current chapter. Of all the player types, Adventurers were most 
eager to share their thoughts on gameplay experiences, and they also were the ones 
who submitted 50 percent of the writings in the call for memorable gameplay descrip-
tions. I had difficulties arranging interviews with both Daredevils and Patterners, the 




8. THE STORY MACHINE 
 
If things are happening right now for the first time, do we call it nar-
rative? (Abbott, 2002, p. 32) 
 
[D]igital gameplay should be regarded as a form of performance 
practice with the capacity to invoke traditional folkloric genres and 
engender new traditions (Miller, 2008, p. 255). 
 
I have investigated the invariant qualities of gameplay by examining the dynamics of 
player–game coupling (Chapter 5), the performative position of the player (Chapter 
6), and the game enactment and its world-like characteristics (Chapter 7). The purpose 
of this chapter is to study the phenomenon of gameplay as an elapsed experience, and 
especially its narrative characteristics. A gameplay experience as a whole must make 
sense to the player, it is after all how we are able to communicate about gameplay, 
share our gameplay experiences with the others, and consider gameplay as an auton-
omous form of expressive culture. Thus, I ask: how do gameplay experiences become 
sensible for us, and what kind of invariant qualities can the elapsed experience of 
gameplay be argued to consist of (RQ1)?  
The experience of a game and its world-like quality arises not only through 
performative and participatory play but also from the fiction of the game. In order to 
examine how a player experiences the fiction of a video game, the concepts of diegesis 
and mimesis should be considered. Diegesis and mimesis were first brought together 
in Plato’s Republic, where diegesis meant story as narrated or told and mimesis story 
as shown or enacted. The concept of mimesis has been later associated with “imita-
tion,” “representation,” “enactment,” “mimicry,” and “simulation” (Oatley, 1999), 
whereas diegesis has been connected to practices of “explaining,” “narrating” and 
“giving an account of” (Halliwell, 2012).  
The concepts of diegesis and mimesis have been widely applied in studies of 
literary fiction, film theory, film music and, more recently, in game studies.95 How-
ever, these concepts have not been utilized in the same way across these fields of 
academic research. I appropriate the concept of diegesis in this study according to the 
definitions made by Christian Metz (1974) in film theory. Yet, I recognize that this 
approach to diegesis is not compatible with diegesis as narrated and mimesis as en-
acted ways of storytelling. I revisit this discussion later in the current chapter.  
Kristine Jørgensen (2013, pp. 65–67) suggests that gameworlds are not pri-
marily diegetic but ludic constructs. This is allegedly so because diegesis, as under-
stood by Jørgensen, refers to the narrative act of storytelling and thus to the fictional 
world as it is recounted. For Jørgensen, the logic of gameworlds is not that of narra-
tives but of the game system. In her opinion, forcing the concept of diegesis to cover 
                                                 
95 In game studies, for example, Galloway (2006, p. 7) adopts the terms diegetic and nondie-
getic. He defines diegesis of a video game as “the total world of narrative action,” and nondie-
getic correspondingly as the elements that are external to the “narrative action.” 
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gameworlds would lead to a situation in which the original meaning of the term would 
be lost. Thus, she proposes dropping diegesis from gameworld analyses (ibid., p. 66). 
As Jørgensen (2013) notes, adopting diegesis in investigations of gameworlds 
would necessitate a reformulation of the concept, but I am not convinced that this is 
an argument strong enough for discarding the concept from gameworld analyses. Af-
ter all, contemporary film theory or film music studies hardly appropriate the concept 
in its original meaning, either. In contrast to Jørgensen (2013) who emphasizes the 
ludic qualities of the video game gameworld, I focus on meaningful first-person game-
play experience as it arises in and from the dynamics of gameplay. From this stance, 
it is necessary to try to bridge the gap between the fictional and the ludic in the game-
world since many gameplay experiences are not only experiences of ludic but rather 
experiences of ludic in a fictional, and often in a narrative, setting.  
Drawing from Étienne Souriau (1951)—who used the term diegetic to refer 
to unique filmic universes of distinctive rules, belief-systems and settings—as well as 
from semiotician Christian Metz (1974, p. 98), for whom ‘diegetic’ meant “the narra-
tion itself, but also the fictional space and time dimensions implied in and by the nar-
rative, and consequently the characters, the landscapes, the events, and other narrative 
elements, in so far as they are considered in their denoted aspect,” Ben Winters (2010) 
approaches diegesis as a narrative space or narrative universe. In this view, the fictive 
world is not reducible to a work of art; rather, it resides in the process of experiencing 
and interpreting a narrative product.   
The confusion between diegesis as defined, e.g., by Metz (1974), where the 
term refers to everything that belongs to the projected, designed and implied world, 
and the “original” meaning of diegesis, i.e., recounting a story, originates from the 
writings of Gérard Genette (1980 [1972], pp. 27, 280; 1988 [1983]). Richard Walsh 
(2007, pp. 90–91) notes that Genette derived the adjective “diegetic” from the French 
word diégèse, and thus it does not have a direct relation to Plato’s distinction. Ge-
nette’s approach is instead based on the distinction between the diegetic story-uni-
verse of a film (signified) and the screen universe (signifier). Porter H. Abbott (2002, 
p. 16) and Stephen Halliwell (2012) suggest that, in the terms of ancient criticism, 
Aristotle’s pair of terms praxis, or action as depicted, and muthos, the dramatic and 
narrative structuring of the depicted activities into a plot, come close to this more 
recent definition of diegesis (diégèse).  
If we recognize that there are two schools of established definitions of die-
gesis, and we position ourselves clearly with the film studies school represented by 
e.g. Metz (1974), diegesis no longer refers to the act of narrating but to the narrative 
space as it is experienced by a subject. We can note, therefore, that the problem intro-
duced by Jørgensen (2013) disappears; it is plausible to appropriate the concept of 
diegesis to the discussions of the fictional gameworlds since the concept does not 
stand for “telling a story” but rather for “experiencing narrative spaces and multi-
verses.” This leads us back to Aristotle’s terms of praxis and muthos, and their corre-







Fabula, Syuzhet, and the Storyworld of the Video Game 
 
The concepts of syuzhet (сюжет) and fabula (фабула), which originated in Russian 
formalism, have been adopted in studies analyzing the experience of diegesis (Win-
ters, 2010). The relationship between the concepts of syuzhet and fabula is still under 
discussion in narrative theory (Walsh, 2007, p. 52; see Popova, 2015, pp. 27–28). In 
the context of film theory, David Bordwell (1985, pp. 49–54) describes fabula and 
syuzhet as follows: 
 
The imaginary construct we create, progressively and retroactively, 
was termed by Formalists the fabula... The fabula embodies the ac-
tion as chronological, cause-and-effect chain of events occurring 
within a given duration and a spatial field… The fabula is a pattern 
which perceivers of narratives create through assumptions and infer-
ences.  
 
The syuzhet is the actual arrangement and presentation of the fabula 
in the film. The syuzhet... arranges components—the story events and 
states of affairs—according to specific principles… The syuzhet em-
bodies the film as a “dramaturgical process.”  
 
Fabula is oftentimes translated as a ‘story’ of “what happens” and what events take 
place, whereas syuzhet, that is, ‘plot’ but also ‘narrative discourse’ (Walsh, 2007, p. 
54; Abbott, 2002, p. 16), refers to “how the events are told or presented” (Oatley, 
1999, p. 440; see Jenkins, 2004). Similar to Bordwell (1985), Winters (2010) concep-
tualizes the fabula of a film as the “abstracted narrative constructed by the spectator”. 
Syuzhet and fabula together engender not only understanding of a given narrative but 
also a storyworld in which the events of a story occur. According to David Herman 
(2009, pp. 106–107, 570), a storyworld is “the world evoked implicitly as well as 
explicitly by a narrative… narrative artifacts (text, films, etc.) provide blueprints for 
the creation and modification of such mentally configured storyworlds.” In contrast 
to fabula, a storyworld highlights the ecology of narrative interpretation.96 
Storyworld refers to grounding or to the world-making activity based on in-
ferences triggered by medium-specific semiotic cues (text, visuals, audio) of a narra-
tive. It is how an individual makes sense of a broader spatiotemporal and sociocultural 
setting only implied in the discourse. Thus, in addition of constructing the story (fab-
ula), individuals also tend to imagine the surrounding context and environment in 
which the events take place (Herman, 2005, p. 570). Understood from a first-person 
                                                 
96 Katharine Young’s (2004) frame analytic concepts of storyrealms and taleworlds is a related 
yet also significantly different take to what I develop in this chapter. First, I distinguish my 
approach from Goffman’s frame analysis, because Goffman did not provide a satisfactory view 
on ‘the self’ (see Chapter 6). Second, Young’s terms, ‘storyrealm’ and ‘taleworld,’ are only 
partly consistent with the terms syuzhet, fabula and ‘storyworld’ as discussed in this chapter. 
Because of these reasons, I do not further discuss Young’s interesting take on the layers or 
laminations of communication in storytelling in this thesis.     
224 
 
perspective, storyworld converges to “what it’s like to be in the fictional environment 
and to interact with its objects, inhabitants and institutions.”  
Drawing from Herman (2002; 2005), Erin James argues in The Storyworld 
Accord (2015) that narrative understanding requires modeling and “inhabitation” of 
the storyworld in an ecological and environmental fashion. In this process, “readers 
come to know… a space and time different from that of their immediate reading en-
vironment… reading—or any type of narrative comprehension—is a virtual form of 
environmental experience.” James (2015) suggests that through their world-building 
capacities, narratives can facilitate storyworld accords, that is, cross-culturally shared 
perspectives of environmental imagination.  
I propose that, although video games are ludic rather than narrative constructs, 
the concepts of fabula, syuzhet and ‘storyworld’ can also be understood in the frame-
work of video game gameplay. Furthermore, I suggest that applying these concepts in 
an examination of video game gameplay experience helps us to better grasp the rela-
tions between ludic and narrative in gameplay. Crucially, for understanding how fab-
ula, syuzhet and storyworld manifest in video game cultures, we must consider both 
the experience of the ongoing coupling between a player and a dynamic game system, 
that is, gameplay, as well as practices of re-presenting such an experience in remem-
bering, personal narration and, for example, writing game-based fan-fiction.  
In contrast to narrative products such as novels or movies, video games do 
not present preconstructed syuzhet, or the how events unfold, for the individual to 
observe. Instead the player co-constitutes the syuzhet in the dynamic couplings with 
the game system and its fictional narrative setting. Only through gameplay does the 
game acquire its “actual arrangement and presentation as a dramaturgical process,” as 
Bordwell (1985, pp. 50–51) describes syuzhet. The fabula, or “the action as a chron-
ological, cause-and-effect chain of events occurring within a given duration and a 
spatial field” (ibid., p. 49), is the player’s experience of what happens in the game. 
Inasmuch as she is the initiator of what happens in the game, the player’s own actions 
become a crucial part of the game’s fabula. In other words, fabula in video game 
gameplay experience includes not only the fiction of the game but also the interactiv-
ity facilitated by the game mechanics and realized through player–gameworld contin-
gencies. The fabula of a game is what makes a variety of syuzhets sensible by offering 
an intelligible canon, the materials (locations, characters, objects etc.), procedures and 
regularities, in relation to which all instances of dramatic gameplay are realized.  
Bordwell’s (1985) description of fabula illuminates how gameworlds make 
sense to us as imaginary planes, storyworlds, although a game does not include a well-
defined narrative but consists instead of, e.g., a single locale and a set of rules. The 
storyworld of a game equals to the world of stories that take place and can be imagined 
to take place in the spatiotemporal and sociocultural setting denoted by the video 
game. The gameworld, in contrast, is the wholeness of the interactions that take place 
and can be imagined to take place in the setting presented and implied by the video 
game (see Chapter 7). For instance, any participatory event a player encounters during 
gameplay is part of the game’s gameworld, and any story that emerges from these 
encounters is part of its storyworld.  
Video game gameworlds vary greatly from each other in how they encourage 
us to imagine them as worlds of stories. Tile-matching video games such as Tetris or 
strategy board games such as Chess hardly inspire a large number of players to imag-
ine the stories that can take place in their environmental and interactional setting. On 
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the other hand, role-playing game series such as Pokemón, Final Fantasy, Legend of 
Zelda, and Mass Effect have inspired thousands of players to write their own fan-
fiction. For example, in a large online archive, fanfiction.net, there are currently al-
most 88 000 fan-made stories inspired by the Pokemón franchise, and 40 000 fan-
fiction entries on Final Fantasy gameworlds and storyworlds. Yet, there are also more 
than 100 fan-made stories based on the gameworld of Tetris as well, including horror 
stories, dramas, poems, and stories about Tetris-themed dreams.  
By appropriating the concepts of fabula/syuzhet to the ongoing experience of 
gameplay, new horizons come into view. First, these concepts make it possible to 
relate elements of interactional gameplay to the narrative contents of the game. This 
is because a player’s performative participation together with the procedurality of the 
game constitutes the dramatic syuzhet of the game-as-played. As a cultural practice, 
gameplay converges with emplotment, which we may understand as enacting the 
gameworld. This quality of gameplay has been earlier discussed by Brenda Laurel 
(2004, p. 21; see Aarseth, 1997), who contends that the player has authorship to the 
game’s plot, and that she contributes to it materially by realizing “patterns of choice” 
in gameplay. Second, the player’s actions in the gameworld become endeavors in its 
fictional storyworld and are thus to be understood to belong to the fabula of the game. 
During a gameplay experience the narrative contents of a game’s storyworld collapse 
together with the player’s participatory agency, which again is facilitated by the game 
mechanics of the gameworld. 
When the game diegesis is interpreted through the lens of syuzhet/fabula, the 
fictional elements and the ludic elements of the game are not separable from each 
other but constitute instead an experiential whole. This notion is crucial for envision-
ing a gameworld as a construct that appears to the player not only as a traversable 
spatiotemporal and responsive setting but also as an imaginary construct that makes 
sense to the player as a fictional world of locations, intentional characters, and a “ca-
nonic” storyworld. From this stance, I am not in an agreement with Jørgensen (2013, 
p. 66), who argues that “diegesis does not… tackle the fact that players interact with 
the world and that game avatars as well as other characters function in a different way 
than diegetic characters.” I argue that although the gameworld is not to be equated 
with the storyworld of the game, the gameworld crucially facilitates not only the ludic 
elements of gameplay but also the experienced fictionality of its storyworld.  
Taken together, what do fabula and syuzhet constitute? According to Abbott 
(2002, pp. 12, 16), they bring about a narrative: “the representation of an event or a 
series of events.” In this definition, ‘story’ equals the event or the series of events 
(fabula) and ‘narrative discourse’ is the representation that conveys the story (syu-
zhet). Since I argue that a game as an object does not have a narrative discourse (syu-
zhet) or a story (fabula)—a game acquires these qualities only through its ontology as 
a process, i.e., as played—I therefore also propose that a game is not a full-blown 
narrative artifact but that it arises as a narrative experience through gameplay. But 






From Emergent Narratives to Emergent Stories in Gameplay 
 
Richard Walsh has investigated the question of whether gameplay produces narrative 
in his insightful article, Emergent Narrative in Interactive Media (2011). When dis-
cussing gameplay, the focus is on the emergent phenomenon that has no direct coun-
terpart in the game system nor in the player. What we identify as meaningful when 
playing belongs to a higher level of organization than the game system itself (Chapter 
5). As Walsh writes (ibid., p. 75), emergent phenomena, including narratives, do not 
persist as entities but as patterns in time.  
The notion of an emergent narrative97 was first introduced in digital media by 
Tinsley Galyean in 1995 who argued in her dissertation (ibid., p. 27):  
 
We all construct narratives out of our daily activities to help us re-
member, understand, categorize and share experiences. It is this skill 
that many interactive systems exploit. They give us environments to 
explore. We, by combining the elements of these spaces with our 
goals (the user's goals), allow a narrative to emerge. If any narrative 
structure (or story) emerges it is a product of our interactions and 
goals as we navigate the experience. I call this 'Emergent Narrative.’  
 
Whereas for Galyean, an emergent narrative results from the interactions between a 
subject and a virtual environment, Ruth Aylett (1999) and Sandy Louchart (2007), 
approach emergent narratives as products of the interaction between the subject and 
‘intentional’ digital characters. In this latter view of an emergent narrative as an 
“emergent character-based generative system” (ibid., p. 11), the importance of inter-
actions between characters exceed the authored narrative types.98  
Walsh (2011) tackles the question of whether the emergent qualities of inter-
active media can be regarded as emergent narratives, and what criteria. For this pur-
pose, he introduces the term ‘simulation’ as offered by Gonzalo Frasca (2003): “[T]o 
simulate is to model a (source) system through a different system which maintains to 
somebody some of the behaviors of the original system” (ibid., p. 223). Frasca (2004, 
pp. 85–87) suggests that simulation is to be separated from semiotic representation of 
a narrative since ‘simulation’ is a medium of exposing rules for producing different 
outcomes rather than description or re-presentation of what happened. Walsh (2011, 
p. 77), however, emphasizes that simulation is nevertheless a form of representation 
since it re-presents a system by specifying a set of rules and regulations.  
Walsh’s understanding of ‘simulation’ as a semiotic artifact (rather than as a 
narrative artifact), which represents the operating system it is modeling, is compatible 
with Jan H. G. Klabbers’ (2009, p. ix) apt definition: simulation refers to how a refer-
ence system is re-presented as a model and to the running of that model. Thus, the 
events in a simulated virtual environment are actions rather than only products of se-
                                                 
97 This concept is to be distinguished from the notion of ‘games of emergence’ by Juul (2002). 
According to Juul (ibid., p. 328), emergence is how simple rules of a game may lead to com-
plexity in its gameplay. The game Go is a prime example of game of emergence. 
98 Also Henry Jenkins mentions the concept of an ‘emergent narrative’ in his article Game 
Design as Narrative Architecture (2004, pp. 128–129). 
  
227 
miotic representation; “Simulation and narrative, as modes of representation, are dif-
ferent in kind: a simulation represents a system, globally, while a narrative represents 
a discrete temporal sequence” (Walsh, 2011, p. 78). According to Walsh, what results 
from a particular run of a simulation is not an emergent narrative but emergent behav-
ior, ready to be narrativized by the person who participated in its creation. Just as our 
daily activities are not narratives by themselves, neither are our experiences with sys-
tems that simulate activities. Instead, both kinds of experiences are objects of our nar-
rative sense-making.  
Walsh (2011), furthermore, suggests that because simulation is both a repre-
sentation of a system it models and the running of that system, it also produces two 
types of interactivity: behavioral and semiotic. In behavioral interactivity the system 
is a domain for actions, whereas in semiotic interactivity it is a domain of communi-
cative acts of representation.99 When these two aspects are brought together, for in-
stance, in a video game gameplay session, “the representational elements of the sim-
ulation can... interact with representational interventions by the user, conceived now 
not as a behavioral participant but as a communicative dialogist; and the interaction 
between these communicative acts can produce the appearance of a higher-degree 
representational intentionality, irreducible to the level of the interactions themselves” 
(Walsh, 2011, p. 79). This, according to Walsh, may produce emergent narratives, that 
is, systemic representations, which result when the behavioral interactivity and semi-
otic interactivity come together in the domain of experience and interpretation—
“emergent behavior is narratable; emergent narrative is legible” (Walsh, 2011, p. 80). 
The main argument by Walsh (2011, p. 82) is that emergent narratives may 
arise from the usages of interactive media (including games) only if players simulta-
neously maintain their performance as action and as communication: “behavior as 
representation.” If gameplay is regarded exclusively as action, or presentation, with-
out also being representation, emergent stories do not result from it directly, only in 
retrospect when the player evokes and thus re-presents her experiences as a player. As 
Murray (1997, p. 43), Abbott (2002, p. 32) and Walsh (2011, p. 82) note, the possi-
bility of maintaining the duality of performance as both presentation and representa-
tion is everyday business for improvising actors.  
I argue in this thesis that the duality condition of “behavior as representation” 
is not only possible but a precondition for all instances of gameplay, because in ga-
meplay, the player presents herself through a re-presentative position of the player as 
being something. To be a player, one has to take a stance in both presentation and 
representation or, in the words of Goffman (1981, p. 83), we must “briefly split our-
selves in two.” Inasmuch as maintaining this position is a necessary condition for 
emergent stories to come into being, it is not enough to simply take a third-person 
stance on oneself—one must preserve this duality through the gameplay.  
We can speak of presentations in situations in which the object of an intentional act is 
present. When we talk about an experience, we are engaged with a mentally evoked 
or re-evoked (remembered) and phenomenally absent intentional object, which can 
                                                 
99 Here we can shortly note that Ian Bogost’s theory on procedural rhetorics has some similar-
ities with the conclusion of Walsh (2011), since Bogost (2010, p. 5), similar to Murray (1997), 
emphasizes that video games and computers in general create representations of processes. 
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thus be said to be re-presentational (see Thompson, 2007, p. 25). However, during 
gameplay we gain agency in relation to the gameworld; the events we experience and 
the entities we perceive as intentional are primarily presentations, not representations. 
As long as I am involved with the gameplay that co-constitutes myself as the player, 
an object within a game appears to me primarily as present, and only secondarily as 
absent, i.e., as a re-presentation.  
The activity of gameplay is that of performative participation in a game en-
actment. Can we, though, regard that what is generated by player–game coupling as a 
standalone narrative, as Walsh (2011) proposes? According to Abbott (2002), narra-
tives are stories conveyed by a narrative discourse, which includes the designed game 
artifact and the player’s participatory agency. Abbott (ibid., pp. 32–33) writes that, 
since narratives are re-presentations of events, i.e., a story, a narrative seems to come 
after a story and, correspondingly, a story seems to pre-exist a narrative. This defini-
tion leads Abbott to contend that “neither life nor role-playing games qualify as nar-
rative since there is no pre-existing story… [i]n this sense, role-playing games, like 
theater improv, are like life itself.” A game, similar to life, seems to “make itself up” 
as it goes on rather than pre-exist before our experience. Because stories are always 
mediated and encountered through narrative discourses, games and life cannot be con-
sidered as stories either.   
There are at least two arguments that make it possible to further analyze the 
close connection between games and stories/narratives. First, gameplay is both about 
that which is present and that which is absent. Although most things that happen in a 
video game happen by our immediate agency, they are nevertheless mediated and thus 
experienced both as presentations and as re-presentations. One can follow here the 
writings of Bateson (2000 [1955]; 1971 [1956]) and contend that gameplay, by defi-
nition, “does not denote what those actions for which they stand would denote” 
(Bateson, 2000 [1955], p. 180; see Chapter 2). In a Batesonian view, then, gameplay 
in itself is for that which is not immediately present.  
Second, a central argument of this thesis is that a person who plays a game 
must embrace a third-person view of herself as being something, and thus whatever 
happens in a game does not happen to her as being a person, but to her player persona; 
the position of the player is itself re-presentative. Both of these theoretical arguments 
suggest that, in gameplay, the actions the player takes and what these actions denote 
are not only about the present situation, since they are also about what is absent, and 
they happen to relate to someone who is not to be simply equated with the person that 
exists beyond gameplay. Thus, a game does not present itself similarly to how life 
does.  
Games, therefore, have a narrative discourse of the game media, which in-
cludes a view of that which it conveys, a story. This narrative discourse (syuzhet), 
however, remains incomplete without player participation. Because a game is not “a 
representation of an event or series of events,” as Abbott (2002, p. 12) defines a nar-
rative but rather a presentation of a re-presentative event or a series of re-presentative 
events, I do not find it plausible to consider games as narratives. Since, as Abbott 
(ibid., p. 16) argues, stories (fabula) should feel like they would pre-exist the narrative 
discourse, a game cannot be considered a story either; it is a constitutional quality of 
a game that the story emerges from the player’s participation and thus feels like your 
own making rather than fixed. My stance is, in principle, akin to that of Aarseth’s 
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(2004, p. 50) who writes: “A story-generating system does not have to be a story it-
self… while life and games are primary, real-time phenomena, consisting of real or 
virtual events, stories are secondary phenomena, a revision of the primary event.” 
We can shortly revisit here the writings by Abrahams (2005) on play genres 
(see Figure 1). Recall that Abrahams divides play genres into Play I, Play II and Play 
III, where Play I consists of those genres that are spontaneous, occur in a back-and-
forth manner and take place frequently in everyday life (e.g., joking, riddling, most 
gaming). Play II includes more organized and formalized and less spontaneous sport 
events, and I would like to add esport events—games that require referees and judges, 
and events that separate players from the audience. Finally, Play III contains folk plays 
and role-playing where the progression of narrative or movement is already more or 
less predetermined.  
We can now observe that Play I, although already structured and set aside 
from conversational genres, is primarily a group of presentational genres, or “present 
reenactment” (Abrahams, 2005, p. 67), whereas in Play III, we enter into the realm of 
semiotic representation of fated and predefined events. The closer we steer towards 
Play III, the more story-qualities we may identify in the unfolding game encounter. 
Video game gameplay, I offer, is often movement between the presentational and the 
representational. Although we may play a game with a strong linear storyline, the 
gameplay element of coordinative/explorative practice (Chapter 5) draws us from the 
representation towards the presentation; otherwise, we would not be playing the game.  
Let us now return to the argument made by Walsh (2011, p. 80): a game may 
result in emergent narratives when the behavioral interactivity and semiotic interac-
tivity become entangled in the gameplay experience. Just as the autonomy of game-
play emerges from the dialogical relationship between a player and a game, new emer-
gent narratives may also come into being, “arising out of the distributed communica-
tive agency of representational interactions at the level of the simulation itself” 
(Walsh, 2011, p. 79). I have suggested that playing a video game creates its syuzhet, 
its arrangement as a dramaturgical process. If this syuzhet makes sense to us both 
progressively during the gameplay and retroactively in reflection by inviting narrative 
interpretation,100 we can speak of a first-person emergent narrative.  
The emergence of a narrative from gameplay is only a possibility, not a nec-
essary quality of a gameplay experience. The main objective of this thesis is not to 
investigate what might result from first-person experiences of gameplay but instead 
to track down the invariants of the gameplay experience as a phenomenon (RQ1). 
Thus, I will not linger any further with the concept of emergent narrative but introduce 
another perspective on the changes brought forth by any elapsed session of video 




                                                 
100 Inviting narrative interpretation necessitates that the form of behavior is communicative 
and intelligible according to a narrative paradigm such as a stereotype, cultural convention, 
genre or plot structure (Walsh, 2011, p. 81). 
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The Enacted Narrative Experience of Gameplay 
 
I return now to the concept of narrative experience and argue that the experience of 
gameplay has a narrative structure. Although a gameplay experience would not result 
in what Walsh (2011) calls an emergent narrative, it remains a distinctive object for 
our narrative sense-making. This is so regardless of whether we are dealing with mo-
bile gaming, solitary video game gameplay, multiplayer video game gameplay, social 
gaming such as board games, competitive esports or sport events. For instance, a ten-
nis match is also a dramatic realization, a syuzhet, of the fabula of tennis as a game.  
The vantage point, or footing, through which a game is experienced is nothing 
but irrelevant. If I watch a tennis game and experience the emergence of a dramatic 
organization through the actions of the players and how their actions represent the 
semiotic system of ‘tennis’ at large, I have a position in which I do not have to main-
tain the duality condition of both enacting and representing. I merely observe the 
events unfolding before my eyes. If, however, I hold the tennis racket myself, I acquire 
the dual position of presenting and representing, that is, acting within the semiotic 
system of tennis, or enacting the gameworld of tennis.  
I argue that in cases where the game does not invite us to interpret what we 
experience as a story, our encounter with the game is not just ‘emergent behavior,’ as 
suggested by Walsh (2011), but instead emergent trajectory, which consists of patterns 
of emergent behavior. Goffman wrote in Encounters (2013 [1961], p. 26): “A matrix 
of possible events and a cast of roles through whose enactment the events occur con-
stitute together a field for dramatic action.” Later in Frame Analysis (1986 [1974], p. 
558) he observed that the game-like character of scriptings is to work with closed 
resources, “a set of characters that makes an early appearance and that provides a 
sufficient and necessary source for what will prove to occur… that what turns out to 
happen could theoretically have been divined from the initial array of figures and 
forces, as in a riddle.”  
In games, no interaction that happens is irrelevant to what will become. 
Events in a game lead up towards a conclusion, and thus the wholeness of this trajec-
tory, or traversal through the game, will make sense at the end of play. Just as Goffman 
notes (1986 [1974], p. 559), everyday life is not organized in a similar fashion. How-
ever, “[T]ales told about experience can (and tend to) be organized from the begin-
ning, in terms of what will prove to be the outcome… what is developed in the tale 
can be phrased as having resulted totally from the interplay of figures within the tale, 
all of which interplay, and only which, is needed to accomplish this development.”  
Games must make sense by definition; they are systems of sense-making, and 
the main job of the rules of the game is to guarantee that what happens in gameplay 
is, in principle, sensible. A game’s closure occurs when its structure as a whole makes 
sense (Murray 1997, p. 174) and when the expectations become satisfied and the 
raised questions answered (Abbott, 2002, p 188). In my view, whether this structure 
should be referred to as ‘a plot’ or ‘a narrative discourse’ depends on whether this 
quality is defined as a property of an existing game object or as an emergent quality 
of experiencing a procedural artifact. Since I conceptualize ‘a plot’ and ‘a narrative 
structure’ according to this understanding, I propose that an experience does not have 
to be explicitly narrated to be experienced as dramatic, hence: a narrative experience. 
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According to Jerome Bruner (1991), narratives are durative since they cover a pattern 
of events through time. They are of particular contextual occurrences rather than of 
general circumstances. Narratives entail a dimension of intentionality; they are intel-
ligible. They are also in some relation to the canonical behavior that they typically 
challenge, breach or violate. Since narratives introduce a breach, they encompass a 
norm, which is thereby challenged. For Bruner, the intrinsic normativity of a narrative 
renders it tellable. The meaning of a narrative should not be separated from the inter-
pretative practice of its experiencer which would render the narrative hermeneutic. 
When we experience a sensible course of events, a trajectory, that fulfills these criteria 
(Bruner, 1991), we can say that we have a narrative experience. According to Bruner 
(1991), stories and narratives are always “account[s] of events occurring over time” 
(ibid., p. 4, emphasis added), but I propose that this is not the case with all narrative 
experiences. We have narrative experiences of that which is not about accounted 
events but of events that take place in our immediate presence. To say that a trajectory 
of unfolding events is subject to our narrative sense-making is to emphasize the expe-
riential structure of a narrative over its textual form.  
Matti Hyvärinen (2008) argues that, for Bruner, we live through narratives as 
well as make sense of ourselves through narrative understanding. To put it differently, 
since we make sense of our being through folk psychological narratives (e.g., cultural 
schemas, models and scripts) and what Abbott (2002, pp. 6–9) calls narrative percep-
tion and narrative time, we readily construct our everyday experiences as narratives. 
Hyvärinen (ibid., pp. 272–275) writes that making sense of unfolding events by rely-
ing on folk psychological narratives renders the current experience canonical, which 
is to be contrasted with the necessary “breach” quality of a “real” narrative. Not every 
experience, then, acquires a quality of specific narrative-like tellability. We may pos-
tulate this quality as “an experience” (see Abrahams, 2005, p. 117; see Chapter 1) in 
which the ordinary, the norm, and the routine becomes challenged or violated. A 
breach is required—one that highlights the ongoing experience as a singular rather 
than canonical, and as special rather than typical (see Bruner 1991; Bruner 2002; 
Hyvärinen, 2008). 
I offer that, in contrast to most of our everyday experiences, a gameplay ex-
perience always involves a challenge and conflict, a breach, if you will. Many scholars 
have argued ‘conflict’ or ‘contest’ to be a definitional quality of all games (e.g., Craw-
ford, 1982; Parlett, 1999; Avedon & Sutton-Smith, 1971; Salen & Zimmerman, 2004). 
The outcome of gameplay is not fully certain (Costikyan, 2013). The canonical norm 
of the experience in gameplay encompasses the rule-structure of the game, and the 
individual performance and the experience of gameplay bring along a necessary 
breach to the game’s ontology as a process.  
I argue that an experience of gameplay has the inherent quality of an enacted 
narrative. Since we are the dramatis personae (Propp, 1968 [1928]) of gameplay, and 
quite typically enact the gameworld as the protagonist of a game’s fictional world, a 
gameplay experience has a first-personal vantage point to the events that occur, and 
the player has some agency over how the events will unfold. In the dynamic couplings 
between a player and a game, these elements together give the gameplay experience 
a structure not unlike recounted narratives, but yet a game-as-played cannot always 
be regarded as an emergent narrative in its own right. Rather, it is an experience of 
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creating a narrative structure, an enacted narrative. Tok Thompson (2010, pp. 399–
400) made a similar observation in his analysis of folklore and narratives of non-hu-
man animals. As Thompson contends, not only are play and stories similar in that both 
have an intrinsic quality of ‘make-believe,’ but play behavior converges with the en-
actment of a narrative: “Play behavior… is an enacted narrative, although this is still 
not enacted story, as it lacks story’s reference to an external situation.”   
In contrast to an ‘emergent narrative,’ which is still to be conceived as a form 
of a narrative object, an ‘enacted narrative’ designates how a new narrative is orga-
nized in our first-person experience; every gameplay experiences produce a syuzhet, 
which necessarily makes sense as an emergent trajectory through the normativity of 
the game. If the conclusion of a game does not make sense in reflection, and if the 
progression of the game does not make sense during the actual play, there is something 
amiss either in the game or in our attitude or capability to play the game. A gameplay 
experience is not “ready to be narrativized” like our canonical everyday experiences, 
but it has instead a built-in dramatic composition. ‘Enacted narrative’ refers thus to 
the sense of story we may sometimes feel in everyday life when we feel that events 
we encounter have a distinctive dramatic structure and heightened personal relevance 
and meaning.  I propose that a gameplay experience invariantly has this kind of struc-
ture, albeit, it is relevant primarily for our situated identity as player personae. Let’s 
consider the concept of ‘enacted narrative’ and the narrative structure of a gameplay 
experience further by examining what elements constitute a prototypical narrative.  
Cognitive narratologist David Herman (2009, pp. xvi, 77) suggests that a pro-
totypical narrative consists of elements of situatedness, the context of telling; event 
sequencing, structured time-course of the unfolded events; worldmaking/world dis-
ruption, the sequence of events will cause disequilibrium in the storyworld involving 
its intentional agents or characters; and what it’s like, “the experience of living through 
this storyworld-influx, highlighting the pressure of events on real or imagined con-
sciousness by the occurrences at issue.”  
A gameplay experience, is not, of course, situated from the viewpoint of a 
narration since it is untold. However, every gameplay experience consists of se-
quences of events, that is, of the decisions made and the actions taken by the player, 
the game mechanics triggered thereby, and the game’s scripted events. During game-
play, these events are organized as challenges and conflicts that take place in the 
gameworld, and thus these conflicts are to be considered as world disruptions. “The 
defining element in computer games is spatiality. Computer games are essentially 
concerned with spatial representation and negotiation, and therefore a classification 
of computer games can be based on how they represent—or, perhaps, implement—
space,” as Espen Aarseth argues (2001, p. 154; see Aarseth, 1997, pp. 101–102). In 
fact, to confront the presented challenges by taking actions afforded by the game is, 
for some, a suitable description of ‘gameplay’ (Adams, 2014).  
At the heart of any gameplay experience is the sensation, qualia, the subjec-
tive experience of living through the gameplay experience from the orientation to the 
resolution, whether it is a feeling of triumph over an adversity, fiero, or a frustrated 
stare at the text “game over” that appears on the screen. Gameplay experience has 
what Abrahams (1982, p. 6) calls performable social construction; a drama is played 
out. Such an experience has an intrinsic dramatic interest for becoming memorized 
and reportable and thus reconstructed into a story.  
  
233 
Building from a stance of enactive cognitive science on narrative understanding, 
Yanna Popova (2015, pp. 25, 40) suggests that a simple narrative includes 1) at least 
two causally linked events, 2) acknowledgement of intentional agency conducting the 
events, and 3) the reader’s enaction, i.e., the living through, of that intentionality. 
When considering the gameplay experience, we can note again that playing games 
fulfills the first criterion since games consist of causally interrelated occurrences. 
Gameplay also invariantly has an intentional agent, but this agent is not necessarily 
found within the game object. Rather, it is the player herself who brings the intentional 
aspect into gameplay. Thus, gameplay combines the second and the third criteria pro-
posed by Popova; the player recognizes her own agency within the game by enacting 
this intentional vantage point that has relevance within the game.  
Not unlike narratives, a gameplay experience tends to reach a state of equi-
librium or closure, i.e, “the sense of completion and fulfillment of expectations that 
have driven the particular course of events,” as defined by Popova (2015, p. 33). Fi-
nally, instances of gameplay and narratives alike regularly include what Roland 
Barthes (1982, pp. 53–56) calls cardinal functions, or turning points of events (e.g., 
so-called boss-fights in role-playing games) as well as catalyzers, which either delay 
or accelerate the main course of action (e.g., grinding more levels, taking on optional 
missions, finding hidden treasures, playing mini-games within the main storyline, or 
farming loot in repetitive tasks). Cardinal functions are constitutional for a story to be 
the story it is, but although catalyzers are merely supplementary events for the story, 
they are nevertheless relevant to the impact and the meaning of the story, as Abbott 
(2002, p. 20) writes. I believe that every game player would agree that the experience 
of gameplay is often as much or even more about engaging with catalyzer events as it 
is with cardinal functions.  
To put my argument more precisely, gameplay experience has the structure 
of a prototypical narrative, save the element of situatedness, which is achieved only 
through narrating. Participation in gameplay produces emergent trajectories that call 
attention to the ludonarrative crux of all gameplay experiences. This I label ‘enactive 
narrative’ and offer as the seventh invariant of the video game gameplay experi-
ence.101  
In solitary video game gameplay, the enacted narrative that results from 
gameplay experience is a property of the person who played the game, and to an extent 
it remains as such unless the person engages with broader game cultures. Again, this 
is not to be equated with an argument that the player would be the sole author of a 
game’s story. As Murray (1997, pp. 152–153) contends, authorship in games is pro-
cedural, which means creating the rules for interaction and descriptions for those in-
teractions. Like a choreographer, a game designer sets the rhythm, possible sequences 
of movements, and the composition of the gameplay as a whole. What the player 
brings along is performative authorship. Not unlike a dancer, the player expresses 
herself in relation to the designed choreography. Indeed, when an experience comes 
                                                 
101 The common denominators between games and stories have been recognized before by 
Espen Aarseth (2001; 2012), who argues that every game and every story [here: narrative] 
includes a world, objects, agents, and events, although these elements are configured differ-
ently between the two media. However, Aarseth’s interest is on games as artifacts rather than 
games as experienced processes, which is the stance of this thesis. 
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to have narrative value for us, this value arises from our unique performance in rela-
tion to a procedural environment. In this sense, the narrativity of the first-person 
gameplay experience is generated in the reciprocity of procedural authorship by the 
game designer and performative authorship by the player. 
Even if the player does not share her own gaming experiences with others, 
the experience may live as a narrative of the self and thus as a memory of cultural 
participation.102 This understanding of gameplay experience has significant affinities 
with how McNeill (2013a, p. 9) describes folklore: “Considering that folklore is being 
slightly adapted and molded every time it’s passed on, after a while it’s quite repre-
sentative of the group as a whole rather than of a single individual.” The following 
excerpt from an editorial article (November 24, 2011) on gameinformer.com (GI) il-
luminates this rather nicely: 
 
I've been playing a borderline unhealthy amount of Skyrim since it 
launched. Not once has another player entered my world, and yet it 
has been a hugely social experience for me. While playing, I'm con-
stantly chatting electronically with my friends about the game: shar-
ing tips, asking questions, bragging about how awesome my sword is 
(so awesome), and swapping stories about our adventures... By any 
reasonable definition of the word "social," Skyrim has been a social 
experience for us despite never connecting to a multiplayer server.  
 
My notion of the enacted narrative has profound similarities to Celia Pearce’s (2004, 
pp. 144–153) interpretation of narrative structures in video games. According to 
Pearce, and similar to what I argue, the necessary experientiality in games produces 
emergent narratives (here: enacted narrative experience) “that develops out of the in-
herent ‘conflict’ of the game as it is played, as experienced by the players themselves.” 
Pearce also writes about the performative level of narratives in gameplay, that is, the 
narrative constituted by the spectators and the commentators (or let’s play players) of 
the ongoing game; the augmentary level of narration including contextual information 
about the game, which can be, for instance, journalistic reportage available to the 
player and for spectators before, during or after gameplay; and the descriptive level 
of recounting and narrating elapsed game events to third parties and participating in 
emergent cultures that are encouraged by the past game events.  
Calleja (2013) has recently criticized Pearce’s model of narrative elements in 
games as being too general. In his view, Pearce’s strategy to apply her model to games 
ranging from basketball to Tic-Tac-Toe and from Battleship to EverQuest (Sony 
Online, 1999) is vague, and that she and others “fail to make the distinction” between 
these different forms of games. Calleja argues that there is next to no reason to discuss 
the narrative of Tic-Tac-Toe.  
From the phenomenological first-person vantage point adopted in this study, 
I do not agree with Calleja (2013). Again, what I mean with ‘enacted narrative’ is not 
to be equated with standalone textual narratives but to the invariant structure of ga-
meplay experience. As an invariant of a gameplay experience, an enacted narrative 
precisely aims to cover games ranging from informal games to collectible online card 
                                                 
102 Stahl (2008 [1989], p. 59) calls this kind of folklore private folklore and personalore in 
contrast to communal folklore.  
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games. In the framework of studying gameplay experience, it would be erroneous to 
try to force a distinction between different types of games.  
I also disagree with Calleja (2013) when he argues that a framework that aims 
to study the story elements of game environments needs not to be able to investigate 
what he calls “the secondary narrative.” The “secondary narrative” is how a person 
remembers, depicts and recounts to herself and to others her past experiences with a 
game. This, according to Calleja (2012), is not relevant to a study focusing on narra-
tive qualities of games. My disagreement with this argument is based on the view that 
gameplay experience is a form of social and cultural participation. No gameplay ex-
perience emerges in a vacuum. The enacted narratives that arise from gameplay are 
entangled with our social and cultural values, intersubjective relations, current state 
of mind, and our reflective understanding of ourselves. For example, the enacted nar-
rative that emerges from a session of Tic-Tac-Toe involving a parent and his child is 
inseparable from the actual gameplay of Tic-Tac-Toe, the parent’s perception of his 
child, the parent’s understanding of himself, and the sociocultural situation.  
Furthermore, “the secondary narratives” we tell ourselves and to others are 
still very much influenced by both the ludic and the fictional elements we have en-
countered in gameplay experiences. This is to say that both experiences and memories 
of gameplay are ludic; there is no clear dichotomy between ludic and narrative in 
game objects or in gameplay experiences. From a folkloristic perspective, the rela-
tionship between ludic and narrative is a dialogical continuum; how one remembers, 
feels and narrates her past game experiences of playing Tic-Tac-Toe is still related to 
the original experience of unfolding gameplay, and thus these “secondary narratives” 
fall within the framework of studying the gameplay experience.  
Recall from Chapter 1 the distinction between the two ontologies of games: 
games as objects and games as processes (Aarseth, 2014b). In the treatise by Calleja 
(2013), narratives in games are reduced into the game object, although these narrative 
qualities would be revealed only through ergodic play. I encourage an alternative 
view, which maintains that each gameplay experience is first-personal, and the emer-
gent trajectories, i.e., enacted narratives, which are brought forth in gameplay, cannot 
be scaled back down to the game object. This is because the enacted narratives result 
not from a game nor from a player but from experiencing the reciprocity of the two.  
With the concept ‘enacted narrative,’ I also differ from Murray (1997, pp. 
108–109), who has compared the structural similarities of experiencing electronic en-
vironments with that of experiencing a visit. Although I concur with Murray that a 
gameplay experience can be regarded a visit, gameplay is a very specific type of so-
journ, one that intuitively makes sense to us as a “path we lay down in walking” 
(Thompson, 2007, p. 218). Surely a visit to any place tends to make sense to us, but a 
gameplay experience always entails a breach and an active first-personal viewpoint of 
the “visit” since it relates directly to ourselves as autonomous agents who have a tre-
mendous impact on the surrounding (game)environment. As a type of visit, a game-
play experience has similarities with the experience of being a performer who takes 
responsibility for her actions, stands in the limelight, and faces a constant possibility 
of failure. For instance, the experiences of holding a keynote presentation or perform-
ing stand-up before a live audience have these structural similarities with that of a 
gameplay experience.   
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We can here shortly revisit the concept of mimesis. In the beginning of this chapter, I 
mention that mimesis has been interpreted in literature, e.g., as imitation, enactment, 
mimicry, and simulation (see Oatley, 1999). Paul Ricoeur (1984–1988, 1: pp. 53–76), 
however, offers another interpretation of mimesis, associating it with “configuration.” 
According to Richard Walsh (2007, pp. 46–49), this approach renders mimesis as the 
structural foundation of all narratives. Ricoeur’s account includes three levels of mi-
mesis in the narrative process: preconfiguration (mimesis1) is our practical knowledge, 
expectations and social competencies we bring to narrative; configuration is the crea-
tive production of making the plot (mimesis2); and transfiguration or refiguration (mi-
mesis3) refers to the interpretative vantage point of the reader.  
The three-level model by Ricoeur is noteworthy in the context of gameplay 
experience because it draws attention to the configurative practice of the player. It was 
Markku Eskelinen (2001) who, by reading Aarseth’s Cybertext (1997, pp. 62–65), 
suggested that “the dominant user function in literature, theater and film is interpreta-
tive, but in games it is the configurative one” (Eskelinen, 2001). Although Eskelinen 
equates configurative practice with “manipulation” (2012, p. 277) to precisely con-
trast it with the reader’s practice in narrative understanding, or what Ricoeur calls 
refiguration (mimesis3), Eskelinen’s usage of the term ‘configuration’ nevertheless 
opens an interesting connection to the terminology of Ricoeur. What I wish here to 
illuminate is that if we consider the trinity of preconfiguration–configuration–refigu-
ration from the perspective of the player practice, we can note that preconfiguration 
is how we as being players bring our expectations and sociocultural competencies to 
a gameplay situation; and configuration collapses together with transfiguration.  
By appropriating Ricoeur’s description of configuration as making the plot, 
we can thus conclude—based on what I present earlier in this chapter—that the con-
figurative practice of the player converges to create the syuzhet for the gameplay 
experience. This renders mimesis as ‘configuration,’ a significant concept that points 
both towards the ludic enactment of gameplay and the narrative structure of the 
elapsed gameplay experience. Perhaps there is an irony to the conclusion: the practice 
that is at the foundation of ludological approach is the one that makes first-person 
gameplay narrative experiences possible. Although the argument has been made by 
many game scholars before (see Aarseth, 2012; Aarseth, 2014a), it is worth repeating: 
we need not drop the ludological or the narratological approach when analyzing mean-
ingful game experience. 
During gameplay, a diegetic effect elevates the understanding of the game-
world as a narrative space rather than being a narrative in its own right. Yet, after a 
game session, the diegetic effect of the game becomes reconfigurated by the experi-
ence of our contribution in its syuzhet and fabula. In a crucial way, therefore, diegesis 
has a threefold existence in the video game gameplay experience. First, it is the fic-
tional layer of the video game product (narratives within a video game). Second, it is 
how a game as played makes sense to us during gameplay (sense-making of a narra-
tive and narrative sense-making of an experience). Third, it is how we may look back 
on our gaming experiences as personal narratives of participating in the gameworld 
and its fabula (enacted narrative experiences and emergent stories).  
Abbott (2002, p. 33) writes that “[s]tory… is our way of organizing time ac-
cording to what is important for us,” and continues to state that, although role-playing 
games and life itself are not stories, they act as “seed-ground of stories” or “untold 
stories,” which can be formulated into narratives. I argue in this chapter that, unlike 
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life, gameplay experiences invariantly have the structure of an enacted narrative; 
games are story machines, regardless of the fact that most of the enacted narratives 
remain untold. The untold narrative experiences of video game gameplay are shared 
by players who have experienced the same game, and yet, because of the first-person 
vantage point, each gameplay experience remains varied, unique and personal. 
 
 
Discussion: Video Game Gameplay and Folkloric Practice 
 
In Playing Along (2012), Kiri Miller suggests that an episode of video game gameplay 
could be regarded as a folkloristic text. A ‘folkloristic text’ is a term coined by Titon 
(1995). Instead of referring to ‘text’ as finite, stable and bounded, a folkloristic text is 
varied and intertextual; “[A] folkloristic text exists in multiple versions and variants, 
similar to one another and thereby referencing one another… the instability of a folk-
loric text is the result of its emergent, processual character, stressing the dialectic of 
innovation and tradition within community-based expressive culture” (ibid., p. 439).  
Miller (2012, p. 11) argues that, for example, the “story collection” of Grand 
Theft Auto: San Andreas (Rockstar North, 2004) is uniquely realized in gameplay 
through individual performances. What is more, she proposes that folkloristic oral-
formulaic theory could be utilized to model the player’s expressive play as players 
combine actions into performative play of the same video game. Oral-formulaic the-
ory as well as ethnopoetics offer tools to analyze how performance renders relatively 
stable text into creative expressions. Both approaches are especially interested in the 
poetic aspects of performance (Shuman & Hasan-Rokem, 2012, pp. 64–66),  
While I am in general agreement with Miller (2012), I think that describing 
experiences of gameplay as text is justified only to a limited extent. I stress that game-
play experiences are above all ludic enactments of participatory culture, which in my 
view cannot be reduced to text. I also argue that, although participating in gameplay 
is a performance of the self, the situation of gaming is not a performance but rather a 
cultural enactment. More importantly, however, I contend, not unlike Miller (2012), 
that any episode of gameplay is indeed folkloric.  
I propose that video game gameplay is a folkloric enactment regardless of the 
fact that video games are often, but not always, commercial and mass-produced arti-
facts. Just as ‘folkloristic texts’ as understood by Titon (1995), folkloric enactments 
exist in multiple versions and variants and are similar to each other and thus intercon-
nected. What results in a folkloric enactment of video game gameplay is an enacted 
narrative experience or possibly even an emergent narrative of its own right. Maybe 
instead of referring to oral-formulaic theory we could speak of a ludo-formulaic ap-
proach, which brings together the performative playfulness of ludic accommodation 
and paidic assimilation, and the constraints of the rule-bound video game. Such an 
approach would focus on how players express themselves in gameplay, how the en-
acted and emergent narratives induced by gameplay relate to each other and to the 
game system, and how past gameplay experiences are remembered and constructed 
as personal and cultural narratives.  
Sharon R. Sherman argued already in 1997 that the situation of playing video 
games begs for further folkloristic analysis. Similar to what I argue in this chapter, 
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she suggested (ibid., p. 244) that “computer games, such as Mario, fit within the study 
of both narrative and game, albeit a genre constructed not to be folk narrative but to 
model it.” Sherman also recognizes that the players of, e.g., Super Mario games are 
simultaneously acting as the protagonist of the game and yet remain individuals. This 
observation leads Sherman to suggest that players come to have a role not unlike that 
of a storyteller in multiplayer video game situations (ibid., p. 251):   
 
In the world of his peers, the expert player exhibits a supremacy 
which he may not otherwise enjoy. While playing, he may become a 
hero within his social group... The video player acts as a storyteller, 
taking his audience to new worlds of adventure… These communi-
cative roles illuminate the similarities between gamers and storytell-
ers, especially when seen through the frame of both individual and 
group.  
 
Although I do not equate the position of the player with that of the storyteller, I agree 
with Sherman (1997) that the player indeed takes participators “to new worlds of ad-
venture,” not unlike a person who posts a let’s play video on YouTube. This adven-
ture, however, is an adventure that unfolds during gameplay; it is something the player 
lives through rather than narrates to others—or to herself. The role of the player is 
thus that of a maker and an improviser of an enacted narrative rather than that of the 
teller of a story. It is not necessary to try to equate the roles of the player with that of 
the storyteller, although there are indeed several structural and functional similarities 
to be analyzed. During the actual course of playing games, we are engaged with ver-
nacular enactment of gameplay in which the lived-through narrativity crucially arises 
from how the game is played.  
If the “how a video game is played” is the self-expression and creativity of 
vernacular ‘folk’ in the enactment of video game gameplay, is there any room for 
‘lore’ in video games? Of course, if the theme of the video game deals with folklore, 
the ‘lore’ has a certain existence in the video game enactment. Michael Dylan Foster 
(2016, p. 5) recently suggested the term folkloresque as follows: “[T]he folkloresque 
is popular culture’s own (emic) perception and performance of folklore. That is, it 
refers to creative, often commercial products or texts (e.g., films, graphic novels, 
video games) that give the impression to the consumer (viewer, reader, listener, 
player) that they derive directly from existing folkloristic traditions.” 
In addition to how (Foster, 2016, pp. 15–19) a popular culture product may 
integrate known motifs and forms to appear more folkloric (e.g., the Harry Potter 
franchise, including Lego Harry Potter video games), portray folklore and folklorists 
(e.g., the TV shows Supernatural or the mobile video game Year Walk) or parody 
folklore (e.g., the Shrek franchise or the adventure video game Grim Fandango), an-
other, and arguably even more profound, perspective on the ‘lore’ of video games 
opens by reading Goffman (2013 [1961], p. 35): “The basic activity in game is a 
move… made or taken… game, defined as a body of rules associated with a lore re-
garding good strategies, and a play, defined as any particular instance of a given game 
being played from beginning to end.”  
This passage by Goffman illuminates that the ‘lore’ of a game does not man-
ifest only in the theme or the fictional content of a game but more fundamentally in 
  
239 
how the game is played. If we consider the lore103 of a game to refer to the strategies 
and thus also to the rules of the game, the lore of a game is a quintessential feature of 
any game that is enacted, whether we are speaking of a social game such as Tag or of 
a recent commercial video game. For example, on gamefaqs.com104 there are currently 
more than 60 000 user-generated and submitted walkthroughs, that is, unofficial strat-
egy guides, cheats and review articles about a multitude of video games. However, to 
equate the lore of how a game is played to the knowledge shared by the gaming com-
munity is to start from the middle, from the meso-level of recurrent patterns (strategy) 
in a game’s enactments. As I suggest, “how a game is played” is also its syuzhet. On 
this micro-level of traversal through the game, the lore of a game manifests as a unique 
trajectory (experience) arising from the patterns of gameplay. Finally, the macro-level 
of lore in gameplay is the actual system of the game (rules), which enable both the 
recurrent patterns of the meso-level as well as the trajectories of the micro-level to 
appear.   
Whereas in the case of backyard games it is nothing new to state that “the lore 
of a game is how it is played, and how it is played is present in every instance of 
gameplay on the micro-level of individual experience, meso-level of play strategies, 
and macro-level of re-enacting the rules of the game,” the situation in cases of board 
games, collectible card games and video games is different. In commercial game prod-
ucts the rules are not ‘lore’ inasmuch as they are fixed and stable and presented as 
given to the players. Yet, as I discuss in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, rules of any game 
can be changed, modified and altered by player communities. When the given set of 
rules are not taken for granted but maintained or transformed by the players them-
selves, the lore of a game extends again not only to the level of 1) experience, and 2) 
tactics and strategy, but also to 3) the rules themselves. 
Let me present yet another argument of folkloric characteristics of commer-
cial video games. Foster (2016, p. 3) argues that the movie Spirited Away (Studio 
Ghibli, 2001) is not folklore but folkloresque. It is not folklore, since it is an official 
commercial product—which entails a profit motive—transmitted mainly through in-
stitutional channels. It also exists in a fixed form that does not vary through time or 
performances. As Dan Ben-Amos insisted (1971, p. 14), an item presented on televi-
sion or in a book is no longer folklore because the communicative context remains the 
same. Foster (2016, p. 29) continues to describe folklore as expressive culture, which 
is not dictated by any author, designer or professional artist. Furthermore, folklore is 
often a shared property of a particular group (see also, e.g., McNeill, 2013a; Oring, 
1986; Toelken, 1996).  
When we compare a movie to a video game, we notice that most video games 
are commercial products (but not all by any means), and they are also typically (but 
not always) shared through institutional channels. However, the critical difference is 
that, by definition, gameplay experiences are not fixed but uniquely varied. In game-
play, the communicative context does change as the formal game system is not the 
                                                 
103 The word ‘lore’ origins from Old English lār, Old English leornian to learn, and refers to 
a particular body of knowledge or tradition (Marriam-Webster). 
104 Gamefaqs.com was started in 1995 by gamer and programmer Jeff Veasey who wanted to 
collect the knowledge of playing video games to a single internet archive. The service was 
bought by CNET Networks in 2003. 
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whole message. The game system restricts the possibilities of gameplay but does not 
determinate the course of any gameplay session. Again, as Miller (2008, p. 263) ar-
gues, “while both the game and the book are mass-produced texts, satisfying game-
play relies on the unique realization” of the texts. Adams (2014, p. 3) puts it aptly: 
 
Reading a book or watching a play is not passive, but it is not inter-
active in the sense of modifying the text. In contrast, each time you 
play a game, you can make different choices and have a different ex-
perience. Play ultimately includes the freedom to act and the freedom 
to choose how you act. This freedom is not unlimited, however. Your 
choices are constrained by the rules, and this requires you to be 
clever, imaginative, or skillful in your play. 
 
Gameplay is a participatory, expressive and performative enactment, which is re-
stricted, yet not dictated, by the game designers. The “storytelling rights” (Shuman, 
1986), knowledge of how to play, and fan-fiction can be considered a shared property 
of a specific group, a folk group, of people who have experienced a particular game. 
It is crucial to observe, however, that all of these characteristics refer to our encounters 
with a game product, that is, to its ontology as a process—how it is appropriated, 
played, experienced and shared—not to the game product as detached from its game-
play.  
Perhaps the most interesting feature that separates games and video games in 
this respect from books and movies lies within the commercial core of the games. 
Foster (2016, p. 23) discusses how plagiarism and ownership relates to folklore and 
folkloresque. He emphasizes that, in the cultural imaginary, folklore is understood to 
fall outside intellectual property rights (IPR): “The fact that folklore is considered 
common property—nobody owns it—is the very thing that allows the proliferation of 
versions and variants, the repeating of proverbs, the retelling of jokes, the teaching of 
techniques, the borrowing of patterns–indeed, all the processes through which expres-
sive culture is transmitted from person to person, from culture to culture, from one 
generation to next.” When we play a commercial game or video game, protected by 
IPR, are we in any way dealing with an item of folklore? I suggest that we indeed 
might be. 
In Chapter 2, I introduce the term ‘game mechanics,’ which defines the modes 
of interaction available to the player during gameplay, and how the entities within the 
game interact with each other (see Sicart, 2009). In a quintessential fashion, game 
mechanics are at the heart of every video game as argued by Ernest Adams and Joris 
Dormans in Game Mechanics (2012, p. xi); “Game mechanics create gameplay.” 
Granted that game mechanics, and the modes of interaction they provide, form the 
core of any gameplay experience, it is fascinating to recognize that no form of intel-
lectual property clearly covers them. Although the rule-system of a game can be pro-
tected in some countries, individual game mechanics fall beyond the scope of IPR 
since they are not regarded as creative elements of the product. As an art and enter-
tainment attorney notes in an internet forum discussion on the subject, “Essentially, 
the game mechanics are not protectable, nor is the idea of the game. So others are free 
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to copy the most basic parts of a game. I know this sounds kind of backwards since a 
good board game is really all about good mechanics, but there it is.”105   
In a recent blog entry (May 30, 2016), an attorney, Zachary C. Strebeck, re-
ports a US court decision on an infringement case between the card game Bang! and 
the game Legends of the Three Kingdoms, which was considered to have directly 
cloned the game mechanics and rules of the former game. According to 17 U.S. Code 
§102, “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend 
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work.” Based on this code, the court concluded, “Unlike a book or 
movie plot, the rules and procedures, including the winning conditions, that make up 
a card-game system of play do not themselves produce the artistic or literary content 
that is the hallmark of protectable expression.”106  
Thus, we find that at the deep core level of any game, commercial or not, 
there is something that falls beyond intellectual property rights, something that can be 
versioned and varied, something that “nobody owns,” something that is common 
property of the vernacular. In game design communities, to devise new game mechan-
ics is known as a very difficult, if not nearly impossible, task to do. This is because 
game mechanics are the folklore of game design, they are the vernacular practices of 
how the game is played. Game mechanics can, indeed, be argued to be vehicles for 
folk ideas, that is, “traditional notions that a group of people have about the nature of 
man, of the world, and of man’s life in the world” (Dundes 1971, p. 95).  
It is not my intention to claim that a mechanic of “pick up”—or indeed any 
single mechanic of a video game—would be folklore, but I suggest that practices of 
combining mechanics together are. By this, I do not mean that, for instance, the me-
chanics of “pick up,” “run” and “jump” would, even taken together, constitute folklore 
in a game. What I propose is that there are traditions of transforming folk ideas (Dun-
des, 1971) and players’ everyday conduct into in-game events. These traditions do not 
reside on the level of a mechanic or even on the level of a set of mechanics. Instead 
we must begin from what emerges when these mechanics are set into motion, that is, 
from the dynamics of expressive gameplay. This observation brings us back to con-
sider gameplay motifemes (Chapter 3). Since gameplay motifemes consist of game 
mechanics when put in motion, i.e., game dynamics, and of the player’s performative 
practices, gameplay motifemes can be argued to be a folkloric element of both infor-
mal games and contemporary commercial video games. 
By being the element of folklore in any game, game mechanics illuminate that 
all games, whether they are social games played by schoolchildren or commercial 
action video games played by middle-aged men, retain their old folkloric core not 
only in how we encounter them during gameplay but also as cultural artifacts. Just as 
McNeill (2013a, p. 13) writes: “It is folklore if it’s passed via person-to-person trans-
mission, creating multiple versions in which we recognize conservative elements (that 







is, it’s traditional), and if those multiple versions are dynamic and variable, with de-
tails changing to fit new contexts… so that there’s no single right version (that is, it’s 
informal).” This is indeed what game mechanics are about.  
Abrahams (2005, p. 26) writes: “Folklore, as a traditional activity, argues tra-
ditionally; it uses arguments and persuasive techniques developed in the past to cope 
with recurrent social or existential problem situations.” I propose that game mechanics 
are how folklore in games argues traditionally; the mechanics are the persuasive ver-
nacular techniques and rhetoric that existed in games of the past and prosper still in 
contemporary high-budget commercial video games. To understand the continuities 
between the traditional and contemporary, folklorists must study the dynamics of cul-
ture “that focuses on the movement of traditional items as they are used by both per-
formers and hearers in a living situation,” as expressed by Abrahams (ibid., p. 38). 
Consider a passage by McNeill (2013a, pp. 8–9): “If I tell you a joke, and you turn 
around and tell it to someone else and the details change a bit, you did not tell it wrong, 
you just told a different version of it… In contrast, if I take a novel and change some 
of the words, it is not just “another version” or “my own version” of the novel; it’s 
wrong… folklore, by the nature of its transmission, is malleable, adaptable, changea-
ble, and mostly anonymous, and this makes it way more culturally and expressively 
communicative than a TV show.”    
A video game gameplay experience is malleable, adaptable, changeable and 
“my own version” of something shared by a folk group, that of the game players. A 
commercial video game is not folklore, of course, but I argue that every game neces-
sarily includes an aspect of folklore—at least as long as game mechanics are consid-
ered common property rather than something that can be protected by copyright laws. 
Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that the emerged narrative structure of a 
video game-as-played is significantly different from those of traditional gameplay ex-
periences or even from other forms of folklore. “Much like the narrating session once 
served up examples of how one travels on a perilous journey to become an adult, video 
games appropriate the monomythic folkloric kingdom creating a postmodern rechan-
neling of traditional content elements and structures” (Sherman, 1997, p. 256).  
Indeed, the experience of a character-based video game gameplay is not a far 
cry from a monomyth within a monomyth; the individual adopts the position of the 
player and, from that position, the role of the protagonist of the game. In the well-
known words by mythologist Joseph Campbell (2008 [1949], p. 23):  
 
A hero [and, again, the player] ventures forth from the world of com-
mon day into a region of supernatural wonder [and that of gameplay]: 
fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: 
the hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power 
to bestow boons on his fellow man. 
 
Whereas the “power to bestow boons” within the fabula of the game remain a char-
acteristic of that storyworld, a similar power acquired by the player may be shared 
with others as personal narratives of one’s endeavors, as strategic hints that can be 
given to others in need, and as intimate experiences of “being the cause” for changes 
in the gameworld, as expressed by Piaget (1961 [1952]). The storyworld accord of 
playing video games is the common experience of the monomythical quality of game-
play experiences, shared by many yet unique between individuals.   
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Taken together, these observations stress that folklore is not necessarily exiled from a 
cultural artifact when it is transformed or reproduced into a commercial product. 
Abrahams (2005, p. 69) argues that “the difference between folklore and other expres-
sive phenomena lies in the range of relations possible in performance.” As Sherman 
(1997, p. 244) writes, video games are not folk narratives, but they model them by 
providing opportunities for performative participation. If we take these statements as 
a guideline, we can indeed argue that there is a folkloric undertone in all sessions of 
gameplay, since to play a game is to take a performative stance and engage oneself 
with challenges that produce an experience that has structural similarities with that of 
experiencing a narrative. 
 
 
Data Analysis: Memoirs of the Video Game Protagonist 
 
I turn my attention to the personal narration and personal narratives the interviewees 
shared with me. These are the participants’ expressions of their most memorable 
gameplay experiences and why they find playing video games valuable for them-
selves.  
In folkloristics, Sandra K. Dolby Stahl (1977; 2008 [1989]; see Schuman, 
2006, p. 149) describes personal narratives as first-person expressions of one’s life 
events. Although the plot structure of a personal narrative is typically new and singu-
lar, personal narratives are not isolated from what is consider collective, intersubjec-
tive, and traditional (Stahl 2008 [1989], p. 16). As Stahl (1977, p. 19) emphasizes, the 
act of storytelling is itself traditional, and personal narratives include specific narra-
tive form, function and stylization. In Stahl’s view (ibid., p. 24; 2008 [1989], p. 30), 
personal narratives are “complete” narratives because a personal narrative is devel-
oped, and it “exists as a stable item in the teller’s personal repository of usable mate-
rials (resources).” Amy Schuman (2006, p. 148) writes similarly that a “personal ex-
perience narrative is positioned between reports of the everyday and that which dis-
rupts ordinary life.”  
A main argument of the current chapter is that, in contrast to most of our 
everyday experiences, a first-person experience of gameplay has an inherent structure 
of an enacted narrative. Not every experience is experienced as a dramatic trajectory 
of events, but a gameplay experience is, and this quality gives gameplay experiences 
a heightened tellability when compared to our other recurrent experiences. This tella-
bility does not yet make a gameplay experience a personal narrative as described by 
Stahl (1977) since gameplay experiences are typically untold regardless of their struc-
tural similarities to prototypical narratives.  
Not unlike dreams, it may make only little sense to tell your gameplay expe-
riences to others who cannot fully comprehend the experience you are describing. In 
striking contrast to dreams, however, a player knows that there are thousands of others 
who also have had a unique first-person experience of playing a specific game. This 
renders gameplay experiences not only as tellable but also as shareable in gaming 
cultures. The players share an experience of “being there,” and not in the narrow sense 
emphasized in the HCI literature on spatial presence, but rather as someone who made 
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things happen by being a player persona. This I highlight with the concept of game-
world accord. Gameplay experiences are fuel for remembering past first-personal ex-
periences alone and together; they are vehicles for “story-sharing.” 
Because of these reasons, most of my interview data (N=32) consists of per-
sonal narration rather than full-blown personal narratives (Stahl, 1977). This is to say 
that my interview material includes only some narratives that can be regarded “stable 
items” in the interviewee’s repertoire. In my view, this observation does not render 
the data non-folkloric. Although well-developed personal narratives are rather scarce 
in the data, the data consists of vernacular expressions about encountering and expe-
riencing a folkloric event of performative gameplay. In what follows, I consider the 
personal narrations of the interviews as stories, which as Abbott (2002) contends, are 
conveyed by a narrative discourse, although this discourse is not typically well-devel-
oped.   
The interviewees generally began to talk more freely about their most mem-
orable gameplay experiences when they reflected on their first experiences of playing 
video games and their childhood memories. For some, this happened already when 
we discussed their favorite games since these games quite often included 1–2 games 
that the interviewee had played many years ago. Others began to think back on their 
earliest memories, when they mentioned their old friends, parents, siblings or some 
gaming technology they had had in their childhood home.  
When interviewees told me about their past gameplay experiences and re-
flected on their own feelings on them, they enacted episodic memories of earlier per-
sonal experiences involving a game and themselves as being the player of the game. 
In episodic memory the event is experienced as absent since it is not temporally actual. 
Drawing from Husserlian phenomenology, I posit that, when remembering a past 
event, a person does not re-present an ‘image’ of that situation but remembers the 
earlier experience. This means that thinking back on one’s past experiences does not 
generate a third-personal observational stance at the cost of losing the memory of ex-
periencing but that remembering rather combines both of these two aspects. Remem-
bering subjective experiences is reflecting on oneself from a third-person vantage as 
an intentional object but is simultaneously a memory of how one felt in those situa-
tions of ongoing experience (the noesis). From this stance, the common experience of 
feeling emotions and being moved during remembering, e.g., childhood events, makes 
perfect sense. “In memory, one reproduces and relives, as it were, this past experience, 
but in a modified way, namely, precisely as re-presented, and thus as not occurring 
now but posited as past” (Thompson, 2007, pp. 289–291; Thompson, 2010, p. 165).  
By analyzing the qualitative interview data, I was able to identify four main 
types of personal gameplay narration. In the first group, the interviewees described 
their [1] first-person experiences of playing a specific video game. The second group 
consisted of personal narration of sharing gameplay experiences with others, and of 
the folkloristic traditions that originated from playing video games [2]. Narration 
about interviewees’ first encounters with video games [3] formed the third group. In 
the fourth type, the interviewees described how playing video games had affected their 
everyday life experience [4].  
The narration about first-person experiences of playing video games consisted 
of [1.1] enacted narratives of gameplay and [1.2] narration about gameplay experi-
ence of a heightened value. When narrating enacted first-person gameplay experi-
ences, an interviewee told me a story about a particular gameplay session in which he 
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or she as the player had experienced something emotionally significant. Typically, 
these stories included descriptions of high arousal, suspense, and dramatic turns of 
events:  
 
In this game, there is one turning point, which… everyone knows, it 
is really difficult, and it really becomes clear to you that you are not 
invincible at all… Well, finally after dying many times, I got past the 
whole thing and felt like a real winner. But then something hap-
pened… there is this mechanic which lets other players enter your 
game and try to kill you, and if they do, they are rewarded and you 
die. So, there I was... just went through a real hell in the game and 
was able to breathe out, when someone invades my game and kills 
me right there before I was able to save.” (P12, adventurer-explorer) 
 
In Nethack, if you know what you are doing, you can play the game 
through every single time although the levels are procedurally gener-
ated. There are only very few sudden deaths, and mostly those are 
due to your own bad decisions. I remember, for example, that I once 
died in the last levels among some elemental planes when I entered 
by a wrong command key and shoved a staff in my bag which then 
exploded and destroyed all my healing potions. (P23, commander) 
 
One experience I remember from the recent past was about Elder 
Scrolls Online and its single-player campaign. There is this one part 
in which you have to go through a massive dungeon and a boss is 
waiting at the end. The boss fight came a bit suddenly, and it had an 
enormous group of minions with it. Then I was like, “Shit I have the 
worst possible skill set!” I had the game setting where I lost every 
weapon when I died, so after two deaths I was desperate. But then I 
used all the potions I got and tried once more, and won the damn thing 
finally. I remember the obsession: “God damn, I will not concede.” 
(P21, companion-adventurer) 
 
Often the stories about enacted narratives [1.1] in gameplay were simultaneously sto-
ries about a video game gameplay experience of a heightened personal value. In this 
latter type of stories, the participants described gameplay experiences that they had 
found particularly memorable: 
 
Majestic, it truly got under my skin. Majestic is an alternative reality 
game in which the game entangles with everyday life environments 
and routines. It was supposed to be about conspiracies and X-Files 
types of things… After the first chapter, I was completely hooked. It 
was really scary, since I suddenly started to receive actual phone calls 
which were about the game’s fictional universe... And at the end of 
the game, I was shown some satellite video feed, like a live-webcast, 
246 
 
about a van and its GPS information. And I realized that it was driv-
ing towards my home. I was like what the hell? And then I saw my 
own home address there, some state agents are coming to get me! The 
game just ended just there, the last thing I saw on my screen was “live 
feed” of some special troop soldiers with guns stepping out of the 
van. And I ran to the window to look, scared as hell, if there really 
was a van waiting for me outside. (P2, adventurer)  
 
As a child, I played everything from Alter Ego to Alley Cat, but the 
most impressive game for me was Loom, a point-and-click classic by 
LucasArts in the 90s. For someone like me, a girl living in her own 
imaginative worlds and enjoying beautiful things, that game was a 
mind-blowing experience. I remember that I got stuck in Loom when 
I should have known what spell could be used to remove a tornado 
from above a sea. I was still very young, so the English story and its 
hints did not quite open to me. So, my dad came to help. He did not 
know the game, but he understood the mechanics. In Loom, the spells 
of the game are constructed from melodies. Being a patient man, my 
dad sat down and went systematically through all possibilities for 
melodies. Finally, he got it right, the storm clouds disappeared, and a 
smile returned on my face. (W1, adventurer) 
 
The most memorable gameplay experiences for me are about World 
of Warcraft. Although it has been more than a year since I played last, 
I remember vividly how I leveled-up my first character, a warlock 
called Grokh, who is still my main avatar today… We began to play 
with my big brother and friends already in 2005 in a realm called 
Argent Dawn. All the areas in which I traveled were amazingly beau-
tiful, even frightening, since I did not know if I had entered into a 
high-level area. In Tirisfal Glades it was easy, but when I traveled 
with my lvl 10 warlock to Western Plaguelands, I encountered imme-
diately an aggressive lvl 50 plague bear which started to chase me. I 
think I screamed aloud when I urged my character run back to a safer 
area… Later we joined a guild which organized many role-playing 
events. We participated in weddings, festivities, and hunts. Some of 
these events started spontaneously, out of our feeling of community. 
For example, after completing a dungeon, we used to meet in Booty 
Bay tavern, got drunk and told stories. (W8, adventurer) 
 
When we compare the two types of stories that describe first-person experiences of 
playing a specific video game, we can notice that storytelling about enacted narra-
tives—or what kind of narrative structure an elapsed gameplay experience had— pri-
marily concerns player performance, and the dramatic turns of events that took place 
in gameplay in relation to the player’s skills. Enacted narratives [1.1] are thus first-
person narratives about what the player did and how it affected the course of game-
play. In contrast to this, stories about gameplay experience of a heightened value [1.2] 
include detailed descriptions of the gameplay as an experienced whole, including the 
aspects of Ludic, Diegetic, and Verisimilitude (see Chapter 7).  
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The stories of a heightened value do not emphasize a player’s skillful experience over 
the other aspects of gameplay experience. Although these stories include elements 
describing excitement and arousal, they are not directly linked to the player’s perfor-
mance but to the events the player experienced. These are stories about what happened 
to the player in the gameworld, what she saw, what she experienced, and how it made 
her feel. Whereas enacted narratives focus on an individual gameplay session, stories 
of heightened value take the aesthetic wholeness of gameplay as the unit of descrip-
tion. For example, participant P2 (adventurer) tells a story about her whole experience 
of Majestic gameplay. It is not one singular gaming session what matters most but 
how consequent sessions together constituted a gameplay experience of a heightened 
value.  
The different qualities between stories of enacted narratives [1.1] and game-
play experience of a heightened value [1.2] can be further elucidated by considering 
what Gerald C. Cupchik (2011b) writes about reactive and reflective modes of expe-
riencing. In reactive mode, a person engages with the activity to modulate feelings of 
pleasure or arousal, but in reflective mode, the person interprets and elaborates the 
aesthetic characteristics of the experience in relation to her own views on life and its 
meanings. It can thus be suggested that the stories about enactive narratives are pri-
marily stories about being in the reactive mode whereas stories about a gameplay ex-
perience of heightened value are narratives of being in the reflective mode of experi-
encing.  
When participant W8 (adventurer) describes community events of World of 
Warcraft, she introduces social interaction as a constituent of meaningful gameplay 
experience. In the data of 32 interviewees and 10 written descriptions, the narration 
about sharing gameplay experiences [2] encompassed two types of stories. The first 
type of these stories illustrates gameworld accord [2.1], which I discuss in Chapter 7. 
The second type describes folkloric traditions [2.2] that are largely generated by the 
“story-machine” qualities of gameplay. Let us first consider stories about gameworld 
accord:  
 
For me, playing has always been a solitary experience… The story 
and the characters are what matter for me in games. Unfortunately, I 
have not discussed games much with my friends since not many of 
them play at all. Nowadays, I talk mostly about Fallout games with 
my friends’ boyfriends and with one of my male friends… I have or-
ganized with my pianist-guitarist friend two concerts in which I have 
sung radio songs that are played in the gameworlds of Fallout 3, Fall-
out: New Vegas and Fallout 4. It was wonderful to be able to perform 
for an audience who had shared similar gameplay experiences. (W7, 
explorer) 
 
This game is influenced by “real” UFO mythology, stories about ab-
duction and stuff. This game was my first experience about emergent 
gameplay that seems to generate little stories you could then share 
with your friends. Like how your whole team got trapped in an am-
bush and only one of them, only a rookie, managed to escape and 
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shoot by blind luck so well that we survived, and the alien was killed. 
During those years, I played this game simultaneously with several 
friends. Each of us played alone, this is a single-player game, but our 
experiences had similarities and then we shared them like some war 
stories. (P12, adventurer-explorer) 
 
These two excerpts demonstrate how emotionally relevant gameplay experiences fa-
cilitate gameworld accord (cf. James, 2015), that is, shared cultural and environmental 
imagination. Because gameplay is often perceived as intrinsically meaningful and 
emotional, we are also interested in sharing these experiences with others who have 
also “been there.” As Miller (2008, p. 267) writes following Amy Schuman (1986), 
experiencing games first-hand brings along specific “storytelling rights.” Only by 
playing a game, can one gain access to a folk group in which individuals engage in 
cultural meaning-making of a particular kind of self-expression and traditionality. 
This quality of a gameplay experience engenders versatile new folkloric activities and 
traditions [2.2]: 
 
We were all fans of Final Fantasy VII at the time, and imitated the 
victory poses and attack styles of the game’s characters in school. It 
was fun, it was one of the first games with 3D animation we had 
played, and the animation looked a bit machine-like, sometimes. It 
was fun to imitate and play with friends. We looked so silly. (P11, 
mercenary-adventurer) 
 
When I was a kid, we had a PC and some games. Some other children 
had Commodore, but not many had any kind of machine for gaming. 
It was the ancient past, you know. We acted out events of some of 
those games with our friends in the forest nearby. I think we played 
King’s Quest, at least, and some other graphic adventures of the 
1980s, too… (P22, patterner-commander) 
 
When I was maybe 8–10 years old, and my friend had Civilization II, 
we used to sometimes to take the idea of the game to our sandbox 
playing. We built our own states, monuments, dams and everything 
out of sand. I remember that we were only allowed to use a few 
wooden sticks, because in the game in England there was not much 
wood, and we did not want to break the illusion of the play. (W9, 
commander) 
 
A while ago I played Heavy Rain, and my husband watched me play. 
The game is an interactive drama game, so it is played by reacting 
quickly to symbols that appear and disappear on the screen. The idea 
is that the player can make meaningful choices and contribute to the 
personality of the playable characters, and to the story. So, I wanted 
to play one of the main characters, Ethan Mars, as a responsible and 
non-violent dad… But there was an event in which, with Ethan, I had 
to fight a man whom I suspected had something to do with kidnap-
ping Ethan’s son. The symbols started appearing and indicated me to 
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fight the man. I pressed quickly the Playstation buttons: circle, 
square, triangle, X, R1, L1, up, down, left, right as accurately as I 
could. I did ok, Ethan found a gun, and I figured that the fight event 
was over already. But then, a shaking symbol R1 appeared on the 
screen prompting me to press the button. So, without thinking, I 
pressed R1, and stared in disbelief when Ethan pressed the gun 
against the man’s head and shot him. I was like: “Nooooo! Why did 
you do that! That was so out of his character!”  
Well, the next day was really bad for me at work, I was so 
angry at my boss who organized an important meeting without con-
sulting me first. So, when I got home, I cursed him to my husband 
who asked me: “R1?” And I shouted back “R1!” [laughs]. After that, 
we started to utter “R1” in every occasion where a single headshot 
would be really appropriate. Like when someone cuts in front of you 
in line. (P2, adventurer) 
 
When I was just a little girl, 6 years old I think, I liked to watch my 
uncle play many videogames and he let me participate in the deci-
sions he made in gameplay. I was fascinated already then in all 
magic-like things, so I wanted to tell him what spell he would choose 
next in those Final Fantasy games, and I got to name the summoned 
guardian force creatures in Final Fantasy VIII. So, they got really 
“mighty” names. One was named “KARHUNHAMMA” [BEAR-
TOOT] since the maximum length for a name was 10 characters. 
(P29, companion-explorer) 
 
Although a few of the stories above include descriptions of folkloric activities that 
include a small group close friends, several are best described by what Elliott Oring 
(1984, p. 20) calls dyadic traditions. Dyadic traditions are “behavioral and linguistic 
routines that are generated, endowed with significance, and maintained within the dy-
adic relationship” such as in a friendship or in a marriage. Interestingly, Oring (ibid., 
pp. 21, 27) observes that many instances of dyadic traditions are characterized by 
playful attitude and humor. According to Oring, (ibid., p. 21), dyadic traditions have 
three core dimensions. First, they reveal whether the persons of the folk dyad have a 
similar attitude towards the elapsed experience and if the participants of the dyad are 
sensitive to the same qualities of that experience. Second, dyadic traditions are en-
coded and encrypted to symbolize an intimate relationship between the immediate 
experience and the members of the dyad. Such expressions typically do not make 
sense to people who have not experienced something very similar. Third, dyadic tra-
ditions are narratives of participation, and thus these traditions evoke a sense of a 
shared meaningful past.  
The aspect of a meaningful past was indeed evident in the stories of memora-
ble gameplay experiences. During the final moments of their interviews, many partic-
ipants began to think back on their earliest gameplay memories [3]. While some in-
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terviewees emphasized gaming technology when remembering their childhood expe-
riences, and a few reflected that they had mostly played alone, a great majority of 
these stories were also about playing together with family members or friends [3.1]: 
 
As a kid, I saw my cousin, who is a bit older than me, play the Mario 
World game and defeat Bowser, the final boss. Then later when I 
played it alone, also I got to the same place. But then I got so scared 
of Bowser, and so excited that I did not dare to play. So, I died on 
purpose just before Bowser, because I just was too scared. I think that 
I was five years old. Most of my other early memories are about play-
ing together with friends. (P7, mercenary) 
 
We played together quite many sports games, Giana Sisters, and 
graphic adventures by Sierra, solving the puzzles together with the 
help of a dictionary. So, it was more memorable, perhaps, because I 
did it with my friends. We talked a lot about these games and tried to 
figure out the solutions during schooldays, too. Those memories are 
really vivid, it is almost unbelievable. I remember many in-game 
rooms and its items very clearly. Like in Giana Sisters, after some 20 
years, I still remember all the levels and enemies. (P25, explorer) 
 
We have some old home video tapes on which my sister is playing 
with the computer and our parents go: “Let your little brother play 
too”, and my sister replies: “No, I won’t.” Then there is a slapping 
sound when I smash the keyboard and yell: “Go away! It is my 
turn!”… Then Age of Empires 2 was published. For me and my sister, 
it was like “now we are really playing this game!” So many of our 
real-life conflicts and arguments have been since solved in that 
game… I think these are the most vivid memories I have from child-
hood. (P21, companion-adventurer) 
 
My mom got as excited as I did about Pokémon games, when she still 
was together with my dad… but my dad did not like it at all, it was 
all too expensive, like the Pokémon stickers and toys: “Do not buy 
any of that stuff anymore, it is a waste of time and money,” he used 
to say. But then when we went into a supermarket just me and my 
mom, my mom bought me those stickers for me and whispered “Let’s 
not tell dad. Now when you capture a Pokémon in the game, you can 
put its sticker into the sticker book.” And then we played together, 
Mom and I, staring the tiny screen of the Nintendo Gameboy. (P15, 
explorer)  
 
I have many memories about the Playstation console. When we 
bought the console, there were no memory cards available, so we 
could not save any game. So, we played Ape Escape and were able to 
proceed really far in the game, and started to panic that we could not 
save the game. So, we begged our mom to go to another store to buy 
a memory card, and finally she went. It was really slippery then, so 
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she managed to damage our family car during that trip… I also re-
member that my uncle, who died in 2000, liked to play with the con-
sole whenever he visited us. So, when he stayed with us, he played 
Final Fantasy VII and asked me constantly to get him more coffee. I 
put his coffee into a pint since he really needed a lot of that stuff. 
(P20, mercenary) 
 
Earlier research has argued that we can remember self-referent information better than 
information about others, and that we even better remember events that include our 
close others (see Ganesh et al., 2011). Emotionally significant experiences are also 
remembered more vividly and in more detail than information that is experienced neu-
trally (see Jeong, Biocca & Bohil, 2008, p. 193). My results of analyzing the personal 
stories of interviewees support both of these theories. Although the above stories all 
emphasize gameplay as a social experience—regardless of if the game was designed 
to be multiplayer or not—it was typical for these stories to include references to gam-
ing technology [3.2]. Indeed, some interview participants emphasized technology 
over the other qualities in their earliest gameplay memories:  
 
A strong memory from those early years is the waiting. You had to 
wait so long for a game to load, and it was terrible with C-cassettes 
since you did not know whether the loading was even going to be 
successful. And we copied those games with tape recorders. They 
even broadcasted the code of some games on radio, so we attempted 
to record that, too. (P25, explorer) 
 
 My earliest memories are from the arcades they had on those great 
ferries between the cities of Turku and Stockholm. I was maybe 10 
years old, and they had Space Invaders there. So, my parents gave me 
10 Finnish Marks and I spend all of my money on a single session 
playing that game. There was a huge line behind me, and other kids 
shouted: “Could you please stop already!” (P31, daredevil) 
 
During the 80s, we lived in Sweden and used to drive between Fin-
land and Sweden quite often. So, I could play electronic games in the 
car and I played so much I got blisters on my thumbs [laughs]. I still 
remember the tunes from the game, too [hums the in-game music]. I 
think that I can still remember the rhythm of the game, since it was 
synchronized with the tempo of the music. (P3, adventurer) 
 
Finally, in the fourth type of personal gameplay stories, the interviewees described 
how playing video games had affected their experiences of everyday life [4]. The first 
subclass of these stories deals with humorous gameplay experiences [4.1]:   
 
Jetpack Joyride was a mobile game that I played a while ago. It was 
like, only when I had to take a dump, I played the game. So, I devel-
oped a kind of habit. Then one day, I looked: “Hey, there are some 
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stats about my playing visible here!” I laughed about it afterwards 
with my friends. I had spent more than four hours playing the game. 
(P13, mercenary) 
 
Then I mentioned Hay Day to mom. I did not understand the point of 
that game at all, but when my mom tried it, oh my god! She started 
to play that for real and got my cousin, a 33-year old mother of two 
kids, to play it with her. And then they started to talk every evening 
on phone with each other, like: “Could you send me some wheat?” 
“Yes, I need corn myself.” Dear lord, that was horrible. (P15, ex-
plorer) 
 
Then I play Tetris, I have played quite many versions of the game. 
On good days, I have played two Tetris games simultaneously, one 
with my right hand and the other with my left hand. One version of 
Tetris had a two-player mode. So, I played it alone in both the coop-
erative and competitive modes against myself. You could say that 
usually I won. (W3, mercenary) 
 
This would be my fifth playthrough of this game. You know, that 
there is the joke that if someone even as much as mentions Deus Ex 
to the people present, one of those people goes instantly home to in-
stall the game again? (P21, companion-adventurer)  
 
In addition to stories that described a humorous quality of gameplay situation, a few 
interviewees described to me how the logic or the events of gameworld “bleed” into 
their everyday life experienced, especially in their dreams [4.2]: 
 
I have really strange dreams. Games tend to come really strongly into 
my dreams. Oftentimes, I have dreams in which the logic of the game, 
or its places and characters are integrated into my own imagination. 
So that dreaming feels a bit like playing. Some immersive and im-
pactful gameplay experiences tend to stick with me so that I continue 
to play when I dream. (P20, mercenary) 
 
After playing Half-Life very intensively, I had the feeling in real life 
that I should check all the corners to see if there is something waiting 
for me. Well, I did not literally do that, but I had the sensation that I 
should be careful and sneak around. The logic of the game breaks 
through a bit, I mean, for a while after playing. And Tetris, I can play 
the game in my mind, especially when I try to get sleep, those blocks 
starts to flow around. (P3, adventurer) 
 
Still another group of interviewees reflected that their experiences of gameplay had 





Some game memories are quite vivid for me. Similar maybe to some 
of my memories of our family trips in Turkey when I was a kid. (P27, 
mercenary) 
 
Well, making choices is something that reminds me about real-life in 
these Japanese RPGs. For example, when I traveled with my dad to 
New Zealand to see the Lord of the Rings scenery, we had to con-
stantly make choices about where to go and what to eat. We are both 
really bad at making such choices. Then if we are tired, we just argue: 
“you decide,” and the other replies, “no, you decide.” (P15, explorer) 
 
Finally, a few participants in this study openly told me that playing videogames was 
a significant part of who they are, and how they live their lives. For these people, 
drawing from Titon (1980), gameplay experiences have become constituents of their 
life story: 
 
A story about my gameplay experiences is a story about my life. A 
while ago I got a free pass for 7 days of playtime in WoW, and I felt 
like 20-years-old again. I played maybe obsessively because I am 
pregnant, and although I am over-the-moon happy, I am a bit scared 
too, that soon I won’t have time to do anything, least of all to play 
games. Well, the fear will soon be over, and I will be thinking about 
all the wonderful games I will be able to play with my child and my 
amazing husband (Alliance, Marksmanship Hunter Dwarf, level 85). 
Games and playing games is an important part of who I am, and I 
cannot imagine my life without playing games. (W10, adventurer) 
 
When an interviewee shared her experiences of playing videogames with me, she in-
vited me to know her values and personality. Stahl (2008 [1989], p. xxxiii) writes that 
such intimacy is a definitional characteristic of personal narratives, and I consider that 
the same holds with gameplay experience stories. Indeed, during the interviews I often 
felt an intimate link of mutual understanding and trust between myself and the inter-
viewees when they described their most memorable experiences of playing video-
games.  
According to Stahl (2008 [1989], pp. 18–19), three features are typical to all 
personal narratives. The features are dramatic narrative structure, an expectation of 
the story to be true, and a recognition that the identity of the main character of the 
story is the same as the person telling the story. When the features of personal narra-
tives are compared with gameplay experience stories, we can observe that, although 
gameplay experiences include an inherent dramatic structure that describes true 
events, the identity of the main character of the story is not necessarily the same as 
that of the teller.  
As we have seen, the main character of a gameplay experience story is often 
the person as being a player or as being a player and an in-game character. Since 
gameplay experience stories denote that the teller describes events during which he or 
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she adopted the position of the player, these stories are typically not personal narra-
tives but instead persona narratives, stories of experiencing the world from the van-
tage point of the player. Although both personal narratives and persona narratives 
sustain the teller’s identity through her usages of the pronoun I, in persona narratives 
I refers not only to the current moment and to the past (see Stahl 2008 [1989], p. 27) 
but also to the person as being the player, i.e., her player persona.  
Similar to personal narratives (see Stahl 2008 [1989], p. 25), persona narra-
tives of being the player are not folklore but instead means for expressing non-verbal 
folklore such as values, attitudes and preferences. Furthermore, persona narratives are 
stories about gameplay experiences, which I have inherently argued are a folkloric 
form of cultural expression. As Stahl (ibid.) writes about personal narratives, persona 
narratives also reveal what happens not only in the recounted story but also in rela-
tionships between the storyteller and her cultural values—and what she finds to be 
meaningful in her encounters with the world.  
 
 
The Seven Player Types and Meaningful Gameplay Experience 
 
In this final section of the current chapter, I conduct a statistical analysis on how the 
seven player types (Chapter 3) differ from each other from the viewpoint of experi-
encing a video game as inherently meaningful. As I outline in Chapter 2, understand-
ing meaningful gameplay experience is a main empirical objective of this thesis 
(RQ2). I propose that to remember an experience and to hold it as a constituent of 
one’s life story (Titon, 1980) is to be taken as a signifier of heightened value, im-
portance, and meaning. 
In Chapter 6, I hypothesize that, since events of emotional relevance are re-
membered vividly, meaningful gameplay experiences and emotional gameplay expe-
riences can be interrelated. In Chapter 7, I note that appreciating Diegetic dimensions 
in games is more strongly correlated with immersion than Ludic or Verisimilitude. I 
also note that the player types who enjoyed (N=1,718) Diegetic the most were also 
the player types that were the most eager to share their gameplay experiences with 
me. The qualitative data I analyzed in this chapter support this view; players of The 
Mercenary type, The Adventurer type, and The Commander type reflected their game-
play experiences in a more detailed and comprehensive way than the players of the 
four other types.  
The survey of 1,718 participants included The Psychological Empowerment 
Scale (Spreitzer, 1995), which is a psychometrically validated 12-item 7-point Likert 
scale designed for measuring experienced empowerment in working environments. 
The scale consists of the four 3-item factors of Meaning, Competence, Self-Determi-
nation, and Impact. Here, I only report data from the Meaning scale.  
Spreitzer (1995) defines the dimension of Meaning as “the value of a work 
goal or purpose, judged in relation to an individual’s own ideals and standards.” I 
modified the scale in the survey (N=1,718) so that it measured the perceived meaning 
of gameplay experience in its relation to the survey participant’s values. The respond-
ents were asked to specify how much they agreed (1=completely disagree, 7=com-
pletely agree) that “Every gaming session is important to me,” “Player activities are 
meaningful for me,” and “The game I play is meaningful for me”. The alpha for the 
3-item scale of Meaning was 0.94, which can be considered a very high value.  
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I then calculated the Meaning mean sums for each of the seven player types to explore 
whether the player types differed in this sense as I hypothesized. The results are shown 
in Table 23. 
 
 
 Meaning sum Std. N Play Time 
Adventurer 4.93 1.47 178 910 
Commander 4.47 1.45 322 820 
Companion 4.07 1.66 137 640 
Daredevil 4.10 1.50 249 650 
Explorer 4.02 1.55 271 630 
Mercenary 4.94 1.31 335 1030 
Patterner 3.50 1.66 225 600 
 
Table 23. Descriptive statistics for the seven player types and their perceived mean-
ingful gameplay experiences sums, as measured with the 3-item Meaning sub-scale 
(α=0.94) of The Psychological Empowerment Scale (Spreitzer, 1995)   
 
From Table 23 we can note that The Adventurers (M=4.93) and The Mercenaries 
(M=4.94) find video gameplay experiences much more meaningful than the other five 
player types. Also, the player type of The Commander (M=4.47) reflected to a degree 
that gameplay brings about distinctive meaningfulness, but this experience was not 
shared with The Companions, The Daredevils or The Explorers, who neither agreed 
nor disagreed with the statements of the meaningfulness of a gameplay experience. 
The Patterners were the only participants who disagreed to some extent with the three 
propositions. These intriguing results indicate that the motifeme factor approach pro-
vides a relevant method for understanding how players valuate their gameplay expe-
riences. However, these results do not yet provide data on how the motifeme approach 
compares with other approaches on understanding perceived meaningfulness of the 
gameplay experience. 
To investigate this question further, I complemented the analysis by compu-
ting bivariate correlations (Spearman rank-order) between motifeme preference fac-
tors (Chapter 3), the identified three factors of ‘a good game’ (Chapter 7), play time, 
and the factors of favored emotional arousal in gameplay (Chapter 6). Of these di-
mensions of player conduct, appreciating Diegetic qualities in games was the most 
highly-correlated with perceived meaningful gameplay experience (0.55), followed 
closely by player preference in Journey (0.52). Favoring high Emotional Arousal 
(0.48), enjoying Assault (0.45) or Manage (0.41) were all moderately correlated with 
meaningful gameplay experiences. Weekly play time (0.32), appreciating Ludic (0.38) 
or Verisimilitude (0.32) and favoring Care (0.27) in games were weakly correlated 
with perceived meaningfulness. Finally, a preference in Coordinate (0.19) showed 
only a very weak connection with perceived meaningful gameplay experiences.  
These correlations do not indicate by themselves that preference in, e.g., Die-
getic or Journey would be a strong predictor for meaningful gameplay experiences. 
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Investigating that question falls beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet, these results do 
reveal strong connections between specific types of gameplay preferences and the 
perceived meaningfulness of gameplay activity for the player. These connections open 
new views on understanding gameplay as a form of experience that some players may 
hold dear enough to remember for decades. However, these questions cannot be con-
sidered much further without taking into consideration another important aspect of the 





9. THE MOTIVATIONAL PULL OF 
THE GAMEPLAY EXPERIENCE 
 
We should not forget that emotions are intentional. They are about 
something, and in order to understand them, it is not enough simply 
to pay attention to their expressions; we also need to look at the con-
text in order to determine what they are about (Zahavi, 2014, p. 163). 
 
 
I propose in Chapter 5 that we cannot assume that one desires to continue gameplay 
simply because she has adopted the position of the player. Rather, when the player 
does desire to play, she has motivation to play. Since gameplay experience is the phe-
nomenon under analysis in this thesis, motivation to play can be suggested as the 
eighth and final invariant of a video game gameplay experience.  
When conducting the interviews, after the interviewees (N=32) and I had dis-
cussed their favorite games and their preferred way of taking the player’s position in 
video game gameplay, I typically asked a short question: “Why do you play?” This 
question was experienced by many as a difficult one. Whereas some interviewees 
clearly expressed that they needed a few moments to think about their reasons to play, 
others replied immediately: “Because it is fun,” which led me to follow up with: “Yes, 
but what makes it fun?” 
The question of why we play games in general, and video games in particular, 
is studied in the literature as human motivations to play. While there are many studies 
on the subject and its connections with gameplay experience (see e.g., Ermi & Mäyrä, 
2007; Kahn et al., 2015), I find two major ones especially interesting for the current 
thesis. First, Nick Yee’s (2006; 2012) studies on online gaming motivations are valu-
able for my work because his approach is based on a factor analytic approach and 
relating the results with prior player type research.  
Yee (2006) constructed an inventory on motivations to play, based on empir-
ical works on MMORPG (massive multiplayer online role-playing games) players and 
Richard Bartle’s earlier work (1996; 2003) on player behavior—and the proposed 
player types of ‘killers,’ ‘explorers,’ ‘socializer’ and ‘achievers’ by Bartle—in a MUD 
(multi-user dungeon) game environment. By conducting an exploratory factor analy-
sis of data on 3000 players, Yee identified 10 motivational categories (eigenvalue > 1 
test) in players of massively multiplayer online games (MMOs). With an additional 
factor analysis on the ten components, he was able to reveal three overarching moti-
vation categories: achievement, sociality, and immersion. Together with Nicolas 
Ducheneaut and Les Nelson, Yee later (2012) presented a confirmatory factor analysis 
on the motivations to play scale. 
An even more interesting body of research was conducted under the umbrella 
of the Self-Determination Theory (SDT), a macro-theory of human motivations, by 
e.g. Richard M. Ryan, C. Scott Rigby, Andrew Przybylski (2006), Ron Tamborini, 
Nicholas David Bowman, Allison Eden, Matthew Grizzard and Ashley Organ (2010), 
and Tamborini, Grizzard, Bowman, Eden, Leonard Reinecke and Robert J. Lewis 
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(2011). These studies are relevant in the context of this dissertation because they en-
able theoretical discussions on how game motifeme factors (see Chapter 3, Chapter 
8) relate to gaming motivations, and to meaningful gameplay experiences in general. 
Fundamentally, to discuss emotional experiences of gameplay, we should be 
able to presume the player as an autonomous actor and the main cause for distal effects 
that take place in the game. Through the modes of interaction, the player may gain the 
“pleasure of being the cause,” as Piaget (1962 [1951], p. 90) put it, describing enjoy-
ment in play. Psychologist Robert W. White (1959) has called the capacity to exercise 
and extend one’s capabilities and to be effective in an agent–environment relationship 
effectance, and its corresponding affect efficacy, and has argued that it is innately mo-
tivating.  
Richard M. Ryan and Edward Deci (2000, p. 54) note that individuals vary 
both in how motivated they are and what type of motivation they experience, that is, 
in whether they experience intrinsic or extrinsic orientation to an ongoing activity. In 
the context of the current thesis, both the level of motivation and especially its orien-
tation are interesting since “orientation of motivation concerns the underlying atti-
tudes and goals that give rise to action—that is, it concerns the why of actions” (ibid.).  
According to Edward Deci and Ryan (1985), what White (1959) described as 
effectance is called, in empirical psychology, non-drive-based intrinsic motivation to 
be self-determining and competent. The experience of autonomy and competence (or 
the lack thereof) thus underlies all emotions brought forth by gameplay. This connects 
emotions induced from gameplay directly to the discussions of motivations to play; 
emotional experiences cannot be distinguished from experiences of human motiva-
tions. Recall from Chapter 6 that emotion can be understood as “the intention to act 
in the near future” (Freeman, 2000, p. 14), whereas “to be motivated means to be 
moved [i.e., inspired] to do something” (Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 54).  
In extrinsically motivating activities, the subject experiences external pres-
sure toward a specific instrumental outcome. This diminishes the subject’s perception 
of herself as being the locus of causality, which renders the situation controlling and 
restricting for the individual’s creative self-expression. (Deci & Ryan, 1985, p. 110) 
In contrast to this, intrinsically motivating activity is inherently enjoyable and satis-
fying for an individual; “When intrinsically motivated a person is moved to act for the 
fun or challenge entailed rather than because of external prods, pressures, or rewards” 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 56).  
Intrinsically motivated activities are not done for instrumental reasons but for 
intrinsic interest, positive experiences, novelty appeal, challenge, and aesthetic value. 
Such explorative and spontaneous playful behavior is connected to intrinsically moti-
vating behavior not only in humans, but also in many animals. However, the concept 
of ‘intrinsic motivation’ does not mean that someone would be innately motivated 
without taking into account the situation in which the individual acts. Rather it means 
that a person experiences intrinsic motivation towards specific activities in the agent–
environment relation. To understand intrinsic motivation, both the individual and the 
task she engages with must be considered (Ryan & Deci, 2000, pp. 56–59). 
The Self-Determination Theory postulates three psychological needs for well-
being, and argues that intrinsically motivating activities manage to support all three. 
The needs are autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Put differently, according to 
SDT, persons are intrinsically motivated to engage with activities that support the sat-
isfaction of the three fundamental needs (Tamborini et al., 2010, p. 758). Autonomy 
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refers to the willingness and volition to engage with an activity. One experiences au-
tonomy when the activities have personal value for the experiencer, and when the 
person has a clear understanding of her multiple choices to take action. Clear and 
constant feedback and perception of how one’s own actions generate effects support 
autonomy and thus intrinsic motivation. (Ryan, Rigby & Przybylski, 2006). Compe-
tence is the need for putting one’s skills in use to overcome optimal challenges and to 
experience effectance. The opportunity to learn new skills, master tasks at hand, and 
to be rewarded with positive feedback enhances competence. Competence, however, 
does not support intrinsic motivation if the individual does not also perceive herself 
to be autonomous in the situation. Finally, relatedness is the sense of being socially 
connected to close others (Ryan, Rigby & Przybylski, 2006).  
Ryan, Rigby and Przybylski (2006) argue that the attractiveness of gameplay 
is primarily due to a game’s capability to facilitate psychological need satisfaction and 
offer experiences of autonomy, competence and relatedness while playing. They sug-
gest that the Self-Determination Theory can thus provide better understanding on why 
gameplay is so commonly experienced as “fun”.  
 In this view, competence in gameplay is connected to intuitive game controls, 
optimal challenges and positive feedback. Competence is therefore directly associated 
with experiences of achieving one’s objectives during play, whether these achieve-
ments are, e.g., in-game rewards for meeting the game’s goals, or new skills the player 
learns through continued play. Gameplay engenders experiences of autonomy since 
playing is voluntary and the player can usually choose a game to her liking and expe-
rience being the locus of causality in game events. Also, the player can self-regulate 
her attitudes toward the game and make decisions based on afforded choices.  
Relatedness is clearly connected to multiplayer-situations, although Ryan, 
Rigby and Przybylski (2006) also express interest in studying whether interacting with 
artificial intelligence may provide experiences of social connectedness. Intriguingly, 
this latter line of argumentation was adopted later in a statistical study by Oliver et al. 
(2015) who utilize relatedness as the player’s “relationships with game characters ra-
ther than with other players.”  
In contrast to Yee’s (2006) empirical approach on identifying motivations to 
play online games, Ryan, Rigby and Przybylski (2006) argue that theory of motiva-
tions should not focus on reasons for why people play specific types of contemporary 
games but ask instead how games in general tap into basic human motivations and are 
able to satisfy fundamental psychological needs. Building on this stance, Ryan, Rigby 
and Przybylski (2006) offer that the reasons we play are the same as our reasons to 
engage with any activity, and thus “players of all types seek to satisfy psychological 
needs in the context of play.” Ryan, Rigby and Przybylski (2006) and Przybylski, 
Rigby and Ryan (2010) do not, therefore, conduct explorative studies on what the 
motivations of play are but ask how general human motivations to experience auton-
omy, competence, and relatedness manifest in gameplay. The authors, therefore, sug-






Study 5: Exploring the Motivational Drivers  
 
In contrast to studies by Ryan et al. (2006) and Przybylski et al. (2010), the current 
thesis is not built on the Self-Determination Theory, and thus I do not take it as given 
that the three psychological needs of autonomy, competence and relatedness are nec-
essarily the main motivations to play video games. Instead, I have fashioned an ex-
ploratory study on the motivational factors that players themselves perceive as their 
reasons to play. My overall goal in doing so was to seek answers to the following 
questions: 
 
RQ2.11: Do the recurrent reasons for why people play video games constitute moti-
vational factors? 
 
RQ2.12: If such factors can be identified, how do these factors relate to the three di-
mensions of SDT, i.e., autonomy, competence and relatedness, and to the 
three overarching motivations to play online games as presented by Yee 
(2006)? 
 
In order to study these questions, I constructed a preliminary motivations to play in-
ventory based on a literature review, and a focus group meeting with three game de-
signers, a psychologist, and a game design researcher in October 2014. The inventory 
was first tested in a pilot study (N=50), which contained open-ended fields to explore 
players’ additional suggestions for their recurrent reasons to play video games. The 
final version of the preliminary inventory included in the survey of December 2014 
(N=1,718) consisted the following items: 
 
 
Item  Motives to play video games Mean SD 
1  I play with my family and friends because of their company 2.51 1.39 
2  I play to relax 3.87 1.05 
3  I play for the fun of playing 4.10 0.99 
4  I play because I am interested in different games 3.24 1.29 
5  I play because I want to get immersed in games 3.12 1.37 
6  I play online because of the other players 2.21 1.35 
7  I play to kill time 2.98 1.24 
8  I play because my friends play 2.11 1.26 
9  I play because of competitiveness 2.33 1.33 
10  I play so that I can get feelings of achievement and success 2.72 1.34 
11  I play to avoid anxiety 1.98 1.24 
12  I play to face challenges and to develop my skills 2.74 1.32 
 
Table 24. Motivations to play items included in the survey of December 2014 
(N=1,718), and the mean preference sums and standard deviations for each item.  
 
The respondents of the survey were asked to report, on a scale from 1 to 5, how im-
portant (1= not at all important, 5 = very important) the above reasons were for their 
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gaming. From Table 24, we can see that the most important reason to play digital 
games in the data of these 1,718 Finnish and Danish respondents was clearly fun (item 
3), followed by relaxation (item 2), game interest (item 4), and immersion (item 5). I 
also studied this question in the sub-group of mobile game players (n=238, see Chap-
ter 3, Study 1). In this sub-group, the most important reason to play was again fun 
(mean 3.89), followed by relaxation (mean 3.67), but the third most important reason 
to play for this sub-group was to kill time (item 7, mean 3.05). These three motives 
were the only ones to have a mean sum above 3.00, which indicates the motive was 
at least somewhat of an important reason for the respondents to play digital games. 
I analyzed the main data set (N=1,718) by conducting an exploratory factor 
analysis using principal factor extraction, polychoric correlations for computing factor 
analysis, and varimax rotation of the 1,718 respondents. I first identified the number 
of factors by using Velicer’s minimum average partial (MAP) test, and accepted only 
factor loadings greater than 0.5. The MAP test suggested that two factors should be 
extracted from the data. In the first solution, items 7 and 11 had factor loadings < .5 
and were excluded from the analysis. After excluding these items, I ran the MAP test 
again to confirm that two factors were still to be extracted. The second iteration with 
the remaining 10 items produced a solution with 2 factors, in which all items showed 
loadings > .5 (see Table 24).  
 
 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
1 0.6147  0.5516 
2  0.6698 0.5513 
3  0.8017 0.3450 
4  0.7213 0.3646 
5  0.6956 0.3786 
6 0.7713  0.3697 
8 0.8028  0.3435 
9 0.7223  0.4495 
10 0.5878  0.4835 
12 0.5294  0.5060 
Mean 2.4371 3.5749  
Std. Dev. 0.9736 0.9283  
Alpha 0.8257 0.7907  
 
Table 25. Factor Loadings, uniqueness for items of the preliminary ‘Motivations to 
play’ scale and descriptive statistics for scale sums. Note that mean, standard devia-
tion and Cronbach’s alpha are calculated using items with loadings above 0.5. 
 
Six items (1, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12) loaded on the first factor. These items indicate that the 
player plays because she enjoys the company of others (items 1, 6, 8). She plays video 
games also because she is motivated by achieving goals and experiencing success 
(item 10), and because she is able to develop her skills in gameplay (item 12). The 
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player is furthermore motivated by competition, because it either offers her challenges 
or because when competing, she can be with close others (item 9), or both of these 
reasons. 
Four items (2, 3, 4, 5) loaded on the second factor. These items indicate that 
the player is motivated to play because playing is fun and relaxing, and because she 
can immerse herself in games that are inherently interesting to her. All of the ten items 
included in the analysis loaded on a single factor without showing cross-loadings. 
The ten motives to play and the two factors, which I label Fun–Immersion 
and Relatedness–Competence, worked as my framework to discuss with the 32 inter-
viewees why they played games. Similar to the theme of ‘a good game,’ I first en-
couraged the participants to freely reflect on their own views on the subject, and I 
waited until after they shared their reflections to present the identified two motiva-
tional factors. Then, we continued to discuss whether these two factors were able to 
capture what they considered to be their own main drivers for playing video games:    
 
Mostly I play just to relax, and to have fun, and to experience some-
thing different from daily tasks and routines. Well, there is also the 
fact that games give me constant feelings of success. In real-life I 
must learn for years to play some musical instrument, but in games I 
can just grab the plastic guitar with five buttons and just perform an 
amazing solo before a bunch of people. (P12, adventurer-mercenary) 
 
I like games that I can play for 100 hours or even more, but only if 
the story is fascinating. I also like if I don’t have to only follow the 
main story but if I can choose to do other things, too. Playing games 
relaxes me, you know. So, if I have awful stress, it helps. Other than 
that, I do not know. (P1, adventurer) 
 
All in all, I like challenge the most. I do not mind being really serious, 
and I enjoy tasting blood in my mouth. And if I then succeed, that is 
really rewarding. But fun, I do not think that gaming is so much “fun.” 
(P11, mercenary-adventurer) 
 
Several interviewees described their motives to play congruently to the model of the 
two motivational factors, Fun–Immersion and Relatedness–Competence. However, 
after only a few interviews, I observed that this was not always the case. For instance, 
there were player-interviewees who emphasized either the elements of challenge or 
being together with friends, without associating their reasons to play to the combina-
tion of those motives. Some players stressed the importance of experiencing the die-
getic qualities of games but did not connect this to ‘fun,’ ‘relaxation’ or “mere fun”:  
 
Nowadays, the story and the characters are what motivate me to play. 
I do not want to waste my time in mindless shooting but immerse in 
stories because they just feel more meaningful. Maybe I want similar 
experiences from playing as from books, movies or music: narratives, 





Furthermore, a group of interviewees talked about a motivational driver that was miss-
ing from the original set of survey items (Table 24) but is recognized as a basic ingre-
dient for intrinsically motivating activities—autonomy: 
 
I want to be able to define myself how I play, and if I want, I go 
fighting against some boss or just wander in the gameworld without 
any objective, just searching for stuff. I want to go with my own flow 
and decide myself. I do not like to follow some agenda set by others. 
(P2, adventurer) 
 
There is something engaging in those gameplay situations in which 
all the weapons and items you had are taken away, and you must just 
rely purely on your own decisions to succeed. I sometimes even do it 
by myself. For example, in Fallout if I’m at level 20, I just leave all 
my stuff behind except one gun and start to search for new stuff from 
scratch, since… I am able to do so… So, it is the feeling of empow-
erment that pulls me to play. (P21, companion-adventurer) 
 
How should the results of the preliminary explorative study (N=1,718) be interpreted? 
Why were the elements describing fun, interest, and immersion loaded on the first 
factor and the items of competence, relatedness, and competition on the second factor? 
Although most of the interviewees did recognize that the twelve motives (Table 24) 
were crucial for their play, a fair amount of the players identified their own play as 
being motivated by either challenges or the company of the others, and either fun or 
immersion in the gameworld. The Self-Determination Theory provides us with a rel-
evant theoretical framework to analyze these results. 
Ryan, Rigby and Przybylski (2006) suggest that intrinsic motivation in game-
play is associated not only with autonomy, relatedness and competence but also with 
presence, which they understand as “the sense that one is within the gameworld.” 
Later, Przybylski, Rigby and Ryan (2010) studied how gameplay experiences that 
manage to satisfy the needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness predict pres-
ence. They consistently found in several studies and experiments that satisfying the 
three motivational needs not only predicted game enjoyment but also immersion 
(Przybylski et al., 2009, p. 253). The players whose motivational needs are satisfied, 
therefore, “are more phenomenologically embedded in the emotional, physical, and 
narrative elements of the gameworld” (Przybylski et al., 2010, p. 162).107 Furthermore, 
as I mention earlier in this chapter, Ryan and Deci (2000, p. 56) and Ryan, Rigby and 
                                                 
107 Przybylski, Rigby and Ryan (2010) report a study in which they compare how the three 
SDT needs predict game enjoyment when compared to the overarching motives to play online 
games proposed by Yee (2006). As I mention already in Chapter 3, and is noted also by 
Przybylski et al. (2010), Yee’s model studies motivations as activity-bounded phenomena, 
whereas SDT is based on universal psychological needs, which are argued to apply across all 
kinds of situations. By conduction regression analyses, Przybylski, Rigby and Ryan (2010) 
found in their study that the three needs all predicted game enjoyment, but the “player motives” 
of achievement, immersion, and socializing by Yee (2006) did not.  
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Przybylski (2006) offer ‘fun’ as a recurrent description for an experience in which the 
three psychological needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness are satisfied.  
The argumentation by prominent SDT theorists suggests, then, that neither 
‘immersion’ nor ‘fun’ are to be considered as parallel factors to autonomy, compe-
tence, and relatedness but instead second-order phenomena, that is, types of experi-
ences of situations in which the SDT needs are fulfilled. ‘Interest’ is not unlike ‘fun’ 
and ‘immersion’ in this sense, as is discussed later in this chapter. The SDT theory 
thus offers an interpretation of the two-factor model revealed in the preliminary study 
I report above: the factor, Relatedness–Competence, can be considered as a first-order 
motivational factor to play, and the factor that encompasses both ‘fun’ and ‘immer-
sion’—as well as relaxation and interest (Table 24)—can be considered to describe 
second-order experiential and emotional outcomes of gratifying play.  
Although the two factors of Relatedness–Competence and Fun–Immersion 
can be argued to be sympathetic with both SDT and the three motivational factors to 
play online games as proposed by Yee (2006), these preliminary results are not iden-
tical to either of these models. In addition to not making a distinction between com-
petence (including an item describing achievement) and relatedness (including an 
item of socializing), the results reported here differ from Yee by introducing ‘fun’ as 
a factor and by relating it directly with ‘immersion.’ In comparison to SDT, the need 
for ‘autonomy’ was missing from the inventory (Table 24). However, the analysis on 
the interview data suggested that ‘autonomy’ could be an important motivational 
driver for playing video games, which led me to reconsider the preliminary motiva-
tions to play inventory. Also, I wanted to investigate further whether analyzing addi-
tional data would result in a model describing first-order and second-order motiva-
tions in a more distinguished way. Most importantly, I was not fully convinced by the 
connection between fun and immersion and relatedness and competence since not all 
of my interviewees associated these drivers to play with each other.  
Seen from an SDT stance and supported by the qualitative interviews (N=32), 
the preliminary study was not fully successful in identifying distinctive motivational 
factors to play but instead revealed that motivations to play could be divided into first-
order and second-order constructs. However, the data from the preliminary study does 
not provide adequate tools to study this question in more detail. Therefore, I decided 
to design an additional study to investigate precisely this matter. 
To be able to develop the motivations to play inventory, I conducted a SDT 
literature review. Because of this, the second study was more firmly informed by SDT, 
although I designed it as an exploratory study without postulating the SDT needs of 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness as primary reasons to play video games. The 
additional inventory items were, however, even more crucially influenced by a more 
profound analysis I conducted on the qualitative interview data (N=32) and the open-
ended answers of the survey (N=1,718). 
 
 
Developing the Motivations to play Scale 
 
I analyzed the interview data in November and December 2015, which enabled me to 
take the results of this analysis into consideration in reconstructing the motivations to 
play scale before conducting another survey (N=845) in late December 2015. As I 
mention in the beginning of this chapter, the question, “Why do you play?” was a 
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subject area I discussed with every interviewee, most typically in the final part of the 
interview. I present here the findings of my analysis on this specific part of the quali-
tative data and elucidate how I developed the motivations to play scale based on the 
interview results. As mentioned earlier, many of my interviewees stated at first that 
they played video games simply because it is fun and generally pleasurable. Often, 
the topic of what motivates players to play led them to also discuss emotional experi-
ences they get from gameplay: 
 
It is mostly fun, but it can also be irritating. But mostly I play just 
because it relaxes me and just feels good. So, it is about fun, then. 
(P1, adventurer) 
 
I find gaming entertaining, that is why I play. It is the same thing 
when I read stuff. I do not read novels to learn something or to edu-
cate myself. I want to be entertained. (P19, explorer) 
 
I just want to build houses so that the gameworld would be really 
nice… It pisses me off when another player comes to destroy what I 
have created. I would just like to design and build for my pleasure 
and to make the citizens happy. (P25, explorer) 
 
Another group of interviewees emphasized that the experiential outcome they hoped 
for was not general pleasure but rather the feeling that playing a specific type of game 
relaxes them and works as a method for stress relief: 
 
When I lose, I quit. But it does not mean that I would not begin again 
in 10 minutes. I do not like it if I have to push my skills to succeed. 
There should be an option for avoiding real challenge. I want to play 
easy games. The best games relax me, they take my thoughts away 
from my own problems. (P28, explorer) 
 
For me the most important feeling is relaxing and the flow-like state. 
It takes away my stress, and I do not have to think about shopping 
lists or diapers for a while. I can just lay back and be. (P3, adventurer) 
 
I play mobile games maybe about 30 minutes daily. Just because after 
work I want to fall on the couch, breathe and relax. (P11, mercenary-
adventurer) 
 
A few participants connected this type of playing specifically to mobile game game-
play and made a distinction in this sense between mobile games and other type of 
games they played. Some interviewees stated explicitly that they played mobile games 
merely to avoid boredom: 
 
I play mobile games if I have the feeling that I must do something 
with my hands or stay awake. Like if I do not have the energy to listen 
266 
 
to a lecture, or something. But just getting a high-score does not mo-
tivate me. It is like after two minutes—thank you, I am done. (P14, 
adventurer) 
 
Yes, Candy Crush Saga is like a secondary activity for me. It does 
not really relax me. I never play these games to “have a me-moment.” 
I just play while I eat my lunch, or something like that. If I would not 
have the energy to get up from my bed in morning, the light of my 
phone and the sounds of a mobile game would wake me up nicely. 
But that’s that, really. (P29, companion-explorer) 
 
Furthermore, there were a few interviewees who did not emphasize gameplay as gen-
erally pleasurable and relaxing, or mobile gaming as a secondary activity to avoid 
boredom. Instead, they reflected on their playing as a self-conscious method of regu-
lating their mood: 
 
Games as media are a bit similar to music. There are many options 
for your current mood. In different life situations, you can enjoy dif-
ferent types of games. Some can try to find a balance in life with the 
help of games. (P4, adventurer-mercenary) 
 
Platform games are like “you do not need your brains,” they just give 
you something to focus on, I like them because of that. In some 
games, the trigger is in social interaction, in SingStar, for example. 
And in some games, solving puzzles. Or it can be some combination 
of those. (P22, patterner-commander) 
 
The interview data suggests that there are at least four ways to approach the ‘pleasur-
able’ experiential outcome of playing for fun: an expectation that gameplay i) makes 
you feel good in a general way; ii) relaxes you and distracts you from your real-life 
issues; iii) acts as a secondary activity to avoid boredom or to kill time; and iv) is a 
way to self-regulate your current mood with the aid of entertaining and enjoyable 
gaming.  
According to the argumentation by Ryan, Deci, Przybylski, Rigby, the pull of 
games is largely due to their capability to facilitate activities that satisfy all three fun-
damental needs. Efficacy, challenges and skill-growth facilitate competence; oppor-
tunities to explore and choose ways to act support autonomy; and cooperation and 
intersubjective communication enhance relatedness (Przybylski et al., 2014, p. 442). 
These needs, furthermore, are what bring forth experiences of self-determination, ar-
gued by these authors as intrinsically motivated—“fun” being one of the most com-
mon ways to express such an experience.  
Still, it must be asked: what is fun, exactly? Fun is, indeed also in the data 
collected for this study, a recurrent description for what motivates one to play games. 
Again, in the terms of Goffman (2013 [1961], pp. 34–44), notable in gameplay situa-
tions is the absence of “interaction tension” and the corresponding presence of “eu-
phoric ease,” which enables experiences of fun. Interaction tension emerges if the 
desires of a person and the situationally normative are not aligned. Characteristic of a 
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gameplay experience is that what the player wishes to do is explicitly regarded as what 
is expected to be done in order to be successful in a game.108  
In contrast to playing for fun, the interviewees’ narration on playing for com-
petence focused on specific qualities of their preferred gameplay experiences and the 
expected emotional outcomes, especially the feeling of achievement: 
 
The experience of control is so important. It is what makes playing 
enjoyable. But I do not play only for achieving something. For exam-
ple, in Streets of Rage, which is an old-school fighting game, every 
punch and fighting sound gives a little reward to my brain, so it feels 
good. I like arcade games, since they require skills and you can really 
see yourself getting better every time. (P7, mercenary)   
 
It is more fun when you can level up and you become more powerful, 
so that is why I play. It is also about the story, but it is really about 
the feeling of achievement, like wow, I actually made it. (P15, ex-
plorer) 
 
Well platformers give me a different feeling, like my adrenaline-lev-
els are higher. But in strategy games, you usually have to start from 
the bottom and be worse than the others. And when you get victories, 
you get better so that you can eventually beat pretty much everything 
you encounter. So, reaching that level is satisfying. (P30, com-
mander) 
 
Some participants emphasized that the most gratifying gameplay experience was a 
result of mastering their own gaming skills. When searching for this experience, the 
players may intentionally want to engage with games of an extremely hard difficulty 
level: 
 
These [bullet hell] games are so over-the-top difficult, I have won-
dered many times why I even play them. It is constant struggling and 
banging your head against the wall. But then when you beat an im-
possible boss, you are like… the feeling, it is this mind-blowing eu-
phoric good feeling, the adrenaline levels are sky-high. Your hands 
shake like hell when you finish, so it feels like you would have just 
                                                 
108 According to Deterding (2015), games outline a specific range of emotions and are designed 
to encourage players to express these emotions in gameplay. In this sense, games do not only 
present a set of rules to the players but also a normative spectrum of “emotion display” within 
which the interaction tension is reduced and the euphoric ease, i.e., the experience of fun, 
becomes possible. For instance, if a person finds the competitiveness of Monopoly unappeal-
ing, there is a tension between the emotions connected to succeeding in the game and those 
that the player finds motivating. To put it differently, to experience fun, the needs and motiva-
tions of the player should align with those enabled by the gameplay and the dynamics of the 
game system itself. 
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escaped from an angry pack of wolves and barely survived. (P13, 
mercenary) 
 
It is about getting better and proceeding in the game. So, you can feel 
that, hey, I can do this now! So that’s the feeling I aim for. In some 
games, like in Diablo, I prefer collecting items and developing my 
characters, but it is really more about learning new skills as a player 
and getting better. It is fun, and challenging… well it is fun because 
it is challenging. (P23, commander) 
 
While some reflected that the development of their own skills was the key for their 
best gameplay experiences, some thought that learning how the game system works 
was the thing they were looking for: 
 
Well for me, the reward I get is about learning new things. In some 
older games by Paradox, you do not really know what happens in the 
game. You see some changes, but you have to figure out yourself why 
just these things happen. So, I went through the structure of the game 
by myself and read the game’s files. It is something I enjoy, to under-
stand how the game system works. (P17, commander) 
 
Still another group of interviewees pondered that they were expecting to experience 
an epic win, the culmination point of the gameplay, a distinctive achievement to be 
remembered: 
 
I want to get that “epic win,” it is the best thing in gaming. To get that 
feeling “I was able to do that, yeah I did it! I am so good!” You can 
get those experiences so much more often in games than you can in 
real-life. So, I look for real challenges in games to get real feelings of 
epic winning. It is not bad at all to feel a little panic and scared, and 
immersed, it enhances the feelings. (P20, mercenary) 
 
By analyzing the interview data, I was able to highlight four different aspects that 
players find rewarding when they play for competence. Players value a sense of 
achievement that follows an experience of: i) becoming generally more powerful in a 
game and able to overcome any challenge they may encounter; ii) mastering their own 
skills as a competent player; iii) learning and understanding the complex game system 
and its regularities; and iv) an epic win over a challenging and formidable foe. To 
these we should add that many interviewees emphasized the importance of experienc-
ing making progress in a game. It is important to note that all of the above aspects of 
experiencing challenges and achievements are also possible in solitary gameplay. 
However, two other types of experiences emerged in the data when the interviewees’ 
reflected on their multiplayer game experiences: 
 
Competitive online gaming was compelling because I felt that I could 
be one of the best players if I only practiced enough… But I quit in 
2005, because it was too time-consuming and not really that fun or 
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glorious… it was a rewarding thing to do since suddenly you were 
really good at doing something. (P11, mercenary-adventurer)  
 
There are maybe 10 of us now, and nothing related to games is too 
obscure for us. Whatever we play, we tend to play it seriously, com-
pete, shout and stuff. I really like to have some way to assess how 
good I am in games, some ranking or high score list, for example. 
Being able to compare your performance with the others’ makes it 
possible to form teams with equal skill levels. (P6, commander) 
 
The most memorable experiences for me have been those moments 
when… you are the last one alive of your team... You can feel the 
excitement rising and your heart beating faster. And then there is the 
relief. And when you succeed, everyone is really happy and praises 
you. It is a powerful feeling. (P7, mercenary) 
 
These three interview excerpts highlight that social play broadens the sense of 
achievement into v) winning a competition and social recognition and praise from the 
other players or from the audience. The last two aspects of playing for competence 
are closely connected to the motivational driver to play to be with close others, but 
these two reasons to play should not necessarily be equated. When one plays for re-
latedness, she is primarily expecting experiences of socializing, which may render the 
game itself a ‘by-product’ of the experience. Of course, one can play competitively 
because it enables social interaction with others. In this sense, the fifth and the sixth 
aspects of playing for challenge could be situated in between the motivational factors 
of competence and relatedness. In some narratives by the interviewees, however, it 
was clear that they played primarily to be with others rather than to be competent:   
 
So, with my brother, it is now more about being together than playing 
a specific game. We are both interested in games, yes, but games are 
more like a catalyst or engine for us to spend time together and talk 
about everything. (P17, commander) 
 
It is a shared experience. When we play together, it is like watching 
a movie with friends. The game is experienced simultaneously, but 
there is a deeper sense of doing things rather than just watching some-
thing. For example, when we play Final Fantasy games simultane-
ously, each of us at our own home, and talk over Skype, we can cheer 
on the others and decide together where to go next. (P9, mercenary-
adventurer) 
 
I started to play EVE Online in 2012. The game is so huge. It is an 
open-world game, so you can do almost whatever you like. The social 
aspect is very strong in this game. Many times, I just logged into the 
game and chatted with other players without even playing at all. We 
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talked about everything, like about daily news and whatever was go-
ing on in our lives. (P27, mercenary) 
 
When talking about social gameplay experiences, some players noted that they played 
games i) to have a reason to spend time with their friends or family members. This 
was especially true when the interviewees reflected on their favorite board games. 
Others emphasized that multiplayer gaming ii) enhanced the ‘fun’ element in game-
play, while still others thought that iii) multiplayer gaming, either local cooperative 
play or online gaming, brought some new elements to the game that would otherwise 
be inaccessible for them in single-player gaming. Finally, there were a few players 
who specified that playing together made the experience more immersive. The main 
elements in the personal narratives of immersion, however, were the desire to act as 
an autonomous agent in the gameworld and to participate in its events. Let us next 
consider how the interviewees described autonomy as their primary reason to play: 
 
For me the best thing is a specific… freedom. So that I do not have 
to be anywhere or to do something someone tells me to do. I can be 
independent. When I played more, I could literally close every door 
in my home, put down the curtains and decide that I would not answer 
the phone if it rings. It is really a unique feeling. It is my moment. 
There is only me and the pale light of the screen. (P2, adventurer) 
 
Now when I think about it, being able to make my own decisions is 
really important. If a game does not enable me to play as I like, I lose 
interest really quickly. When I think about what game to play next, I 
always check first what kind of choices it provides for me. I like to 
explore all possibilities in games. (P4, adventurer-mercenary) 
 
Being able to be in control and make your own decisions is para-
mount. When I play, I try to remember that I do not really have the 
control, it is something designed in the game. But it is a peculiar ef-
fect, I start to feel like I can really make a difference. (P13, merce-
nary) 
 
Several interviewees considered the possibility to be autonomous as a key ingredient 
for experiences of immersion, escapism, and continued play at large: 
 
I am fascinated with being able to fly X-Wings and swing at Darth 
Vader with a lightsaber or whatever, but in online games I lose my 
interest because, you know, “hell is other people.” So many online 
groups are toxic and hostile. So, if you even get in such a group, you 
suddenly must do all kind of shit and keep up your level to the stand-
ards of the others. (P12, adventurer-explorer) 
 
Red Dead Redemption is one of my favorite games. It has such a 
strong atmosphere, you can lose yourself there, just be immersed in 




wherever you like. It is a sort of escapism, I guess… I like it to be my 
own experience, to find my own path. (P11, mercenary-adventurer) 
 
Mostly, the personal narratives of an immersive experiential outcome were directly 
connected to the diegetic qualities of the game. Many interview participants empha-
sized the importance of an expansive gameworld and compelling storyline. When do-
ing so, they often compared gameplay experiences to their experiences of watching 
movies and reading books: 
 
What keeps me playing is the story of the game. I want to know how 
the story ends. My personality is like that, I want closure… Even if I 
don’t identify with the game’s characters, I am immersed in the game-
world. I have traveled quite a lot in many countries, and gaming feels 
a bit similar. It gives me strong and vivid memories. (P13, mercenary) 
 
It is about making decisions and then following that path by playing 
a role. For example, in Dragon Age and Deus Ex, when you have 
made a decision, it is going to affect the story… I like to take the 
perspective of a character and then start to act like she would act and 
think like she would think. (P21, companion-adventurer) 
 
I like games in which I can create and design my own avatar. I hate 
to play in groups of many players, but I like the character creation 
and customization options in MMORPGs… It is about entering the 
gameworld and experiencing it. You want to know what kind of place 
it is, and get to know the people who live there. (P18, adventurer) 
 
Several players thought that best gameplay experiences were those that were able to 
make them feel attached to the gameworld and especially its characters, including the 
avatar of the player herself. This experience of attachment was found to be especially 
emotional and touching by a few interviewees. It was what made them care about their 
experience and feel, for example, emotions of sadness and sorrow: 
 
Well, I do not know if I feel so different when I play from when I 
watch movies. Maybe I am more attached to the characters and their 
stories since I can participate more and make meaningful choices 
like… So, I get the feeling that I do not just follow the story, but I 
make the story happen. (P9, mercenary-adventurer)  
 
I get attached to the avatars I play with, and their in-game friends. I 
have had many discussions with my female friends about the in-game 
romances in these games. There is a feeling of loss when a long game 





The feeling of sorrow is probably the strongest feeling I get from 
games. Well, I have fun too, but it is rare for me to laugh when I play. 
And sometimes I may despise some character. But sorrow is what I 
seem to experience in many games… I do not get similar emotional 
experiences from books. In games it is more like being in the charac-
ter and with the other characters so long, doing things together and 
helping each other. (P1, adventurer) 
 
By analyzing the interview data, several aspects of playing out of desire to be auton-
omous were revealed: to i) being able to choose how to act, ii) exploring possibilities, 
and iii) making one’s own decisions. In the interviewees’ narration, these elements 
were connected with how the interviewees described feelings of iv) self-expressivity, 
freedom and for-me-ness in gameplay experiences. In many interviews, the players 
who talked about the importance of acting autonomously in gameplay also referred to 
being motivated by immersive experiences. Although some players only talked about 
gameplay immersion without emphasizing their autonomy as players, there was a 
clear connection between these two subject areas.  
When the interviewees shared their thoughts on the motivational pull of im-
mersion, they reflected on i) the sense of being in the gameworld; ii) how deeper par-
ticipation facilitates experiences of story-making and being a part of the game’s sto-
ryworld; iii) identifying with one’s avatar and feeling attached to the game’s charac-
ters; and iv) the wide range of emotions from joy to sorrow, which devoted participat-
ing may bring along.  
Based on my findings on the interview data analysis, I retained eight items 
from the preliminary motivations to play inventory (Table 24) when constructing a 
second iteration of the scale. I decided to drop items 7: “I play to kill time” and 11: “I 
play to avoid anxiety” because neither of these items showed loadings on the factors 
of the preliminary study and both of them had high uniqueness scores (Item 7: 0.92, 
Item 11: 0.721), which indicates that these variables were not explained well by the 
revealed factors of the first-order and second-order motivations to play.  
A qualitative interpretation also supports the decisions of excluding the item 
7 and the item 11. If a person reflects to play to avoid boredom or because she is 
anxious, she comments upon the personal and sociocultural context in which she 
chooses to play rather than the activity of gameplay itself. In such a situation, ga-
meplay is seen as a step to the right direction but not necessarily as inherently mea-
ningful or intrinsically motivating type of activity. Thus a person may reflect that she 
usually plays while waiting for a bus, but this depiction does not explain how the 
activity of playing manages to make the situation more satisfactory. I propose that the 
items 7: “I play to kill time” and 11: “I play to avoid anxiety” are not motivations to 
play similarly to e.g., competence, relatedness or immersion. Instead, these two items 
could be connected to more profound motivations to play in distinctive ways. Indeed, 
this constitutes an important subject for future research on e.g., motivations to play 
casual mobile games.  
I decided also to exclude item 4: “I play because I am interested in different 
games” since I considered it too vague for making sensible interpretations. Moreover, 
this item is not discussed in the abovementioned SDT literature the way ‘fun’ and 




An Exploratory Factor Analysis with the Refined Scale 
 
I developed the second version of the motivations to play-inventory further by split-
ting three items of the original inventory into two separate ones (Items 1, 10, 12 in 
Table 24), and by devising a total of 12 completely new items to study the possible 
motivational factors of ‘autonomy,’ ‘immersion’ and ‘fun’ further. All of the new 
items were based on my analysis on the interview data and qualitative data from the 
survey of 1,718 respondents.  
I also compared the refined inventory items with SDT literature on the psy-
chological needs of competence, autonomy, and relatedness as well as how presence 
or immersion and fun have been described in this theoretical tradition. Based on this 
theoretical and empirical foundation, the research questions and hypotheses of this 
exploratory study are: 
 
RQ2.13: Can we identify motivational factors for why people play video games? 
 
RQ2.14: If we can, do the factors consist of constructs that can be interpreted as SDT 
needs? 
 
RQ2.15: Do other factors, such as ‘immersion’ and ‘fun,’ emerge from the data, or do 
these elements cross-load on the possible SDT factors?  
 
H1: Based on the results of the preliminary study, I expect that motivations to play 
factors will be revealed. 
 
H2: Based on the results of the preliminary study and SDT literature, the factors that 
will be revealed include the motivations of autonomy, competence, and related-
ness. 
 
H3: Based on the SDT literature, I hypothesize that no more than three motivational 
factors will emerge. The items describing ‘immersion’ or ‘fun’ will not constitute 
independent factors, but these items will cross-load on the SDT factors instead.  
 
The revised motivations to play scale was included in a survey of 879 Finnish re-
spondents (ages 18–65, mean age 41.5, women 50.5%), who were recruited by a com-
pany specialized in survey research. The initial data set included 1,053 participants, 
but I removed a total of 174 of these since they showed content nonresponsivity by 
responding in an identical way regardless of the item content. A data cleaning proce-
dure, which aims to screen the data to exclude inappropriate responses, is generally 
encouraged, especially in factor analytical studies aiming for scale development 
(Meade & Craig, 2012). I removed the participants who did not show any or only very 
minimal variance in their responses. The careless response rate (16.5%) was in line 
with the typical estimations (see e.g. Meade & Craig, 2012). The third survey I report 
in this thesis was conducted in 2016 by utilizing a web-based survey tool. Answering 
the survey took about 15 minutes with either a mobile phone or a computer. Similar 
to the first survey (N=1,718), the respondents of this survey (N=879) were asked to 
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report on a scale from 1 to 5 how important (1= not at all important, 5 = very im-
portant) 25 reasons were to their gaming (Table 26). 
 
 
Item Motivations Mean SD 
1 I play online because of the other players 1.90 1.17 
2 I play because my friends play 1.88 1.14 
3 I play with my family because of their company 2.09 1.21 
4 I play with my friends because of their company 2.07 1.22 
5 I play because I especially enjoy playing with others 2.10 1.22 
6 I play to get experiences in being successful 2.67 1.22 
7 I play because of the challenge 2.95 1.21 
8 I play to master my skills and to beat myself 2.71 1.22 
9 I play to make progress and to achieve objectives 2.93 1.25 
10 I play to beat my opponents or enemies in the game 2.46 1.29 
11 I play because I want to immerse myself in games 2.62 1.29 
12 I play because I want to identify with the game characters 1.99 1.17 
13 I play because the gameworld and its mysteries fascinate me 2.53 1.33 
14 I play because game events bring about emotions 2.25 1.23 
15 I play because I want to be part of the gameworld and its events 2.22 1.26 
16 I play because it is fun 3.63 1.17 
17 I play because playing games is relaxing 3.48 1.15 
18 I play because games are entertaining 3.64 1.14 
19 I play because games are enjoyable 3.51 1.17 
20 I play because playing makes me feel good 3.18 1.20 
21 I play because in games I can be independent 3.07 1.24 
22 I play because in games I can make my own decisions 3.05 1.25 
23 I play because in games I can make a difference with my actions 2.71 1.25 
24 I play because in games I can make meaningful choices 2.70 1.25 
25 I play because in games I can realize myself and my values 2.43 1.22 
 
Table 26. The second iteration of motivations to play inventory, as included in the 
survey (N=879), and the mean preference sums and standard deviations for the 
items. 
 
I analyzed the survey data by conducting an exploratory factor analysis using principal 
factor extraction and promax rotation with a data set from 879 respondents. I used the 
promax rotation method instead of varimax rotation, because promax rotation allows 
correlations between factors and does not force them to be orthogonal to each other 
(Matsunaga, 2010, p. 100). It is plausible to assume that a player who is motivated to 
play can be motivated by several distinctive factors, and, therefore, varimax rotation 
could misinterpret the results. The number of factors was identified by using Velicer’s 
minimum average partial (MAP) test, which suggested five factors to be extracted. 
Item 10, “I play to beat my opponents or enemies in the game” did not load on any of 
the five factors, but all of the other items resulted in loadings > .5 on a factor. In the 
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second iteration, the MAP test still suggested five factors. All of the remaining 24 
items showed a loading over 0.5 on a factor, and the solution was thus retained.  
Five items (11–15) loaded on the first factor. These suggest that a player is 
motivated by being able to immerse herself in the gameworld and its events, and by 
identifying herself with game characters. The player enjoys being a part of the fiction 
of the game, and she is fascinated by its mysteries, which may bring about versatile 
emotions. I call this factor Immersion. 
Five items (21–25) also loaded on the second factor. These items describe 
how a player is motivated to play video games because she is able to make a difference 
in games with her actions, to realize herself and her values by acting independently, 
and to choose her own way to act among the afforded options. This factor is Auton-
omy.  
Four items (6–9) loaded on the third factor. This motivational factor suggests 
that a player plays because of the challenge a game provides her with. Through chal-
lenges, she is able to make progress and achieve her goals. The experiences of chal-
lenges and being successful motivate her because she also desires to master her skills 
and beat herself. I name this factor Competence.  
Similar to factors 1 and 2, five items (16–20) loaded on the fourth factor. 
These items denote that an individual plays because games are entertaining and en-
joyable, and because gameplay is fun. She is also drawn to play because playing 
makes her feel good and relaxes her. I name the fourth factor Fun. 
Finally, five items (1–5) loaded on the fifth factor. These items constitute a 
motivation-to-play factor that emphasizes social connectedness in a gameplay situa-
tion. A person plays because of the company of her friends, because she enjoys being 
with others and playing with close others and because she can be with her family 
members during gameplay. In online gaming, she is fascinated by interacting with the 
other players. I label this factor Relatedness. 
The exploratory factor analysis I report in Table 26 suggests five motivational 
factors for playing video games. These factors are Fun, Relatedness, Immersion, Au-
tonomy, and Competence. Notably, item 10 describing competition did not load on 
any of the factors but showed similarly low (<.50) loadings on several factors. This 
indicates that we would not play because of the competition an sich but because of a 
combination of other factors, including the factor of being with others (relatedness), 
being competent, experiencing immersion and having fun.  
As hypothesized, motivations to play factors emerged from the data (H1). 
Based on the results of the preliminary SDT literature review, I expected that the ex-
ploratory factor analysis would include the three SDT factors of Autonomy, Compe-
tence, and Relatedness. Such factors were revealed, and thus the second hypothesis 
(H2) was supported in this study. However, in contrast to the third hypothesis (H3), 
both the factors of playing for Fun and playing to experience Immersion were also 
identified.  
These results are not fully in line with SDT argumentation. If Fun and Im-
mersion are experiences of SDT need satisfaction as Ryan et al. (2006), Przybylski et 
al. (2009) and Przybylski et al. (2010) argue, they should not constitute distinctive 
motivation-to-play factors, nor should they load only on one of the SDT motivation 
factors. However, the preliminary study suggested that motivations for playing can 
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perhaps be divided into first-order motivations (Relatedness–Competence) and sec-
ond-order motivations (Fun–Immersion). Although the exploratory factor analysis I 
report in Table 26 does not reveal any structure of first-order and second-order factors, 
it is possible that such a structure is a latent quality of the five motivational factors to 
play video games.  
 
  
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Uniqueness 
1     0.7250 0.2949 
2     0.8804 0.2434 
3     0.6961 0.5152 
4     0.9074 0.1990 
5     0.8065 0.2789 
6   0.6661   0.3622 
7   0.8621   0.2216 
8   0.8525   0.2547 
9   0.5836   0.3385 
11 0.6405     0.2954 
12 0.8240     0.2455 
13 0.8094     0.2387 
14 0.8630     0.1795 
15 0.9104     0.1479 
16    0.8795  0.2443 
17    0.7916  0.3148 
18    0.9365  0.1462 
19    0.8875  0.1698 
20    0.6742  0.2555 
21  0.7039    0.2386 
22  0.8075    0.1927 
23  0.7605    0.2037 
24  0.7697    0.2217 
25  0.5570    0.3423 
Mean 2.3233 2.7918 2.8157 3.4901 2.0114  
Std. Dev. 1.1306 1.1023 1.0770 1.0528 1.0299  
Alpha 0.9411 0.9314 0.9030 0.9429 0.9160  
Note: Mean, standard deviation and Cronbach’s alpha are calculated using items 
with loadings above 0.5. 
  
Table 27. Factor Loadings (Loadings > .5), uniqueness for items of the second iter-
ation of motives-to-play scale and descriptive statistics for scale sums (N=879). 
 
Recall that several players told me in the interviews that they played just because it is 
fun. Only by asking “What makes it fun?” was I able to flesh out their reflections on, 
e.g., the ability to overcome challenges was that which made gameplay fun for them. 
Both ‘fun’ and ‘immersion’ could then be recurrent ways to reflect on and describe 
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specific types of experiences and emotional outcomes. I propose in Chapter 6 that 
‘immersion’ is a player reflection of experiences of heightened presence. Similar to 
‘fun,’ this would render ‘immersion’ as an experiential outcome rather than a first-
order reason to play. This is indeed what the SDT literature suggests by offering that 
SDT needs facilitate experiences of both immersion and fun. To confirm if there are 
indeed five factors for playing video games and know if the factors can be divided 
into first-order and second-order motivational factors, a confirmatory factor analysis 
should be conducted.  
I calculated the motivational factor mean sums for the sub-group (n=492 in 
this data set) of players who reported playing mobile games more than any other types 
of digital games, as measured by weekly play hours. Interestingly, the mean sums for 
mobile game motivational factors did not differ much from the mean sums of the 
whole data of 879 respondents.  Further, the same five-factor structure was found 
when I ran another EFA with the sub-group of mobile game players. In the mobile 
game player sub-group, Fun was clearly regarded as the most important factor for 
playing games (mean 3.60). As with the data set as a whole (N=879, Table 26), Com-
petence was the second most important reason to play (mean 2.87), followed by Au-
tonomy (mean 2.83), Immersion (mean 2.38), and, finally, Relatedness (mean 2.08). 
These results suggest that, although there may be other latent reasons for why people 
play mobile games in particular (e.g., to kill time or to avoid boredom), mobile game 
motivations are not fundamentally different from motivations for playing other kinds 
of digital games. The same motivational drivers underline both mobile game playing 
and PC and console gaming. 
 
 
Study 6: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 
As discussed above, Ryan et al. (2006), Przybylski et al. (2009) and Przybylski et al. 
(2010) contend that ‘immersion’ and ‘fun’ are to be understood as experiential states 
that result from situations in which the basic psychological needs of autonomy, relat-
edness, and competence are satisfied. The results from Study 5 indicate, however, that 
both fun and immersion constitute their own motivational factors rather than those 
that would be associated with all three SDT needs. It is not plausible to make argu-
ments on the relationships between the SDT motivations to play and fun or immersion 
without conducting a confirmatory factor analysis. Therefore, I ask: 
 
RQ2.16: Can the five-factor structure reported in Study 5 be confirmed by conduct-
ing a confirmatory factor analysis on the motivations to play-scale (Table 
26) with additional survey data? 
 
H1: I expect that by conducting a confirmatory factor analysis, the five-factor model 
of motivations to play can be confirmed. 
 
I designed a confirmatory factor analysis on the five latent constructs (Fun, Related-
ness, Immersion, Autonomy, Competence) by analyzing the data from a survey con-
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ducted in December 2015 (N=845). The survey included a 25-item inventory of mo-
tivations to play, identical to what I report in Table 26. This made it possible for me 
to compare these two data sets and to analyze whether the five-factor model of the 
survey reported above (N=879) could be confirmed with another data set. Both of 
these data sets consist of survey respondents of Finnish people who were at least 
slightly interested in video games and playing video games. The only significant dif-
ference between these two data sets is that the data from 845 respondents consists of 
people ranging from 18 to 55 years old, whereas the data from 879 respondents con-
sists of people between 18 and 65.  
By conducting explorative studies on motivations to play, I have been able to 
develop a theoretical perspective on the subject, allowing me to make theory-based 
hypotheses on quantity, quality and relationships of the proposed motivational factors 
to play video games. In contrast to an exploratory factor analysis (EFA), a theory-
driven confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) allows each item included in the analysis 
to have its own unique variance. As Alan C. Acock (2013, p. 11) states, a unique 
variance means the proportion of the responses for a question that do not reflect the 
shared variance between other items of the same factor. For instance, item 16, “I play 
because it is fun” (Table 26), shows a loading of 0.865 on the factor Fun (see Figure 
18), and this proportion of the variance of variable 16 is what it shares with the four 
other items that also loaded on Fun. The unique variance of item 16 is called the error 
term. In contrast to EFA, the error term or the unique residual of a variable is also 
under analysis in CFA. 
In the confirmatory factor analyses I report below, the oval shapes represent 
latent factors, and the rectangular shapes the observed items, that is, the actual ques-
tions that were asked of survey respondents in the survey (N=845). The little circles 
next to the shapes are the error variances. Again, error variance describes what is 
unique to each item and what is not measured by the latent factor or factors. The anal-
yses I report here are confirmatory since I have specified, based on the reported studies 
and the literature, that there are five motivational factors for playing video games: 
Autonomy, Competence, Relatedness, Fun and Immersion.  
I conducted the CFAs according to the procedure suggested by Acock (2013) 
and Matsunaga (2010). Acock emphasizes that, for developing a model consisting of 
more than one factor, one should first ensure that each factor is meaningful by itself. 
This procedure, however, is valid only if the survey includes scales that have been 
validated in prior research. Since the scales of Autonomy, Competence, Relatedness, 
Fun and Immersion were exploratory, I did not conduct validation for each scale but 
moved instead to screen the items of the motivations to play scale (Table 26) accord-
ing to a procedure proposed by Matsunaga (2010). 
A researcher aiming to validate a factor structure should first consider 
whether the items included in the scale can be argued to measure the factors properly. 
The items should be screened in order to identify which items can be included in a 
CFA. According to Matsunaga (2010, p. 101), inventory items can be evaluated with 
three types of criterion. First, a researcher can focus on the highest factor loadings the 
items show on a factor. The threshold for this criterion can be 0.40 or above. In this 
thesis, I apply the threshold of 0.50 for this purpose. Second, the cross-loading be-
tween the highest and the second highest factors per an item can also be considered. 
In this evaluation model, researchers typically utilize thresholds of 0.6/0.3, 0.6/0.4 or 
0.5/0.2. The third method does not operate with fixed factor loadings but instead 
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measures the discrepancy between the highest and the second highest factor loadings. 
A discrepancy value of over 0.3 is typically considered good and thus items that show 
a discrepancy value of over 0.3 can be retained in the pool of inventory items.  
I screened the results of the EFA with the data of 879 respondents (Table 27) 
by utilizing the criteria of primary factor loading of > .60 and a discrepancy value of 
> .30. By following these principles, I excluded items 9, “I play to make progress and 
to achieve objectives,” and 25, “I play because in games I can realize myself and my 
values,” because the highest factor loading for these items was under 0.60. I then cal-
culated the discrepancy values for each item by comparing their primary and second-
ary factor loadings. Since the lowest discrepancy value for the remaining 22 items 
was 0.44 (item 21, “I play because in games I can be independent”), I did not remove 
any additional items from the motivations to play inventory. As a result, the inventory 
consists of 22 items in which the factors of Fun, Relatedness and Immersion all in-
clude 5 items, Autonomy 4 items, and Competence 3 items. 
For conducting a CFA on the motivations to play, I constructed 3-item scales 
for each of the hypothesized five factors. This was done because three items per a 
latent factor is regarded as sufficient for conducting CFA analyses (Brown, 2015, pp. 
61–62). Another reason for including only a sub-sample of the 22 items was that if a 
shortened scale could be confirmed, the instrument of 15 items could be more easily 
included in follow-up studies than the whole inventory would be. I selected the three 
items for a factor based on the criteria of a primary loading > .60 and a discrepancy 
value > .30. In addition, I took into consideration the qualitative aspects of the items 
and whether each of the items could be argued to portray discernible features of the 
corresponding latent construct. I present the selected items in Figure 17 and Table 28. 
 I constructed the confirmatory factor analyses with a statistical modeling 
method known as structural equation modeling (SEM). J. J. Hox and T. M. Bechger 
(1998) describe that SEM is typically used to identify theoretical constructs of the data 
by identifying correlations or path coefficients between latent (exogenous) factors and 
observed (endogenous) variables. SEMs are usually reported by presenting visual mo-
dels, and the statistical model as a set of matrix equations. I ran all of the CFA calcu-
lations with a maximum likelihood estimation without missing values (see Acock, 
2013). I proceeded to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis for the five-factor model 
presented in Study 5. Since my hypothesis was that the SDT-based motivations to 
play (autonomy, relatedness, competence) may predict the motivations of fun and im-






Figure 17. A measurement model reporting confirmatory factor analysis for the five 
motivational factors to play video games (N=845). All loadings are significant on the 
level p < 0.001. The goodness-of-fit values of the model: RMSEA 0.060, CFI 0.970, 
SRMR 0.036. 
 
There are several methods of evaluating the goodness of a CFA model. The compar-
ative fit index (CFI) calculates how well the model fits the whole data by comparing 
the model to a baseline model that does not assume relationships between observed 
variables and latent factors. The CFI value for the five-factor model (Figure 17) was 
0.970. This result means that the model is 97 percent better than a baseline model in 
which it is assumed that the items and the latent constructs are unrelated. A CFI score 
of 0.95 is widely considered as good and 0.90 as acceptable (see Acock, 2013, p. 23). 
The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) is another widely utilized 
measure for analyzing the goodness-of-fit of a model. The RMSEA measures whether 
the complexity of the model is reasonable. If the model is unnecessarily complex, the 
RMSEA score will be worse. A value under 0.050 is generally considered a good fit, 
and a value under 0.080 is acceptable. The RMSEA score for the five-factor model I 
report in Figure 17 was 0.060, which suggests that the model fit is acceptable. Finally, 
the standardized root mean squared residual score (SRMR), which measures the ab-
solute fit of the model, was 0.036, which is considered a good value (see Kenny, 
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2015).109 Similar to the values of RMSEA, SRMR is considered good if the value is 
under 0.05 and acceptable if it remains under 0.08 (see Acock, 2013, p. 24; Schreiber 
et al., 2006, p. 330; Brown, 2015). I did not utilize the chi square test (χ2), because 
this test has been argued to be ill-fitting for large sample sizes, especially when the 
correlations in the model are strong (Matsunaga, 2010, p. 106; Russell, 2002). 
According a structural equation modeling review article by Schreiber et al. 
(2006, p. 327), if most of the goodness-to-fit indexes indicate a good fit, the model 
can be regarded as a close fit. Based on this argument, the model of Figure 17 can be 
argued to have a good fit with the data. The fit of the model could have been further 
improved by letting error residuals of the items correlate with each other by studying 
the modification indices of the model. However, here, I followed arguments presented 
by Brown (2015) who contends that error covariances should be added only if they 
are strongly justified by, e.g., method effects, such as reversed wordings or similar 
phrasings between the items, or theory. Since the model presented in Figure 17 
showed a close fit to the data according to SRMR and CFI tests, and an acceptable fit 
according to RMSEA, there was no need to try to improve the fit by adding error 
covariances to the model.  
One should ask, however, why the RMSEA value remained over 0.05 alt-
hough the other indices suggested a close fit to the data? RMSEA measures the com-
plexity of the model, and a high value indicates that the model could be unnecessarily 
complex. If we consider the results of the confirmatory factor analysis for the five-
factor model (Figure 17), we can note that the factors of Autonomy and Immersion are 
very highly (0.89) correlated with each other. In the data of 845 participants, this 
might suggest that the variables of Autonomy and Immersion are very close to loading 
on a single factor rather than on two separate ones. Another reason for getting only an 
acceptable RMSEA value is revealed by studying the modification indices of the final 
model; nearly all statistically significant but unallowed correlations between individ-
ual items of the model were either between the variables of Immersion and those of 
the other SDT factors, or between Fun and those of the SDT factors. Although the 
modification indices did not suggest major changes to the model, it is worth noting 
that the changes can be interpreted as qualitative differences between the SDT moti-
vations to play and Fun and Immersion. I return to this subject shortly. 
 
 





x2 I play because my friends play 2.89 1.72 0.30 1.66 
x4 I play with my friends because of their company 2.66 1.56 0.51 2.02 
x5 
I play because I especially enjoy playing with oth-
ers 3.63 1.63 -0.20 1.80 
                                                 
109 Another widely used measure is the Chi Square Test: χ2 which measures whether the model 
is statistically significant. However, David A. Kenny (2015) notes that if the sample size of a 
study is larger than some 400, the chi square test considered an ill-fitting test because it is 
statistically significant in almost all cases, especially if the correlations in the model are large. 
Thus I do not report the Chi Square test results. 
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x6 I play to get experiences of being successful 2.64 1.85 0.63 1.84 
x7 I play because of the challenge 2.60 1.64 0.58 1.95 
x8 I play to master my skills and to beat myself 2.36 1.59 0.82 2.32 
x12 
I play because I want to identify  
with the game characters 1.90 1.28 1.29 3.51 
x14 I play because game events bring about emotions 1.60 1.15 1.97 6.02 
x15 
I play because I want to be part of  
the gameworld and its events 1.88 1.30 1.36 3.75 
x16 I play because it is fun 3.98 0.98 -1.14 4.29 
x18 I play because games are entertaining 4.00 0.99 -1.19 4.40 
x19 I play because games are enjoyable 3.93 1.01 -1.04 3.96 
x22 
I play because in games I can make  
my own decisions 3.16 1.23 -0.42 2.21 
x23 
I play because in games I can make  
a difference with my actions 2.90 1.25 -0.16 1.99 
x24 
I play because in games I can make  
meaningful choices 2.83 1.26 -0.12 1.90 
 
Table 28. Descriptive statistics for the 15-item motivations to play scale (N=845). 
 
All of the five motivational factors for playing video games were found to correlate 
with each other, as shown in the Figure 17. The strongest connection was shown to be 
between Autonomy and Immersion (0.89), which indicates an intimate relationship 
between these two motivational factors. Autonomy also correlated very strongly with 
Competence (0.84). Autonomy showed a moderate connection to Fun (0.52) and Re-
latedness (0.40). Playing for Competence strongly correlated with Immersion (0.75), 
relatively strongly with Fun (0.58), and moderately with Relatedness (0.49). Related-
ness showed only a weak connection to Fun (0.26), but it was found to be moderately 
connected to Immersion (0.50). Finally, Immersion was associated moderately with 
Fun (0.45). All of the correlations shown in Figure 17 are statistically significant.   
To validate a construct, the construct validity, convergent validity and discri-
minant validity of the model should be studied and reported. The goodness-of-fit in-
dices demonstrated construct validity for the five-factor model, as I report above. Con-
vergent validity means that latent constructs or observed variables that should be re-
lated to each other, according to theory, can in fact be shown to be related. This can 
be analyzed by investigating correspondence or convergences between constructs ar-
gued to be similar. To show convergence, intercorrelations between observed variab-
les or latent constructs should be at least moderate (Kline, 2010, pp. 71–72). As shown 
in Figure 17, all of the five motivations to play constructs are correlated with each 
other on the level of p < 0.001, which means that the correlations are highly statisti-
cally significant, and it can be concluded that the five constructs measure a single 
phenomenon, that of motivations to play.  
To show convergence of a latent factor, the factor loadings for each item 
should be considered to be strong, that is, over > 0.60. The model I present in Figure 
17 fulfills this criterion because the lowest factor loading was 0.73 for item x2, “I play 
because my friends play.” Convergent validity of a construct can be further analyzed 
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by calculating the composite reliability (CR) estimated for each of the factors. A value 
over of 0.7 is considered to be a good value for CR (see Zait and Bertea, 2011). The 
CR estimates for the 3-item five factors were: Relatedness (0.823), Competence 
(0.827), Immersion (0.861), Fun (0.905) and Autonomy (0.880).  
To investigate both the convergent and discriminant validity for a CFA, an 
average variance extracted (AVE) analysis is recommended (Farrell 2009; Zait and 
Bertea, 2011). The AVE analysis is used for studying the average amount of variance 
in the observed variables that is explained by the factors. The value of AVE should be 
at least 0.50 for each factor to demonstrate convergent validity (Fornell and Larcker 
1981; Farrell 2009). After calculating the AVE value, the analysis continues by testing 
if the square root of average variance of each construct is larger than the square of the 
correlation between two constructs within the model. If the AVE value for a factor 
exceeds its shared variance with the other factors, the analysis supports discriminant 
validity for the model (Fornell and Larcker 1981, pp. 45–46; Farrell 2009). 
 
 
 Relatedness Competence Immersion Fun Autonomy 
Relatedness 0.610     
Competence 0.236 0.615    
Immersion 0.246 0.565 0.673   
Fun 0.066 0.345 0.198 0.761  
Autonomy 0.159 0.698 0.799 0.268 0.710 
 
Table 29. The Average Variance Extracted Analysis on the five-factor model of mo-
tivations for playing video games (AVE values bolded) and shared variances be-
tween the constructs. The test was calculated according to a formula by Fornell and 
Larcker (1981, p. 46), which considers the measurement error of the variables. 
 
The AVE values for each of the five motivations to play factors were clearly over 
0.50, but the shared variance Autonomy–Competence and Autonomy–Immersion still 
exceeded the AVE of the corresponding factors. These results, together with factor 
loadings and composite reliability (CR) estimates, support convergent validity for the 
five-factor model (Figure 17), but the discriminant validity remains open for critique, 
regardless of the fact that the five-factor structure was indeed identified in the EFA 
made with the data of 879 respondents. Because of this, another CFA study should be 
designed and conducted with cross-cultural data to confirm whether motivations for 
playing digital games can be reliably interpreted through the framework of five moti-
vational factors. 
With the exception of the correlation between Relatedness and Fun (0.24), all 
of the correlations I report in Figure 17 were at least moderate. Why did Relatedness 
show lower correlations with the other four factors than it did with the other latent 
constructs? Perhaps this happened because playing games to be with friends and with 
close others renders gameplay as an instrument for fulfilling another goal than ga-
meplay itself, namely that of socializing. More precisely, Relatedness may be partly 
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an extrinsically motivated reason to play games. Since the five-factor model shown in 
Figure 17 describes the core drivers for intrinsically motivated gameplay, the factor 
of Relatedness is not very strongly correlated with the four other factors. Nevertheless, 
Relatedness also shows moderate correlations to other factors than Fun.  
Ryan and Deci (2000) argue that in SDT, extrinsic motivation and intrinsic 
motivation are seen as a continuum. Some forms of extrinsic motivation may thwart 
autonomy, competence and relatedness, but this is not necessarily the case. Extrinsi-
cally motivating activities can also be experienced as intrinsically rewarding. All ac-
tivities that are extrinsically motivating are done to attain a separable outcome not 
innate to the activity itself. For example, elements such as rewards, threats, and pres-
sure for competition can diminish intrinsic motivation in an activity since they are 
perceived as ways to control one’s agency (Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 59). The process 
by which an individual can adopt externally given objectives as her own is called 
internalization in SDT; “Thought of as a continuum, the concept of internalization 
describes how one’s motivation for behavior can range from amotivation or unwill-
ingness, to passive compliance, to active personal commitment” (ibid., p. 60). 
Ryan and Deci (2000, pp. 61–62) present a taxonomy of human motivation 
consisting of three main categories: amotivation, extrinsic motivation and intrinsic 
motivation. Extrinsic motivation further includes the sub-categories of external regu-
lation, introjection, identification, and integration. In external regulation, an activity 
is done solely for external demand. In introjection, a person is interested in the activity 
but regulates it internally, mainly because of the pressure of others, or to boost her 
own feeling of worth. In identification, the subject acknowledges that the activity at 
hand has importance for her and thus identifies the goals of the activity as her own, 
although she might not find the activity otherwise interesting. In integration, the sub-
ject fully perceives herself as an autonomous agent, and that her competences match 
those of the activity. Although a person feels that the activity and her own motivations 
are aligned, integration remains extrinsically motivating since it is done because of 
the expected value it has for other situations. In integrated regulation, however, the 
activity is experienced as volitional and personally rewarding.  
I propose that the primary experiential outcome of relatedness, namely “so-
cializing,” does not describe intrinsically motivating gameplay but rather extrinsically 
motivating yet integrated activity. “Socializing” can be argued to point outwards from 
the gameplay to the social relations between a player and her opponent. Although 
Relatedness was not as strongly correlated with the other four motivations as the latter 
were with each other, the observed items of the five scales converged into the latent 
factors of Relatedness, Competence, Autonomy, Fun and Immersion as hypothesized, 
and these five latent factors converged into the single higher order factor of intrinsic 
motivation to play video games. This concludes the construct validity, convergent va-
lidity and discriminant validity test of the suggested five-factor model. The measure-
ment model I report in Figure 17 confirms the five factors for playing video games as 
Relatedness, Competence, Autonomy, Immersion and Fun, although the relationship 
between Autonomy and Immersion as well as that between Autonomy and Competence 
should be validated with an additional confirmatory factor analysis with cross-cultural 
data. In SDT literature, it is not only argued that autonomy, relatedness, and compe-
tence predict fun and immersion but also that the second-order phenomena of immer-
sion and fun mediate gameplay enjoyment. I investigate this question in the final sta-
tistical study of this thesis. 
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Study 7: Motivations to Play and Positive Valuations  
 
In this final statistical study, I investigate how the five motivations to play predict 
video game enjoyment and appreciation. I do this by presenting a constructed struc-
tural equation model based on the measurement model, i.e., the confirmatory factor 
analysis of the five motivational factors to play (Figure 17). This research subject is 
important because better understanding entertaining and meaningful gameplay expe-
rience is key to apprehending different game cultures and the individual valuations 
players attach to games and gaming. 
In what follows, I consider the motivational factors of Immersion and Fun 
qualitatively distinct from Autonomy, Competence, and Relatedness for two reasons. 
First, the preliminary study of this chapter (N=1,718) suggests that the motives to play 
can be divided into two main categories consisting of 1) competence, competition, 
and relatedness, and 2) fun, immersion, relaxation and interest. Second, SDT literature 
offers that ‘fun’ and ‘immersion’ are experiential states engendered by situations in 
which the three psychological needs are satisfied. This latter observation renders ‘fun’ 
and ‘immersion’ as second-order phenomena or types of experiences to be considered 
in relation to the first-order dimensions of autonomy, competence, and relatedness.  
Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned the studies by Przybylski et al. (2009) and 
Przybylski et al. (2010) in which it was found that satisfying the SDT needs in game-
play predicted experiences of immersion. In these studies, the authors argue that the 
effect that SDT needs satisfaction has on immersion may moderate gameplay enjoy-
ment (Przybylski et al., 2009, p. 253). Tamborini et al. (2010) note that enjoyment in 
SDT is indeed generally understood as satisfaction of the three needs, and it is not 
particularly connected to pleasure-seeking purposes of an individual. The distinction 
between enjoyment as 1) satisfaction of the three SDT needs and 2) pleasure-seeking 
is, however, paramount when analyzing what kinds of gameplay experiences the five 
motivations to play predict. 
Tamborini et al. (2010) offer an inclusive approach in which both the satis-
faction of “higher-order” SDT needs and hedonic or pleasure-driven purposes are un-
derstood as facets of ‘enjoyment’ (ibid., p. 759), where the former would cover why 
we also enjoy tragedy, horror, and dramas, which are qualitatively distinctive from 
“mere” pleasure-seeking in an immediate experience. In their approach, positive val-
uations of media are not split into enjoyment and appreciation, but it is held instead 
that both the satisfaction of hedonic needs (immediate arousal, absorption) and eudai-
monic needs of SDT elicit experiences of enjoyment. “Whereas we agree that appre-
ciation and enjoyment may be distinct processes, we do not believe that one is tied to 
the satisfaction of hedonic needs and the other is tied to the satisfaction of nonhedonic 
needs… all positive valuations of need satisfaction can be experienced as enjoyment” 
(Tamborini et al., 2011, pp. 1025–1026).  
Similar to Ryan et al. (2006), Tamborini et al. (2010) designed an experi-
mental setting in which they manipulated specific qualities of gameplay that facilitate 
experiences of the SDT needs. This was done to experiment the connection of the 
SDT needs satisfaction and perceived enjoyment of gameplay activity. Also similar 
to Ryan et al. (2006), it was found that autonomy, competence, and relatedness all 
predicted gameplay enjoyment. However, Tamborini et al. (2010) acknowledge that 
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their approach does not explain all of the variance of enjoyment since the hedonic 
features were excluded from the study. Because of this, Tamborini et al. (2010) con-
clude that both pleasure-driven and SDT need-driven aspects should be studied sim-
ultaneously to understand what makes gameplay experiences enjoyable. Hedonic 
pleasure, e.g., ‘fun’, remains crucial to the concept of enjoyment.  
The studies reported in Tamborini et al. (2010) suggest that players may in-
deed be intrinsically motivated to play based on both purely pleasure-seeking reasons 
and on interest in experiencing something that taps a specific psychological need, such 
as autonomy, competence, or relatedness as proposed by SDT. However, the approach 
by Tamborini et al. (2010) differs from another body of studies on media enjoyment, 
which is equally important for interpreting further how the proposed five motivations 
to play engender gameplay experiences.  
Vorderer (2009) and Vorderer and Ritterfield (2009) argue for a two-factor 
model of positive entertainment experience consisting of hedonic needs, or enjoyment, 
and higher-order eudaimonic needs, that is, appreciation. Taken together, both the 
factors of enjoyment and appreciation would engender positive valuations of enter-
tainment. Similarly, Oliver and Bartsch (2010; 2011) and Oliver et al. (2015) distin-
guish appreciation from enjoyment and argue the two as conceptually distinct, alt-
hough the latter authors define eudaimonic appreciation more narrowly than Vorderer 
and Ritterfield (2009), as contemplations concerning, e.g., human moral virtues and 
life’s purposes (Oliver and Bartsch, 2011) and affects such as being touched, moved 
or compassionate (Oliver et al., 2015).  
According to Tamborini et al. (2011, pp. 1037–1038), although both appreci-
ation and pleasure-seeking behavior bring about enjoyment, they can be distinguished 
by recognizing that enjoyment is characterized by intuitive processing, whereas ap-
preciation requires a more reflective attitude. In pleasurable experiences, the intrinsic 
needs of SDT are all satisfied through quick and intuitive responses. However, in ap-
preciation, at least one of the SDT needs is satisfied via reflection, introspection and 
contemplation when the others are not. The latter denotes specific meaningfulness, 
importance, insight and significance characteristics, which can be argued to be absent 
from “mere” pleasure—of which the experience of fun, engagement and amusements 
are prime examples, as shown in the studies by Oliver and Bartsch (Oliver & Bartsch, 
2010; Oliver & Bartsch, 2011, pp. 29–30; Lewis et al., 2014, pp. 397–398).      
Like Tamborini et al. (2011), Cupchik (2011a; 2011b) argues that media re-
sponses can be separated into action-oriented reactive and experience-oriented reflec-
tive modes. If an individual chooses media to get experiences that modulate pleasure 
and excitement, she acts according to a reactive mode. When a person is deeply en-
gaged with content that resonates with her own personal life experiences and values, 
she is in a reflective mode of experiencing. Cupchik argues that the emotional elabo-
ration of the reflective mode is more complex, challenging and involving than the 
affective covariation of reactive mode because reflective mode requires perception 
and evaluation of symbolic meanings and relating these aesthetic qualities to the per-
son’s own life history (2011a, p. 339). It remains an open question, then, whether both 
the positive valuations of appreciation and pleasure are to be regarded as facets of the 
dual-process of enjoyment (Tamborini et al. 2010; 2011) or whether enjoyment re-
sults only from pleasureable experiences and is thus orthogonal to qualitatively dis-
tinctive appreciation (Oliver & Bartsch, 2010; 2011).  
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In sum, the approach by Oliver et al. (2010; 2011; 2015) and Vorderer (2009), Vor-
derer and Ritterfield (2009) differ from Tamborini et al. (2010; 2011) by postulating 
two kinds of positive valuation for satisfying gameplay, appreciation and enjoyment, 
whereas Tamborini argues that both hedonic pleasure-seeking conduct and non-he-
donic appreciation-seeking conduct are facets of the broadly defined ‘enjoyment.’ 
Furthermore, Oliver and Bartsch (2011, p. 31) presume that appreciation defined as 
“contemplation of meaningfulness via human virtue” is associated with specific af-
fective and motivational outcomes that further differentiate appreciation from pleas-
ure-seeking. In this study, I utilize a model suggested by Oliver et al. (2010; 2011; 
2015) and study enjoyment and appreciation as distinctive modes of positive valuation 
of an experience. I ask the following research questions:  
 
RQ2.17: Do the five motivational factors for playing video games predict gameplay 
enjoyment and appreciation? 
 
RQ2.18: If they do, do the motivations of Immersion and Fun mediate the effect be-
tween the SDT needs and gameplay enjoyment as suggested by Przybylski 
et al. (2009, p. 253)?  
 
H1: Based on SDT literature, I expect that the five motivations for playing video 
games predict gameplay enjoyment and appreciation.  
 
H2: I hypothesize that the effects the SDT motivations to play are mediated by both 
Fun and Immersion. 
 
Importantly, Cupchik (2011b) describes the action-oriented reactive mode as pleas-
urable and the experience-oriented reflective mode as inherently interesting for the 
individual. Building on Berlyne (1971), Cupchik (2011b, p. 7) notes that ‘interest’ is 
associated with the increasing complexity and novelty of the experience, whereas 
‘pleasure’ is connected to a preference of only moderate complexity:  
 
Interest in a program [of entertainment] can result from intellectual 
engagement and a search for meaning or for alleviating boredom. 
Pleasure can result from the meaningful interpretation of a program 
or from the positive associations that it evokes. Interest and pleasure 
are therefore complementary processes. At a superficial level, a pro-
gram can serve merely to distract a bored viewer and elicit pleasant 
associations. At a more profound level, a viewer can be drawn into 
the interpretive process that is pleasurable in and of itself. 
 
Based on the above, I assessed enjoyment and appreciation of video games using two 
three-item constructs. The survey of 845 respondents included an 18-item product 
attachment scale (Mugge et al., 2006), which is reported to consist of the five latent 
factors of product attachment, self-expression, group affiliation, memories and pleas-
ure. Respondents’ product attachment to their favorite games was enquired about in 
the survey by asking them to remember a game that was especially gratifying and 
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memorable for them and then state how much they agreed (1=completely disagree, 
5=completely agree) with a set of questions. I calculated an Appreciation (α = 0.88) 
mean sum (Mean=3.31) for the items “I am very attached to this game,” “This game 
is very dear to me” and “I have a bond with this game.”  Similarly, I constructed the 
Enjoyment (α=0.90) mean sum (Mean=3.97) for the items of “I enjoy playing this 
game,” “It is a pleasure to play this game” and “I feel good when I play this game.” 
I chose to assess appreciation by asking how dear games were to the players, 
because playing games is considered an intrinsically motivating activity, and only in-
trinsically motivating activities are experienced as inherently valuable and interesting 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 64). To hold that an activity or a product is precious to some-
one is thus to maintain that it has personal significance and value of a kind, and that 
the individual appreciates at least some element of the activity because it resonates 
with her own life history and values (Cupchik, 2011a; 2011b).  
I studied how the five motivations for playing video games predict gameplay 
enjoyment and appreciation by designing a structural-equation model (SEM). An 
SEM makes it possible to estimate path models by including intervening variables 
between independent variables and dependent variables (Hox & Bechger, 1998). The 
path analysis estimates theoretically causal connections between latent variables iden-
tified in the CFAs, i.e., the measurement model (Acock, 2013, p. 115). The model I 






Figure 18. Structural equation model on how the five motivational factors for playing 
video games predict the endogenous outcome variables of gameplay Enjoyment and 
Appreciation. In this model, Fun and Immersion are considered second-order moti-




I assigned the motivational factors of Immersion and Fun as intervening latent con-
structs between the latent three SDT factors, and the dependent single-item variables 
of Appreciation and Enjoyment. Thus, all of the five motivations to play were consid-
ered as possible predictors for gameplay Enjoyment and Appreciation. In addition, I 
investigated the moderating roles of Immersion and Fun. This was a theoretically in-
formed decision, since prior research suggests that 1) all of the SDT needs have direct 
effects on gameplay enjoyment (Ryan et al., 2006; Tamborini et al., 2010), and that 
2) the experiential outcomes of fun and pleasure (Tamborini et al., 2011) and immer-
sion (Przybylski et al., 2009) are mediators of game enjoyment. The goodness-of-fit 
values for the model presented in Figure 18 indicated a good model and a close fit to 
the data (RMSEA 0.054, pclose 0.110, CFI 0.971, and SRMR 0.037).  
According to the data of 845 survey participants, playing for the challenge 
and for making progress (Competence) in a game moderately predicts (0.52) that the 
player is motivated to play because gameplay experiences are fun, entertaining and 
relaxing (Fun). If one plays because she enjoys putting her skills to the test, she is 
therefore likely to expect the experience to be fun. Interestingly, this result is suppor-
ted by studies on flow experience, which argue that experienced flow predicts per-
ceived enjoyment (Landhäußer & Keller, 2012; Baumann, Lürig, & Engeser, 2016). 
However, the motivational driver of Competence did not predict that the player would 
be drawn to play because gameplay offers emotional experiences of being in the ga-
meworld and relating with in-game characters (Immersion). In contrast to Compe-
tence, being motivated by the possibility of acting independently and freely (Au-
tonomy) very strongly (0.88) predicted a preference in immersive gameplay expe-
riences (Immersion). Being able to decide what to do, where to go, and how to express 
oneself facilitates the experiences of being immersed in the gameworld. Autonomy did 
not significantly contribute to the motivation of Fun.  
Playing to be able to spend time with close others (Relatedness) did have a 
weak effect (0.18) on playing because gameplay experiences are immersive, but there 
was no significant effect on Fun. If one plays because she wants to be with her friends, 
she is therefore a somewhat likely to enjoy immersing herself in the gameworld. The 
results are reasonable. If one plays in order to be with close others, one does not nec-
essarily expect the gameplay itself be the locus of delight. Yet, there are also players 
who report that they play with others because it makes the gameplay experience more 
engaging and captivating. Therefore, it can be concluded that, while many players 
play just to be with the others, the some players play with others because it enhances 
the meaningfulness of the gameplay. This result only partially supports the decision 
by Oliver et al. (2015) to interpret relatedness in video game gameplay as the interac-
tions the player forms with in-game characters.  
Of the three SDT motivations for playing video games in the model (Figure 
18), none had more than minor effects on the outcome variables: perceived gameplay 
Enjoyment and Appreciation. Because the effects were minor and not supported by 
the theoretical framework of this study, I did not include these direct paths in the 
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model.110 Instead, Figure 18 shows that the most important predictor (0.67) for Enjoy-
ment is the motivation to play games because gameplay is fun and relaxing. Fun also 
contributes to Appreciation, albeit only weakly (0.20). Playing games because the ex-
periences are immersive and emotionally touching moderately predicts (0.50) Appre-
ciation. However, in the light of the data of the 845 respondents, the pull of immersive 
gameplay does not contribute to Enjoyment.  
We can now calculate the direct, indirect and total effects for each of the five 
motivational factors for gameplay Enjoyment and Apperciation (Table 30). The results 
reveal that while Immersion (0.50) and Autonomy (0.46) are the main predictors of 
Appreciation, the effect of Autonomy is fully mediated by Immersion. Also, playing 
for Relatedness (0.08) or for Competence (0.07) has an effect on gameplay Apprecia-
tion, although this effect is very weak.   
Playing video games because of Competence was, together with Fun, the 
main predictor for perceiving gameplay experiences as enjoyable. Again, the effect of 
Competence on Enjoyment was fully mediated by Fun. All of the other motivational 
factors, Relatedness, Autonomy and Immersion, had weak negative effects on game-
play Enjoyment, indicating that a player who plays because of these reasons is a bit 
less likely to regard gameplay experiences as inherently enjoyable. Rather, such a 
player would consider gameplay experiences as interesting and meaningful. 
The model presented in Figure 18 measures 39 percent of the variance of gameplay 
Appreciation and 49 percent of the variance of gameplay Enjoyment, as measured 
with the R-squared test. Thus, I can conclude that the five motivational factors of 
Autonomy, Relatedness, Competence, Fun and Immersion predict both gameplay En-
joyment and gameplay Appreciation. The results confirm the first hypothesis of this 
study (H1). Also, the effects of the SDT motivations to play on Enjoyment and Ap-
preciation were almost completely mediated by the motivational factors of Fun and 
Immersion (H2).  
Based on these findings, I suggest that the five motivations to play can indeed 
be divided into first-order motivations, Autonomy, Competence and Relatedness, and 
second-order motivations, Fun and Immersion. Whereas the motivations of Compe-
tence, Autonomy and Relatedness perhaps describe the human needs for self-determi-
nation, the motivations of Fun and Immersion more accurately grasp the phenomeno-
logical level of experiencing the player–game relationship in the ongoingness of 
gameplay.  
Similar to the study by Przybylski et al. (2009, p. 253),111 it was revealed in 
the this study that in-game autonomy is more closely related to ‘presence’ or experi-
enced immersion than it is to the other two SDT needs. In other words, one can more 
deeply relate with the game’s storyworld and experience a wide range of emotions 




                                                 
110 The modification indices suggest that Relatedness would have a very weak positive effect 
on Appreciation, and that all of the three SDT motivations would have very weak (Relatedness, 
Competence) or weak (Autonomy) negative effects on Enjoyment if they were included.  
111 The correlations between other relevant factors and presence were 0.28 for in-game com-
petence, and 0.31 for game enjoyment (see Przybylski et al. 2009, p. 253).  
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Outcome Direct Effect Undirect Effect Total Effect 
          
Measurement       
 Immersion → Appreciation 0.50***      -  0.50*** 
 Fun → Appreciation 0.20***      -  0.20*** 
 Relatedness → Appreciation      - 0.08***  0.08*** 
 Competence → Appreciation      - 0.07  0.07 
 Autonomy → Appreciation      - 0.46***  0.46*** 
         
 Immersion → Enjoyment 0.05      -  0.05 
 Fun → Enjoyment 0.67***      -  0.67*** 
  Relatedness → Enjoyment      - -0.02   -0.02 
 Competence → Enjoyment      - 0.34***  0.34*** 
  Autonomy → Enjoyment      - 0.11  0.11 
          
Structural       
  Relatedness → Immersion 0.18***      -  0.18*** 
 Competence → Immersion -0.08      - -0.08 
  Autonomy → Immersion 0.82***      -  0.82*** 
          
 Relatedness → Fun -0.04      - -0.04 
 Competence → Fun 0.52***      -  0.52*** 
  Autonomy → Fun 0.10      -  0.10 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, and * p < 0.05 
 
The significance levels are for the unstandardized solution, and the effects are 
shown for the standardized solution. 
 
Table 30. The direct, indirect and total effects of the five motivational factors for 
playing video games on gameplay Appreciation and Enjoyment (N=845). 
 
The results of Study 7, however, suggest that the SDT need satisfactions do not only 
contribute differently to the experiences of fun and immersion but also that neither 
fun nor immersion, as expected experiential outcomes, are predicted by all of the three 
motivational factors of autonomy, relatedness, and competence (cf. Przybylski et al. 
2009, p. 253). These findings are different from those of Ryan et al. (2006) and Tam-
borini et al. (2010), who, in their experimental studies, found a connection between 
satisfaction of autonomy, competence, and relatedness and perceived enjoyment of 
gameplay experience. It must be emphasized, however, that the study I report here is 
not based on manipulating game qualities during gameplay activity, but it is instead 
based on players’ own reflection on their motivations to play. It is thus not plausible 
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to argue that the current study would be contradictory to that of Ryan et al. (2006) or 
Tamborini et al. (2010).  
We can also compare these findings to the three motivations for playing 
online games as suggested by Yee (2006): achievement, socializing and immersion. 
To be able to discuss this subject, I want to remind the reader that the model I present 
in this chapter argues that motivations to play can be interpreted as first-order or as 
second-order motivations. Motivations of the first-order describe what the player ex-
pects to be able to do in gameplay, whereas motivations of the second-order illustrate 
what the player expects to experience. The second-order motivations emphasize emo-
tional outcomes of an activity, while the first-order motivations are about the activity 
itself, and the player’s agency in it. Following this line of reasoning, I consider Im-
mersion and Fun to be second-order motivations to play.  
From this stance, I propose that what Yee (2006) describes as motivations to 
play should rather be understood as the experiential states and emotional outcomes 
one expects to experience in intrinsically motivating gameplay, that is, second-order 
motivations. More precisely, I propose that ‘achievement’ is the primary second-order 
motivation of Competence, ‘socializing’ of Relatedness, and ‘immersion’—as we see 
from the current study—of Autonomy. For example, one can express that she plays 
because she can experience achievements or because she can feel connected to the 
others. Correspondingly, seen from the perspective of first-order motivations, if one 
plays to be able to realize her autonomy, she is likely to expect experiences of immer-
sion and emotions associated with that experiential state. When playing because of 
relatedness, one may not be intrinsically interested in gameplay as a standalone phe-
nomenon but in gameplay as a social event. Further, if one plays for the challenge, 
she is likely to expect experiences of mastery, achievement and fun.  
By offering that motivations to play can be interpreted from a first-order and 
second-order perspective, I argue that the five-factor model I develop in this chapter 
is congenial with both the argumentation of the SDT literature and the three motiva-
tions for playing online games, as identified by Yee (2006). Recall also the distinction 
between an action-oriented pleasurable mode and an experience-oriented reflective 
mode, as proposed by Cupchik (2011b). In Cupchik’s view, the action-oriented mode 
is connected to pleasant associations and experiences that do not have a high-level of 
complexity, whereas the experience-oriented mode illuminates how an activity comes 
to have personal importance to an individual. In future research, it would be intriguing 
to analyze how being in a reflective narrative mode of experiencing relates to ga-
meplay appreciation, and how game developers can take this into consideration when 
designing new games for varied audiences.  
Based on three sets of data (N=1,718, N=879, N=845), I suggest in this chap-
ter that we play video games because of five core reasons: 1) to be able to realize 
oneself autonomously, 2) to face challenges that put our skills and competence to the 
test, 3) to be with people close to us, 4) to be able to experience immersion and 4) to 
have fun. By constructing a structural equation model, I further demonstrate how these 
motivational factors predict gameplay enjoyment and appreciation. All of the five mo-
tivational factors are connected to an intrinsic motivation for playing video games 
inasmuch as they contribute to either enjoyment or appreciation and interest. The SEM 
model in Figure 18 is congenial with the argumentation by Oliver et al. (2015) since 
the study reported here suggests that a variety of reasons for playing video games 
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predict gameplay enjoyment and appreciation, and these reasons qualitatively de-
scribe different ways to valuate intrinsically motivating gameplay experiences.  
 
 
Summary: The Conceptual Framework of Eight Invariants 
 
In the Chapters 5–9 of this thesis, I first develop theoretical arguments by combining 
phenomenological enactivism and folkloristics (RQ3), and then explore how game-
play is experienced as personally valuable by analyzing three sets of statistical data 
(N=2,594, N=845, N=879), interview data of 32 participants, and 10 writings on 
meaningful gameplay experience (RQ2). In the course of this thesis, I argue for a total 
of eight invariants of gameplay experience (RQ1):  
 
[i] lusory attitude and the position of the player (Chapter 2)  
[ii] coordinative and explorative player practice (Chapter 5)  
[iii] a change in the self-presence (Chapter 6) 
[iv] player persona and its performative distance (Chapter 6)  
[v] emotional outcome (Chapter 6)  
[vi] gameworld-relation of ludic, narrative, and verisimilitude aspects (Chapter 7) 
[vii] enacted narrative or narrative structure of gameplay experience (Chapter 8) 
[viii] motivation to play (Chapter 9) 
 
Building on the arguments I make throughout this dissertation, I contend that players 
have different preferences in relation to demands and possibilities for coordinative 
ludic and explorative paidic player practice [Invariant ii]; the types of self-presence 
and skillful access during gameplay [Invariant iii]; and participatory distance incor-
porating a specific performative node of functioning [Invariant iv] in distinctive lu-
donarrative gameworld settings [Invariant vi]. Finally, a gameplay experience has the 
structure of a narrative [Invariant vii], which makes it a sensible subject area for per-
sonal narration and emergent storytelling of adopting and acting through the position 
of the player [Invariant i]. I propose that for a gameplay experience to arise as mem-
orable and meaningful, all of the eight dimensions should be taken into careful con-
sideration. Thus, I offer that the framework of the eight invariants manages to reveal 
the qualities of gameplay experience through which it arises as emotional, relevant 
and worth sharing with others. The framework of these eight invariants also illustrates 
the complexity of the phenomenon of gameplay, and the importance of considering 
games simultaneously as artifacts and processes, which we who play experience from 
a first-personal stance. 
The approach of gameplay motifemes seems to be a promising method for 
interpreting how players share similar preferences in video game gameplay. In Chap-
ter 3, we see that players can be categorized into player types based on their preferred 
and disliked gameplay motifeme factors, and that the highly similar five-factor struc-
ture of Assault, Manage, Journey, Care, and Coordinate was revealed in two separate 
statistical studies (N=1,718 and N=845). We also see in Chapter 3 that the five factors 
of gameplay preferences have relevant correlations with motivations to play, recurrent 
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challenge types of video games, and with the “risk” of playing games of a particular 
genre, i.e., action games and strategy games.  
In Chapter 5, it is revealed that players of the seven player types share differ-
ent preferences in coordinative and explorative player practice (Invariant ii). We see 
in Chapter 6 that players appreciate different participatory distances, emotional expe-
riences, and levels of involvement (Invariants iii, iv, and v), and that these differences 
are correlated with their gameplay motifeme appreciation. By bringing together play-
ers’ preferences in gameplay motifemes and expectations for a particular range of 
emotions [Invariant v], I argue that a better understanding of people’s desires in spe-
cific gameplay motifemes may be a potential way of comprehending the more general 
reasons for why some gameplay memories are valued over others.  
This is continued in Chapter 7 with an analysis on how players of different 
player types favor ludic, diegetic, and verisimilitude dimensions in video game game-
play. In Chapter 8, I analyze the personal narration themes of players of the seven 
motifeme-based player types, and how the seven player types reflect the perceived 
meaningfulness of gameplay experiences.  
The revealed seven player types (Chapter 3) are traits for distinctive player 
personae, that is, specific types of performances of the self in video game gameplay. 
By indicating that they favor one gameplay motifeme type over the others, the re-
spondents of the survey (N=1,718) expressed that they prefer a specific performative 
position, that is, a type of player persona over the others. I propose that the seven 
identified player types can thus be interpreted as player persona types. Therefore, we 
have seven preliminary player persona types: The Mercenary, The Companion, The 
Adventurer, The Commander, The Patterner, The Explorer, and The Daredevil. 
Taken as a whole, the gameplay motifeme approach and the eight argued in-
variants of video game gameplay experience seems to be a potential conceptual fra-
mework for further investigations of first-person gameplay experience and game cul-
tures. However, I conducted an additional content analysis process with the qualitative 
interview data (N=32) to explore whether the eight invariants could be argued to cover 
all relevant dimensions of first-person gameplay experience.  
In content analysis (Mayring, 2012; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Gläser & Lau-
del, 2011), the analysis process begins with a preliminary model of expected relations 
between recurrent variables in the data under observation. The model helps the re-
searcher devise relevant research questions and select and produce appropriate data 
for analysis. It also works as the ‘search grid’ for identifying relevant patterns from 
the transcriptions, which can then be developed into abstract categories for further 
analysis (see Chapter 3). Finally, organizing the data into categories makes it possible 
for the researcher to conduct thematic analyses (Boellstroff et al. 2012, p. 167). 
I analyzed the qualitative player interview data by coding the interview tran-
scriptions into categories and data sections. I followed here an analysis procedure de-
scribed in Boellstroff et al. (2012, pp. 164–168) and began by comparing interview 
transcriptions to find regularities, patterns and differences in relation to the conceptual 
framework I had developed and present in the previous chapters. After the initial sys-
tematization phase, I indexed the data sections according to the conceptual categories 
representing the eight invariants of gameplay experience. This enabled me to identify 
the relevant concepts and data sets for the current study, as well as recognize what 
parts of the data was not taken into account in the original model of eight invariants. 
My objective here was similar to how Boellstroff et al. (2012, p. 176) describe the 
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purpose of an ethnographic analysis: “[W]e focus on the rich specificity [of the data]... 
from that specificity we craft an analysis whose value goes beyond the particular in-
cidents we encountered. We seek patterns and logics—the ways of thinking, believ-
ing, and doing that makes cultures and societies possible.” 
 I proceeded then to analyze the data that did not fit the conceptual model by 
coding it into additional categories until a ‘theoretical saturation’ was reached. Satu-
ration occurs when analyzing the data no longer contributes new insight on the phe-
nomenon under analysis but rather consistently repeats the already identified struc-
tures and themes (Boellstroff et al., 2012, p. 59). A recursive process through which 
the theoretical model is re-evaluated in relation to the empirical data was required for 
operationalizing the abstract notions derived from theoretical discussions. Operation-
alization is an important objective for developing the framework into directions that 
enable comparison between studies aiming to scrutinize different aspects of meaning-
ful gameplay experience.    
When I analyzed the interview data, I quickly learned that the structure of the 
eight invariant dimensions or categories did not fully cover what had been discussed 
in the interviews. By comparing the material in all nodes, I reached a saturation point 
in coding the data into core categories when I had classified the data of the first 16 
interviews. All of the eight proposed invariants of gameplay experience were repre-
sented in the data, but not equally. Most of the interviewees did not talk very much 
about their attention allocation and self-presence [Invariant iii] in gameplay and coor-
dinative/explorative player practice [Invariant ii], although several interviews did pro-
vide material on these subjects. Instead, the players talked at length of the gameworld-
qualities of their favorite games [Invariant vi], emotional outcomes of gameplay [In-
variant v], motivations to play [Invariant viii] and their personal memories of playing 
video games [Invariant vii].  
A few interviewees reflected on their gameplay experiences by describing in 
detail what kind of challenges they preferred in games. Although the subject of ‘chal-
lenge’ can be considered to fall under the category of ‘coordinative player practice’ 
(Chapter 5, see also Study 2 of Chapter 3), I did not analyze this data extensively. This 
is an important addition to be considered in future research on gameplay preferences, 
player types, and gameplay experiences. Another theme that arose when analyzing the 
interview data was players’ perception on addictive gameplay. While a few talked 
about addictive games, only one interviewee and one person who submitted a written 
description of their gameplay experiences regarded this “addiction” as a negative 
thing. It was more common for the interviewees to speak about “good addiction” and 
refer to the addictive nature of games as a quality of a satisfying game experience. 
Moreover, the approach of gameplay motifemes and eight invariants does not describe 
the broader historical and cultural context in which gameplay experiences arise. Nor 
does it focus on subject areas such as age or gender of the player, game technology, 
or personal gaming history.  
In addition to the subject areas of the eight invariants of gameplay experience, 
the theme of what Deterding (2013) calls “gaming modes” emerged in a notable way 
from the content analysis of the interview data. Drawing strongly from Goffman, De-
terding (ibid., p. 248) studies what he calls “gaming modes” by analyzing the data of 
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19 interviews. According to him, gaming modes are the different ways in which lei-
sure video gaming frames are organized into gaming events. He argues that gaming 
modes differ from each other principally based on their different ethos, that is the 
“jointly acknowledged dominant motivational relevancy that guides the actual organ-
isation of the gaming instance (including genre, setting, device, social contexture), 
and is drawn upon discursively as an evaluative standard and rationale for actions, 
events, and communications transpiring in the situation” (ibid., p. 260).  
Deterding suggests that gaming modes consist of four aspects, all of which 
were already recognized by Goffman: motivational relevancy including skill and in-
volvement; telicity or purposefulness; attentive absorption; and arousal. Although I 
have also analyzed the phenomenon of gameplay from a framework that includes the 
aspects of motivation, skill, purposefulness, absorption (self-presence), and emotion, 
my focus is on the first-person experience and not on the types of organization of the 
gaming situation (cf. Deterding, 2013).112  
Several of my 32 interviewees did, however, reflect on their favorite gaming 
“setup” and type of involvement or gaming mentalities (Kallio et al., 2011) with 
games under the nodes of relaxing casual gaming with low difficulty levels, hardcore 
gaming with very high difficulty levels, and social gaming in the forms of competitive 
gaming and cooperative gaming. A few interviewees talked about mobile gaming by 
distinguishing it from PC or console gaming. Relatedly, some interviewees talked 
about “true gaming,” which they often associated with experiences of immersion and 
presence. Finally, a couple of interviewees shared their experiences on devising their 
own rules for playing video games, and modifying existing commercial game prod-
ucts to better fit their own preferences.  
The content analysis of 32 interviewees therefore suggests that the model of 
eight invariants could be further amended by taking the gaming setup into more care-
ful consideration. This is indeed an important area for future research. Although a 
gaming mode is, of course, an invariant of gameplay as a cultural phenomenon, this 
subject strongly overlaps with the proposed eight invariants. As Deterding himself 
states (ibid., p. 248), the motivational relevancy of a gaming event is the main factor 
that separates one gaming mode from another. Furthermore, Deterding suggests that 
the gaming modes can be analyzed by specifying how much emphasis is put on the 
telicity, i.e., the coordinative player practice, in gameplay.  
The close connections that gaming modes arguably have in relation to moti-
vations to play, expected emotional outcomes, and telicity may suggest that ‘gaming 
                                                 
112 Although the conceptual framework I propose has similarities with that of Deterding’s 
(2013), there are also several crucial differences. First, the model I develop takes a firm first-
personal stance on the phenomenon of gameplay by putting the viewpoint of the experiencer 
as the focal point of the analysis. Second, as I discuss in Chapter 5, from the viewpoint of 
phenomenological enactivism, the self does not appear only in relation to an ongoing situation 
but rather both as an enduring autonomous organization and situated—according to the prin-
ciple of needful freedom by Jonas (2001 [1966]). Based on the concept of needful freedom, I 
am able to consider how the self emerges during gameplay as a player persona, and how pre-
reflective self and narrative self appear in skillful gameplay. Third, the framework of this thesis 
emphasizes the narrative organization of the gameplay experience. Fourth, the current study 
adds an emphasis on game motifemes to the gameplay experience discussion, enabled by the 
designed gameworld and enacted by player agency. Fifth, I analyze extensive sets of both 
statistical and interview data. 
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mode’ is a higher-order description, which includes several of the invariants of game-
play experience, namely, coordinative/explorative player practice [Invariant ii], emo-
tional outcome of gameplay [Invariant v], and motivations to play [Invariant viii]. If 
a gaming mode is interpreted as an aggregate of several invariants of gameplay expe-
rience, and as a way to reflect on one’s own game preferences, it can be proposed that 
my approach of eight invariants of the gameplay experience and that of gaming modes 
by Deterding (2013) are sympathetic to each other regardless of their different theo-
retical stances.  
 
 
Discussion: The ‘Real’ Relevance of the Gameplay Experience 
 
In the final discussion of this thesis, I aim to bring together the arguments I have made 
throughout the previous chapters. By doing so, I ask: how does a video game game-
play experience emerge as something real and genuine, given that gameplay is by 
definition something separable from fully real. 
In Half-Real (2005, p. 1) Jesper Juul argues that video games consist of real 
rules and fictional worlds, which is similar to an argument previously proposed by 
Caillois (2001 [1961]; see Aarseth, 2014b, p. 490). The argument states that when a 
player encounters, e.g., a dragon in a game, the player is dealing with a fictional 
dragon instead of a real one. Aarseth (2007b, p. 37), however, disagrees with Juul by 
comparing the dragons of Tolkien’s storytelling world with the ones a player encoun-
ters when playing video games. According to Aarseth, in-game dragons are not only 
signs but simulations, and this difference makes game content profoundly different 
from fictional content. “[W]e can get to know the simulation much more intimately 
that we come to know the fiction… we can’t have our way with fictions, but with 
games, we may.” Aarseth (2007b, pp. 36–37) suggests that the category of fiction is 
problematic in the context of video games since games provide experiences of real 
participation. He proposes that an in-game dragon should be understood as virtual and 
as simulated instead of claiming it to be either real or fictional.  
Karhulahti (2012) has recently questioned, however, whether in-game enti-
ties, such as a dragon, can be accepted as a simulation. He states, based on reading 
Chris Crawford (1982), that accepting a dragon as simulation contradicts the primary 
function of computer-based simulations, which is to gain empirically valid and relia-
ble knowledge of the factual world. Karhulahti (2012) proposes that from the concepts 
suggested by Aarseth (2007b), we could discard ‘simulation’ but appropriate ‘virtual.’ 
Drawing from Langton (1986), he gives ‘the virtual realm,’ ‘the virtual universes’ and 
dynamics of ‘virtual automaton’ as alternative terms for describing the contents of a 
video gameplay experience. 
I agree with Karhulahti (2012) in accepting ‘virtual’ as a better concept for 
characterizing in-game contents and events than ‘simulation.’ ‘Virtual’ can be under-
stood as potential (Massumi, 2002, p. 30), where it is related to the gap between what 
is perceived as actually being “‘Virtual’ connotates approaching the actual without 
arriving there” (Boellstroff, 2008, p. 18–19; see Miller, 2012, p. 7). Virtual is thus not 
to be opposed to real but to actual. 
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To ask whether something is real or fictional is an important research question for 
third-person approaches interested in the ‘objective’ characteristics of their research 
subject (see Chapter 1). For the first-person approach of phenomenology and enactiv-
ism, the question of the objective ‘truthfulness’ is not adequate in itself. Instead, game 
contents are examined as experienced and in relation to how they are perceived and 
enacted by the player. “Grasped phenomenologically… reality is that which is dis-
closed to us as real… we have no grip on what reality means apart from what is dis-
closed to us as real, and such disclosure necessarily involves the intentional activity 
of consciousness” (Thompson, 2007, p. 21). It is not satisfactory to argue that in-game 
events, characters, or qualities of the gameworld are real or unreal without postulating 
an embodied subject who perceives and experiences the game as such, e.g., during 
pre-reflective gameplay or while reflecting on her earlier experiences.  
I suggest that from a phenomenological and enactive first-person stance of 
the current study, it is not correct to posit in-game activities as profoundly virtual, 
either. A person who plays a video game would agree that the emotions she experi-
ences during gameplay are not virtual but actual. This raises the question: based on 
what grounds can gameworlds be argued to be different and more virtual than our 
everyday cultural world “since it is human ‘nature’ to experience life through the 
prism of culture, human being has always been virtual being? Culture is our ‘killer 
app’: we are virtually human” (Boellstroff, 2008, p. 5). Sutton-Smith (2001 [1997], p. 
195) made a similar observation: since “human cultures are built out of imagination 
and fantasy… the duality of mundane and virtual is more appropriate” than real and 
unreal, and “mundane and virtual are both real worlds but in different ways.” Our 
lives have been virtual all along inasmuch as our lives include experiences of the po-
tentially actual (Miller, 2012, p. 7).  
I offer the concept of relevance as an alternative to the dichotomy of virtual/ 
actual. From the research tradition of pragmatics in narrative understanding, we could 
draw the four maxims: quantity, quality, relation and manner. Here, quantity refers to 
the informativeness of communication, quality to its truthfulness, relation to its rele-
vance, and manner to its clarity, lucidity and organization (Grice, 1975). In the narra-
tive understanding of different forms of literature, such as fiction, it matters not 
whether the quality of truthfulness is present. Instead, the principle of relevance is of 
great importance and may be primary in comparison to the other maxims; we have to 
be able to make sense of what we encounter (Walsh, 2007, p. 30).  
Instead of postulating game contents as real/unreal by following the maxim 
of quality, we can apply the maxim of relation and discuss the in-game events as 
potentially (virtually) relevant (see Popova, 2014). When game events are enacted by 
the player, these potentials manifest as actual, real emotional experiences that are rel-
evant, meaningful and memorable to the player-subject: “The goals of play are fic-
tional; the incentive rewards, however, that accompany movement to a fictitious 
goal—these are real.” (Peterson, 2002, p. 70) 
In gameplay, virtual becomes actual through participation. This is to say that, 
in ongoing gameplay, the distinction between virtual and actual vanishes. Meaning 
resides in this process of sense-making: “One can treat the difference between actual-
ity and possibility [virtual] in terms of temporal displacement… Meaning is the unity 
of actualization and virtualization” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 65). The player does not have 
to accept the in-game events as real, that is, pretend to play or suspend her disbelief, 
because the in-game events become meaningful and actual through her participatory 
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agency, and an access to the responsive gameworld. Perhaps we do not have to make-
believe in what we encounter in games since they make sense to us through our ongo-
ing participation. Just as Aarseth (2014b, pp. 491-492) writes:  
 
[T]here is no need for make-believing when players shoot at each 
other in Counter-Strike (Valve Corporation, 1999); they are manipu-
lating nonphysical, informational guns that shoot non-physical, infor-
mational projectiles and when their avatars are hit, they do not have 
to make-believe that they are eliminated. This happens, factually, in 
the game machine, entirely independent of the players’ imagination, 
just like a pinball when it drops below the reach of the flippers.  
 
Let me now return to theories of affective science and enactive phenomenology, 
which I introduce in Chapter 6. Appraisal theorists Fridja and Scherer (2009, pp. 142–
144) suggest that four features of emotion are of central importance to the understand-
ing of any phenomenon under analysis: 1) emotions come forth to us when something 
relevant happens in our presence, 2) they give a strong motivational force, 3) and urge 
us to act, and 4) this urge is given a priority over other action possibilities. 
Recall the argument I make in Chapter 5: “Videogame gameplay emerges as 
an autonomous organization between at least one player and a dynamically changing 
game system” and that this reciprocity gives the person who plays an identity of player 
proper. Now, consider the presented four central features of emotion (Fridja & 
Scherer, 2009) together with an enactive approach to sense-making as described by 
Kyselo (2015):  
 
[N]ot everything in the world matters; instead, environmental and in-
dividual processes acquire a particular status for the individual when 
they matter for the continuation of its identity. Being in the world is 
thus always concerned and an act of evaluation… A person cares for 
self-preservation as long as she is alive.  
 
I argue that gameplay is experienced as emotional because it matters to our self-con-
stitution. To care about the events that take place in the game is to care about one’s 
identity as player proper, i.e., one’s performative player persona. Following Noë 
(2015) and Korsgaard (2011), I suggest that inasmuch as we play at all, gameplay 
participates in constituting us as humans—we define ourselves also by playing games: 
“If, when we act, we are trying to constitute ourselves as the authors of our own move-
ments, and at the same time, we are making ourselves into the particular people who 
we are, then we may say that the function of action is self-constitution” (Korsgaard, 
2011, p. xii).  
The fact that gameplay is emotional for us means that it has a specific rele-
vancy as a first-person experience. Were it not relevant, no emotions would emerge 
from it. “Emotions are elicited when something relevant happens to the organism” 
(Fridja & Scherer, 2009, p. 143; Colombetti, 2014, p. 13). We become afraid in horror 
games because there appears a threat to our continuity as players proper. We feel joy 
when we achieve in-game goals because these achievements are ours; they have the 
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inevitable quality of for-me-ness (Zahavi, 2014), a quality that is present in all of our 
activities in which we have sense of agency and sense of ownership (Gallagher, 2012). 
Gameplay is relevant, and therefore emotional, because the player acquires self-pres-
ence in the player–gameworld relation. It is where her “I” resides during gameplay.   
I argue that presence in gameplay is greater than in other media since all gameplay 
engenders transformations in the player’s self-presence (Chapter 6). “Presence as ac-
cess is as real as presence gets, and that’s real enough” (Noë, 2012, pp. 33–34). There-
fore it can be concluded that regardless of the content of the game, whether the player, 
for example, encounters massive dragons, trees that speak or other “counter-intuitive” 
in-game figures, a gameplay experience as a first-person experience is real, the emo-
tions one feels are real, and gameplay as a whole may converge into real through its 
relevance—depending on how present it is to our access spaces (Noë, 2012, pp. 34–
36). The more comprehensive the presence is in video game gameplay, the closer to 
real it turns out to be; “[W]hat are given to me in perception are not necessary truths, 
but presences” (Di Paolo, 2016, quoting Merleau-Ponty). The dragon Juul writes 
about (2005) is not real or fictive, but present, and through its presence it may gain 
real relevance for us as the game players.  
Goffman (2013 [1961], p. 80) wrote: “An encounter provides a world for its 
participants… something in which the individual can become unselfconsciously en-
grossed is something that can become real to him.” The moment we step back from 
gameplay to take on an introspective stance or if we engage in other activities, the 
relevance of gameplay takes a serious hit. This happens because we no longer perceive 
our agent–environment relation from the perspective of our player persona, our 
presentation of the self in gameplay. In-game events do not appear as emotional, rel-
evant or real to us anymore.  
In Chapter 1, I introduce first-person folkloristics—consisting of the marriage 
between folkloristics and phenomenological enactivism—and offer it as a promising 
theoretical framework for studying both the invariant structures and varied experi-
ences of video game gameplay. I position this thesis as a work for demonstrating how 
‘enactment’ can be understood as an alternative approach to performance-centered 
folkloristics, which, according to Bronner (2016), faces considerable challenges, es-
pecially in digital environments. In contrast to folkloristic school of performance stud-
ies, an enactment-centered approach is able to study cultural expressions without pos-
tulating ‘performer’ and ‘audience,’ but instead that of a ‘participant.’  
By utilizing the concept of ‘enacting’ and ‘enactment,’ a folklorist can change 
the locus of interest between the first-person view and the third-person view, in which 
the former emphasizes embodied subjective experience and the latter an event in 
which an embodied subject acquires the position of a participant. Enactment-centered 
first-person folkloristics investigates the continuities between cultural traditions and 
emergent cultural expressions, including performances. The concept of ‘enaction’ also 
connects folkloristics directly to a field of embodied cognitive sciences, which opens 
up unexplored possibilities for interdisciplinary discourses. These notions are largely 
in line with how Bronner (2016) describes the impacts of practice theoretical ap-
proaches in contemporary folkloristics. 
It is my sincere wish that the observations I offer in this thesis manage to open 
up new horizons for both folkloristics and game scholars representing varied research 
traditions. Studying games and play requires active interdisciplinary research collab-
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oration, and cooperation with game developers. With this thesis, I argue that folklor-
istics belongs among the disciplines that study all games, whether informal social ones 
or commercial video games. In its very essence, folkloristics is a field of research 
specialized in exploring the connections between traditions, genres, and transmis-
sion—in the case of ‘game’ this covers the ontologies of games both as objects and 






When someone asks, “What is folklore?” I reply: “All those things 
they say, they sang, they played” (Abrahams, 2005, p. 10). 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the video game gameplay experience by 
exploring its invariant structures (RQ1) and the varied meanings players attach to 
these structures (RQ2). It is argued that folkloristics is a promising academic disci-
pline for studying these questions as it is an equally promising research tradition for 
studying all kinds of games (RQ3). Although ‘folklore’ is, by definition, to be distin-
guished from what is considered institutional and commercial, folklore can exist only 
in relation to the established and to the norm, and therefore, folkloristics studies not 
only the vernacular but the vernacular in its dynamic and dialogic relationships with 
the institutional. This delineation renders ‘game’ as a prominent subject of research 
for folkloristics, especially in its ontology as a process, that is, a game-as-played. 
 Games as processes can be approached from two profoundly different angles. 
If the interaction processes that take place between players and a game are viewed 
from an outside perspective, we can speak of a third-person viewpoint. In contrast to 
this, the first-person approach advocated in this thesis begins from the experience of 
an individual and argues that objects cannot be analyzed without investigating for 
whom the analyzed phenomenon manifests and how it comes forth in the experience. 
 Folkloristics has been argued to be a field of academic research specialized 
in taking a view within and striving to better understand how culture is experienced 
and expressed by the vernacular. This observation positions folkloristics as a disci-
pline suitable for taking the first-personal approach. Enter first-person folkloristics, 
the stance of this thesis and a research strategy, which aims to illuminate how the 
vernacular experiences and expresses itself and its surrounding culture on the level of 
the embodied and affective subject.  
 Although many folklorists emphasize the subjective experience in their anal-
yses, the tools for doing so remain limited if a folklorist does not embrace an interdis-
ciplinary attitude. Phenomenology is a field of philosophy that appropriates the life-
worlds of individuals as its point of departure to investigate the structure of conscious-
ness and experience. In its thread of enactivism, we meet a scientific attitude of em-
bodied cognitive science, which aims to naturalize phenomenology by studying the 
entire brain–body–environment perspective of an experience. Enactivism does not an-
alyze the objects of the world and the subjects as detached from each other but pre-
cisely and only in their ongoing coupling. It is argued in this thesis that phenomeno-
logical enactivism is a highly relevant theoretical tradition for conducting first-person 
folkloristics and for studying games as processes since enactivism has been devised 
for examining both the interactivity and the qualia of our encounters with the world. 
It has been proposed by Goldstein (1993) and later by McNeill (2013b) that 
folkloristics can be distinguished from its closest academic disciplines by the combi-
nation of what they call “tools for a folkloristics.” There are arguably three of such 
tools: ‘genre,’ ‘transmission’ and ‘tradition.’ These tools mirror that folkloristics is 
interested in studying objects of folklore, processes of folklore, and the continuities in 
how the objects and processes of folklore are experienced in a variety of vernacular 
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communities and cultures. I argue that these three tools shape folkloristics into a very 
promising research tradition for studying play and games. This is because games are 
objects and processes (Aarseth 2014b), and both of these ontologies require corre-
sponding research tools. With the tool of ‘genre,’ folklorists are equipped to study 
games as objects, and the tool of ‘transmission’ affords them to investigate games as 
processes. With the tool of ‘tradition,’ folklorists are furthermore capable of investi-
gating games and gaming through patterns in time and cultures. 
The combination of folkloristics, phenomenological enactivism and game 
studies may be regarded as improbable, but I trust that presenting this interdisciplinary 
theoretical framework is a central contribution of this thesis for both folkloristics and 
game studies discourses at large. Whereas the research interests of folkloristics are in 
the specific cultural expressions and how they are transmitted to others, phenomenol-
ogy aims not to identify idiosyncratic characteristics but to establish invariant struc-
tures of experience. This profound difference between phenomenology and folkloris-
tics does not mean that the two research traditions would be necessarily incompatible 
if they were considered distinctive phases of conducting research. With this thought 
in mind, I moved forward in this thesis to first investigate the invariant structures of 
games as processes and only then did I consider, through the lens of these invariants, 




The Invariants of the Video Game Gameplay Experience 
 
From Lusory Attitude (i) to Explorative and Coordinative Player Practice (ii) 
 
I began tracking the invariants of gameplay by delineating that a video game gameplay 
experience requires a player and a video game object, and their ongoing interaction, 
which is called coupling in enactivism. While prior research offers a large body of 
descriptions for ‘gameplay,’ none of the earlier studies utilizes embodied cognitive 
theory for developing a rigorous definition for the phenomenon. Enactivism, I argue, 
offers such a stance since it is built on theoretical biology and neuroscientific work on 
situated cognition.  
To be able to analyze ‘gameplay’ from the perspective of enactivism, I offered 
a view on the systems that are interconnected in gameplay. A player is an autonomous 
system, but a game is heteronomous. An autonomous living system regulates its in-
teractions with the world in order to sustain and regenerate its constitution. Instead of 
stable states, it has tendencies and transients. In contrast to this, a game is a state 
machine (Juul, 2005) that changes its current state in relation to the player’s actions 
and its internal code.  
Following Mead (2015 [1934]) and phenomenological argumentation, I pro-
pose that the self of the player encompasses pre-reflective consciousness and reflec-
tive, i.e., narrative, consciousness. In the course of this thesis, this distinction was 
important to make since it was immediately followed by an argument that narrative 
consciousness is required for taking on the position of the player, for embracing the 
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lusory attitude (Suits, 2005 [1978]). Without narrative consciousness, the player 
would not be able to consider herself as being the player (Mead, 2015 [1 934]), 
which would mean that the person who plays could not make a distinction between 
‘game’ and other events in her life. The lusory attitude is not something the player 
should only embrace before gameplay to make it possible but instead something that 
the player must actively sustain throughout gameplay by desiring to retain herself as 
being the player. Therefore, the lusory attitude is both a precondition for gameplay 
and an invariant of the gameplay experience. This marked the first invariant structure 
of the video game gameplay experience. 
In an enactive theory of social cognition by De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007), 
it is contended that the quality of ‘autonomy’ is not only essential for living systems, 
but social interactions can come to have temporary autonomy. In autonomy of inter-
action (Kyselo, 2014) at least two autonomous systems that are coupled with each 
other regulate themselves and the interaction in activities of participatory sense-mak-
ing (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007).  
By conducting a phenomenological analysis, I argue that the quality of auton-
omy does not only come forth in social play but in all forms of gameplay, including 
single-player video game gameplay. This argument is based on the proposed phenom-
enal sameness between human–game interaction and human–human interaction. The 
player who desires to play must take into consideration the interactional demands set 
by the game. The game provides affordances, that is, opportunities to act for the 
player, and these affordances are normative since the performance of the player is 
evaluated by the game, as Karhulahti (2015b) has recently argued. The actions the 
player takes are thereby not individual actions in the sense that she would not have to 
take her responsive partner, the game, into constant consideration. This condition ren-
ders a player’s action phenomenally similar to a social action taken in person-to-per-
son interaction. I call these performative acts.  
By taking performative actions, the player sustains herself as being the player 
and the interaction, which is also sustained by the game system. From this reciprocity, 
gameplay emerges as autonomous organization. More than that, this reciprocity en-
genders the identities of the player proper and the game proper since it is the auton-
omy of gameplay that gives the game system and the player their “true” identities.   
Although the player–game interaction has qualities similar to social interac-
tion, the game remains heteronomous. In contrast to autonomous agents, such as hu-
mans, the game belongs to its environment and is not able to dictate the gameplay. 
The asymmetry between a living being and its environment mandates that only the 
living being—because of its adaptive autonomy—is able to regulate its interactions. 
From a first-person enactive stance, it is the player who regulates her encounter with 
the game by intending to sustain her identity as being the player.  
The argument that gameplay has an autonomy is not new. Instead, many au-
thors have stated that games have endogenous meaning. What is new in my argument 
is that, by appropriating an enactive theory of participatory sense-making, I reveal 
how this autonomy arises from the coupling between an autonomous player and a 
heteronomous game, through reciprocal acts that bear phenomenal similarities to per-
formative social acts between two persons.  
The crucial notion here was that a player’s performative acts are explorative 
or coordinative. Again, similar to any social interaction, the autonomy of the player–
game coupling of gameplay is sustained by explorative and coordinative practices. In 
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explorative practices, the player studies, tests, bends and even breaks the rules of the 
game. In coordinative practices, the player takes actions to find accord with the game 
system. Understood as a dialogical and recursive pattern through time, the explorative 
and the coordinative practices enable an equilibrium that pushes the game forward. 
This process is akin to growth in adaptation in living systems in their environments. 
More precisely, the player evaluates the needs and then explores her possibilities. 
Then she expands her means for making progress in the game by coordinating her 
actions in relation to the demands of the game.  
The notion of explorative and coordinative player practices is not a new ar-
gument in game studies either. The novel contribution of this thesis is that this notion 
has not been analyzed in relation to how gameplay arises as an endogenous, autono-
mous system of meaning-making. Furthermore, gameplay as a phenomenon has not 
previously been compared to the process of folkloristic activities in general. Here, my 
argument was that, as a type of activity, gameplay has profound similarities with how 
folklore manifests in culture: in both, the person represents the vernacular who is able 
to express herself and create something new in relation to that what is normative, in-
stitutional and regulated by social rules.  
I argue that both the explorative player practices and the coordinative player 
practices are required for an activity to be regarded as gameplay. Thus, they are con-
stitutive principles of gameplay and together comprise the second invariant of the 
video game gameplay experience. I defined gameplay as the self-sustaining autonomy 
that arises in a dynamic reciprocity between at least one autonomous agent and a re-
sponsive game artifact. In this reciprocity, the agent both regulates itself and its cou-




From Self-Presence (iii) to Persona (iv) 
 
I went on to investigate the position of the player and her identity as player proper. In 
gameplay, a specific repertoire of features is presented to the player. As argued in the 
literature of human–computer interaction (HCI), these features may facilitate experi-
ences of spatial presence, social presence and self-presence for the player. In spatial 
presence, the player senses herself as being there in the mediated environment. 
(Steuer, 1992; Wirth et al., 2007). Social presence is the sensation of being in contact 
with another intentional agent through a medium (Biocca et al., 2003) in the forms of 
immediate co-presence, being psychologically involved with another intentionality, 
and being behaviorally engaged with each other (Tamborini & Skalski, 2006). In self-
presence a person feels that her self is transported to the virtual environment to the 
extent that this alternative self arises as primary egocentric reference frame of experi-
encing (Wirth et al., 2007). 
In contrast to HCI literature, I contended in this thesis, from a phenomenolo-
gical stance, that self-consciousness includes the aspects of pre-reflective conscious-
ness and reflective or narrative consciousness. I argued that all discussions on pre-
sence should take this two-folded nature of consciousness into consideration and ask 
how the presence manifests in relation to both pre-reflective and reflective experience. 
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Furthermore, and perhaps consequently, HCI literature seldom appropriates a first-
person stance or studies the life-world of the experiencer. Because of this, the role of 
active participation by the player has only received moderate attention. In enactivism 
and in the stance of the current thesis, presence is defined as how experience becomes 
available to the subject. It is stressed that presence is a matter of degree rather than 
something that only happens in mediated interactions. Presence describes what kind 
of access we have to the world, and thus what kind of agency is provided for the 
skillful experiencer (Noë, 2009; Noë, 2012).  
I argued that video game experiences have a greater degree of presence than 
our encounters with other types of media. This is because most games require that we 
allocate our main involvement, that is, our main self-presence to the gameplay instead 
of dividing our attention between other activities. Games also manage to tap into our 
capability of skillful action or access spaces (Noë, 2012) more extensively than other 
media. We can both perceive how objects in the media act upon ourselves and we can 
act upon them as being the players. Games require us to utilize social interaction skills 
because we have to adapt to new situations by taking the normativity of the player 
performance into constant consideration. Finally, I argued that video game gameplay 
inevitably alters the player’s self-presence, and that this is to be taken as the third 
invariant of the video game gameplay experience.  
Whereas self-presence in prior literature has meant that the player feels like 
she is experiencing the unfolding events from a viewpoint of an in-game avatar and 
thus identifies herself with this position, my argument is that such an embodied rep-
resentation in the game is not required for a change in self-presence. Instead, a change 
in the self-presence means in this thesis that gameplay changes our agent–environ-
ment relations, which introduces “I” anew. This is to take a relational stance on “I”: 
that what I experience as ‘me’ is not separable from what is present for me in every 
situation. As long as we aim to remain the player of a game, we invariantly care about 
our relationship with the game, which changes our primary relationship with the world 
into the ongoing coupling between ourselves and the game.  
Video game gameplay does not only alter a person’s self-presence but also 
brings along the new temporary identity of the player proper. I introduced the concept 
of player persona as the mask of the player through which a person experiences the 
gameplay and expresses herself. Persona is the fourth invariant of the video game 
gameplay experience. Persona is not to be equated with a role. If there is a role in a 
game, this role is a fictional intentionality within the game, not the position a person 
acquires by adopting a lusory attitude. Persona is how we experience the organized 
activity of gameplay through the identity of the player proper. It is how we present 
ourselves in gameplay and enact a perspective of the gameworld.  
Although my cogitations on persona were strongly influenced by Goffman, I 
made a clear distinction between frame analytic studies and my own endeavor by ac-
cepting the phenomenological take on enduring pre-reflective self. In my view, 
Mead’s writings on the social self can be regarded as sympathetic with the phenome-
nological and enactive view, but Goffman’s social constructivism takes a different 
stance on understanding the self as a bundle of social interactions and roles without 
an explicated lasting core. Following Kyselo’s (2015) lead, I appropriated Jonas’ 
(2001 [1966]) theory of needful freedom, which enables both the autonomous stable 
self and the situated selves or I-positions that manifest in our encounters in the world. 
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From this theoretical perspective, I revisited Goffman’s dramaturgical theory on 
presentation of the self in everyday interaction (1959) and proposed that the player 
persona’s presentation of the self in gameplay can be analyzed in relation to the model 
fashioned by Goffman. By doing so, I urged that the presentation of the player in 
gameplay is profoundly performative and that it covers the seven facets of lusory at-
titude, style, responsibility, glorification, normativity, skill and uncertainty. In game-
play, the player presents herself as a persona by taking on the position of the player 
and by expressing herself in a specific style. The position of the player entails respon-
sibility for the decisions that are made and the actions that are taken, and conducting 
normative acts may lead to glorification of the player. However, to reach this, one 
must show skills and expertise and recognize that the final outcome of the performa-
tive play is never absolutely certain.  
 
 
From Gameworld-relation (vi) to Enacted Narrative (vii) 
  
I continued to discuss the concept of ‘performance’ and whether, in addition to the 
player’s participation, gameplay itself could be considered a performance. This dis-
cussion was based on folkloristic literature on performance. I conclude that gameplay 
is not a performance because performance includes a re-presentation of absent events, 
and it is shown (displayed) rather than lived through (played). Although all experi-
ences are, of course, also lived through, in gameplay the conscious player does not 
primarily stage or re-present her performance but instead presents herself by enacting. 
Gameplay, like performances, is constitutive (created and enacted), epistemic (a way 
to know), and critical (reflexive) activity (see Bell, 2008), but this is not enough to 
give gameplay the identity of performance.  
From the vocabulary of folkloristics, ‘enactment’ was proposed as more suit-
able description for the event of gameplay. Abrahams (1977) introduced enactment as 
a latent category that encompasses performances, festivities, rituals, and play and 
games. All of these cultural events consist of encouraged participation, stylization of 
behaviors, heightened senses of meaning and intensity, and reflectively self-conscious 
forms of participation. We readily know when gameplay is going on, and similarly, 
we are quick to identify festivities, rituals and performances. Cultural enactments are 
genres of interaction and patterned scenes of focused cultural conduct. Drawing from 
Abrahams (1977; 1982; 2005), I propose that games-as-played can be demarcated 
game enactments.  
In a game enactment, the game emerges as an alternative environment for the 
player. By reading the theory of Umwelt by Jakob von Uexküll (2010 [1934]), I sug-
gested that such an environment is intrinsically meaningful for the player-subject be-
cause participating in it enables her existence as being the player proper. Umwelt is 
the first-person view to the world, and in this thesis, it is argued that during gameplay 
gameworld comes forth for the player as a temporary Umwelt: the self-world of the 
player. Our actions have different kinds of meanings in games than they have in non-
game environments because of game mechanics (Sicart, 2009). Thus, a gameworld-
relation is proposed as the sixth invariant in the gameplay experience. 
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Similar to how I interpreted Goffman’s (1959) theory of the presentation of the self 
to performative player practice, I explored how a gameworld comes to have a full-
blown sense of worldness to it. I proposed seven such relationships: a lusory attitude 
is enabled by the affordances of the game; the performative style of the player takes 
place in a setting presented by the game; performative play includes an element of 
responsibility, which makes sense because the actions the player takes have conse-
quences in the game; the player may experience glorification because the conse-
quences in the game are contingent on the game design and form interrelated events 
instead of only isolated effects; the player performance is normative because of the 
rules of the game; the player must show expertise and skill and her performance is 
evaluated. Yet, the player performance entails uncertainty, because of the element of 
noncommunication in the game.  
I continued then to explore the notions of gameworld and storyworld in rela-
tion to each other and argued that the player’s performative participation in the game 
is what engenders a syuzhet, that is, the plot or the narrative discourse of the gameplay 
experience. With this argument, I meant that gameplay acquires its dramatic organi-
zation in relation to the player’s agency and decisions. Noting that a game presents a 
story to the player (or “tells a story”) is different from discussing how the game-as-
played comes to have narrative structure in the player experience. In gameplay, a 
player may experience her endeavors in the game as parts of the game’s fabula or 
story and storyworld. When we think back on our gameplay experiences, we do not 
remember only what happened in the game but also how we made it happen. 
Building on these views, I argued that every gameplay experience generates 
an enacted narrative and that this quality is to be understood as the seventh invariant 
in the video game gameplay experience. Our experience of playing games necessarily 
make sense to us because games are sense-making systems. An experience of game-
play has an inherent dramatic organization in which actions lead to effects and activ-
ities to consequences. This is what the rule-system and the game mechanics enable, 
and this is also why all gameplay experiences as enacted have a structure not unlike 
prototypical narratives. At times, we all experience that the events we encounter have 
an inherent sense of story to them. In gameplay, however, this experience is not rare 
or uncommon but definitional. I argue that it is a core reason for why people play 
games or attend sport events in the first place: we want to experience the dramatic 
narrative structure of unfolding events. A game can be regarded as a story machine, 
although it is not a narrative in itself. 
The innate narrative structure of a gameplay experience is also what makes 
video game gameplay folkloric. As Kiri Miller (2008; 2012) has argued before me, a 
gameplay experience is akin to “folkloristic text” since it exists in multiple versions 
and is shared in versatile cultural communities. Furthermore, game mechanics, that is, 
modes of interaction, have a deep folkloric core. Many of the game mechanics of 
contemporary video game cultures have their roots in informal games, and these tra-
ditions of game design are not owned by anyone. Rather they are commonly shared, 








From Motivations (viii) to Emotional Outcomes (v) 
The fifth and the eight invariants of the video game gameplay experience encompass 
the emotional relevance of being a player. I argued that a person who takes on the 
position of the player by adopting a lusory attitude is invariantly motivated to play. I 
continued with the argument that the player plays with an invariant expectation of an 
emotional outcome; understood from a stance of enactivism, a gameplay experience 
is constitutionally emotional because it matters to our identity as being the players of 
the game. As long as a player intends to play and cares about her player persona, 
gameplay emerges as value-laden and emotionally relevant. Finally, the invariant 
emotionality of video the game gameplay experience is what introduces gameplay 
experiences as relevant and meaningful. I offered that, instead of discussing games as 
real/unreal or actual/virtual, we can ask how relevant the gameplay experience is for 
the player-subject and thus how present the player is for the game and the game, cor-
respondingly, for the player.  
Taken as a whole, the proposed eight invariants of video game gameplay ex-
perience state that: the player has to take the position of the player in order to play a 
video game, and continue to exhibit a lusory attitude throughout the gameplay (i). 
When she plays, her participation consists of explorative and coordinative player prac-
tices, which afford experienced growth in adaptation (ii). In gameplay, the player is 
available for the game and the game is available for the skillful access of the player. 
Because of this shared availability, gameplay invariantly changes the self-presence of 
the player (iii). By participating in a game, the player acquires the identity of a per-
formative player persona (iv). In the coupling between a player and a game, the game 
environment arises as the primary context for our agency, which introduces a game-
world-relation to the player (vi). The structure of a gameplay experience is that of an 
enactive narrative, which necessarily makes sense to us as a dramatic trajectory 
through the game (vii). As long as the player intends to play, she shows a kind of 
motivation for gameplay (viii), which entails an expectation of the emotional outcome 
(v) of the experience. 
 
 
The Varied Experiences of Video Game Gameplay 
 
Gameplay Motifemes and Player Types 
 
The empirical sections of this thesis consisted of a series of mixed-methods studies 
on players’ gameplay preferences and their interpretations on preferred gameplay ex-
perience. I began the empirical analyses by developing a folkloristic approach to the 
model of game dynamics preferences published by Vahlo et al. (2017). I argue that 
game dynamics that emerge from interrelated game mechanics when set in motion by 
player performance can be interpreted as gameplay motifemes. I base this argument 
on Alan Dundes’ (2007 [1964]) article on game morphology in which Dundes utilized 




In Dundes’ view, motifemes converge into the functions or units of action in folklore, 
and allomotifs into how concurrent motifemes are varied and presented in a singular 
item of folklore. Based on the framework by Dundes, I argue that gameplay motifemes 
are abstracted descriptions of an activity enabled by game dynamics and enacted by 
performative play, defined from the point-of-view of its significance for the course of 
the game. Similar to ‘player performance’ and ‘game dynamics,’ ‘gameplay mo-
tifeme’ describes a meaningful unit of gameplay. However, whereas ‘player perfor-
mance’ emphasizes the player’s point-of-view and ‘game dynamics’ stresses the de-
signed game product, ‘gameplay motifeme’ observes the activity of gameplay as a 
whole, from the perspective of player–game coupling.  
In the first statistical study of the thesis, I explored the gameplay motifemes 
of contemporary video games and players’ preferences in taking performative agency 
in them. These empirical questions were thus analyzed to investigate the variable man-
ifestations of the invariants gameworld-relation (vi), and the player’s performative 
preferences as the player persona (iv). 
I conducted a qualitative content analysis on 700 published game review ar-
ticles to identify what the most prevalent gameplay motifemes of video games are. 
The analysis, consisting of printed review articles of Pelit and Pelaaja magazines and 
online articles published on IGN.com, GameSpot and TouchArcade, resulted in 2900 
individual descriptions of gameplay motifemes, which exemplified what “you will be 
doing as the player of this game.” These descriptions were then abstracted into finite 
verb phrases that specify the core activity and its immediate objects. By comparing 
the individual descriptions, i.e., allomotifs, I proceeded, with the co-authors of Vahlo 
et al. (2017), to present 33 core gameplay motifemes of contemporary video games. 
The list of 33 core gameplay motifemes was then constructed into The Core 
Game Dynamics Scale (The CGD scale), which was included in a survey of 2,594 
respondents. The purpose of the survey was to investigate whether player-respondents 
could express their preference in gameplay motifeme and whether we could reveal 
latent motifeme preference-type factors based on respondents’ preference scores. This 
was studied by conducting an exploratory factor analysis on the data of 1,718 respond-
ents who reported that they played digital games at least one hour weekly but not more 
than 8 hours every day.  
The factor analysis revealed five gameplay motifeme type factors: Assault, 
Manage, Journey, Care and Coordinate. A player who prefers Assault is likely to 
enjoy shooting enemies, sneaking and laying traps, stealing cars, breaking the law and 
waging war. If one prefers Manage, she indicates a preference in building and con-
structing, generating resources, directing people or inhabitants and strategizing. A 
high preference in Journey denotes that the player is fascinated with exploring the 
gameworld and its secrets, creating an avatar and developing its skills and abilities, 
making meaningful choices and collecting hidden treasures. A player who enjoys 
Care tends to like to take care of animals and show affection towards others by flirt-
ing, hugging and kissing. Finally, a high preference in Coordinate suggests that the 
player enjoys the gameplay motifemes of staying in rhythm by playing instruments or 
dancing, jumping on platforms while avoiding obstacles, or matching tiles together. 
In Vahlo et al. (2017), based on the revealed five motifeme type preferences, 
we conducted a cluster analysis to explore whether the preference scores in the factors 
formed player types. A cluster analysis indicated seven player types: The Mercenary, 
The Companion, The Patterner, The Daredevil, The Adventurer, The Explorer and 
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The Commander. Each of these player types had distinctive preferences for the five 
gameplay motifeme type factors. For instance, The Commander had a neutral score in 
Assault, a very high score in Manage, but a very low score in Care.  
Informed by the results of the first study (N=1,718), I made several modifi-
cations to The CGD scale and included it in another survey of 845 respondents. I then 
repeated the analysis procedure of the first study to investigate whether the second 
analysis would result in similar gameplay motifeme factors. Five factors were also 
revealed in this study and, due to their very high similarity with the first study, I was 
able to reveal the motifeme type preference factors of Assault, Manage, Journey, 
Care, and Coordinate in this study as well. I then continued to develop The CGD scale 
by making a data triangulation by analyzing a total of 166 official game instruction 
manuals. Here, I followed the steps of the content analysis included in the first study. 
As a result, I was able to identify most of the motifemes already included in the first 
iteration of The CGD scale. In addition to this, the results of the data triangulation 
suggested that an additional 11 gameplay motifemes could be considered in the third 
iteration of the scale. 
I concluded this section of the thesis by studying how the gameplay motifeme 
type factors and individual motifeme items compared to recurrent in-game challenge 
types and established video game genre classifications. In a statistical calculation of 
the relative risk ratio, I was able to demonstrate that the motifeme type factor prefer-
ences were connected to the probability to play specific video game genres. These 
connections were, however, multi-dimensional. For example, a preference in Assault 
did not only predict a higher “risk” for playing action games, but also action-adventure 
games, role-playing games and racing games. This study was part of the discriminant 
test of The CGD scale since it revealed that, by asking what kinds of gameplay mo-
tifemes players preferred to play, we did not ask whether they were “action game 
players” or “strategy game players.”  
By reading folkloristic literature on genre classifications, I argued, by follow-
ing Whittaker (2012) that actions and activities form the most promising unit of anal-
ysis by which a game genre classification can be developed. Finally, I presented a 
preliminary take on how video game genres can be classified based on the gameplay 
motifeme model proposed in this thesis. 
 
 
Varieties of Meaningful Gameplay Experience 
 
I continued the empirical analyses in Chapters 5–9 by conducting mixed-methods 
studies on the quantitative data of three surveys (N=1,718, N=845, N=879) and qual-
itative data consisting of the interviews I conducted with 32 players who participated 
in the first survey of 1,718 respondents. Furthermore, I analyzed 10 open letters sub-
mitted to my call for meaningful gameplay experiences. The call was open only to the 
respondents who had participated in the local version of the first survey (N=594).  
A total of 308 respondents indicated in the local survey conducted in Decem-
ber 2014 (N=594) that they were interested in future research. I shortlisted these in-
terview candidates based on their player type, since each of these respondents were 
included in the cluster analysis process. I interviewed eight players of The Mercenary 
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type, seven of The Adventurer type, seven of The Explorer type, six of The Com-
mander type, two of The Companion type, and one each of  The Patterner and The 
Daredevil types. I analyzed the interviews through the conceptual framework of eight 
invariants in video game gameplay experience. The analysis consisted of four sec-
tions: the ludic involvement in ongoing gameplay; the game choice; memories of the 
video game protagonist; and motivations to play.  
In the first section of the analysis, I reflected on the qualitative data with re-
gards to the invariant of coordinative and explorative player practice, pre-reflective 
and narrative self-consciousness, and the discussions of player’s skills. Here, it was 
argued that taking the pre-reflective stance results in emotionally different kinds of 
gameplay experiences than playing from the narrative or reflective stance. When dis-
cussing coordinative and explorative player practice and players’ skills, I offered a 
critical view of how Csikszentmihályi’s (1990) theory of flow experience manages to 
encompass the varied gameplay experiences. I suggested that the explorative player 
practice is difficult to conceptualize in the framework of ‘flow,’ and yet explorative 
paidic activity was reflected by many interviewees as what they really enjoyed in 
gameplay. 
I continued then to analyze how the interviewees narrated their preferences in 
player performance. This I did from the viewpoint of the invariant player persona and 
the proposed four functional nodes of principal, enactor, strategist and animator (see 
Goffman 1986 [1974]). I especially studied how players may or may not experience 
empathy in the animator node when playing from a first-person or third-person camera 
angle. I then continued to discuss how in-game characters, and the gameplay experi-
ence as a whole, manage to engender experiences of social presence and, correspond-
ingly, social emotions such as pride, fear or sadness.  
I concluded this empirical section with a series of analyses on emotions in 
gameplay experience. By conducting factor analyses and linear regressions with the 
data of 1,718 respondents, I revealed that common emotions of gameplay can be di-
vided into Positive Valence and Negative Valence. I then identified that Positive Va-
lence includes the dimensions of Comfort and Thrill, and Negative Valence the aspects 
I called Disaster and Disappointment. Comfort describes feelings of certainty, ease 
and self-trust, whereas Thrill denotes excitement, attentiveness and relief. These pos-
itive emotional experiences were then contrasted to the Disaster of feeling anger, fear 
and shock, and the Disappointment of self-contempt, shame, inability and frustration.  
By analyzing the connections between the motifeme factors and the four fac-
tors of emotions in gameplay, I showed that a preference in Journey is a main predic-
tor for enjoying Comfort and Thrill, whereas appreciating Assault predicts higher pref-
erence in Disaster and Disappointment. The preference profiles of the seven player 
types also suggest that video game players appreciate emotional experiences of posi-
tive valence much more than those of negative valence. In the case of positive valence, 
players hope to experience emotions of comfort, pleasure and satisfaction more than 
those of thrill and excitement. In emotions of negative valence, experiences of fear 
and disaster are tolerated better than those of disappointment and shame.   
I then proceeded to investigate how players reflect on the elements of a good 
game. For this purpose, I conducted another statistical analysis on the data of 1,718 
respondents. A factor analysis revealed that players appreciate video games based on 
three dimensions: Diegetic, Ludic and Verisimilitude. A player who prefers Diegetic 
appreciates a good story and beautiful in-game music, and in-game characters with 
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which the player can identify with. High scores in Ludic indicate that the player ap-
preciates a responsive game system with a well-tuned level of difficulty and smooth 
gameplay. Verisimilitude indicates that the player enjoys real-like and believable 
gameplay experiences, which do not “break the illusion.” When the interviewees nar-
rated freely about what made a game a good game for them, they described their pref-
erences congruently with the revealed three factors. Both in the interviews and the 
statistical data, it was revealed that Ludic qualities were regarded generally as the most 
important elements for a good game, followed by Diegetic. While some players also 
emphasized Verisimilitude, these aspects were not typically mentioned as the most 
important qualities for a good game. 
Next, I analyzed the personal narration and the personal stories of the inter-
viewees to understand what made specific gameplay experiences memorable for the 
players and what the interviewees (N=32) described when they discussed their game-
play experiences with me. It was revealed that these narratives were about four main 
types. In the first type of narration, the interviewees described their first-person expe-
riences of playing a highly memorable video game. The second type of personal nar-
ratives considered folkloristic traditions and the feeling of the ‘gameworld accord’ 
that resulted from video game gameplay. The third type of narration dealt with the 
interviewees’ first encounters with video games and video game technology. The 
fourth and final type encompassed how the interviewees described the impact of play-
ing video games in their everyday life. I concluded this chapter by statistically ana-
lyzing how the seven player types were connected to the perceived meaningfulness of 
a gameplay experience. The analysis revealed that gameplay experiences are more 
meaningful for The Mercenaries and The Adventurers than for the other five player 
types. It was also observed that a preference in Diegetic qualities in games and in the 
motifeme factor of Journey strongly correlated with the perceived meaningfulness of 
first-person gameplay experiences. 
Finally, I investigated the profound question of why people play video games. 
In order to do so, I conducted an iterative mixed-methods process, which was 
launched with a factor analysis on a preliminary motivations to play scale. The anal-
ysis on the data of 1,718 respondents revealed two motivations to play factors: Fun–
Immersion and Relatedness–Competence. I then analyzed the interview data in which 
I discussed these two broad categories with the 32 interviewees. The qualitative data 
analysis suggested that the motivations to play scale could be significantly improved 
by including several items that would describe Fun, Immersion, Relatedness and Com-
petence and by introducing Autonomy as the fifth core reason to play video games.  
After conducting a literature review of self-determination theoretical (SDT) 
studies on motivations for playing video games, I made another factor analysis with a 
data set of 879 respondents. I included the second iteration motivations to play scale 
in this latter survey. As a result of yet another factor analysis, the 25 items included 
in the motivations to play inventory loaded on five factors: Autonomy, Relatedness, 
Competence, Immersion and Fun. Based on the SDT literature, the interview data ana-
lysis and the results of the two statistical studies, I hypothesized that the five motiva-
tions to play factors could be divided into first-order (the SDT motivations of Au-
tonomy, Relatedness, and Competence) and second-order (Fun and Immersion) moti-
vations to play. In this model, the first-order motivations describe what the player 
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expects to be able to do in motivating gameplay, and the second-order motivations 
emphasize the emotional outcome of such a gameplay experience. 
For investigating whether the five revealed factors (N=879) could be consid-
ered as the five main reasons to play, and whether the motivations could be argued to 
be first-order or second-order motivations, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) with the data of 845 respondents. The survey for the 845 respondents included 
an identical motivations to play inventory as the data of 879 respondents, which made 
this procedure plausible. With the data of the 845 respondents, I was able to confirm 
the five factors of gameplay motivations, although the correlations between Autonomy 
and Immersion and Autonomy and Competence suggest that yet another CFA should 
be conducted with cross-cultural data. The CFA model, which I presented in Chapter 
9, showed an acceptable fit (RMSEA 0.060, CFI 0.970, SRMR 0.036) to the data of 
845 respondents without the need to let error residuals correlate with each other.  
I followed this analysis by designing a structural equation model to investi-
gate whether playing for a specific reason would predict gameplay enjoyment or 
gameplay appreciation. This final model had a close fit with the data (N=845, RMSEA 
0.054, CFI 0.971, SRMR 0.037). The model indicates that playing because one enjoys 
challenges (Competence) predicts that one is motivated by the emotional outcome 
driver of Fun. The motivational factor of Autonomy even more strongly predicted the 
driver of experiencing Immersion in gameplay. Finally, the effect of Relatedness, 
Competence, and Autonomy on gameplay Enjoyment and gameplay Appreciation was 
completely mediated by the experiential outcome factors of Fun and Immersion. The 
factor of Immersion was strongly connected to gameplay Appreciation, and the moti-







I have argued in this thesis for phenomenological enactivism and folkloristics as a 
promising stance for studying the gameplay experience. There are many possibilities 
for future research based on what I have presented in this thesis. Future research could 
explore, in a more extensive way, the proposed eight invariants of the video game 
gameplay experience. The motifeme preference factor approach should be developed 
further by conducting a confirmatory factor analysis on the third iteration of the scale, 
and the motivations to play scales and the elements-of-a-good-game scale should be 
analyzed more extensively than was possible in the context of a dissertation.  
Throughout this study, I have described myself as a phenomenologically in-
clined folklorist doing video game research. I am not only that but also a game scholar. 
Since ‘game’ still today remains an elusive research subject, which is often positioned 
at the intersection of multiple research traditions rather than understood as its own 
discipline, a game researcher can have an identity of both a game scholar and, e.g., 
folklorist. Similarly, this thesis has been an endeavor in both folkloristics and game 
studies. I hope that this thesis opens new discussions on how folkloristics and phe-
nomenological enactivism deserve a central position in the academic discourses of 
game studies, and especially in studies concerning the rhetoric of self, progression, 
and identity (see Sutton-Smith, 2001 [1997]) and the ontology of games as processes.  
The combination of folkloristics and phenomenological enactivism appears 
to be a rich framework for examining procedural knowledge generation, meaning con-
struction, and the emotional gameplay experience. These synergies become evident in 
the concept of ‘enaction,’ which can be described as the practice of laying down a 
path in walking as we traverse through the [game] environment (Varela, 1987, p. 63). 
After all, both video games and folklore must be enacted to exist (Abrahams, 2005, p. 
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Appendix 2: Game Instruction Booklets 
 
 
999: Nine Hours,  
Nine Persons, Nine Doors 
Ace Attorney Trials and 
Tribulators 




Assassin's Creed 2 
Astro Boy 
Baldur's Gate 2 
Baten Kaitos 
Batman Arkham Asylum 
Battlefield 3 
Beyond Good and Evil 
Bioshock 
Bit Trip Complete 
Breath of Fire IV 
Call of Duty: BlackOops 
Castlevania:  
Symphony of the Night 
Catherine 





Command & Conquer: 
Red Alert 
DanceDanceRevolution 
Dark Souls 2 
Day of the Tentacle 
Dead Space 





Donkey Kong Returns 
Doom 
Doom 2 




Elite Beat Agents 
Etrian Odyssey 






Final Fantasy Tactics 
Final Fantasy VI 
Final Fantasy VII 
Final Fantasy X 
Fire Emblem 
Ghost Trick 
God of War II 
Gran Turismo 3 
Grim Fandango 
Grand Theft Auto III 











Indiana Jones and the Fate of 
Atlantis 
Infinite Space 
Jagged Alliance 2 
Jak & Daxter Trilogy 
Jak II 
Jet Set Radio 
Katamari Damarcy 
Kingdom Hearts 
Last of Us 
Legend of Dragoon 
Lego Harry Potter 
Limbo 
Little Big Planet 
Locoroco 
Lufia Curse of the Sinistrals 
Mario Kart 
Mass Effect 2 
Master of Orion II 




Midnight Club:  
Los Angeles 
Might & Magic: 
Clash of Heroes 
Minecraft 
Myst 
Ni No Kuni 
Nintendogs 




Persona 3 Fes 
Persona 4 
Pro Evolution Soccer 2011 
Planescape: Torment 
Pokemon Leaf Green 
Populous 
Portal 2 
Prince of Persia 
Professor Layton  
and the Curious Village 
Radiant Historia 
Ratchet & Clank 3 
Rayman Legends 




Rome Total War 




Sim City 2013 
Spelunky 
SSX on Tour 
Star Ocean II 
Starcraft 2 
Street Fighter 
Street Fighter IV 
Suikoden II 
Super Mario 
Super Mario 64 DS 
Super Mario Galaxy 2 
Super Robot Taisen 
Super Smash Bros 
Supreme Commander 
Tales of the Abyss 
Tetris 
The Dark Spire 
The Sims 2  
The World Ends With You 
The World of Goo 
Theme Park 
To the Moon 
Towerfall 
Transport Tycoon 















Zelda A Link to the Past 












Measurement Model Estimates   
 Immersion → x12 1 (constrained) 0.802 
 Immersion → x14 1.106 0.859 
 Immersion → x15 1.056 0.798 
 Fun → x16 0.867 0.882 
 Fun → x18 0.853 0.859 
 Fun → x19 0.881 0.876 
 Relatedness → x2 1 (constrained) 0.725 
 Relatedness → x4 1.307 0.856 
 Relatedness → x5 1.111 0.753 
 Competence → x6 1 (constrained) 0.789 
 Competence → x7 0.932 0.755 
 Competence → x8 1.019 0.807 
 Autonomy → x22 1 (constrained) 0.838 
 Autonomy → x23 1.048 0.868 
 Autonomy → x24 1.002 0.821 
Variances   
 error x12 0.551 0.355 
 error x14 0.434 0.261 
 error x15 0.636 0.363 
 error x16 0.214 0.221 
 error x18 0.259 0.262 
 error x19 0.236 0.233 
 error x2 0.673 0.474 
 error x4 0.454 0.263 
 error x5 0.703 0.433 
 error x6 0.544 0.377 
 error x7 0.589 0.430 
 error x8 0.500 0.348 
 error x22 0.454 0.298 
 error x23 0.384 0.246 
 error x24 0.521 0.327 
 Immersion 1.000 1 
 Fun 1 (fixed) 1 (fixed) 
 Relatedness 0.745 1 
 Competence 0.900 1 
 Autonomy 1.069 1 
Factor covariances   
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 Immersion with Fun 0.445 0.445 
 Immersion with Relatedness 0.428 0.496 
 Immersion with Competence 0.713 0.751 
 Immersion with Autonomy 0.924 0.893 
 Fun with Relatedness 0.221 0.256 
 Fun with Competence 0.549 0.578 
 Fun with Autonomy 0.535 0.517 
 Relatedness with Competence 0.398 0.486 
 Relatedness with Autonomy 0.355 0.398 
 Competence with Autonomy 0.819 0.835 
*** p < 0.001, Note: RMSEA 0.060, CFI 0.970, SRMR 0.036 
 
Appendix Table 1. Unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the CFA 










Structural Model Estimates   
 Relatedness → Immersion 0.008  0.183 
 Competence → Immersion -0.003 -0.080 
 Autonomy → Immersion 0.035 0.884 
 Relatedness → Fun -0.009 -0.038 
 Competence → Fun 0.111  0.517 
 Autonomy → Fun 0.019  0.964 
Measurement Model Estimates   
 Immersion → Gameplay Enjoyment 1 (fixed) 0.049 
 Fun → Gameplay Enjoyment 2.732 0.675 
 Immersion → Gameplay Appreciation 12.384 0.503 
 Fun → Gameplay Appreciation 1 (fixed) 0.205 
 Immersion → x12 24.726 0.804 
 Immersion → x14 27.284 0.859 
 Immersion → x15 26.143 0.800 
 Fun → x16 4.264 0.887 
 Fun → x18 4.175 0.858 
 Fun → x19 4.300 0.872 
 Relatedness → x2 1 (fixed) 0.726 
 Relatedness → x4 1.304 0.857 
 Relatedness → x5 1.1101 0.753 
 Competence → x6 1 (fixed) 0.789 
 Competence → x7 0.933 0.756 
 Competence → x8 1.020 0.807 
 Autonomy → x22 1 (fixed) 0.838 
 Autonomy → x23 1.048 0.868 




Variances   
 Gameplay Appreciation 0.610 0.611 
 Gameplay Enjoyment 0.350 0.512 
 error x12 0.549 0.354 
 error x14 0.434 0.262 
 error x15 0.630 0.360 
 error x16 0.207 0.214 
 error x18 0.260 0.263 
 error x19 0.242 0.239 
 error x2 0.671 0.473 
 error x4 0.458 0.265 
 error x5 0.702 0.432 
 error x6 0.546 0.378 
 error x7 0.587 0.428 
 error x8 0.501 0.349 
 error x22 0.454 0.299 
 error x23 0.385 0.247 
 error x24 0.518 0.325 
 Immersion 0.001 0.181 
 Fun 0.028 0.661 
 Relatedness 0.747    1 
 Competence 0.899    1 
 Autonomy 1.068    1 
Factor Covariances   
 Apperciation with Enjoyment 0.204 0.441 
 Relatedness with Competence 0.399 0.486 
 Relatedness with Autonomy 0.356 0.398 
 Competence with Autonomy 0.819 0.836 
All estimates, variances and covariances are significant on the level of p < 0.001, with the 
exception of Competence → Immersion, Relatedness → Fun, Autonomy → Fun, and Im-
mersion → Gameplay Enjoyment, which are not statistically significant, Note: RMSEA 
0.054, pclose 0.139, CFI 0.971, SRMR 0.038 
 
Appendix Table 2. Unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the SEM model 
of Five Motivational Factors, gameplay Appreciation and Enjoyment (N=845) as reported in 
Study 7 of Chapter 9.  
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Appendix 4: Qualitative Research Data 
 
 
 Interview date Gender Age Player type 
Interview P1: 6.11.2015 Female 23 Adventurer 
Interview P2: 2.11.2015 Female 38 Adventurer 
Interview P3: 18.11.2015 Female 37 Adventurer 
Interview P4: 2.12.2015 Male 25 Adventurer 
Interview P5:  19.11.2015 Female 23 Explorer 
Interview P6: 9.12.2015 Male 25 Commander 
Interview P7:  19.11.2015 Male 27 Mercenary 
Interview P8: 21.11.2015 Male 29 Mercenary 
Interview P9: 2.12.2015 Female 24 Mercenary 
Interview P10: 5.12.2015 Female 25 Explorer 
Interview P11: 3.11.2015 Male 27 Mercenary 
Interview P12: 17.12.2015 Male 32 Adventurer 
Interview P13:  24.11.2015 Male 27 Mercenary 
Interview P14:  15.12.2015 Female 22 Adventurer 
Interview P15: 6.12.2015 Female 25 Explorer 
Interview P16:  25.11.2015 Male 26 Commander 
Interview P17:  24.11.2015 Male 34 Commander 
Interview P18: 5.12.2015 Female 25 Adventurer 
Interview P19: 9.11.2015 Female 35 Explorer 
Interview P20: 17.11.2015 Female 26 Mercenary 
Interview P21: 27.11.2015 Male 27 Companion 
Interview P22: 4.11.2015 Female 34 Patterner 
Interview P23: 25.11.2015 Male 28 Commander 
Interview P24: 14.11.2015 Female 30 Explorer 
Interview P25: 16.11.2015 Female 38 Explorer 
Interview P26:  17.12.2015 Male 37 Mercenary 
Interview P27:  3.12.2015 Male 25 Mercenary 
Interview P28:  11.5.2016 Female 43 Explorer 
Interview P29:  14.9.2016 Female 20 Companion 
Interview P30: 14.9.2016 Female 28 Commander 
Interview P31:  20.9.2016 Male 49 Daredevil 
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